Blackburn Skua was it that bad?

[dunmunro1]

What Eagle squadron thought
[RAF 71 Squadron was formed in September 1940 at Church Fenton in Yorkshire with American volunteer pilots. They were given three Brewsters, which must also have been 339Bs. The squadron leader was Walter Churchill, credited with 4-plus victories during the Battle of France; he filed this report in October. -- Dan Ford]

It is strongly recommended that this type should on no account be considered as a fighter without considerable modification.

The wings are not bolted to a centre section but appear to have a common main rear spar located through the fuselage. Changing wings in the event of accidents will therefore be uneconomical and slow.

The elevator is actuated by a push-pull tube. While this is a positive method of operation it is feared than an explosive shell or even a bullet . . . may shatter or collapse it. Experience has proved how much punishment the twin cable can stand without breaking down.

The electric system instead of having dual cables is of the one wire earth return [negative ground] type, which means that a chafed lead may cause fire and will in any case blow the fuse in the given circuit.

The fire power of two .5 Colt and two .303 Browning guns is inadequate.

No reflector sight.

The side panels of the windscreen are at such an angle that it is difficult to see through them.

The armour plated seat is not thick enough or high enough to protect the head. It should stretch from one side of the cockpit to the other. It is submitted that the side panels on the fuselage adjacent to the seat be armour plated in view of the number of arm wounds which have been received in other single seat fighters.

The [primer] is not positive like our Ki-gas and it has a habit of sticking in the off position. It incorporates a rubber gland which perishes and has to be removed.

The undercarriage actuating lever is so small and sharp that it is both difficult as well as painful to operate. . . . The same applies to the flap operating lever. [He didn't like the seat adjustment lever either.]

The top straps of the Sutton harness should be fed through the back of the seat instead of over it. In its present position the pilot is only securely held when right way up. In the inverted position the straps give enough to allow him to hit his head on the hood.

The control column with firing button on top . . . does not give such good firing maneuverability when fighting as the spade grip, with the firing button in the front.

The R/T controls are on the right hand side, necessitating changing hands to operate [the radio], and is so placed that the pilot's elbow hits the seat every time he changes from send to receive.

The oxygen is regulated automatically instead of manually, where the pilot can turn it on a bit more for fighting.

The clock itself is of no value without a trip indicator which this one has not got.

The rudder has only one instead of two control cables. It should have three hinges.

The inertia starter is not so good for quick take-offs as the battery starter.

There is no automatic mixture control with the supercharger in high gear. There is no exhaust gas analyser by which to judge the mixture control.

There is not automatic boost control. This means that in a battle climb the throttle has to be adjusted continuously in order to avoid exceeding maximum possible boost.

The fuel tanks appear to be of the integral type built into the spar. A bullet hole in the tank will therefore mean changing the wings.

The flaps are not large enough and only work for 60 [degrees} of travel, with the result that the glide is somewhat flat and the aircraft trundles a long way on landing.

When landing or taxying the tail wheel wobbles on its caster and rips the rubber of the tyre.

As a trainer the aircraft is delightful. It behaves with the ease of a [Gloster] Gladiator and is just as simple to aerobat. So far we have found no vices.

The aircraft was inadequately armoured and had no SS fuel tanks, and when these were added its performance was seriously degraded.
These aircraft did not have carrier arrestor gear and carrier landing trials were unsuccessful.

Edit: Here's a short history of the 339B:
http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/f2a_5.html

 

[parsifal]

This might be of interest
Brewster v. Hurricane
[The Air Fighting Development Unit at Northolt filed this report on 5 Nov 1940 after testing a 339B.--DF]
Pilot's Cockpit - The pilot's cockpit is roomy and comfortable and well laid out, and the design of the hood gives an exceedingly good field of view, especially to the sides and rear. The type of hood itself is to be recommended in that it is very strongly built and operates on robust runners. It is difficult to close at high speed but opens easily at all speeds. The arrangement for raising and lowering the pilot's seat is bad; it is exceedingly difficult to raise when flying.

Trimming Tabs - The aircraft is supplied with elevator, rudder and aileron trimming tabs operated from the cockpit. These are very effective although rather sensitive and contribute materially to the ease of the control of the aircraft.

Field of View - For a single-seater single-engined fighter, the pilot's field of view is exceedingly good all around. For taxying, take-o9ff and landing the nose rather obscures the view directly ahead. The view to the rear is far superior to the Spitfire or Hurricane.

Take-off and Landing - The aircraft has a good take- off, being better than a Hurricane, with a slight tendency to swing to the left. . . . For landing, it has a flat approach, and to approach with comfort a little engine is required. It has a comparatively fast approach but pulls up very quickly once having touched down. The actual touch down is simple. The brakes, which are pedal operated, are very efficient both for taxying and landing.

Climb and Dive - The climb to 15,000 feet is better than that of the Hurricane, and the aircraft easily out-dives the Hurricane.

Comparative Speed in Level Flight - [The fighters were flown at the rated heights for the two-speed supercharger on the Brewster's Cyclone engine.] At 6,000 feet the Brewster was approximately 15 m.p.h. faster than the Hurricane; while at 14,700 feet the speeds were practically identical. [If similarly equipped,] the Brewster's speed at 6,000 feet would be approximately the same as the Hurricane, whereas at 14,700 feet it would be approximately 12 miles slower.

Maneuverability - In the air the Brewster Fighter is very maneuverable, its aileron and elevator controls being positive and lighter than the Hurricane or Spitfire at all speeds. The rudder is definitively heavy, but only a little movement is required for full control. It can easily turn inside the Hurricane.

Steadiness of aircraft as gun platform - Although the guns were not fitted, it is the opinion of all pilots who flew the aircraft that it should be a steady gun platform.

I also found out that the Buffalo was to wide for the lifts in most RN carriers. This may have had something to do with the reluctance to use it on board ship. It is only fair to say that it seems to lose performance at any altitude but that wasn't the Fulmars strong point either.

To sum up, you go to war in the Fulmar I will take the Wildcat, Zero or even the Buffalo.

Simple question about the F2-A....if it was so successful and of high peformance, what were its operational results, either in Europe or in Pacific. In the ETO it may have shot down one aircraft. In the Pacific, it might have done better, but the overwhelming appraisal of it as a type was that it was a failure., and that just wasnt because of combat with the Zero....even against combat with the lowly Ki-27 it could not really compete.

