Blenheim as a torpedo bomber?

stona said:

...Why is this important? The answer comes in one word, range. I have read that the Finnish Blenheims only carried the heavy loads for 300Kms, a 600Km round trip plus a reserve...

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I cannot answer that from top of my head. Should look the sqn histories and combat reports before being able to verify.

stona said:

For example, to fly from a North Eastern base across the North Sea to the Norwegian coast is at least 400 miles. Once there the aircraft had to fly a patrol line before returning. From a South Western base to the Bay of Biscay is a similar distance.
If a fully equipped Blenheim can lift 700-800kg with a sufficient fuel load then it might be viable for such operations, otherwise it is, as it historically was, a non starter as a torpedo bomber.

Cheers

Steve

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Many CC torpedo attacks were made inthe Channel and off Belgian and Netherland coast, at least later on. Those targets would have been in the reach of the Torp Blemheims. On the other hand, Hampden TB Is were used because most of the Norwegian coast and Bay Of Biscay were too distant even for Beaufort.

Juha said:

Many CC torpedo attacks were made inthe Channel and off Belgian and Netherland coast, at least later on. Those targets would have been in the reach of the Torp Blemheims.

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As this area fell under Bomber Command control in 1941 it would have to be later. After the argument between Pierse and Joubert Coastal Command could not operate in an anti-shipping capacity in this area except in exceptional circumstances.
Bomber Command, unsurprisingly, bombed!

As I am playing the voice of the real history I think that we should also consider when Coastal Command historically even considered developing torpedo attacks. In late 1941 and early 1942 Coastal Command's Operational Research Section and its Development Unit started to investigate the best means of attacking various classes of shipping with the weapons available. I can't possibly reproduce these reports at length but most of the conclusions related to the method of attack, bombs still being the principal weapons. The first use of the new Beaufighters was to be as escorts and flak suppression aircraft.
It was only in May 1942 that Joubert asked his ORS to investigate torpedo attack. The importance of developing torpedo attack was emphasised, but so was the reservation of torpedo carrying Beaufighters for 'Major attacks'. The reason for this is simple, a chronic shortage of torpedoes. The production of torpedoes was the responsibility of the Admiralty, catering for the needs of the FAA and RAF as well as the surface and submarine fleets. In December 1941 it was agreed that half of torpedo production would be devoted to aircraft variants, stocks of torpedoes for use by surface vessels were allowed to drop to enable this. However, in January 1942, of the 100 aerial torpedoes produced, the RAF got just 25. When the Air Ministry protested that this level of supply would jeopardise aircraft attacks on major German naval targets and rule out attacks on merchant vessels for the foreseeable future the supply was increased to 33 (from 110) in February. The RAF estimated its monthly requirement at 167. In March and April 1942 production stuck at an average of 102 per month and the RAF got none, ZERO. During the four months from March to June 1942 the RAF received 88 torpedoes, but only 33 were for operational use.
We can see what's happening here.It would be very difficult to argue for more torpedo bombers when there were no torpedoes to drop. Coastal Command dropped just 13 torpedoes against merchant shipping in the first 6 months of 1942.
This problem was only alleviated after a 1943 expansion in production and a decrease in demand for the MTO following 'Torch'. Indeed the success of torpedo attacks in the MTO did much to bolster Coastal Command's hand in respect of this method, but far too late for the Blenheim.

Cheers

Steve




the supply of torpedoes which were expensive and required maintenance even in storage. Here Coastal Command had to compete with the Fleet Air Arm.

In some of these "what if" threads we are actually looking at 4 or more things.

1. Would the "what if" actually perform as proposed.
2. Could the hardware have built given the knowledge of the time?
No Mustang style wings in 1937,etc.
3. Could the hardware have been built given the production abilities of the time.
No magic factories.
4. Could/would the "intended user" have been able to make use of the "what if".

