Better German naval strategy 1930-1945? (2 Viewers)

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the Germans seemed to do a lot of stuff well in the 20s and early/mid 30s. A lot of the weapons (planes/tanks/artillery/ships) seem to have been solid workman like designs. A bit better than a lot of the other nations stuff. Problem seems to have started in the late 30s ? Believed a little too much of their own propaganda? It is like they tried to leap frog a bunch of different technologies and/or believed they were smarter than their opponents.
The standard 88mm AA gun was good gun but it was not exceptional in any way. What was exceptional was the mount and the overall weight (a bit lighter than average) and perhaps the fire control system. The later long barreled 88mm gun went a little overboard. It fired the standard shell at about 1000m/s instead of 820m/s but it came at the cost of much shorter barrel life, in large part because it used about twice the propellent per shot. The Germans had a real thing for high veleocity guns and maybe they should have backed off just a bit.
Jumping over the manned (mostly) aircraft turret to remote control/remote aiming didn't work out well for them.
A number of other things, like getting rocket motors to work was one thing. Trying to come up with the guidance systems was something totally different. That is guidance systems that would work in combat, not work on a test range just to see if it was feasible.

For the U-boats, yes they were late adopting the snort, So was just about everybody else. But the early snort had more than a few problems. It limited the speed of the sub to about 6kts. They could have made it heavier so it didn't bend or break at higher speed but that complicated folding it up. There were problems in rough seas when the diesels tried to suck the air out of the boat when a wave blocked the inlet for more than a few seconds. Post war the British and Americans tried several things, including closing off the engine room/s and using the next compartment as an air chamber while closing off the rest of the crew compartments to make things easier ( pressure change in aircraft is minor in comparison.

Homing torpedoes had some basic problems. One, you have to get the torpedo to home at any speed. two you have to get it to work at a usable speed.
The Allied Fido worked because it ran at about 12 kts and the German U-boats topped out at about 8kts under water. Most homing torpedoes stopped working in the mid teens for speed. Either the noise of the water rushing by the sensors made them deaf or the noise of their own propellers drowned out the target. A better sensor doesn't work, you need to make the the torpedo itself quieter and somehow smooth the flow of water over the sensor, or move the sensor while keeping a similar search pattern.

German Type XXI subs had some real problems. British didn't even want to try to use the one/s they got after after the war even for experiments. They claim there were control issues. Like keeping at a set depth at high speed. British were having trouble with some of their own boats that were running at closer to 12kts. Boats would either broach (break surface) of dive too deep which was really dangerous as you need a slightly different amount of water in the ballast tanks for different depths and it works backwards, the deeper you go the less water you need in the ballast tank/s. Hull actually shrinks a little bit under pressure reducing buoyancy.
The high speed was real, it was nerve racking and dangerous to use so it didn't give quite the benefit they thought. 1950s subs got more automated depth keeping systems.
Germans tried to go from 8-9kts under water to 17kts (type XXI) or into the 20kt area with the H2O2 boats.
Maybe something halfway would have been easier and still given the Allies fits. 12 knots for 2 hours? Or perhaps 6kts with lot less noise?
 
They need to build ships that hold together in rough weather. Replace Bismarck and Tirpitz with two more Scharnhorsts, that's 16-17,000 tons of steel for other projects. Build ocean-going destroyers that avoid the instability issues.
I agree. For starters, Bismarck and Tirpitz did not accomplish anything that two more Scharnhorsts could have done for cheaper. Maybe if the Treaties can be ignored, skip the 11" and go for three turrets of twin 15" guns on all four (or six) Scharnhorsts. Or even perhaps better, go with a development of the WW1 era 13.78" or 12", ideally in three triple mounts.



And give them the machinery and fuel load to make the Scharnhorsts the longest range capital ships of all time.
 
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Four Ugly Sisters each with 6x15" armament will not only tie down a lot of Home Fleet resources, it will also allow two to be refitting while two are hunting. If I were running the Kriegsmarine I'd kill the Bismarcks ... of course, there's hindsightium in my opinion. But just getting through the North Sea, in or out, is a big problem made worse by how big these ships are, and that fact was well known at the time.

That will still be problematic because supplying such big ships at sea will require an obvious and targetable fleet train.
 
If I'm running focus on uboats. I'd kill the entire surface fleet beyond cruisers and put all that steel into tanks, new APCs and trucks to take Russia by the end of 1941. If you can't do it, then don't invade Poland in 1939.

There's also Monty's First Rule of War. Rather than march on Russia, the Germans should have focused on the UK and Hitler, if he had a brain at all, should have put off invading Russia until after some sort of peace had been made in the West. If no peace was forthcoming, focus on knocking Britain out of the war.

Not really Kriegsmarine strategy, more national strategy, but seriously a two-front war had scared the Germans for decades, and suddenly Hitler thinks the Wehrmacht can do anything. But if you keep it to a war with the UK, you don't need thousands of tanks in the East. Build subs and airplanes and tire them out, and hope for the best.

By the end of 1941, he'd made war with three of the four largest industrial economies of the world, simultaneously. That's some stupid shit. Settle with the UK one way or the other before moving on. Don't invade Russia, and don't declare war on America, until you've got the bird in hand. Until then, skip the prestige battleships and build lots of subs and airplanes.