Now, opting for the Wildcat in 1940 does a number of things to your force structure. Firstly the production of the Wildcat in 1940 was extremely limited. In the RN the Martlet Is ordered in February 1940, began service delivery in the following November, and undertook very limited squadron service from about the following April (I think).

However the real cruncher with these Martlet Is was their lack of wing folding. Wing folding was not introduced into the F4F until April 1941, and did not reach the RN even in small numbers until the latter part of the year. AFAIK they were not used to any substantial degree, until the following April (1942).

So for most of the the period we are talking about, the Wildcats for the RN are available in limited numbers, or dont have wing folding. This means that roughly speaking your fighter component onboard that fictional US carrier would be halved again. So instead of being able to field 16 bombers and 16 fighters, you will be able to accommodate 16 bombers and 8 fighters, because the non-wing folding fighters take up twice as much space as a wing folding type.

Now my opinion is that the zero was a superior type but to the end of 1940, only 12 pre-rpoduction types had been delivered. If the zero had somehow been available to the British, they might have been entering squadron service by about June of 1941. They too lacked wing folding (except the tiny wingtip folding mechanism) andd if the wingspan of the F2A was too big for RN Elevators, then so too would the Zero, since the F2A has a span of 35 feet, and the Zero 36 feet 1 inch, and the Fulmar is 46 feet (of course the last two had wing folding).

So even though, in the end, the Wildcat was developed into a superior weapon system to the Fulmar, in the context of 1940-42 it was either not available, or, incorporated non-wing folding making it impossible to stow on RN carriers, and limiting the size of the CAG severely.

I am happy to accept a carrier based fight on those terms at any point June 1940- through to June 1941 which is the period the Fulmar was ascendant.

 

[Glider]

No one is pretending that the Buffalo was a great fighter, however I do believe that it was better than the Fulmar. Both aircraft seem to suffer at even medium altitude. This is a serious handicap in any fighter.
To support my case I have quoted the Only Squadron leader who commanded a squadron which had both aircraft under his command. You chose to put this down as only the opinion of one fighter pilot, which to a degree is true but as he was the only senior officer in this position in the thick of serious fighting I believe his voice is worth listening to.
I attached the report of the Air fighting development unit. A professional body who support the contention that the Buffalo was very manoeverable at low altitude and handled well being able to turn inside the Hurricane.
Dunmunro has posted what can only be described as a withering report on the Buffalo. The vast majority of these comments are structural and I have no reason to doubt it, as any aircraft that struggles over 10-15000 feet and has a max speed of approx 300 at best is going to get slaughtered by the 109's. But even in this summary they say As a trainer the aircraft is delightful. It behaves with the ease of a [Gloster] Gladiator and is just as simple to aerobat. So far we have found no vices.
You mentioned Eric Brown but cherry picked on one comment whch gave a misleading overall view and didn't comment on the other aspects of his report the summary can be described in his words "My feeling after flying the Buffalo was one of elation tinged with disappointment. It was a true anomaly of an aeroplane with delightful manoeuvrability but poor fighter performance. Indeed above 10,000 ft. it was labouring badly."

You question its success well it didn't fit on the RN carriers which is one significant factor, so you are left with two options:-
a) use it in the West where all parties agree that it would be a sitting duck for the 109 which had learnt long ago not to get into a turning fight with RAF fighters.
b) send it to the far east where it had the same problems as everyone underestimated the Japanese aircraft and pilots. I don't have the bloody Shambles series but my understanding is that maintaining these aircraft was a limiting factor to its success and the report posted by Dunmunro was probably vindicated.

You question its firepower as do some of the official reports, but all I can say is that a lot of aircraft were shot down by 4 x 0.5 hmg. it may have been light by modern western standards but it did the job well enough in most situations.

You stick with the Fulmar and if you want a combat from a UK carrier I will take the Sea Gladiator. If your not fussy about the carrier I will take any of the other options.

 

[dunmunro1]

I did this research out of interest:

The Fulmar in action near Crete:

March 19 1941:
10 SM79 and 5 Cr42 intercepted by 3 Fulmars.
"One Fulmar shot down an SM79, and was seen to inflict damage on two more before colliding with a 4th and crashing into the sea...the SM79...crashed...and was destroyed..." Another Fulmar claimed damage to a SM-79. No other Fulmar losses.

March 21 1941:
Two JU-88s attack Convoy MW-6. 2-3 Fulmars intercept and share one kill with ships AA.

March 29:
Here's an account of a JU-88 attack on Formidable in March 1941:

1511: radar detects incoming raid.
1514: 3 Fulmars launched, to join 2 on CAP, which have been drawn away from the CV by another E/A.

~1531: DP AA opens up on 12 JU-88s. One is blown up by a direct hit.

Ju-88s attack but score no hits, and 4 near misses - no damage to CV.

As the last 4 JU-88s commence their attack, they are bounced by the 3 Fulmars. One Ju-88 is shot down and the rest jettison their bombs and turn away. One Fulmar was hit by return fire and crashed while attempting to land on the CV.

April 3rd:
Two Ju-88 attack Convoy ANF-24, a single Fulmar flying CAP intercepts and shipborne observers "...reported that the Junkers was almost certainly shot down."

April 17:
A Fulmar intercepts but fails to damage a recon Ju-88.

Data from Air War Over Greece and Albania 1939-1941
By Alexis Mehtidis


Operation Tiger, a fast convoy that was escorted by HMS Ark Royal close to Malta and subsequently by HMS Formidable to Alexandria, resulting in FAA Fulmars engaging in a number of combats, from May 8-12 1941.

Fulmars from Ark Royal(first day only) engage:
16 Sm79 and CR42 escort
2 SM79 shot down - 2 Fulmars lost

28 Ju87 and 6 BF110
5 Stukas shot down. Out of 7 intercepting Fulmars, 2 Fulmars crash land on CV (these two actions not covered in detail by Shores but Ark Royal only was involved. Other accounts note a mixture of Me-110 and Ju-87 kill claims). Luftwaffe DBs turn away before finding convoy.

