Blenheim as a torpedo bomber?

One more point up to May 1940 British Gov loathed to damage private owned property and that incl. shipping. So only warships and state owned merchant ships were legitime targets. Gov contracted merchant ships were so so... And how could an aircrew to check the ownership of an merchant ship they saw? That was the problem. So no incentive to improve methods to attack merchant ships. KM warships were of course legitime targets.

Juha

It appears from Coastal Command sources (August 1939) that their Ansons could carry two 100lb bombs 'internally' and up to eight 20lb bombs in 'wing cavities' (???). An alternative of two 250lb bombs 'externally' is mentioned but seems not to have been the norm. The Hudson's 1,400lb internal load is used for comparison and both are described as 'useful'.
The Anson's range is given as 600 miles whereas the Vildebeest's is given as 'between 150 and 185 miles' which is,frankly, laughable for a land based maritime aircraft. Even Fighter Command's Hurricane interceptor had a 'radius of action restriction' of 120 miles.

There was some crazy thinking behind all this. Some unlikely people recognised it. On 7th December 1936 in a memorandum to the Air Staff on Combined Air Requirements none other than the ultimate bomber man, a certain Group Captain A.T. Harris wrote.
"Our mistake has been to make a bomber and then add a torpedo or vice versa."
The same memorandum them went on to give a requirement for a torpedo bomber that could double as a medium bomber!

Some have touched on an important point above. The British aircraft industry of the 1920s was not that of the 1940s or '50s and '60s. The start of the expansion period coincided with quantum leaps in aircraft and engine design. All metal monoplanes were replacing the earlier wood and fabric aircraft, retractable undercarriages, variable pitch propellers and numerous other advances were being made. Engine power also increased by a factor of as much as five in roughly ten years. A lack of investment in the 1920s meant that insufficient resources were channeled into research and development, making it difficult for firms to match the technical standards being achieved on the Continent and in the US as rearmament began.
This was compounded by an overall lack of production capacity. When the Air Ministry radically cut its orders in the 1920s many smaller companies simply went out of business. Some were not so small, perhaps the most notable casualty was the Sopwith company.
One of the first effects of increasing pressure on production was the withdrawal from design departments of facilities available in leaner times.
It wasn't until 1938 that the Air Ministry adopted a policy of fostering experimental work shops.
As late as 1942, an investigation into design and development work revealed that some aircraft firms still didn't have experimental work shops and that in most the introduction of new aircraft was slowed down by insufficient allocation of floor space and plant for developmental work.
The most advanced aircraft that the British had at the outbreak of war was the Spitfire. It was essentially the result of a small team of flying boat designers drawing on the companies racing heritage to design a fighter with the most advanced features of the time. It was not the result of a concerted and well financed government effort to produce a cutting edge aircraft. We had it as much by luck as by judgement. A comparison of the investment and facilities at BFW/Messerschmitt AG and the Supermarine sheds at Eastleigh makes for a salutary lesson.
Compare the investment and facilities at BFW/Messerschmitt AG with the Supermarine sheds at Eastleigh.
The contemporary Hurricane was a more conservative design, a throwback to earlier times, and is far more representative of the state of the British aircraft industry in the 1930s. All the Luftwaffe's front line combat aircraft at the outbreak of the war, including bombers and dive bombers, were all metal monoplanes.

Cheers

Steve

Juha said:

One more point up to May 1940 British Gov loathed to damage private owned property and that incl. shipping. So only warships and state owned merchant ships were legitime targets. Gov contracted merchant ships were so so... And how could an aircrew to check the ownership of an merchant ship they saw? That was the problem. So no incentive to improve methods to attack merchant ships. KM warships were of course legitime targets.
Juha

Click to expand...