To me the torpedo Blenheim certainly seems at least plausible for item 1. (we don't have hard numbers proposed but they may not be necessary, better than a Vildebeest and not as good as a Beaufort seems to be the range/target.)
A torpedo Blenheim could certainly past test 2.
3 & 4 tend to merge. Without a magic factory no extra production is available due to the willful stupidity of certain people in the RAF/Air Ministry. However 4-9 squadrons of Blenheims (torpedo/bomber/fighter mix)could have been diverted to Coastal Command in 1939 without making a dent in what Bomber Command accomplished with them (using hindsight). Using "foresight" on the other hand, it seems incredible that the main CC aircraft (the Anson) had fewer machine guns and 1/2 the bomb load of many of the flying boats/floatplanes used for coastal patrol in WW I. It was faster but endurance wasn't much better than some of them either.
However it also seems to a case of Coastal Command also not being able to do much with Blenheims unless some people in charge got their heads out of their butts and both investigated better ways of attacking ships (both weapons and tactics) in 1938-39 so the squadrons would have time to train with the weapons and tactics. Otherwise you are back to the all to common situation of the British servicemen in the early part of WW II. "Take this piece of kit (which is quite probably rubbish and/or they have not been trained to use) , keep a stiff upper lip and muddle your way through."
This "practice" resulted in a LOT of VCs but didn't produce a lot in the way of lasting effects.

BTW it is about 350 miles from Aberdeen to Bergen and about 305-310 miles from Scapa Flow to Bergen. Put a few air fields in the Shetland Islands (225 miles from Lerwick to Bergen).

Another BTW, the first helicopter crash in Britain was at Twatt airfield on Orkeny (about 12-15 miles from Scapa Flow) and involved a
Sikorsky R-4 and a parked Blenheim. date was Feb 1945.

As far as 'what iffery' goes,the Torpedo Attack Committee was not established until June 1942 and with other bodies went on to define what would later become the familiar Wing Strike Tactics.
On 30th July 1942 this committee reported that equipment essential for a successful torpedo attack were an ASV (Air to Surface Vessel) radar and a means of sighting. Desirable was a radar altimeter. All the aircraft of the Strike Wing should be composed of the same type of aircraft and they should be fast enough for Fighter Command's single engine fighters to provide effective cover. The Hampden was singled out as completely unsuitable.
At the same meeting it was also revealed that there were no target ships being used for torpedo practice.
This is in the middle of 1942. I'm afraid that any notion that a viable torpedo strike force could have been established in 1939/40/41, using the Blenheim or any other available type, is difficult to support, even if the torpedoes could be found.

Atlases at the ready again !!!!!!!!!!!!!

In 1940 (the time we are considering in the original posters premise) patrols weren't flown from Aberdeen to Bergen. Patrol lines were flown at 35 mile intervals. The northern line ran from the Shetlands to the Norwegian coast just above Stadlandet (about 250 miles) and the southern line ran parallel (in a sort of North Easterly direction) from Newcastle on Tyne out into the North Sea towards Denmark. This system was soon abandoned and a system of 'cross over, line and box' patrols started. The only aircraft that Coastal Command had capable of making what we might call armed reconnaissance along Norway's south western coast line was the Hudson.
Later as the Germans used more northerly ports patrols were extended north and south from Trondheim to the Heligoland Bight. Even from the Shetlands to Trondheim, on a straight line, is over 400 miles, add another 150 or so from Wick. From, say, Wattisham to the Heligoland Bight is more than 300 miles. Once an aircraft arrived it then had to look for and identify any shipping.

Cheers

Steve

It didn't take a rocket scientist to figure out where the Germans would have to travel to get submarines and surface raiders into the North Atlantic.

In 1938-39 they had four choices.
1. the English channel
2 the gap between John o'Groats and South Ronaldsay (basically an entrance to Scapa Flow)
3 the gap between the Orkney and Shetland islands
4 the gap between the Shetlands and Norway.