May not win the war, but you'll avoid being crushed like a bug.
 
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None of that is a positive argument for keeping maritime patrol in the hands of the Air Force.
It's saying that turf wars are inherent in how pretty much any large-scale organization is setup. It's really up to the top management to monitor and intervene and keep down the turf wars to a manageable level so that the organization (in this case, a military as a whole) serves the purpose for which it exists. It seems Germany was doing that part quite poorly. That, as such, is not uncommon in dictatorships, as they often use a divide-and-conquer strategy with turf wars and competition for favors from the Great Leader as a way to control their underlings and keep them loyal.

As for arguments for keeping all aviation in the hands of the Air Force:
  • Keeping all aviation in the hands of those who have the most experience in procuring and operating aircraft.
  • Economies of scale in things like flight schools, maintenance etc.
  • Procurement experience. The Air Force might not have as good an understanding of the Navy's needs as the Navy itself, but they probably understand aircraft better.
  • Building bigger strike packages. You might get better results if you have, say, 2N dive bombers hitting an industrial installation today, and the same 2N aircraft bombing shipping tomorrow, than by having those strikes with 1N aircraft and the other half taking a day off as it's not their turf.
These arguments apply better for something like WWII Germany which might need a modest number of land-based maritime patrol and strike aircraft. For something like the USN which by itself is bigger than most countries Air Forces, the economy of scale benefits are marginal at that size, carrier aviation is substantially different from land-based, and the carriers operate in areas which land-based aviation cannot.

So like I said in a previous message, I don't know if the KM would have been better off with control of their own aviation or not. The fundamental problem was the relationship between the KM and LW, and that the high command (ultimately, Hitler himself) did little to fix it. Had they had their own aviation, the problems in getting the LW to do operations that helped the KM would have been replaced by other problems.
 

In Calum Douglas book there is a description of how the Germans tried to compress the timeline for development programs. The idea was to get newer and better kit into the hands of the LW faster, but the reality was that this meant the development programs went ahead to the next phase before previous problems had been solved, stuff went into mass production without a development phase to optimize the manufacturability etc. With the well-known problems with reliability, engines that had to be derated etc. Of course it didn't help that they were lacking critical minerals, and that many experienced people were sent to the front.

Not that the Germans were unique in pushing stuff into service with a level of reliability that would never have been acceptable in peace time, or even seriously flawed concepts. See e.g. Napier Sabre.

Another factor is that the Germans knew they were outmanned, they had to win by doing better. This then (predictably?) spiraled out of control into the obsession with various Wunderwaffens.


Indeed. I believe the 88mm long barreled flak gun wasn't considered a success for the reasons you mention, and relatively few of them were made. But it did find a second life as the 88L71 (anti-)tank gun e.g. on the King Tiger. Though one wonders how necessary it really was, probably not many situations where the older 88L56 on the Tiger I or the 75mm gun on the Panther weren't enough.

Coming slightly back to the topic of this thread, the high velocity obsession also extended to naval guns. Seems the German WWII era naval guns all had significantly higher muzzle velocities than the corresponding guns of the major naval powers. With the attendant sacrifice in barrel life. It also seems, for reasons I don't know, that high velocity cannons tended to be less accurate than guns with more modest velocity. So might have been a better idea to drop the velocity a bit, and if you want better range just make the gun bigger (maybe streamlining shells could have helped a bit as well?).

German Type XXI subs had some real problems.
Maybe something halfway would have been easier and still given the Allies fits. 12 knots for 2 hours? Or perhaps 6kts with lot less noise?

I suspect the Type XXI were another victim of trying to do too much too fast. They were put into production before they were ready. Wiki also mentions they were susceptible to damage e.g. due to having hydraulic lines going outside the pressure hull.

But yes, something like 12kn submerged speed would already have been a significant improvement. With a streamlined hull and conning tower, it might not even require heroic engine power.
 

Subsequent to the AGNA (which allowed the Germans to build beyond the limits of the Versailles treaty) they could build up to 16" guns, just like the other treaty signatories. Hitler insisted on 11" for the Scharnhorsts in order to not piss off the Brits. I think there were also considerations that switching to 15" would have delayed them, hence the plan to launch with 11" guns and retrofit them later.

Perhaps had they gone for interrupted screw breechblocks instead of sliding ones they could have packed slightly bigger guns into the barbette diameter?
 
In early 1937, when the RLM issued their request, which the Fi167 was a result, the IJN had the B5N under development.

While the Ju87B-1 was being adapted for carrier use (as the Ju87C), the IJN had the D3A undergoing trials.

As far as a dedicated Naval fighter, the Luftwaffe chose to adapt a current land-based fighter that was the winner of a short ranged defensive fighter request.

Surely if the Japanese, whose industrial base was no bigger than Germany, could come up with a long ranged potent naval fighter as well as an equivalent for their Army, Germany could do the same?
 
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Surely if the Japanese, whose industrial base was no bigger than Germany, could come up with a long ranged potent naval fighter as well as an equivalent for their Army, Germany could do the same?