This was a real problem in the first months of the war. As I said above, there was a slow slip in what could and could not be attacked.
It wasn't until 4th May 1940 that the Air Ministry issued a signal to Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands stating that any shipping underway, merchant or otherwise and irrespective of the flag under which it was sailing, was liable to attack if found within 10 miles of the Norwegian coast south of latitude 61 degrees North, and anywhere east of longitude 6 degrees East as far south as latitude 54 degrees North (the base of the danish peninsula). Ships at anchor could be attacked if definitely identified as enemy on all parts of the Norwegian coast except Oslo and Trondheim fjords, this because allied troops were still concentrated here in the closing stages of the Norwegian campaign.
As early as December 1939 Joubert had said.
"I think it is possible that the attacks already carried out by German aircraft on inoffensive British shipping would enable us to get away with an attack on German shipping from the point of view of neutral nations."
There were all sorts of ridiculous orders about identifying signals, warning shots and attacks on 'non vital' parts of vessels. It wasn't until February 1940 that merchantmen and trawlers converted as flak vessels were allowed to be attacked.
Britain was in a difficult situation in Scandinavia. The Russo Finnish peace agreement in March 1940 finally ended any hope of a foothold in northern Scandinavia and Britain was wary of attacking Norwegian shipping (2/3 of Germany's non-Baltic routed iron ore was delivered in Norwegian ships) for fear of precipitating a German-Norwegian alliance and it was feared any attacks on Swedish shipping would lead that nation to go back on agreements limiting Germany's ore supplies. It wasn't until the German invasion of Norway in April, that the British felt that they could attack these merchant fleets, hence the May Directive. The Germans had managed to solve Britain's conundrum for her.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

It appears from Coastal Command sources (August 1939) that their Ansons could carry two 100lb bombs 'internally' and up to eight 20lb bombs in 'wing cavities' (???). An alternative of two 250lb bombs 'externally' is mentioned but seems not to have been the norm. The Hudson's 1,400lb internal load is used for comparison and both are described as 'useful'.

Click to expand...

The eight 20lb bombs in the wings (?) could also be replaced by smoke floats or flares. Coastal Command was hardly going to say that the Anson's bomb load was "useless"

The Anson's range is given as 600 miles whereas the Vildebeest's is given as 'between 150 and 185 miles' which is,frankly, laughable for a land based maritime aircraft. Even Fighter Command's Hurricane interceptor had a 'radius of action restriction' of 120 miles.

Click to expand...

The land bomber version of the Vildebeest (the Vincent) could (and did) carry a 100 gal tank under the fuselage in place of the torpedo and was credited with around 1250miles range. The Vildebeest is sometimes listed as having a range of 1000 miles or more but that may be with a similar (same?)external tank. Point is well made however. What was acceptable range/performance in 1928 (First flight of a Vildebeest prototype) was hardly up to world standards by 1934 when the contract for the MK III was issued let alone in 1939-41.

[quoteThere was some crazy thinking behind all this. Some unlikely people recognised it. On 7th December 1936 in a memorandum to the Air Staff on Combined Air Requirements none other than the ultimate bomber man, a certain Group Captain A.T. Harris wrote.
"Our mistake has been to make a bomber and then add a torpedo or vice versa."
The same memorandum them went on to give a requirement for a torpedo bomber that could double as a medium bomber!
[/QUOTE]

Once again, making sure that as many planes as possible could be borrowed/commandered for the RAF's true mission (bombing the enemy into submission and gaining the RAF equal status with the Navy and Army)

Some have touched on an important point above. The British aircraft industry of the 1920s was not that of the 1940s or '50s and '60s. The start of the expansion period coincided with quantum leaps in aircraft and engine design. All metal monoplanes were replacing the earlier wood and fabric aircraft, retractable undercarriages, variable pitch propellers and numerous other advances were being made. Engine power also increased by a factor of as much as five in roughly ten years. A lack of investment in the 1920s meant that insufficient resources were channeled into research and development, making it difficult for firms to match the technical standards being achieved on the Continent and in the US as rearmament began.[QUOTE/]

I was perhaps rather critical of the Cheetah engine, it was actual a pretty good engine for it's size/class but the problem was in selecting such a limited aircraft in general for widespread use as a Coastal Patrol plane. It may very well have been more comfortable for the crew than using Hawker Harts/Hinds and the two engines did give better margin of safety than a single engine plane. While plenty of subs had been scared into diving by not very effective attacks during WW I that method (or dependence) of attack is hardly a sign of good planning. A few Squadrons to ease the crews into monoplanes with retracting gear as an interim plane is one thing, having over 1/2 of your patrol planes being such a limited machine 5 years later is another.