It shouldn't have taken much more than a paper airplane scientist to figure out the first two were rather unlikely or poor choices.
It shouldn't have take much more than a rubber band powered model airplane scientist to figure out that the Shetlands-Norway gap was the most likely (especially for surface ships). It also shouldn't have required any especially brilliant thinking to figure out you couldn't depend on Norwegian coast watchers notifying the Admiralty of ship movements in a timely fashion. With the experience of hundreds of years of smuggling going on in European waters depending on surface ships alone wasn't the right answer either no matter how much it pleased the RAF to foist off the maritime patrol/shipping watch mission on the Navy's surface fleet assets.
Leaving Coastal Command with few air craft capable of patrolling the most likely route (even unarmed reconnaissance) seems like a real failure in planning. Again referencing even WW I experience.
As to the training, it points out how in "what ifs" so much is training and tactics vs actual performance of hardware.
Mixed Groups of Blenheims consisting of bomber versions, trained in low level attacks, fighter versions for strafing/flak suppression and torpedo carrying versions had they been trained for it and trained to operate together could have been a formidable strike force in 1939 and the Norwegian campaign. 1939 German ship AA being much lighter than German ship AA in 1942/43.
On the other hand even with a time machine, handing 1939/40 squadrons 1943 Beaufighters and Beauforts and having them use 1939 tactics/methods of attack wouldn't have changed historical outcomes much. Uncoordinated attacks by penny packets of aircraft operating without decent intelligence (forget Ultra, just timely reports from radar equipped shadow aircraft) wasn't going to accomplish much except by pure luck.

They weren't looking just for the surface raiders and submarines, that would have been fairly easy.
Rather like with bombing policy there was a progressive slip in what shipping could and could not be attacked from the air. By February 1940 was only a step away from a blockade of Germany. The Chiefs of Staff had just re-iterated that "The wearing down of Germany by ever increasing force of economic pressure should be the foundation of our strategy."
The matter of limiting Scandinavian ore supplies to Germany by force (trade negotiations had limited Sweden's to 9.9 million tons per annum) was seriously discussed as early as November 1939.

The MEW estimated that 18% of Germany's supply of iron pyrite and 6% of copper ore (the actual figure was much higher) came from Norway as well as timber, 32% of Germany's fish requirement and any number of other vital supplies. This is the shipping that Coastal Command was supposed to find. Further south it was all the commercial shipping passing through ports like Rotterdam, Emden, Hamburg etc and then on down into the French ports from Cherbourg, through the Bay of Biscay to Spain.

It was a huge area to cover. In fact the only way convoys could be found and interdicted was with a combination of human intelligence from agents in ports from Norway to Spain, photographic reconnaissance of ports and signals intelligence. It wasn't until May 1940 that efforts were made to intercept signals traffic of the German merchant fleet whose simple cyphers were open. The ships tended to travel in small groups and there wasn't much traffic to intercept, but by mid 1940 larger convoys were being used for protection. Early in 1941 the cypher used in German controlled dockyards was broken giving valuable information on convoy movements. By July the Admiralty was able to draw up a complete plan of convoy activity between the Elbe and Rotterdam for example. Luftwaffe signals indicated important convoys that would receive air cover (the code word 'Citrone' was used for this for many months, not a good idea) and might therefore contain valuable targets. The escort vessels were usually naval minesweepers who used Enigma. From August 1941 this was broken and proved most important in ascertaining Coastal Command's efficacy against convoys, particularly outside the Bay of Biscay. The escorts not only gave details of their charges but always reported accounts of enemy action and any damage incurred, very useful for British Intelligence.
A signal like this one, intercepted on 5th August 1941 is invaluable:
"V.2012 proceeded to Hook [of Holland] with convoy after SS Viborg had been severely damaged by air attack."
Coastal Command's responsibilities and operations were much, much more complicated, and its area of operations much vaster than your post would have us believe. It takes a far too simplistic view of challenges facing the British and Coastal Command in the early stages of the war. If only it had been so easy!!

