Bf-109 vs Spitfire vs Fw-190 vs P-51

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Kurfurst
Thanks for the paper. You can see how the PR Spits with their extra attention to finish and lack of guns would be hard to catch.

The majority of the loss of performance was down to changes in equipment something that I understood would apply to all aircraft as the war progressed and requirements altered. Germany and the Me109 must had had similar issues, do you know of any similar tests undertaken on the 109 and 190?
 
This may be of interest

Re the losses over Malta. In Malta the Spitfire Year pages 645 and 646, it gives the following summary.

For the Period 19th December 1941 to 7 November 1942 according to Luftwaffe records 249 aircraft were lost to fighters and AA fire.

For the period 1st January to 7th November 45 Hurricanes and 148 Spitfires were lost in the air.

It should be remembered that some of the RAF losses were caused by the Italian air force and AA fire and on the other side of the equation, a good number of Italian aircraft were lost in combat with the RAF. Unfortunately the book doesn't give a summary of those losses.

Luftwaffe fighter claims were 415

In 1942 until 7th November 1942, on average approx 46 tons of bombs fell on Malta every day, a very high proportion of which were aimed at the airfields
 
Last edited:
This may be of interest

Re the losses over Malta. In Malta the Spitfire Year pages 645 and 646, it gives the following summary.

For the Period 19th December 1941 to 7 November 1942 according to Luftwaffe records 249 aircraft were lost to fighters and AA fire.

For the period 1st January to 7th November 45 Hurricanes and 148 Spitfires were lost in the air.

It should be remembered that some of the RAF losses were caused by the Italian air force and AA fire and on the other side of the equation, a good number of Italian aircraft were lost in combat with the RAF. Unfortunately the book doesn't give a summary of those losses.

Luftwaffe fighter claims were 415

In 1942 until 7th November 1942, on average approx 46 tons of bombs fell on Malta every day, a very high proportion of which were aimed at the airfields

The other factor is that the Bombers which were the primary targets of the the Commonwealth fighters. were also shooting back, and some fighter losses were inevitable from that cause alone.
 
... and then were RAF fighter destroyed on the ground, RAF bombers destroyed in the air, Fleet Arm fighters destroyed over the sea and a zillion other types besides Spits and Hurris...;)
 
... and then were RAF fighter destroyed on the ground, RAF bombers destroyed in the air, Fleet Arm fighters destroyed over the sea and a zillion other types besides Spits and Hurris...;)

True of course, but if you are looking at the air fighting and how well the RAF fighters did then this is a fair observation. It is also true to say that Luftwaffe aircraft were destroyed on the ground which is why the quote relates to Luftwaffe losses in the air. With the intense aerial bombardment you will not be suprised to know that the RAF had more losses on the ground.

I have not missed or cherry picked any specific data from the book. There is a breakdown of German losses by type which I have not entered but will do when I get some time later tonight if that would be of interest.
 
Hello Glider
Quote:" The majority of the loss of performance was down to changes in equipment something that I understood would apply to all aircraft as the war progressed and requirements altered. Germany and the Me109 must had had similar issues."

Yes, if one looks on Fw 190A, after A-3 there were no speed gain, in fact A-6 – A-8 were slightly slower than A-3, they had better armament and protection etc but because of they had only slightly more powerful engine, speed and climb rate suffered because of increased weight-

On Bf 109, there were no clear speed increase over F-4 before G-6AS, G-10 and K-4. If we look the standard fighters, G-2 had stiffer wings than F-4, more flexibility and higher FTH, G-4 introduced better radio, in G-6 the rc cowling mgs were replaced by hmgs but speed dropped by some 20km/h. But 109 with its ingenious variable speed hydraulically coupled supercharger had always respectable high altitude performance, Spit Mk V was on the other hand in essence low and medium altitude fighter. Of course Mk V was a good turner which was an asset in defensive fight against German fighters and with metal ailerons it seemed to have rolled better than Bf 109. even if between 270 and 350mph IAS difference wasn't big.

There were also some complains on the quality of the surface finish of very late 109s.