The Bristol Mercury was actually a rather good engine, it's main problem was it was too small in relation to the the main US competition being roughly 5/6ths the size. However in the late 30s in offered about as much power at altitude as the bigger American engines and they only really surpassed it by a large margin in later versions. Mercury and Pegasus stayed rather frozen in time as Fedden and Bristol pursued sleeve valves. The Wright R-1820 needing a new crankcase (steel) (G100 series)in order to make more than 1000hp and then getting a redesigned crankcase and different cylinder fins to go from 1100hp to 1200hp. it also needed the change from 87 octane too 100 octane.
Unfortunately for Bristol using the same number of cylinders and keeping the same size cylinders while switching from poppet valves to sleeve valves was not going to bring the same sort of power increase, in part because it was a smaller engine to begin with.
Even developing the Perseus to the same level as a 1600hp Hercules (same cylinders) was only going to give you about 1025-1030hp.
This is only simple arithmetic and it should have been obvious to the mandarins in the air ministry that switching from the Mercury to the Perseus was NOT going to give them the power needed for larger/heavier aircraft. The Taurus depended on small cylinders and high rpm to get it's power increase. however smaller, neater engine installations do not really make up for bigger wings and bigger bulkier fuselages so even the Beaufort was bit suspect as to the real performance increase. Trouble is the British had no alternative engine (short of whacking the design team at Armstrong Siddeley over the head with cricket bats until they put a center bearing in the Tiger, but that would have had to have been done in the mid 30s to have any effect). the British kept ordering old designs as makeshift interim aircraft while waiting for new designs that took much too long for the reasons you state, to come to fruition. Unfortunately this often meant the "new" plane was approaching obsolesce when introduced.

Click to expand...

[/QUOTE]

It does appear that the Anson really wasn't a bad option for Coastal Command, at least as a reconnaissance aircraft. It's range did leave it a little short and as far as I can tell nobody ever thought to extend this by the simple expedient of adding additional fuel capacity in place of the internal bomb load.

I've no idea why the Vildebeest couldn't manage a 400 mile round trip with a torpedo, that was a limitation imposed by Coastal Command. I suppose it was the same as Fighter Command's 'radius of action restriction' like the 120 miles for a 'standard' Hurricane (as of August 1941) which I quoted.

Cheers

Steve

Thanks Juha - it's always neat to see that aircraft being flown. We are very fortunate that its here in our corner of the world.

Sorry, it doesn't take hindsight to criticize a bomb load of a pair of 100lb bombs over 15 years later while using higher powered engines.

Click to expand...

Let's look at the role of maritime patrol between 1918 and 1939. There was little change in technology in either the hunters or the hunted and while the aircraft might have changed, the means of detecting them and destroying them hadn't; the most effective piece of equipment aboard a sub hunter was the good ole Mark One Eyeball. Typically, submarine hunting sorties were carried out in conjunction with surface forces, patrol boats and destroyers, with which the aircraft were in radio contact. The electronics fit aboard was HF radio and DF equipment and that was pretty much it. The spotting of the submarine was done by eye until the appearance of ASV (Air-to-Surface Vessel) radar during the war. The standard bomb sight in use in Ansons, as it was in the RAF's heavy bombers was the Mk.IX Course Correcting Bomb Sight, which was, to all intents and purposes, useless at attacking moving objects.

Maritime patrol was carried out low and slow. During the Great War one of the most effective maritime patrol assets was the non-rigid airship; the RNAS operated around 200 by the end of 1918, although not all at once. Compared to the Anson of 1936, the North Sea Class of 1917, which was probably the best and most capable non-rigid of the war had a greater radius of action and endurance, a larger crew and a heavier war load, but with airships come the added chore of operations and maintenance - airships are cumbersome by comparison to aeroplanes. Surprisingly there were very few incidents involving hydrogen mishandling - the British maintained a high standard of discipline and workmanship within its airship community, which reduced incidents and unnecessary losses. By comparison the Anson was faster and had the benefit of ease of operation, faster turnaround time and greater manoeuvrability; airships had a huge turning circle. As for defensive armament - and that's what it was for, almost all the fighter aircraft in service in 1936 had armament of two small calibre machine guns; the same as the Anson. The Luftwaffe's principal fighter in 1936 was the Heinkel He 51 although the biggest threat to British maritime patrol aircraft at the outbreak of war was German aircraft carrying out the same role. The Anson I flying in New Zealand is in the markings of an aircraft flown by a New Zealander in the RAF whose aircraft was shot down by a Heinkel He 115; he was the first RAF officer to become a POW of the war.