Time and manufacturing resources were (I think) the major problem.

There is no reason to think the Fi167 would not have done a good job of delivering torpedoes in the North Atlantic and MTO - after all, the Swordfish and Albacore did.

The German engineering establishment could certainly have designed a better carrier based fighter. than the Bf109T - but what would the cost be in terms of time and manufacturing resources? And was there any point (even from their viewpoint) if they were not going to get the GZ or the smaller designs completed sooner?

IMO, the KM (or whoever the decision makers were) were looking at building a very small carrier force without any justification.
 
True, but we're looking at this from the retroscope.

At the time of Germany's carrier vision, lead wasn't flying yet.

Meanwhile, Japan was active in the Pacific. Germany had military liaisons in Japan along with Heinkel engineers.
There is absolutely no way that Germany was not aware of what worked for a major maritime power.
 
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Meanwhile, Japan was active in the Pacific. Germany had military liaisons in Japan along with Heinkel engineers.
There is absolutely no way that Germany was not aware of what worked for a major maritime power.

I agree, that is why I said that ". . . the KM (or whoever the decision makers were) were looking at building a very small carrier force without any justification."

Assuming they paid attention to the Japanese preparations and accorded them proper value, by 1939 they had to know that they could not build a large enough carrier force quickly enough to be of worth in a naval war with the British. Even if they had managed to complete the GZ before the war started (assuming the war started later than in the real time line) - say in 1942-43 - such a carrier could not have survived anywhere in reach of land based air or the British navy. The Germans had to know that the British could do anything they could in the area of naval surface operations and aerial mining. The German navy simply did not, and could not, have enough of a navy to do what the British did. They would not have been able to survive as a coherent fighting force. Add in the second GZ planned and it makes almost no difference.
 
Surely if the Japanese, whose industrial base was no bigger than Germany, could come up with a long ranged potent naval fighter as well as an equivalent for their Army, Germany could do the same?

Not losing WWI, not being subject to the restrictions of the Versailles treaty, not suffering as much in the post WWI economic slump (eg the hyperinflation of the Weimar republic) was surely a big part of it?

Also, seems much of the German economic rise and rearmament miracle of the 1930'ies was a castle built on sand. Had they not started the war when they did, they would have defaulted on their foreign debts and the German economy would have collapsed (see writings by Adam Tooze).

So to fix their collapsing economy, they start not a two front war their forefathers were afraid of, but start campaigns in every direction of the compass rose. It's mystifying, really, how they thought they could pull it off. Drinking their own kool-aid, to put it mildly.
 
In 1935, around the time of King George V Silver Jubilee Fleet Review in July, some German personnel involved in the design of GZ were allowed to tour HMS Furious. They followed that up with a trip to Japan before the end of the year and visited Akagi. That would be around the time she was beginning her reconstruction.
 
Not losing WWI, not being subject to the restrictions of the Versailles treaty, not suffering as much in the post WWI economic slump (eg the hyperinflation of the Weimar republic) was surely a big part of it?
Japan's economy suffered greatly in the 1920s

And then they had cope with the effects of The Great Kanto to Earthquake of 1923, on top of financial woes.
 
With the Italians fielding triple 15" and the French quad 14", the German twin 15" mounts were certainly obsolete and an inefficient use of displacement by the 1930s. If triple or quad 15" are somehow beyond German capabilities then I would build triple 12" or 13.7" mounts.
 
NotIt's mystifying, really, how they thought they could pull it off. Drinking their own kool-aid, to put it mildly.
France's quick surrender must have emboldened them. Poland bravely fought the might of both Germany and the USSR for 26 days. Meanwhile the seemingly world military power of France lasted only nine days more. Tell Mussolini to remain neutral so to avoid distractions in North Africa and the Mediterranean, and don't declare war on the USA in Dec 1941 (the staff at the German embassy in Washington who understood US resolve and capability must have thought Hitler was insane). Then, go for it all against the USSR.
 
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In retrospect, something like a "super-Scharnhorst" design with 3x3 33cm (13") guns would have provided them with all the capability they could have expected from the Bismarcks, at a cheaper price.

The Scharnhorsts were somewhat mismatched. Overkill as just a cruiser-killer against treaty cruisers, a bit weak against the Dunkerques they were designed as counters against due to the small guns, and weak enough against a treaty battleship that the RN felt comfortable sending a single one against the Scharnhorst at North Cape.

With 33cm guns it would be quite evenly matched against the Dunkerques, a bit weaker but strong enough against a KGV that the RN would need two BB's to confidently engage it.
 

Dunkerque & Strasbourg had 330mm (13") guns. After which the French moved to 380mm (15") with the Richelieus as a response to the Italian Littorios with their 3 triple 15" turrets. A second pair of Richelieus were planned as a response to the Bismarck & Tirpitz (the design of this latter pair was changed with the 4th, Gascoyne, planned to have a quad fore and aft). These "4 gun" turrets were in effect "double twins" with a dividing wall between each pair. While each gun had its own cradle, the relative movement of the guns in each pair was limited. The quad turrets in the KGVs were a proper quad.
 

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