2 Cant 1007 seaplanes claimed by Formidable's Fulmars, (one confirmed by Shores)

3 He111 shot down (original formation size not noted) (confirmed by Shores who notes that actually 4 were shot down and notes each aircraft identity) by Formidable's Fulmars

I recon Ju-88
Shot down (confirmed by Shores but destroyed in crash landing due to damage suffered)

I recon Ju-88 Shot down (damaged according to Shores who notes a 3rd unconfirmed kill claim - maybe confused with he-111 above?)

9 JU-88
2 Ju-88s shot down (Shores states one damaged, one lost)
1-Fulmar lost. (collided with target)

The Fulmars suffered a number of operational Losses leaving Formidable dangerously weakened later in the month. No ship was lost from aerial attack but one Merchant ship struck a mine and had to be scuttled.

(from Royal Navy Aces)



data in brackets above from Air war for Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete, 1940-41
By Christopher F. Shores, Brian Cull, Nicola Malizia

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
On F2A's operational records, at least land based in ETO got exceptionally good results, look LLv 24 of Finnish AF 1941-43. And Finnish pilots really loved it, of course it became slow when time went on but as being very manoeuvrable it still had it chances even in 44. And its armament of 3 hmg and one .3mg, Finns converted their planes later on to 4 hmg was at least against protected a/c at least as effective as 8x.303 of Fulmar.

Hello Glider
Thanks a lot for the Buffalo vs Hurricane report!

Very much appreciated
Juha

 

[parsifal]

Hi Juha.

The F2A performance in Finn service is acknowledged. IContrary to what some think I dont think it was due to poor Soviet performance either. I just think it was a great reflection of the standard of pilots in the Finn AF. Plus they seemed to do better in the cold, and as i understand it the Finn aircraft were lighter than those delivered to the RAF and the RN.

The Finn experiences on the type, and their impressive record does not compensate for the fact that in Allied service and particularly as a carrier based aircraft, the type was a total failure. It could not operate from carriers because of the landing gear problems, and its combat record in both Europe and the Pacific was abysmal, to put it bluntly. In australian service it is viewed with extreme loathing, it cost us many pilots, and contributed materially to the British defeat at Singapore. In my book, based on allied operational experince with the type, it had no saving graces, no real victories, and an attrocious combat record.

Just in case I am not being clear, I have no time for the Brewster Buffalo....

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
yes B-239 was lighter than B-339E (Buffalo Mk I).
Brewster had quality problems, problems with unions, very militant shop stewards etc. Finns also had to make mods on their planes, for ex reseal fuel tanks etc. IIRC we even got some compensations for that from Brewster Co. The undercarriage was on weak side but so was that of Seafire. At least some problems with the undercarriage of USN F2A-1s were because of bad workmanship, navy even suspected sabotage. IIRC the reason that really killed F2A in USN service was the big difficulties to achieve self-sealing to F2A's integral fuel tanks.

Juha

 

[buffnut453]

The F2A performance in Finn service is acknowledged. IContrary to what some think I dont think it was due to poor Soviet performance either. I just think it was a great reflection of the standard of pilots in the Finn AF.

In australian service it is viewed with extreme loathing, it cost us many pilots, and contributed materially to the British defeat at Singapore. In my book, based on allied operational experince with the type, it had no saving graces, no real victories, and an attrocious combat record.

So, in essence, you are saying that in Finland the Buffalo was rubbish - it was the pilot that won the fight - but in Malaya, where most of the pilots were fresh out of flying training, it was still the aircraft that was rubbish and not the lack of experienced pilots that led to its poor operational record? You're totally ignoring operating enviroment - the Buffalo squadrons were hugely outnumbered (about 3-to-1 in fighters across the entire force (7-to-1 for northern Malaya during the initial Japanese onslaught)), the RAF fighter force had no effective early warning system, and no robust third-line repair capability. But it's still the aircraft's fault that success wasn't achieved?

One other point, exactly how many Australian Buffalo pilots have you contacted? Just wondering where your "extreme loathing" comment comes from because I certainly have not come across such sentiments from any of the contacts I've made after several years of research into the subject. I've corresponded, and met, with pilots from 21 Sqn RAAF, 453 Sqn, 67 Sqn, 243 Sqn, 488 Sqn and 4 PRU and not one of them expressed "loathing" for the type. They recognised that it lacked performance, and that there were maintenance issues but many of the problems were also relevant to other types in service at the time (eg gun firing problems in the P-40 and the Boomerang).

In terms of pilots killed by enemy action whilst flying Buffalos, there were 13 in Malaya/Singapore (5 Aussies and 8 Kiwis) and a further 7 in Burma (5 Kiwis and 2 Englishmen). Loss rates of 20 pilots across 5 squadrons for 80 days of continuous operations (100 days in the case of 67 Sqn) against a numerically superior adversary doesn't seem significantly worse than, say, loss rates for Hurricanes and Spitfires in the Battle of Britain...and that's with considerably more advantages in terms of early warning and enhanced logistics support.

Sorry for the rant. I'm not saying the Buffalo was great but I would at least like to see some consistency in your arguments.

 

[parsifal]

To try and argue that the the Japanese outnumbere the British 7-1 over malaya during the initial onslaught is simply a distortion of the truth. The initial landings over Khota Baru were covered by just 25 Japanese aircraft, of the yamada detachment, the 25 zeroes that you have previously stated never showed over Malaya, moreover this situation continued for some days afterward, with some assistance from Petes, until airbases in Northern Malaya had been secured for the main force of JAAF. These army formations could not really get into the thick of the fighting until about the 15th December.

By that stage, 15th December, the two Australian squadrons were reduced to being able to put just three aircraft airboprne between them, losses and breakdowns to that point having caused a massive attritiuon rate in the Buffalo equipped units. Later on the 15th an additional 10 airframes arrived, but the Australians were restricted providing standing patrols over the airfield at Ipoh. Effectively, they were not participating in the airbattle outside that confined airspace after that date, so in effect, far from lasting 80 days in the battle, they had lasted 5.