In terms of weaponry and tactics, the maritime patrol aircraft of 1936 operated similarly to those of 1918; when a contact was made, surface vessels were radioed and marker flares were laid. If the aircraft was in a position to make an attack, bombs were dropped, although this was not always possible. The bomb load was small and in actual practice during the Great War, the bombs were found to be in use for disabling the submarine to prevent it from escaping before surface vessels that could carry greater and more potent loads arrived on the scene. More often than not, aircraft did not drop their bombs on submarines, merely recording and marking their position. There are accounts of successful sinkings of submarines using small ordnance during the Great War; an exploding 100 lb bomb under the water close to a sub hull is going to create a considerable shock wave depending on how close the bomb is to the submarine.

Sub hunting was, in 1918, as it was in 1936 and even into 1942 a very hit-and-miss activity; the detection of a damaged or destroyed submarine was determined by visual cues only; oil slick, debris rising to the surface and this might not actually signify a destroyed submarine, and the sub could still be able to make its way back to a safe port, yet give the impression it was destroyed from visual cues, hence the presence of surface vessels, which were nominally equipped with Asdic, which was introduced in 1918. At the end of the Great War, it was proudly announced that no convoy under escort by airship was successfully attacked by submarine, not strictly true, but it underlines the real value of maritime patrol aircraft; that of deterrence.

Let's look at the submarines. In 1918 as in 1936, submarine technology hadn't changed much. They weren't true submarines, but submersibles, not being able to spend much time under water as it was uncomfortable for the crew and of course having to rely on battery power alone. This restricted their submerged speed to around four to six knots. Most submarines submerged to hide themselves, preferring to operate on the surface, where their small silhouette could conceal their presence. Their forward speed on the surface was around 10 to 12 knots; your average pleasure cruiser in 1936 could do faster than that. This status quo didn't really change until the introduction of the Schnorkel, XXI U-boats and closed cycle engines in the latter half of the war.

So, bearing all this in mind, was the Anson inadequate? What type of vessel would it expect to encounter in waters around Britain in 1936 and how well would it deal with it? There's no reason at all to suspect the Anson of not being able to carry out these tasks as described above in 1936. Lets face it though, the replacement spec for the Anson stipulated greater performance, load carrying capability etc and first flew in 1939, merely three years after the Anson entered service, the Beaufort torpedo bomber reconnaissance aircraft.

This has been a most interesting if meandering thread!
To return to the original premise, there was no impetus to convert anything into a torpedo bomber for Coastal Command for a variety of reasons, not least a lack of torpedoes.

Despite some successes with torpedoes it wasn't until late 1942, when there was a prospect of more torpedoes becoming available, that the aptly named Aircraft Torpedo Attack Committee asked Coastal Command's ORS to investigate the comparative effectiveness of bombs and torpedoes against shipping. The conclusion was that bombing was more effective than torpedo attack and that might be even more so with the adoption of the Mk XIV bomb sight.

In an amazing volte-face by the Air Staff, which had always favoured bombing as the best way to attack just about anything, the Command was told that it was too early to form such an opinion and that in the period in question the torpedo had been inexpertly employed, training was poor, most squadrons did not have proper sighting equipment etc. It was also sceptical of the Mk XIV bomb sight demanding more practical operational experience with the new sight before conclusions could be drawn. This never happened.

The 25lb solid rocket head proved the most efficient sinker of shipping. 5 of the 9 vessels sunk by Nos. 16 and 18 Groups between June and December 1943 were claimed for this weapon.

The adoption of Strike Wing tactics ended the large scale use of the bomb as an anti-shipping weapon, largely in favour of cannon and rockets but also, by late 1943, with the now available and improved Mk XV torpedo. The aircraft were also the improving with more powerful Beaufighters (Mks XIC and X) as was the equipment. The ASV Mk II radar was being fitted, even to the old Hampdens that would be withdrawn a few months later, such was the availability. In July 1943 Coastal Command started using 'Gee' as a navigational aid. By early 1944 this was standard equipment on the Command's Beaufighters. Transmissions in No. 18 Groups area were reported effective up to 460 miles, all the way to Trondheim.
Slessor argued hard for Mosquitoes for Coastal Command and the first squadron (No. 248) received some in December 1944, becoming operational with the type in February 1945. The Mosquito was one of the best aircraft of the entire war on all sides and the late war exploits of the rocket firing anti-shipping version will need no introduction here.