Cheers

Steve

Re Enigma and Coastal Command.
It seems that Enigma intercepts were rarely useful in the day to day operations of the Command. They rarely provided timely information to enable the organisation of a strike on a valuable target.
There were a few notable exceptions and these were in the Command's campaign against blockade runners sailing between the French Biscay ports and the Far East.
It was interception of signals from one of the Elsa Essberger's accompanying U-boats that led to her location about 50 miles north west of the Spanish coast. She was attacked and severely damaged on 11 Jan '42 and forced to unload her precious cargo of natural rubber and vegetable oil at the Spanish port of Ferrol.
Later it was signals intercepted showing that 5 destroyers were leaving Gironde at about the time that the blockade runner Alsterufer was expected that led to the location of this ship which was attacked and sunk on 27 December '43, before she had even reached the outer limits of the Bay.
Note the dates, none of this was possible in 1939/40 or even 41.
Cheers
Steve

Thought for the day.
In November 1942 a Bomber Command crew (heavy or medium) had a 44% chance of surviving a first tour of 30 missions and an overall 19.5% chance of surviving a second.
Coastal Command crews had to complete 200 hours operational flying for a tour, surprisingly close to the 30 missions of Bomber Command. A torpedo bomber crew had a 17.5% chance of surviving a first tour and if recalled for a second (a common occurrence) this fell to just 3%.
Another survey conducted in early 1943 revised the figures for a Coastal Command torpedo bomber crew to just 2% for a first tour and 0% for a second.

Thank you for the Historical notes, I have learned a few (or more than a few) things.
They re-enforce my contention that you could not expect 1943 results in 1939-40 simply by changing aircraft.

However the "selection" of aircraft for "Coastal Command" was simple in 1936-39. And the Anson was not the answer.

Before France fell in 1940 we can eliminate the Bay of Biscay from consideration.
Germany's outlets to the Atlantic were as outlined above. Coastal Command did have the responsibility of watching most/all of the north sea and the English Channel just in case the Germans did try something. CC was also responsible for covering the Western Approaches.

What was needed was an airplane that could cover the Western Approaches AND at least part of the Norwegian coast as those were the greater distances at the time (mid Atlantic gap can be worried about later). Now perhaps given budget constraints a hi/low mix of air craft could be considered but in Sept 1939 CC had 18 squadrons, 10 equipped with Ansons and 2 with Vildebeests and 3 with Saro London Bi-plane flying boats
(and one of these squadrons was based at Gibraltar)
and 2 with Sunderlands and 1 Supermarine Stranaer
Flying boat squadrons rarely, if ever, had a complement of 12 aircraft so a simple squadron count skews things a bit.
It looks like the bean counters in the treasury had skewed things (with the air ministry) toward the low end of the mix.
Ansons not having the range required and having, as it turned out, an almost useless bomb load.
Not only was it below (often well below) the planes used in WW I but the 100lb anti-sub bomb was useless. Another example of "wishful" thinking.

From Wiki:

"
The primary weapon against the U-boats in a future conflict was to be the 100 lb (45 kg) anti-submarine bomb (ASB). It was developed in 1926 following a 1925 Admiralty request. Trials were undertaken in 1927. Inexplicably, although the weapon was introduced and ready for testing in 1931, not a single test was carried out against any submarines or to determine the bomb's behaviour under water. The Air Ministry preferred 250 lb (110 kg) and 500 lb (230 kg) bombs, which were unacceptable to the Admiralty, due to corrosion issues in salt water, possible due to the ammonium nitrate fillings. Nevertheless, a trial order of 50 was placed in May 1939. The 100 lb (45 kg) A/S bomb proved useless. The aircraft available could only carry two, and even if they scored direct hits, little damage was done"

Even if they had worked 2 bombs is hardly an "effective" armament as 4 bombs makes a longer string and greatly increases the chances of a "HIT". Hit being a bomb exploding close enough to cause damage. Later operational research revealed that the 250lb depth charge had a lethal radius of 19 feet.