On the 17th December, the standing patrol was engaged by three "zeroes"' (according to the official history, but i think they were Oscars), After a ten minute battle the enemy aircraft broke off, , but immediately thereafter another decoy force of 3 "zeroes" (again I think Oscars), and managed to lure the entire operational strength of the two squadrons....8 aircraft, into the air. So occupied and engaged, 10 bombers attacked the airfield, untroubled , destroying much of the airfields infrastructure and destroying 3 Buffaloes under repair. . By now short of fuel, the Buffaloes were forced to return to a damaged airfield, and just as the last of them landed , lost another two aircraft, to yet another Bomber force that attacked as they landed.

Two more Buffaloes were lost the next morning, and three damaged by enemy fighters. On the 19th 6 Buffaloes were sent south leaving only 7 from the two squadrons at ipoh. Later that day another another two Buffaloes were lost in yet another battle. Folowing that defeat, 21 Squadron with no aircraft retreated to Sembawang, whilst 453 squadron, with just 5 aircraft, deployed to Kuala Lumpur. Ten more Buffaloes were waiting for them at KL, but 453 was now the only fighter squadron on the whole of the peninsula.

on the 21st December another Buffalo was lost in yet another desperate fight over the city. The next daythe twelve serviceable Buffaloes were engaged by more than 20 enemy fighters. four buffaloes were shot down (one in a subsequent follow up raid) , two crash landed, and four were severely damaged. I do not know the precise loss figures for the japanese, but the official history lists the enemy as suffering ten confirmed losses....but as Joe has shown repeatedly, claims are consistently overblown, particularly against the Japanese. 453 emerged from this battle with just 3 serrviceable aircraft.

Due to this extremely high attrition rate, 21 and 453 squadrons were temporarily amalgamated and given 16 additional Buffaloes, I believe being the last of the reserve aircraft....The history says, "lessons learned were now applied to the Buffalo in an attempt to give it better performance. Since nothing could be done with the fuel pressure and boost systems, combat at altitudes above 6000 metrews required the operation of a hand pump, as it was impossible to operate the hand pump whilst engaged in combat the operational ceiling was critical. Armament troubles persisted with many jams, and the RT sets were deleted. The subsequent failure of the type with even these field modifications gave final proof that nothing could be done to make the type an effective combat machine".

By 8 January 21/453 squadron had been reduced to just 6 Buffaloes. On the 12 January the compaosite squadron intercepted a raid by more than 100 Japanese aircraft. Misdirected by the fighter controller, they only managed to intercept one of the attacking groups of 27 Bombers aircraft. However, the Japanese bombers having already dropped their bombs simply opened their throttles and left the Buffaloes well behind.

Over Singapore, the Buffaloes needed at least 30 minutes warning to climb to 7000 metres, the usual attack altitude for the japanese. They seldom, if ever giot that amount of warning, so their efforts were largely fruitless

By 13 January, Buffalo strength had climbed back to 14 serviceable aircraft, it was on this day that the hurricanes arrived at Singapore.

On the 17th January Sembawang was attacked, and three Buffaloes were destroyed, for no claimed Japanese losses . An unknown number of Buffaloes suffered varying degrees of damage.

The next day, the naval base was heavily attacked, 8 Buffaloes were lost . On the 18th a further buffalo was lost whilst providing escort to bombers attacking enemy forces.

On the 19th, the allies delivered a raid with approximately 8 strike aircraft (Wirraways and Dutch Martin 139s) , escorted by eight Buffaloes, attacked enemy positions on the Muar River. Five bombers were lost, along with a Buffalo. Thereafter I am unsure what happened to the Buffalo in combat.

These efforts were certainly heroic, but to argue that the type was effective is lunacy in my book. In the initial combats it was not outnumbered, as you claim, but it was certainly outflown. I also debate that the pilots of the Australian formations were that badly trained, though the tactics they employed were certainly the wrong. In Europe the British had learned to dogfight with Me109s, but this was precisely the wrong tactics to use against the japanese.

Another source has this to say about the Buffalo in RAAF service.

"453 Squadron came into existence at Bankstown on May 23, 1941. The squadron's motto was Ready to strike. It was raised under the Empire Air Training SchemeBritish Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The squadron was deployed to in August 1941, as fears of war with Japan increased. The squadron, along with No. 21 Squadron RAAF No. 243 Squadron RAF and 488 squadron RNZAF, all initially flying the Brewster Buffalo. Following the Japanese invasion of the Malay Peninsular on 8 December 1941, 453 Squadron was deployed to airfields at Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur. The squadron strove to support the ground troops by providing air cover and attacking Japanese troops and transport, but suffered high losses in doing so. The squadron withdrew to Singapore on 24 December with only three working aircraft. In Singapore, 453 Squadron merged with 21 Squadron.

The squadron fought on until 5 February with just six operational Buffaloes. In spite of many mechanical and performance problems the Buffalo squadrons claimed a 2:1 kill ratio against the Japanese."

However, the claims of 2:1 need to be considered in the light that as a general rule of thumb you need to divide claims by 4 or 5 to obtain the actual losses. JoeB can give a far better accounting than I about the actual losses for the IJN and JAAF over Malaya atr this time, but I can assure you it wont be anything like 2:1 in favour of the Allies...far more likley to be 2:1 against them in fact.

I am not claiming that the Finns Buffaloes were rubbish, please dont try to force things down my mouth. And whilst inidividual pilots may not have anything too bad to say about the type, the CO was pretty scathig in his appraisal of the type....the above acount is based on his reports (I believe)

Sorry, but I stand by my opinion that the Buffalo was a total failure as a carrier borne aircraft, and a near total failure as a land based fighter , and I have remained consistent in my position on this from the beginning

 

[buffnut453]

Parsifal, I have no problem with your position but I do take issue with the inconsistency of your argument (or, indeed, that you didn't answer my questions in your last post).

You state that the Buffalo was a success in Finland because the pilots were experienced and very skilled. However, in Malaya where the pilots were very inexperienced (ie straight out of training) you state that the aircraft was the reason for the Allies failing to gain air superiority. That is an inconsistent argument. Either the pilot is fundamental to overall system performance or he's not but you can't (as you seem to be) selecting which components of the overall system to blame or praise.

You also failed to justify your statement about "extreme loathing". I have corresponded, interviewed and met pretty much all the surviving Buffalo pilots, and I've accessed diaries and other personal records from many who have passed away. None of their testimonies indicate the intensity of feeling that you conjure up.