Juha
 
Last edited:
But 109 with its ingenious variable speed hydraulically coupled supercharger had always respectable high altitude performance, Spit Mk V was on the other hand in essence low and medium altitude fighter.

Juha

The 109 variable speed hydraulic drive supercharger was not responsible for the 109s high altitude performance. The fact that the DB engine required a rather lower level/amount of boost in order to make it's rated power meant that it needed a somewhat less sophisticated supercharger compressor to get that boost.
It did mean that the 109 didn't have to sacrifice low altitude performance to get the high altitude performance like the single speed Spitfires did. The Merlin 46 offered better performance at altitude than the Merlin 45 but it gave up over 100 hp at sea level for that high altitude performance. With over 3000 merlin 46's made they weren't that rare and had the same performance as the Merlin 47 used in the Spitfire MK VI with pressure cabin. They just didn't have the cabin blower. How much a low or medium altitude fighter the MK V was depended on which engine it was fitted with.
 
]... and all it took was to send the entire Fighter Command to France where there were but two Jagdgeschwadern. 8) Though I am not aware how Foreman calculates the exchange rates - fighters vs fighter losses only, or BC's losses are included as well..?
Not correct. The biggest sweeps over France seldom involved more than 5 squadrons, and most frequently never more than 2. And from the accounts I have read, it was usually the same squadrons going into battle time and again.

On those occasions that the LW went on the offensive, they were not taking on the whole of fighter command, just one of the groups under FC command.

There was a fundamental difference in the battle the germans could wage and the battle the British had to fight. Whereas the airspace over South east England was home territory for the British, and therefore they had to fight, no matter what the odds, in the case of the German defences over Northern France, because it was not vital home territory, the Germans could, and did, refuse combat, unless the battle was on their terms. This forced the RAF to present their fighter sweeps in numbers and at altitudes generally favourable to the Germans, whereas, the Germans could attack at strength and at altitudes most favourable to them, knowing that the RAF had to respond, regardless of the tactical situation.

And just to clarify a little further, until the latter part of May 1941, it was not just two JGs facing the RAF, it was more or less 2 LFs, with the strengths of attacks still heavily in favour of the LW. They were sending bombers over England by the hundred whilst the RAF was replying with raids measured in the tens. Same deal with fighter combats……LW fighter intercepts invariably outnumbered the attacking RAF fighters, often by as much as 2:1.

Foreman says that he calculates the daily loss records on the basis of the official loss records of either side. There are occasional discrepancies here, and some omissions, but it is generally acknowledged as the best daily record sheet easily available. The losses include Whereas the germans invariab

IIRC there was a very enlightening discussion on this at TOCH, and the conclusion was that despite all the post-war literature lamenting on the Fw 190 scourge, the situation in 1941 and 1942 was just as bad if not worse than after the Fw 190 appeared. The Fw 190 certainly brought a shock to FC, but it very much appears it was more of a psychological one, rather than physical: while the 109 was fairly similiar to the Spitfire in its qualities, the 190 was an entirely different, and completely alien beast. So I wonder, how did you manage to arrive at your different conclusion?

I tend to agree with your summation, however, I still think the FW was a superb aircraft, and outclassed the Spit V at low level. .

That's a big IF - when and where on Earth did the Mark V manage even half a decent exchange rate? Of course it cannot be blamed on the aircraft alone - after the losses over France and Britain in 1940, FC was short on experienced pilots, the tactics were still in infancy, and these alone were probably more decisive than some extent technical inferiority.

Suggest you read Foreman and you will find the exchange rates started rather poorly (but then these losses were not flying Spit Vs), and then gradually improved throughout 1941. Foremans accounts stops in August 1941, but by then the LW was struggling to achieve loss rates better than 1:1. Of course the problem for the RAF was that a big percentage of shoot downs were also registering as lost pilots.

If these are the 'facts', then why the horrible exchange rates, why the severe losses, despite massively outnumbering the fighter defences in France, why the Mark IX, and why RAF reports of the time keep stating that they can't keep up with the opposition, especially at altitude...?