Against surface ships (unarmed) the Anson with 100lb normal bombs might have been a bit more effective but it gave a pretty poor return for crew and fuel used even if cheap to purchase.

In real History 4 squadrons of Blenheim fighters joined CC in Feb 1940 from fighter command, Bomber command graciously (sarcasm) loaned 2 squadrons of Blenheim bombers in May of 1940 and in August gave up a squadron of Fairey Battles (which was shipped off to Iceland).

Now we do have the historic Air Ministry issued Specification G.24/35 which covered a replacement for the Anson and to which Bristol responded with designs that wound up as the Bolinbroke/Blenheim IV.

The intent was there, the design was there, the Canadians set up a production line for them to satisfy Canadian requirements (although events over took production.)

What seems to be lacking in Britain was sense of urgency in regards to Coastal Command equipment vs Bomber Command equipment. This lack of urgency (or Bomber Commands hogging of resources) lead to CC getting cast-off aircraft for several years after the war started. (old Wellingtons and Whitleys as Bomber Command got newer planes).

Shortround6 said:

.
What seems to be lacking in Britain was sense of urgency in regards to Coastal Command equipment vs Bomber Command equipment. This lack of urgency (or Bomber Commands hogging of resources) lead to CC getting cast-off aircraft for several years after the war started. (old Wellingtons and Whitleys as Bomber Command got newer planes).

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This never changed. Even after the North Coates Wing had demonstrated success with it's Wing attack tactics, many lessons had been learned or re-learned by early 1943, there was a concerted move to disband it! This time the demand came from within Coastal Command and from its new AOC-in C, Slessor.

If we have a look at the aircraft involved in the first of the North Coates Wing's successful operations we have another demonstration of why such operations would have been impossible much earlier.
The torpedo component of the Wing was No. 254 Squadron with a full complement of 31 'Torbeaus'. The anti-flak component was made up of Nos. 236 and 143 Squadrons with a total of 38 Beaufighters.
On 18th April a convoy was spotted of The Hague by Mustangs on reconnaissance operations. Their report was relayed to No. 16 Group H.Q. where the decision to launch a strike against an important convoy, comprising eight merchant vessels and eight escorts including four minesweepers (which now carried additional anti-aircraft armament) was taken.
21 Beaufighters were dispatched accompanied by 21 Spitfires of Nos. 167 and 118 Squadrons and 8 Typhoons of No. 56 Squadron as cover. Close escort was provided by 8 Mustangs of No. 613 Squadron. Total aircraft dispatched, 58.
They sank the Norwegian Hoegh Carrier (4,906 tons) and damaged some other vessels.This was the sort of force that was needed to conduct successful strikes against protected convoys, and continued to be so later in the war with better types.
It was low level bombing and torpedo attacks by individual or few aircraft that had caused the appalling losses behind the statistics I quoted above. It wouldn't matter what aircraft were employed, what was needed was plenty of them in a coordinated action with developed tactics to minimise losses. Throughout 1941/2 Coastal Command was trading at least 6 aircraft and their crews for each vessel sunk.

Cheers

Steve

Interesting that Wikipedia says that the Canadians flew Ansons with 2 x 250lb bombs on patrols over the Gulf of St Lawrence. These might have been a later mark with the 450hp P&W Wasp junior.

The Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Navy operated the aircraft until 1952. Although the Canadian Ansons were used throughout the training schools of the British Commonwealth Air Training plan for training aircrew some were pressed into operational service with the RCAF's Eastern Air Command. A good example of the training schools involvement in combat operations with the EAC during the emergency of the battle is illustrated in an article dated the 1st of March, 2006 of the Royal Canadian Legion magazine entitled Eastern Air Command: Air Force, Part 14 the author Hugh A. Haliday wrote: "The need for Atlantic patrols was undiminished, yet the Battle of the St. Lawrence stretched EAC resources. Based at Charlottetown, 31 General Reconnaissance School was mobilized to fly patrols using Avro Ansons, each carrying two, 250-pound bombs. At the very outset of the war the Anson and its ordnance had failed in RAF anti-submarine work. Now in Canada it was remobilized as an aerial scarecrow. German views varied as to Canadian countermeasures. The captain of U-517 found his operations increasingly restricted by strengthened air patrols. In October 1942, U-69 reported "strong sea patrol and constant patrol by aircraft with radar."