Finally, as to numbers of opposing forces, I do not dismiss the Zero's role but the key fighters over northern Malaya in early Dec 41 were IJAAF fighters based in Thailand. Their roles were air defence of the invasion fleet and "aerial exterminating action" against RAF fighter and torpedo bomber airfields in northern Malaya (specifically identified as including Alor Star, Sungei Patani and Kota Bharu). The IJAAF had approx 140 fighters available and these were in use from 6 Dec onwards (when they shot down a Catalina), including operations over the airfields noted. This information is derived from Japanese sources which you, apparently, seem to dismiss.

For the record, I'm not re-writing history to paint the Buffalo as an operational success - that patently can't be done. However, the operational failures in Malaya were less down to individual aircraft performance and more due to lack of numbers (4 sqns to defend a country the size of England is inadequate, even if those units were equipped with Spitfires), an inadequate early warning system and general lack of leadership and dynamism from the leadership in Singapore.

 

[parsifal]

453 squadron was formed in March '41, and moved to Malaya in August. It was not newly trained, or a green formation. However it did suffer from using the wrong tactics, employing what had been learned in the air fighting in Europe to an enemy where fighting in the Horizontal plane was the favoured technique.

The JAAF might be listed as being available from 6December (but not in Thailand....sorry but the Japanese did not enter the country until 8December, the first air units entered soon thereafter, but due to the range limitation of the JAAF fighters, they were restricted to unescorted raids and /or raids of the airfields at Alor Star, Khota and Sungei Patani).

You certainly have a penchant for trying to put words into my mouth, when did I say I was ignoring Japanese records? And why are you saying the Japanese occupied Malayan/Thai airfields from the 6th December?

Regarding the role of JAAF fighters in the first half of December, they basically were not in the front line of combat over central and lower Malaya until after the 15th December, and by that time the Allies had already suffered heavy casualties. Until that time a very significant proportion of the air fighting was borne by the Yamada detachment (which had a starting strength of just 25 aircraft, and were reinforced at some point to about 40 aircraft. They (the JAAF fighters) did affect the fighting in Northern Malaya, but in central Malaya, where losses were occurring from the very beginning, there was basically no involvement by JAAF fighters in that sector until somewhere between the 15th aqnd 18th December. 453 squadron which was initially based at Sembawang, and then Ipoh, and finally KL was not outnumbered 7-1, it was probably closer to 3-2 (in fighter strengths)

As far as your persistance with pilot reports, I never mentioned the views of the Pilots themselves even once. Try widening your horizons and read the official combat appraisals such as the one I used in my previous posts and post-war histories a bit, and see what the general view of the type was, and then tell me the type was held in high esteem and affection. It certainly increased the RAAFs reticence to adopt the Boomerang, which was seen as a similar type aircraft (unfairly in my opinion). You jump to conclusions far too quickly make assumptions and generally try to purport things that I allegedly said or inferred about the pilots which I never did.

So, having got to that point, are saying, or not saying, the buffalo in allied service was a success. I am not looking for excuses, or rationalization, or some diversionary argument, just a simple yes or no, was it successful as a combat plane or not

 

[buffnut453]

I'm not saying the Buffalo was a successful aircraft but there is more to the discussion than "the Buffalo was useless".

Per some of your other comments, 453 Sqn WAS green - most of the pilots had less than 100 hrs flying TOTAL, and most of that was on biplanes with fixed undercarriages and no flaps. Not even the Sqn CO or Flt Cdrs had any operational experience until the arrival of Sqn Ldr Harper to replace Sqn Ldr Allshorn - and Harper proved ineffective as a military leader, seldom leading his unit into battle.

Now time for me to eat a spoonful or two of humble pie. For Thailand in my previous post, please read Indochina (got a tad carried away in my response). The IJAAF fighters were based there commencing 3/4 Dec onwards and were used for air defence of the invasion fleet "aerial exterminating action" raids on the RAF airfields. It was IJAAF fighters in Indochina that shot down the RAF Catalina on 6 Dec 41. As for range, a Buffalo in northern Malaya could have reached the IJAAF's forward fighter airfields on Phu Quoc from a base in northern Malaya so why couldn't the Ki-43s do the same in reverse?

From the Japanese Monograph on air operations over Malaya: "When the advance units of the 25th Army lands at dawn (time may be changed according to the moon) the Air Corps will destroy enemy air power in Northern Malaya". Formations participating were to include 3rd and 7th Flight Battalions (minus 27th and 62nd Regiments) which, in fighter terms, equated to the 64th and 59th Sentais - those with Ki-43s. This is not days after the land invasion, this is immediately in concert with the invasion and the fighter units involved were based out of Phu Quoc Island. This is one of the Japanese sources you are ignoring.

As for the fighting over central Malaya, the IJAAF was involved in multiple attacks on Penang during the period 11-13 Dec. 64th and 59th Sentais were again heavily involved. It was IJAAF aircraft which 453 Sqn encountered on 13 Dec 41. Thereafter, IJAAF focus switched to Ipon and Kuantan etc. Meanwhile, the 12th Air Battalion was stationed at Singora 10-14 Dec 41. How are these actions and movements not in the front line? These, again, are drawn from the Japanese Monograph.

Finally, I have widened my horizons which is what got me interested in this subject area. All I heard about was how the Buffalo was shot down in droves, that it was largely responsible for the loss of air superiority over Malaya, and hence the loss of Malaya itself. Unfortunatley, there are wider considerations - lack of appropriate tactics, lack of experienced aircrews (less than 100 hrs total in the RAF compared to many pilots with over 100 hrs combat time in the IJAAF and IJNAF), lack of an early warning system etc etc etc. If you're going to claim that pilots loathed their aircraft, then we need to go back to the pilots' reports and not some third hand (and often poorly researched) re-hashing of "accepted wisdom".

Even the official RAF report on Malaya cited that the Buffalo wasn't a bad aircraft it just wasn't efficient enough to cope with the scale of fighting, and that lack of forces and preparation were key to the loss of Malaya. No Allied fighter could have won over Malaya in 1941. Had 21 Sqn been equipped with Spitfires, they would still have been caught on the ground at Sungei Patani on 8 Dec 41 and repairs to Spits would have been equally difficult because Sungei Patani was a forward operating base without hangarage or adequate repair facilities. Fighter reinforcement for northern Malaya did not occur until 5 days later when 453 Sqn was sent north from Singapore, and even then several aircraft were lost in transit because the pilots became disoriented and lost their way - 3 were written off trying to land in padi fields (but I suppose that's the aircraft's fault again and not lack of maps, pre-war deployment training etc?).