Whatever the outcome of all this, the efficacy of air dropped torpedoes was still being hotly debated in early 1943.
All the technological developments that made torpedo bombing viable came far too late for a Blenheim torpedo bomber. It never had a role in Coastal Command as a torpedo aircraft. Despite the best efforts of the men who served in the squadrons through out 1939/40/41, the Command only became effective in 1942 and from these beginnings developed by 1943/44 into something quite different to the sorry organisation it had been. Having a Blenheim torpedo bomber in the early years would have made no difference at all.
It would have been one more target for enemy fighters or flak (if it actually found a convoy to attack) and would rarely have had torpedoes available for operations in any case.

Cheers

Steve

nuuumannn said:

.................. As for defensive armament - and that's what it was for, almost all the fighter aircraft in service in 1936 had armament of two small calibre machine guns; the same as the Anson. The Luftwaffe's principal fighter in 1936 was the Heinkel He 51 although the biggest threat to British maritime patrol aircraft at the outbreak of war was German aircraft carrying out the same role.

In terms of weaponry and tactics, the maritime patrol aircraft of 1936 operated similarly to those of 1918;............

Let's look at the submarines. In 1918 as in 1936, submarine technology hadn't changed much. They weren't true submarines, ........

So, bearing all this in mind, was the Anson inadequate? What type of vessel would it expect to encounter in waters around Britain in 1936 and how well would it deal with it? There's no reason at all to suspect the Anson of not being able to carry out these tasks as described above in 1936. Lets face it though, the replacement spec for the Anson stipulated greater performance, load carrying capability etc and first flew in 1939, merely three years after the Anson entered service, the Beaufort torpedo bomber reconnaissance aircraft.

Click to expand...

Nice summation of ASW although a bit biased towards the Anson. The main thing the Anson had going for it was that it was cheap.
Granted no other aircraft had any better detection system and more than a few had worse vision and comfort for the crews (hard to be an effective lookout if you are half frozen although the RN didn't believe that.
IF you don't expect or specify a better war load that WW I float plane with a single 250-300hp engine then you aren't going to get it.
The 100lb anti-sub bomb turned out to be a bad joke. It needed "almost" a direct hit in order to be effective. The 250lb aerial depth charge carried 170lb of torpex and was figured (several years after going into use) as having a lethal radius of 19ft. The MK I 100lb AS bomb held about 52lbs of TNT and the MK II held 62lbs. lethal radius is not in the books I have but is obviously much less than the 250lb DC. Given the roughly 16ft beam of the Pressure hull of a type VII U boat the ideal spacing for using the 250lb DC with two charges would have been about 45 ft giving a lethal pattern of 80-85ft to cover aiming/drop error. Going to four charges would give a pattern length of about 175 ft. This is using hindsight as the British never tested their anti-sub bombs against hulked subs or even mock-up sections of hull structure to see what effect they had between the wars.
They were using, as noted in a previous post large numbers of 230lb light case anti-sub bombs in WW I and even a few 520lb light case anti-sub bombs.
The "idea" that the 100lb anti-sub bomb was adequate was based more on hope and faith than any objective reasoning.

So was the defensive armament. Specifying the SAME defensive armament as a DH-4 in 1933-34 was based more on budget than reality of what the plane would face in 1936-39 in service. British were specifying (or at least seriously talking about) 8 gun fighters. The French introduced at least some fighters armed with 20mm cannon in 1935. Many countries, even if keeping 2 machine guns were shifting to faster firing guns that so that two modern guns would equal 3-4 WW I era guns.

The speeds you gave for submarines were their normal cruising speeds. Granted most subs attacked from air were caught by surprise at cruising speeds but even a British WW I H class sub (1916) could make 13kts on the surface and 8-9kts under water (briefly). The L class (1917) could make 17knots on the surface. They were good for 10.5 kts underwater when new.
Any anti sub tactics needed to take these burst speeds into account. A surface ship that takes 15 minutes to get to the smokefloat/marker now has to search for a submarine that could be anywhere in a 4 mile diameter area.

Has anyone pointed out that the Anson was cutting edge in it's time?

The first monoplane with a retractable undercarriage to enter squadron service with the RAF!

ChrisMcD said:

Has anyone pointed out that the Anson was cutting edge in it's time?

The first monoplane with a retractable undercarriage to enter squadron service with the RAF!

Click to expand...

