]... and all it took was to send the entire Fighter Command to France where there were but two Jagdgeschwadern. 8) Though I am not aware how Foreman calculates the exchange rates - fighters vs fighter losses only, or BC's losses are included as well..?
Not correct. The biggest sweeps over France seldom involved more than 5 squadrons, and most frequently never more than 2. And from the accounts I have read, it was usually the same squadrons going into battle time and again.
On those occasions that the LW went on the offensive, they were not taking on the whole of fighter command, just one of the groups under FC command.
There was a fundamental difference in the battle the germans could wage and the battle the British had to fight. Whereas the airspace over South east England was home territory for the British, and therefore they had to fight, no matter what the odds, in the case of the German defences over Northern France, because it was not vital home territory, the Germans could, and did, refuse combat, unless the battle was on their terms. This forced the RAF to present their fighter sweeps in numbers and at altitudes generally favourable to the Germans, whereas, the Germans could attack at strength and at altitudes most favourable to them, knowing that the RAF had to respond, regardless of the tactical situation.
And just to clarify a little further, until the latter part of May 1941, it was not just two JGs facing the RAF, it was more or less 2 LFs, with the strengths of attacks still heavily in favour of the LW. They were sending bombers over England by the hundred whilst the RAF was replying with raids measured in the tens. Same deal with fighter combats……LW fighter intercepts invariably outnumbered the attacking RAF fighters, often by as much as 2:1.
Foreman says that he calculates the daily loss records on the basis of the official loss records of either side. There are occasional discrepancies here, and some omissions, but it is generally acknowledged as the best daily record sheet easily available. The losses include Whereas the germans invariab
IIRC there was a very enlightening discussion on this at TOCH, and the conclusion was that despite all the post-war literature lamenting on the Fw 190 scourge, the situation in 1941 and 1942 was just as bad if not worse than after the Fw 190 appeared. The Fw 190 certainly brought a shock to FC, but it very much appears it was more of a psychological one, rather than physical: while the 109 was fairly similiar to the Spitfire in its qualities, the 190 was an entirely different, and completely alien beast. So I wonder, how did you manage to arrive at your different conclusion?
I tend to agree with your summation, however, I still think the FW was a superb aircraft, and outclassed the Spit V at low level. .
That's a big IF - when and where on Earth did the Mark V manage even half a decent exchange rate? Of course it cannot be blamed on the aircraft alone - after the losses over France and Britain in 1940, FC was short on experienced pilots, the tactics were still in infancy, and these alone were probably more decisive than some extent technical inferiority.
Suggest you read Foreman and you will find the exchange rates started rather poorly (but then these losses were not flying Spit Vs), and then gradually improved throughout 1941. Foremans accounts stops in August 1941, but by then the LW was struggling to achieve loss rates better than 1:1. Of course the problem for the RAF was that a big percentage of shoot downs were also registering as lost pilots.
If these are the 'facts', then why the horrible exchange rates, why the severe losses, despite massively outnumbering the fighter defences in France, why the Mark IX, and why RAF reports of the time keep stating that they can't keep up with the opposition, especially at altitude...?
I think you are misunderstanding, or not acknowledging the facts. The period that I am referring to the LW was not outnumbered, it was in fact the other way around. Moreover, the exchange rates are not that bad. In the operations over france it started at about 2:1 against the RAF over france, but by the end of the period, when the LW was admittedly outnumbered in the west in a strategic sense (but for reasons outlined above, not in a tactical sense), the exchange rate was down to nearly par. Admittedly this involves all types, but given the SpitV was the best equipment available to the RAF at that time, it seems reasonable to assume a similar loss rate for the SpitV.