Again, just for the record, the Buffalo was not a wonderful aircraft. It was mediocre at best. But it certainly was at least as good as a number of other types that operated without the operational constraints, or the widespread castigation, that the Buffalo suffered. The P-36 immediately springs to mind. In performance terms, the Buffalo (as tested by RAF pilots in the Far East - and this was a war-weary ex-67 Sqn Buffalo) performance was on a par with the Hurricane. I've never claimed the Buffalo was great, I'm just saying that it has been overly maligned when other, wider factors contributed in large part to its lack of operational success. And if you're going to say that I'm caveating, well I'm afraid that has to be done. There are so many variables at play in air combat that one must consider wider issues of theatre, opposition, supporting activities etc. This is precisely why the plethora of "best/worst" discussions on this forum usually devolve down to personal opinion because hard quantitative comparison across different theatres is impossible. For example, the Zero was shot down aplenty during the Marianas Turkey Shoot - does that specific engagement make the Zero a useless fighter? Of course it doesn't yet the Buffalo, which performed admirably in Finland is still, in your book, an ineffective fighter. Again, I just want to overcome the illogic in your arguments.

 

[parsifal]

You know, ther isnt that much separating our two opinions, although that will probably cause you to gasp. Juhas posts suggest an aircraft needing some attention before it was combat worthy, and with enough differences in construction as to explain at least some of the different experience. I have read also that cooler climate in the Arctic may have helped the performance of the type there. Add to that that the Russians tended to operate below 6000 metres a lot of the time, and you start to understand why the Finns did better with their Buffalo mounts than we could.

As for being green, 453 squadron went to war with Buffaloes, they may have trained with biplanes (although once they transferred to an OTU they would have used wacketts or harvards, or perhaps even Wirraways...Im not saying I know, but I am saying they would have been one of the few EATS squadrons not to have finished advanced training on a more advanced type. With 100 hours of training time, they would have been considered somewhat "light on" but following this and after activation they had 7 months of flying in the Buffalo, or at minimum 3 months after the deployment of the squadron to Malaya in August. Tough bikkies that they had an inneffective CO , that happens, but they just are not a green formation in any sense except one....they had no real combat experience. I will grant you that.

If 64 sentai fought battles over Ipoh and KL, or even Butterworth as early as the 11 December, that would be the first time I have ever heard that. Perhaps you are right, but I would certainly like to examine your source material to make that statement. Ive always read that they did not enter the fray over the central peninsula until the 15th

As far as the Buffalo being able to reach the Indochinese bases, and why the JAAF could not do the same back, I will hazard a guess and say that the JAAF had issues with a shortage Drop tanks. I am unsure about the JAAF, but I do know the IJN suffered a shortage of Drop Tanks in the opening months of the war, and relied on inadequate plywood drop tanks in the opening campaigns that had been rushed to the front line units just prior to the war. It seems very likley to me that the more boorish army aviation might not have drop tanks at all. I would also argue that the Buffalo could only reach Indochina with a drop tank attached to the aircraft, and am not sure if theyr were available to the units in the far east at that time either....

The great failing for the Buffalo was that it could not operate effectively at altitudes above 6000 metres, and that means that the tactics worked out to defeat the Japanese, the boom and zoom tactics, could never be adopted by an aircraft like the buffalo. You intimate they are comparable to a Hurricane....Ive read this elswhere, and for me I have a simple answer....not a chance. Even in the pacific, where the Hurricane did not shine too well, the Hurri could at least adopt the tactics of altitude dive, and speed, and carried far greater weight of armamant to make such high speed tactics workable. There was hope for the Hurricane at least, whereas the buffalo was a lost cause from the start...it never had a chance.

And this does not even address the salient feature in the argument....namely, was the Buffalo a success as a caqrrier borned fighter. The answer is no it wasnt, it was an abject failure, lasting about two months or so in carrier operations before being shipped ashore.

 

[JoeB]

fighters in that sector until somewhere between the 15th aqnd 18th December. 453 squadron which was initially based at Sembawang, and then Ipoh, and finally KL was not outnumbered 7-1, it was probably closer to 3-2 (in fighter strengths)

The overall order of battle strengths of Japanese and Allies in Far East in Dec 1941 was:
Navy Zeroes: 115
Navy Type 96: 36
Army Type 1: 59
Army Type 2 (pre-production combat trials): 9
Army Type 97: 195
Total: 414
It doesn't count the Japanese carrier fighter sdns, but they were hardly used in the SEA campaigns

Allied:
P-40: 72
P-35: 18
P-26: 12
Buffalo: 112 (RAF, incl reserve a/c)
Brewster, CW-21 and Hawk of KNIL: 83
Wirraway: 89
Total: 386
It doesn't count the AVG about to become operational with around 100 P-40's.

Just to give a solid starting point. The thing with numbers match ups in air operations is that it also typically changed rapidly from losses and reinforcements. In the early Pacific the Allies brought in a lot more replacement a/c much more rapidly than the Japanese did. The Japanese only made replacements within basically the same units for quite moderate combat losses and pretty reasonable operational losses. The Allies had to completely replace their strength almost immediately.

Also though the Japanese concentrated their forces according to their offensive plan in which they seized and kept the initiative. The Allies had no coordinated plan, no central command until it was basically too late in the initial campaigns. For examle one might chuckle at including Wirraways, far away, but that was an Allied decision to allow themselves to be defeated in detail, and as for quality how is the Wirraway so outclassed by the Type 97 in theory anyway? and the Navy Type 96's were hardly used in combat either.

And, even for a given area and time, just because one side deploys 500 fighters in a theater and the other 250, it doesn't mean that each combat will feature twice as many planes on one side; it's just as likely the typical combat involves similar numbers on each side, but half the missions of the more numerous side are not countered at all by the less numerous side.