As far as I know Coastal Command used Anson's with a couple of the next to useless 100lb bombs or 20lb bombs (not sure how many) on external racks. I haven't really checked, but don't remember noticing the use of 250lb bombs. I'll happily be corrected

What is certain is that the Hudson was Coastal Command's primary bomber along with the Blenheim in the early war years.
Cheers
Steve

tomo pauk said:

The Mercury engines wer not the latest thing, still the Blenheim have had better power to weight ratio than Beaufort with Tauruses, along with more favorable wing loading.

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I think that is a major point. All these aircraft are underpowered.

If Bristol had managed to get the Hercules into volume production in time for a Hercules/Beaufort the problem of a decent, long range, fast torpedo bomber would have been solved in plenty of time and the RAF might have had some of the successes the IJNAF had with the G3M and G4M.

AFAIK the Taurus was a double Aquila, in the same way that the Hercules was a double Perseus and yet is started design later - so if Fedden had sorted out Hercules mass production in time; all this hanging on with old model Mercuries, Pegasuses etc. would have been unnecessary.

After all the Beaufighter is essentially a "sports model" Beaufort. Without the extra gunners/bomb aimers and with a huge payload.

I find it interesting that only the IJNAF and the RAF actually planed land based torpedo bombers (I stand to be corrected, but I think all the rest were adaptations).

ChrisMcD said:

AFAIK the Taurus was a double Aquila, in the same way that the Hercules was a double Perseus and yet is started design later - so if Fedden had sorted out Hercules mass production in time; all this hanging on with old model Mercuries, Pegasuses etc. would have been unnecessary.

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Aquila was 9 cylinder single row engine with a 5in bore and a 5 3/8in stoke (950cu in/15.6L) The Taurus was a 14 cylinder two row engine with 5 in bore and 5 5/8in stroke (1550cu in/25.4L)
The Perseus was a 9 single cylinder with 5 3/4in bores and 6 1/2 in stroke(1520cu in/24.9L) The Hercules was a two cylinder 14 cylinder engine with 5 3/4in bores and 6 1/2 in stroke(2360cu in/38.7L)

The Mercury was a 9 cylinder single row engine with..........wait for it............5 3/4in bores and 6 1/2in stroke (same 1520 cu in/24.9L as the Perseus)
The Pegasus was a 9 cylinder single row radial with 5 3/4in bores and a 7 1.2 in stroke. (1753cu in/28.7L).

Please notice that the Aquila was simple too small to be seriously considered as a combat engine (anybody want to use the R-1340 out of a T-6 trainer in a combat plane?) and the Hercules was in a whole new class/category.

The British were engaging in wishful thinking (self deception?) in thinking that swapping/substituting any of the others around was going to make any great difference in aircraft performance. P & W canned the R-1535 (14 cylinder twin row) from further development in the late 30s as not worth the time/effort of future development compared to the R-1830 and R-2800.

The Taurus was almost 300lbs heavier than a Mercury and around 165lbs heavier than a Pegasus so what ever it gained in power and streamlining had to be balanced against the weight gain. Every 3 Perseus made was 2 Hercules NOT made in cylinders.

However the "selection" of aircraft for "Coastal Command" was simple in 1936-39. And the Anson was not the answer.

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Oooh, pre-WW2 looks soooo backward in hindsight.