The RAF was run by incompetent buffoons who lived on a diet of Avgas and Dope. All its planes were complete rubbish built by the Wright Bros that carried only enough fuel to fly from London to Brighton before crashing. All other countries had vast fleets of Anti Sub aircraft that could fly to the Moon and back, they carried so many Depth Charges they sank the entire German U Boat fleet in one pass and could drop Laser equipped Sharks to finish off the survivors.

The Anson was a General Purpose aircraft used as a Transport, a Coastal patrol aircraft but mostly as the RAFs main multi engine trainer. The RAF knew it wasnt up to much and was desperate to get better patrol aircraft but circumstances meant it was still in use in 1939 when it was pretty much obsolete. If the Anson kept U Boats off the surface they were doing a vital job.

fastmongrel said:

The RAF was run by incompetent buffoons who lived on a diet of Avgas and Dope. All its planes were complete rubbish built by the Wright Bros that carried only enough fuel to fly from London to Brighton before crashing. All other countries had vast fleets of Anti Sub aircraft that could fly to the Moon and back, they carried so many Depth Charges they sank the entire German U Boat fleet in one pass and could drop Laser equipped Sharks to finish off the survivors.

Click to expand...

Gee whiz, somebody finally got it right

A little more seriously, what would you call the men or organization responsible for designing a AS bomb in 1926/27, doing only the most rudimentary of testing (but never a live shot (real explosives against a real or even simulated target) , sealing the design and then issuing a production contract for the first 50 bombs in October 1938. Delivered in 1939? No 250lb or 500lb AS bombs until then either.
The Anson had NOTHING to drop in 1936-37 and most if not all of 1938 except 20lb bombs or perhaps 40lb bombs, both being fragmentation bombs.
This means no training with "real" bombs during those years, no checking to see if bombsights will put the unmade bombs where pilot/bombardier think and so on.

The Anson was a great trainer and light transport. It might have been a decent short range maritime recon plane. As an anti-sub aircraft it left an awful lot to be desired. And if the RAF needed a plane to patrol the Norwegian coast or the Shetland/Norway gap the Anson wasn't it.
And being cutting edge in the RAF in 1935-36 was hardly cutting edge in world in of aviation.

Now as an equal opportunity "basher" don't get me started on some of the obvious mistakes the Americans made like the hyper engine fiasco, The Wright Tornado engine, several Curtiss designs and..................oops, got started

Shortround6 said:

And being cutting edge in the RAF in 1935-36 was hardly cutting edge in world in of aviation.

Click to expand...

Exactly, I touched on this above. Why do people get so irate about facing a self evident fact? I think the Anson was a decent aircraft but yet again it harks back to an earlier era in its construction techniques. It was an old fashioned aircraft and this is only glossed over by having a retractable undercarriage and a few other 'modern' features. The most glaring problem with aircraft like this, which are effectively the end of one generation of aircraft, is the lack of development potential (think Hurricane and any number of early bombers as well). The more or less contemporary Bf 110 was so far ahead in this respect that it was still being built in numbers as a front line night fighter at the end of the war!

You will often see people write or say that 'we were lucky to have the Spitfire'. They usually don't know how true that is.

Cheers

Steve

Nice summation of ASW although a bit biased towards the Anson. The main thing the Anson had going for it was that it was cheap.

Click to expand...

It was, and to a degree I agree with you, my point was to illustrate what the status quo was and yep, the Anson was definitely yesterday's technology; it was based on the Avro Ten (which was a licence built Fokker F-VIIb) with its one piece wooden wing mounted at the bottom of the fuselage, but again, my point was to illustrate that there wasn't much alternative to the Anson at the time - the de Havilland entry to the requirement that produced the Anson was a military version of the D.H.89a Dragon Rapide!

As for speeds of submarines, adding a couple of knots isn't going to change much really and the speeds I quoted were pretty much for the subs in service with Britain's potential enemies. Yes, there were faster subs and more advanced aircraft than the Anson, but they weren't in service in Britain in the North Sea and by highlighting the expense, you've hit the nail on the head, Shorty; Britain wasn't at war when the Anson entered service; as I pointed out in a previous thread; Britain was at peace and budgets were oriented toward other things. The Anson was adequate for what it was at the time, and I think your perspective and expectations are biased toward what you think should have been the status quo based on individual examples, rather than what actually was, based on trends at the time.