And there's no reason to limit the discussion to one particular episode or period within the first several months of the war. The Buffalo for example was used fairly intensively over several months, small scale by say East Front or 1944 Germany standard of course, but not just in Malaya in the first few weeks. So there's no reason to fixate so much on that period. The Buffalo did no better in Burma or as used by KNIL or USMC, all v the Japanese.

As for Buffalo v Hurricane, it's absolutely unsurprising that a head to head analysis would have found the a/c comparable since their combat records v the Japanese were similar, bad for both. The only significant difference was v Type 97 where the Buffaol for some reason did very badly and Hurricane not badly (though still <1:1); v Zero and Type 1 their records were about the same, in range or 1: 4 or 5 kill ratio. The Hurricane continued to have a similarly bad record v the Type 1 through 1943.

The Buffalo was not a successful airplane in the Pacific, nor the Hurricane. The P-36 in brief career with the Dutch was not successful either, though RAF Mohawks (P-36's basically) were reasonably successful against Type 1's in 1943 (around 1:1) definitely better results than Hurricanes flown by the same air arm, in the same circumstances, at the same time. Those are the results. Of course opinions are like you know what, everyone has one and can *always* come up with a theory about why any actual results don't prove anything.

But as far as Fulmar in the Pacific cold meat on the table for the modern Japanese fighters, obviously (though there was only one brief actual example, small formation of RAF flown Fulmars basically wiped out by Zeroes w/o loss at Ceylon in April 1942). And I wouldn't like its chances much v the Type 97 either, assuming it was flown by the same units and situations where Buffalo's and Hurricanes couldn't achieve favorable kill ratio v the Type 97.

The Fulmar and Skua were viable planes if they faced unescorted bombers (they could catch) far at sea. In the few cases where fighters were called on to do that in the early Pacific (F4F's effective defence of Lexington against unescorted Type 1 'Rikko' attack from Rabaul Feb '42, where Butch O'Hare won CMOH, is one of the few examples) they, or the Fulmar anyway, might have gotten by. In the actual mission for Allied fighters most of the time in Pacific War 1942 it would have been basically suicide to use Fulmars. Of course you'd be better off in a Buffalo, though results seem to say, much better off in a Wildcat. The simple obvious difference was that highly efficient and aggressive opposing fighter units were usually around in Pacific 1942, usually with plenty of fuel to fight, completely different situation than Med situation where RN carrriers *using sound military judgement* stayed outside or on the edge of the range of short legged landbased Axis fighters, except when the numbers and quality of the Axis fighters was low.

Joe

 

[buffnut453]

My Japanese material all came from the Japanese Monograph #55. The Buffalo could just reach Phu Quoc and, if memory serves, the Ki-43 had a slightly longer operating range - enough for a hit-and-run strafing raid which is precisely what the 64th and 59th Sentais did.

453 Sqn underwent "OTU" training after their arrival in Singapore. Pilots were sent in batches to fly Wirraways with 21 Sqn RAAF at Kluang, southern Malaya, as were pilots destined for other squadrons converting from multi-engine types to fighters (eg Geoff Fisken). This was not a quick process because only a few pilots could be trained at any one time and there were so many inexperienced pilots that required training before joining one of the Buffalo squadrons. The lack of experience showed in the time taken to get 453 Sqn operational - they were only officially declared on 11 Nov 41 and even then only had one pilot with operational experience (and even that was quite limited).

The Buffalo could operate above 6000m. The most successful Buffalo pilots used precisely the sort of boom and zoom tactics that you're talking about - read some of Geoff Fisken's accounts of how he fought with the aircraft. The key problem was lack of warning - the Buffalo lacked the sustained climb rate to reach sufficient altitude in time (although, to be fair, not even Spitfires could have made the climb rates demanded by the amount of warning provided). The lack of warning meant the Buffalo was placed in a tactically disadvantaged position in almost every engagement - climbing up to an enemy who outnumbered him (but let's not go around that buoy again). With the loss of the very few RDF sites as the Japanese advanced down Malaya, the RAF was forced to rely on interception of radio transmissions to warn of incoming raids but that only told them the enemy was coming, not where to find him. A proper air defence network with ground observers, trained controllers, adequate radar coverage etc was never established. In fact, the COs of 243 and 488 Sqns were taken from their units during the fighting to lead the Fighter Operations Room in Air HQ because there were no other trained staff who could do the job.

Other issues with the Buffalo revolved around weapons failure, radios and engines. The weapons and their firing mechanisms were "Government Furnished Equipment" and not installed by Brewster (other GFE items included the radio, which also never worked satisfactorily, and the gun sight). There are several accounts of gun failures in P-40s and other US types because of gun solenoids not being up to the job. This was precisely the problem with the Buffalo. The key question is why did Air HQ not demand sufficient gunnery training to identify the problem with the guns and rectify it before the outbreak of war? As for the engines, several problems were discovered that necessitated extensive work (and two fleet-wide groundings) to rectify but these were issues with the Wright Cyclone and not its installation in the Buffalo. You could criticise Brewster for poor quality control but it's simply impractical to inspect the insides of every engine you receive before installing it in an aircraft. The last fleet-wide grounding of Buffalos occurred immediately prior to the outbreak of war and was entirely due to incorrect machining of one of the Cyclone's interior components (and the RAF only discovered the problem in November 1941...again, one must ask why was this not noticed earlier?).

Finally, the Buffalo was patently not a success as a naval fighter, although again there are wider issues. The undercarriage was undoubtedly weak for the heavyweight F2A-3 but that version was built at the behest of the Navy to further increase its range and not because Brewster decided to put yet more weight into an already plump airframe. It also appears that maintenance practices contributed to the problem - heavy landings would cause slight forward movement of the undercarriage leg which, if it happened often enough, would start to foul the undercarriage bay opening. The offending projections, a row of round-headed rivets on the undercarriage leg would be filed down so the undercarriage would clear. You can guess what happens if you do that a couple of times...however, it shouldn't have happened and the undercarriage certainly was too weak for the -3 (but I'm not so sure the same is true for the lightweight -1). Finally, one must also remember that the USN is a very conservative, and political, organisation. Even through to the F-14, fighters were built for the USN by Grumman (which is partly the reason why the Corsair was dumped on the Marine Corps). Brewster really bucked the trend by offering the XF2A-1 which roundly whupped the biplane offering from Grumman. However, Brewster did themselves no favours by failing to deliver on time, union problems, lack of quality control etc. Ultimately, Grumman got back in the game with the F4F and the rest is, as they say, history although performance-wise the aircraft were quite similar - Marion Carl who flew both types reported that he would have done just as well in a Buffalo as he did in the Wildcat.