In 1936 the Anson was frontline - it was a patrol bomber; there was no requirement to spend long hours over the mid Atlantic or the very northern reaches of the North Sea - that was the job of the new Supermarine Stranraer flying boat that also entered service that year; the Anson was just to operate around Britain's immediate coastal waters. In 1936 the RAF was equipped with the Gloster Gauntlet and Bristol Bulldog as its fighters and the Handley Page Heyford as its heavy bomber. Even the Harrow, which was a monoplane of similar construction to the Anson didn't enter service until a year later. In order to establish what was front line at the time, take a look at what air forces around the world had in service in 1936, not under development, but squadron use. In 1936 Britain was in a peaceful state and the economy was geared toward such things - there was definitely weapons development but of greater immediate priority was stabilizing the economy for peacetime growth.

This didn't mean there was no foresight; there was a spec for a torpedo bomber on the cards and Bristol even saw that the basic 142 from which the Blenheim was developed would be inadequate unless it underwent considerable modification and was fitted with new engines. Also that year, P.13/36, the spec that produced the Manchester had a requirement for a torpedo to be carried internally, although this was later dropped.

let's say that Peace-In-Our-Time did actually happen and there was no WW2; aircraft like the Anson, Blenheim and Battle would have remained in service a lot longer than they did - there would have been no Hudson for the RAF, no Mustang, probably no Lancaster nor Mosquito.

yes, the Anson's warload was inadequate, but show me examples of modern land based (not flying boats) maritime patrol aircraft in service in 1936 for comparison.

Steve, the Anson's puny warload was carried internally - see here:

Omaka Open Day 31 January 2016

After all the Beaufighter is essentially a "sports model" Beaufort. Without the extra gunners/bomb aimers and with a huge payload.

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In theory it was supposed to be, as the Beaufort Fighter, but in practice the two had nothing in common. There was no structural commonality between them.

nuuumannn said:

In theory it was supposed to be, as the Beaufort Fighter, but in practice the two had nothing in common. There was no structural commonality between them.

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I have always understood the Beaufighter shared the tail section aft of the observers position, wings outboard of the engines, ailerons and landing gear with the Beaufort.

I'm away from home, so I can't verify it, but I remember reading something about the Beaufighter being fitted with Frise ailerons and the Beaufort not, but I could be mistaken. As for the undercarriage, could be, I can't recall, but the rear fuse on both aircraft have different dimensions and the elevators are a different shape. As for the outer wings, the Beaufighter's were different owing to hard points and I think the ailerons were different lengths. If only I worked at the museum still and I could nip down during my lunch break and check them both out! Certainly Wikipedia supports that view, and maybe in the prototype, but in production aircraft there were considerable differences in these areas.

From Wiki: "In general — apart from powerplants — the differences between the Beaufort and Beaufighter were minor. The wings, control surfaces, retractable landing gear and aft section of the fuselage were identical to those of the Beaufort, while the wing centre section was similar apart from certain fittings."

More on this in a bit...

nuuumannn said:

Oooh, pre-WW2 looks soooo backward in hindsight.

In 1936 the Anson was frontline - it was a patrol bomber; there was no requirement to spend long hours over the mid Atlantic or the very northern reaches of the North Sea - that was the job of the new Supermarine Stranraer flying boat that also entered service that year; the Anson was just to operate around Britain's immediate coastal waters. In 1936 the RAF was equipped with the Gloster Gauntlet and Bristol Bulldog as its fighters and the Handley Page Heyford as its heavy bomber. Even the Harrow, which was a monoplane of similar construction to the Anson didn't enter service until a year later. In order to establish what was front line at the time, take a look at what air forces around the world had in service in 1936, not under development, but squadron use. In 1936 Britain was in a peaceful state and the economy was geared toward such things - there was definitely weapons development but of greater immediate priority was stabilizing the economy for peacetime growth.