I think you are misunderstanding, or not acknowledging the facts. The period that I am referring to the LW was not outnumbered, it was in fact the other way around. Moreover, the exchange rates are not that bad. In the operations over france it started at about 2:1 against the RAF over france, but by the end of the period, when the LW was admittedly outnumbered in the west in a strategic sense (but for reasons outlined above, not in a tactical sense), the exchange rate was down to nearly par. Admittedly this involves all types, but given the SpitV was the best equipment available to the RAF at that time, it seems reasonable to assume a similar loss rate for the SpitV.
 
Parsifal,

I have some numbers that seem to contradict the kill ratios that you have presented. In 'Fighter Command vol 3', on page 85, Foreman states that the loss ratio was 4 to 1 in the Germans favor prior to the Spit 9. The 'Biggin Hill Wing' by Caygill states that from the beginning of June to the end of September 1941 saw Fighter Command lose 572 single engined fighters while the Luftwaffe loses were 128 .
 
Hello Shortround
OK, I reprase. 109 with DB605A with its ingenious variable speed hydraulically coupled supercharger had always respectable high altitude performance without significant power loss due to needs of its supercharger at lower levels.

Hello Parsifal
I also recall that FC was roughly handled by Jagdwaffe in 41-42 and FC Spits got upper hand only during the 2nd half of 43. RAF pilots had by then learned from past errors, they got Spitfire IX with Merlin 63s and 66s which were better than those with Merlin 61s and more and more reliable Typhoons for lower altitude combats. Also during early part of 43 RAF got new, longer range radars for fighter control over France which meant better situation awareness to RAF formation leaders over France.

Juha
 
Hello Juha

Hello Shortround
OK, I reprase. 109 with DB605A with its ingenious variable speed hydraulically coupled supercharger had always respectable high altitude performance without significant power loss due to needs of its supercharger at lower levels.

Juha

Not as simple. There always more power losses due to an hydraulic clutch from a rigid one. Your ingenious supercharger makes the engine loosing more power at rated altitudes (to viscosity...) and less between them. A more smoothed speed curve if you want. If some ingenious should be, i would rather quote the Polikovsky variable pitch blades supercharger or Schidlowski-Plagnol variable flow one. In both cases the compression power losses are lower than in a classical Merlin or DB supercharger, where produced boost in excess is just evacuated by security valves or lost in inlet inclosure gaps.

Regards
 
Your ingenious supercharger makes the engine loosing more power at rated altitudes (to viscosity...) and less between them.

Hundreds of horsepower gained between the low/high rated altitudes, and about 10 horsepower lost at and above the rated altitude to quantify it a bit.
 
True of course, but if you are looking at the air fighting and how well the RAF fighters did then this is a fair observation. It is also true to say that Luftwaffe aircraft were destroyed on the ground which is why the quote relates to Luftwaffe losses in the air. With the intense aerial bombardment you will not be suprised to know that the RAF had more losses on the ground.

I have not missed or cherry picked any specific data from the book. There is a breakdown of German losses by type which I have not entered but will do when I get some time later tonight if that would be of interest.

Luftwaffe losses by type 19 December 1941 - 7 November 1942: fighters and AA

Ju 88=161 lost, 21 Damaged 30=60%, 18 Damaged 5=30%

Ju 87= 17 , 2 , 1

He 111 = 3 , 0, 0

Do 17 = 1, 0, 0

Do 24 = 0, 0, 1

Bf 109= 64 , 3, 4

Bf 110 = 3, 0, 0

Total=249 , 26, 17


Shores et al also make the point that the percentage of "aircraft admitted damaged to those reported lost appear to be grossly out of proportion."
 
So it was 45 Hurricanes and 148 Spitfires lost in the air against 64 Bf 109s lost (and three 110) as per the earlier post.

I am not sure how this equates to the Mark Vs tipping the balance over Malta against Bf 109F - its more like turning a one sided mass execution into a simple bloodbath, as far as fighters go. I wish there would be a breakdown with the losses attributed to Flak, fighters and bombing, but I guess with the exception of the last category, it was not even clear back then...
 
So it was 45 Hurricanes and 148 Spitfires lost in the air against 64 Bf 109s lost (and three 110) as per the earlier post.