As a final postscript, the RN did try to convert the ex-Belgian B339Bs for operation aboard HMS Eagle but they had been de-navalised and the local maintenance units in North Africa didn't have the resources to design and integrate the sort of tailhook the USN would use ('cos the RN typically went for underslung hooks on 'A' frames rather than a hook at the extreme tail of the aircraft. Tests were ultimately abandoned. Ultimately, the lack of a folding wing would have severely limited the Buffalo's utility aboard RN carriers, but it would have been interesting to discover if the RN suffered from the same undercarriage problems as the USN (note that not one belly landing in RAF Buffalos was due to undercarriage failure - all were down to pilot error).

 

[dunmunro1]

But as far as Fulmar in the Pacific cold meat on the table for the modern Japanese fighters, obviously (though there was only one brief actual example, small formation of RAF flown Fulmars basically wiped out by Zeroes w/o loss at Ceylon in April 1942). And I wouldn't like its chances much v the Type 97 either, assuming it was flown by the same units and situations where Buffalo's and Hurricanes couldn't achieve favorable kill ratio v the Type 97.

The Fulmar and Skua were viable planes if they faced unescorted bombers (they could catch) far at sea. In the few cases where fighters were called on to do that in the early Pacific (F4F's effective defence of Lexington against unescorted Type 1 'Rikko' attack from Rabaul Feb '42, where Butch O'Hare won CMOH, is one of the few examples) they, or the Fulmar anyway, might have gotten by. In the actual mission for Allied fighters most of the time in Pacific War 1942 it would have been basically suicide to use Fulmars. Of course you'd be better off in a Buffalo, though results seem to say, much better off in a Wildcat. The simple obvious difference was that highly efficient and aggressive opposing fighter units were usually around in Pacific 1942, usually with plenty of fuel to fight, completely different situation than Med situation where RN carrriers *using sound military judgement* stayed outside or on the edge of the range of short legged landbased Axis fighters, except when the numbers and quality of the Axis fighters was low.

Joe

A formation of Fulmars were caught taking off and 4 were shot down, and at least 3 of them probably still had their landing gear down. This is hardly indicative of anything. Fighting at altitude the Fulmars faired much better (as did the Hurricanes) over Ceylon. However, no one, least of all me, is claiming that the Fulmar was a viable fighter in 1942 against modern single engine fighters. However when introduced it compared favourably to other CV borne fighters and it proved to be effective in combat, as my examples above demonstrate.

 

[buffnut453]

Thanks, JoeB, for your useful and, as always, insightful input. I agree that the key advantage for the Japanese is they could mass forces locally to meet their operational tempo while the defending forces could not. One must also consider different roles/tasks/operating conditions even within the theatre. For example, the RAF's Mohawks were not regularly engaged by Japanese fighters - in essence the fall of Burma led to a stalemate where the IJA couldn't advance any further but the Allies lacked the strength to re-invade Burma. Such operating conditions are markedly different from those experienced during the Malayan Campaign, indeed Mohawk kills and losses in air combat were both so few as to make statistical analysis really meaningless.

Your figure for the RAF Buffalos is slightly low - I reckon there were about 145-150 including reserves in Malaya, Singapore and Burma (depending on which date you select and how many were written off before the war in training accidents). However, apart from the Immediate Reserves held by squadrons (typically 4 aircraft above the number of pilots), the reserve aircraft were not operationally ready - they were simply sitting in hangars on Singapore waiting for a Sqn to claim them and then fit all the equipment (gun sight, radio, guns etc) to make them operational. In reality, the RAF never had more than 70 Buffalos available for operations across the 5 sqns that operated the type - and that includes 67 Sqn in Burma.

Other than the above minor observations, I broadly agree with pretty much everything you've said.

 

[parsifal]

Yes, regarding the Fulmar, by 1942 it had had its day, it was overtaken by the F4F and the Zero by that time. But at the time of its introduction to service....June 1940, both the F4f and the Zero were not in squadron service, or in very limited service, and retained some elementary problems like no wing folding (for the F4F) at that time....there was nothing better that the RN could use in that period, moreover, from a practical standpoint, this situation continued for a very long period.

It could even operate within enemy Me 109 fighter range, provided it remained on the outer rim of that range. Though this was seldom attempted, because being that close was inviting the loss of the precious carriers, provided it could get altitude, and the loiter time for the enemy escorts was limited, it could get some attacks into the attacking bombers, and then run like hell, hoping the enemy fighters might run out of endurance before they caught the poor old Fulmar. This sort of desperate expedient would not have worked against such a long legged and capable aircraft as the zero....it had plenty of endurance

I am not aware of the Fulmar being greatly troubled by the Me 110, though if anyone has information about Bf 110 v Fulmar, it would be interesting

 

[dunmunro1]

The Fulmar claimed Me110 kills in the Med and had a confirmed kill during the raid on Kirkenes and Petsamo. During that raid 9 Fulmars encountered stiff opposition from both Me110 and 109 fighters over Kirkenes, yet only two of the Fulmars were lost and they claimed 2 Me110s and one 109 in return and I know that they scored at least one confirmed Me110 kill. The Albacores on the Kirkenes strike lost 11 of 20, but some of these were lost to AA although at least 6 Albacores were lost to fighters. An Albacore had a confirmed front gunner kill on a Ju-87. The Petsamo strike met less opposition, IIRC and lost one Albacore and one Fulmar, (another Fulmar was an operational, non combat, loss), both to Me109 fighters, while a Fulmar claimed one Me109 damaged.

I gave a brief account of some Fulmar combats in the Med from March-May 1941 in post 184. The Fulmar met single engined fighters and Me110s on several occasions and yet never suffered massive losses, with the exception of the flight that got caught upon take-off over Ceylon.

 

[Vincenzo]

In performance terms, the Buffalo (as tested by RAF pilots in the Far East - and this was a war-weary ex-67 Sqn Buffalo) performance was on a par with the Hurricane.

Hi buffnut you know if this comparation test it's available on line?