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Let's see, the British were flying the Blackburn Kangaroo

In 1918 on anti-sub missions. Max bomb load was 900-1000lbs depending on source but usual bomb load was a pair of 230lb Anti-sub bombs or a single 520lb LC Anit-sub bomb was also carried at times and one Kangaroo used the 520lb bomb to severely damage the UC 70 which was finished off by Destroyers.
The British used hydro-static fuses on the 230lb AS bombs (two types) and the 520lb AS bomb in WW I.
Using a pair of 270hp RR Falcons the Kangaroo could carry a pair of 230lbs for eight hours over a distance of 560 miles.
Handley Page O/100 bombers were also used for anti-sub patrol on occasion, at least 3 being fitted with the 6pdr Davis recoilless gun for anti-sub work (not very successful)

There were at least 3 different single engine float plane patrol bombers, mostly operated from shore bases, Being able to land on water in an emergency (engine failure?) being seen as a safety measure. These planes carried four to six 100-116lb bombs depending on type of aircraft on patrols of 3-1/2 to 4 1/2 hours.
Then we have a variety of flying boats used for anti-sub patrol, also carrying multiple 100-116lb bombs (or pairs of 230lb bombs).

Sorry, it doesn't take hindsight to criticize a bomb load of a pair of 100lb bombs over 15 years later while using higher powered engines. Or the fact that the WW I planes had 2 machineguns as a minimum and sometimes up to 4 machine guns. Of course in 1935 the idea of using 335hp engines in a "Patrol Bomber" was pretty laughable, unless you were trying to build the cheapest patrol bomber you could.
The Cheetah engine was a 7 cylinder engine of 835cu in displacement (13.7L) which hardly a first class engine in the early or mid 30s.
Wright had a 7 cylinder 760cu in engine and a 9 cylinder 975 cu in engine (using the same cylinders) at the time in addition to the 1820 cu in Cyclone.
P & W had a 985 cu in 9 cylinder engine called the Wasp Junior because it was smaller than the older 1340 cu in 9 cylinder Wasp.
P & W was also offering a 9 cylinder 1690 cu in engine (the Hornet) and 1535 cu in and 1830 cu in 14 cylinder engines.

BTW the chances of a Supermarine Stranrear flying patrol over the mid Atlantic was about nil, normal range is usually given as 1000 miles or 400 miles less than a Blenheim which nobody has suggested was a plane capable of patrolling the mid Atlantic.

the Harrow was a victim of the protracted design/procurement time frame all to common to British aircraft projects of the time.

American examples of what could be done include things like the P-26 for fighters (6 squadrons in service in 1936) and the Martin B-10 bomber. 103 B-10Bs delivered by Aug of 1936, first flight of a much different prototype was back in Feb of 1932.
BTW the first PBY prototype (granted it had a different tail among other things) flew just 8 months after the first Stranrear.
Lets also remember that the Douglas rolled the 100th production DC-2 airliner out the door in July of 1935. Not a "patrol bomber" although it was the basis of the B-18 bomber.

Sorry, better aircraft both possible and available had they been willing to pay the price.
The idea of going to war 1939 with anti-sub bombs that had been designed and minimally tested (but not against even a scrapped WW I Sub) over ten years before before a production batch was even ordered also boggles the mind.
Too many brave British airmen lost their lives trying to fight with grossly inadequate aircraft and weapons (untested bombs, WW I machineguns, etc)

fastmongrel said:

I have always understood the Beaufighter shared the tail section aft of the observers position, wings outboard of the engines, ailerons and landing gear with the Beaufort.

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It may have started that way and it was certainly the plan, It is somewhat borne out by the Beaufighter having one of the shortest development cycles (start of project to prototype to 1st production version) of any British project of the time.
How much the tail and wings, etc changed from first production version to later versions and diverged from the Beaufort I don't know.
We know the dihedral on the tailplanes changed. we know that wing guns were added after the first few hundred Beaufighters were built, and then fuel tanks were made to fit in the gun bays.
I have no idea how much changed from the MK I Beaufighter to the MK X. The MK X may be quite different than a late production Beaufort. The MK Beaufighter may be much closer to a 1940 Beaufort.

nuuumannn said:

...the Anson's puny warload was carried internally - see here:

Omaka Open Day 31 January 2016

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Hello Nuuumannn, really excellent shots of the Faithful Annie!

Juha