Steve, I like to think of it as pragmatism, rather than romanticism. One questionable decision regarding your point is, why was the Blenheim kept in production for as long as it was, with wartime experience with it? Decisions made about such aircraft like the Battle and Blenheim are harder to justify when they entered service before the war, but during the war things changed considerably and cold hard experience highlighted inadequacies for what they were, but before the shooting started, who knew? Let's face it though, the British realised the Anson was inadequate before the war, when the British Purchasing Commission went to the US and ordered the Hudson off the drawing board as an Anson replacement in 1938 (of course, this leads directly back to the questionable proposition behind turning the Blenheim into a torpedo bomber...).

Numerous aircraft were kept in production after their sell by dates because of the parlous state of the aircraft industry. The practice of phasing out one type whilst introducing another was a double edged sword. Old types lingered and new types were delayed. It was all in an effort to produce quantity rather than quality and the Air Ministry felt that some role would be found for just about anything with wings.

I mentioned in another thread that British aircraft production, with the exception of a few months in 1940 NEVER matched the numbers planned.

Cheers

Steve

Another shift away from the thread, regarding the Beaufighter being different to the Beaufort. Having consulted my various sources (I'm home temporarily before I bugger off again) the production examples shared nothing in common structurally. The Beaufighter's undercarriage was changed from Vickers units as installed in the Beaufort and Beaufighter prototype to Lockheed units in anticipation of weight increases. The Beaufighter's fin and rudder areas increased on production examples and wings changed in structure owing to weapons fit (as highlighted earlier). On the prototype, the Beaufighter's oil coolers were placed under the engine nacelles, whereas the Beaufort's were in the wing leading edge, the Beaufighter's were moved back to the leading edge in production examples. Control surfaces changed as trim tabs on the Beaufighter increased in size over those fitted to the Beaufort. So, the reality, despite the intent was that the two were so different that they shared no common structure at all! There was no interchangeability between them.

stona said:

Numerous aircraft were kept in production after their sell by dates because of the parlous state of the aircraft industry. The practice of phasing out one type whilst introducing another was a double edged sword. Old types lingered and new types were delayed. It was all in an effort to produce quantity rather than quality and the Air Ministry felt that some role would be found for just about anything with wings.

Click to expand...

Yes, understandable to a point, but questionable in the face of combat experience. It's always easy to second guess 70 or more years after the fact, isn't it!

Often what is wanted/desired for 2nd string aircraft like a crew trainer is not what is wanted or desired in a front line combat aircraft. The crew trainer can use an older form of construction, it needs to be 'modern' enough to crew "realistic" training.
Like pilot having to use (or at least have) retracting landing gear and flaps if that is what the operational types are going to have. The ability to drop some sort of bombs that will act/behave in flight/drop like operational bombs. Gunner/s need a gun station at least resembling what they will see in service. It would help in the gun/s were the same as operational guns. Inter-crew communication, teamwork are being formed too.
A good crew trainer needs to be rugged and easy to fix. The pilots are still learning and minor crack-ups and hard landings are going to be all too common. The Anson was a good fit for many of these requirements. If anything it may have been too easy to land
It was also roomy enough to handle other roles and the roominess allowed for instructors to be carried in addition to the crew or for certain types of instruction several students at the same time. Multiple navigators or radio operators for instance.
There is no doubt that the Anson performed many valuable services for the RAF for many years. And for many of those jobs having the latest, most up to date aircraft would not only have provided little or no benefit but increased the overall cost of the training program or missions.
That doesn't mean it was a good anti-sub aircraft even in 1937-38 even if the AS bombs had been available.
Most if not all of the Ansons used by Coastal Command came from the first 5 production batches. Batch one was 174 aircraft delivered from March 1936 to April 1937, batch two was 143 aircraft delivered from April to Sept of 1937, batch three was 28 aircraft delivered from Oct to Dec of 1937, batch four was 98 aircraft delivered between March 1938 and Sept 1938 and finally the 5 batch, 850 aircraft delivered from October 1938 to Sept 1939. some planes from these batches were delivered to Australia and at least 3 foreign countries.
Using the Anson in place of biplanes in 1936-38 CC is one thing, having it form the backbone of CC in Sept 1939 (10 out of 18 squadrons?) is another thing.