I am not sure how this equates to the Mark Vs tipping the balance over Malta against Bf 109F - its more like turning a one sided mass execution into a simple bloodbath, as far as fighters go. I wish there would be a breakdown with the losses attributed to Flak, fighters and bombing, but I guess with the exception of the last category, it was not even clear back then...

It doesn't give a breakdown as to how many Spitfires were lost to the 109 s. clearly the fighters went after the bombers (161 Ju 88s) and there were losses to German bombers, Italian fighters, operations over Sicily etc, not to mention the Spitfires lost on the ground to bombs and strafing.
 
Last edited:
Hello VG-33
Yes, I am aware that that there was some power losses because of viscosity but I still see them as very reasonable trade-offs when we look what was gained at lower levels.

Hello Kurfürst
you forget completely the Italians, who played substantial part on Malta Campaigns and also suffered substantial losses and also achieved kills against Malta fighters.

Also I'm sure that when you evaluate the effectiveness of the fighter defence of the Reich you do not compare only Allied escort fighter losses vs. LW fighter losses but also take the Allied bomber losses into consideration, so why not do the same in case of Malta. After all the main target of an interceptor was the bomber. Malta Spitfires in Oct 42 succeeded to stop the German bombing offensive by extracting higher price from LW bomber force than LW was ready to pay. And those Mk Vs were equipped with Vokes filters, which produced rather high performance loss, and had to fought against Bf 109G-2s and Macchi 202s. Even if I'm not a great fan of Spit Mk V, it seems that when operated right way, it wasn't so bad as an interceptor in Med.

Juha
 
Parsifal,

I have some numbers that seem to contradict the kill ratios that you have presented. In 'Fighter Command vol 3', on page 85, Foreman states that the loss ratio was 4 to 1 in the Germans favor prior to the Spit 9. The 'Biggin Hill Wing' by Caygill states that from the beginning of June to the end of September 1941 saw Fighter Command lose 572 single engined fighters while the Luftwaffe loses were 128 .

We are looking at different publications. My reference is "1941- Part 2 - The Blitz To The Non-Stop Offensive - The Turning Point" John Foreman Air Research Publications 1994. It concentr4ates on the fighting between early April, through to the end of June. Losses are broken down by type, and the circumstances.

Foreman lists casualties by individual type. I looked at two periods, the losses in April and the losses in June. The losses are aircraft lost, and aircraft damaged, from all causes, with less than half the casulaties shown being aircraft actually lost, for both sides. They are those aircraft deployed in England, France, Germany, the low countries and Norway:

1) April 7-30, 1941

RAF: 207 Fighters, 273 Other
LW: 113 Fighters, 221 Other

Ratio of RAF losses to LW losses
Fighters 1.83:1
Others 1.23:1
Overall 1.44:1


2) June 1941

RAF: 169 Fighters, 225 Other
LW: 119 Fighters, 134 Other

Ratio of RAF losses to LW losses
Fighters 1.42:1
Others 1.68:1
Overall 1.55:1


Whilst there was an overall increase in favour of the LW between April and June, this was solely because BC losses had begun to rise. LW losses in fighters had risen sharply, moreover these losses were principally during day actions whilst attempting to curtail the circus operations by the RAF. How much of the increased loss rate for the LW JGs was due to improved RAF equipment, rising experience, or just sheer weight of numbers, is a bit difficult to say. But I think the general trend is clear......the qualitative gap between the RAF and the LW was narrowing, and fast
 
Parsifal,

You're quite right. We are looking at different publications and time frames. It would seem that the British were holding their own until summer 41, but from then on, the exchange ratio began to favor the Germans. That's not completely surprising with the Germans being on the defensive and choosing when and where to engage. Looking at German claims, it seems that they usually ignored the small number of bombers and concentrated on ambushing the British fighters. Late 41 and all of 42 were a hard time for Fihgter Command, with the performance difference between the fighters being only one of several factors.
 
During the Malta 42 fighting, the Italians lost at least 97 aircraft, some 60 of which were MC202 and RE2001. The Italian fighter pilots claimed around 150 Spits; a very substantial over claim, but obviously, some Spits were lost to the Italians.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back