It is easy to criticize 70 years after the fact in many cases. In many instances we don't know what the production capabilities or even engineering capabilities of the various companies or facilities was. We don't know how far in advance things had to be ordered. For instance while the initial order for the Blenheim not "only" covered 150 aircraft it also covered "long lead items" for further 450 aircraft. This contract was placed 9 months before the contract for 600 Hurricanes was placed. Once a program was up and running not only were the powers that be loath to cancel them but cancellations in the middle of contracts/production runs could result in both lost money (unusable parts/material) and lost man hours.

However there were also many boneheaded decisions made by many air forces/armies/navies that were either contrary to good engineering practice or flew in the face of experience gained in WW I.
2nd guessing decisions made in the 30s in light of what was known (or should have been known) is more difficult but certainly possible. For instance, The RAF had tested variable pitch propellers in the early or mid 20s as I recall (could be wrong, maybe late 20s) and came to the conclusion that whatever advantage in performance they provided was offset by their cost, increased weight (lower payload?)and increased maintenance. Once this report was made it seemed to become gospel in the RAF or Air Ministry and further consideration of variable pitch propellers was not entertained. Bringing it up was a waste of time.
Now the initial report could very well have been correct. Fitting variable pitch propellers to a wire braced, fabric covered biplane with fixed landing gear is unlikely to offer a large change in performance. However by the early/mid 30s 2 pitch if not variable pitch props were becoming much more common even in commercial (airline) aviation on all metal monoplanes with retracting landing gear. Rotol was formed by Rolls Royce and Bristol almost in the face of opposition from the air ministry because both companies could see the need of higher powered engines and faster aircraft to have such propellers. The Air Ministry was caught several years behind the trend in world wide aviation.
Variable pitch props were certainly not secret and had been being used since 1932/33 with further refinements coming until constant speed fully feathering props were in use by over a dozen airlines in 1938. Granted they were more expensive than fixed pitch or 2 pitch props.
I would really like to see the thinking behind the 100lb AS bomb. seeing as how a 230lb light case bomb was almost standard in WW I for the planes that could lift it (in pairs or multiples) how a bomb 43% of that size came to be seen as the new "standard" almost boggles the mind. The improvement in explosives (torpex and cyclonite blends) was way in the future and not implemented until after the 1st year or two of WW II and for quite some time certain size and types of weapon had priority over others until production could meet demand.
Ineffective weapons are only cheap if they don't have to be used in earnest. Once they have to be used in actual conflict they become very expensive indeed.

A few points to the very interesting thread
Anson was a fairly good navigator trainer but not very good for pilot training being too nice to fly. Airspeed Oxford was clearly better being much more demanding.
IMHO besides the many lean years which had undermined British aviation industry and many not too flexible minds in top positions in the RAF and the Air Ministry one main problem hindering the development of the british bomber a/c was Fedden's fixation to the sleeve valve. That delayed the production of the reliable 1500 - 2000 hp radials a few/several critical years. Without adeque power it is almost impossible to design a good bomber.

Juha said:

Without adeque power it is almost impossible to design a good bomber.

Click to expand...

Amen to that. They tried and got the Stirling.

Cheers

Steve

To be fair and without using the retropectoscope (hindsight) too much the Perseus was in production in small numbers from 1933/34 on. This lead to the erroneous conclusion that they had the sleeve valve production problem figured out. They could build sleeve valve engines in small numbers without getting reject sleeves in out of ordinary numbers. It was large scale production that resulted in crippling scrap rates of sleeves. Or sleeves that would not stay round after short periods of service.
What one doesn't need the retrospectroscope for is wondering why they thought switching to sleeve valves on the same size (displacement) engine (Mercury to Perseus) would result in a big enough power increase to allow that much bigger/heavier aircraft.
The Taurus was a blind alley that sucked up too much time and effort during this time. Need for the retrospectroscope is mixed. We know it didn't turn out well but trying to see the attraction in a 14 cylinder engine that was only about 2% bigger in displacement than the 9 cylinder Perseus takes a bit more faith. It offered higher rpm and less frontal area than the 9 cylinder engines but future increases in power were going to be limited. It was about 94% the displacement of a Merlin and conventional wisdom of the time was that air cooled engines could not equal liquid cooled engines in terms of power for displacement as a general rule of thumb. It was also about 85% the displacement of the P & W R-1830. It, again, was trying to make up for the lack of displacement with RPM.
The Hercules was about 91% of the displacement of the Wright R-2600. The R-2800 wasn't generally known about until several years later and comparisons to that engine definitely need the retrospectroscope. The Hercules was eventually turned into a reliable high powered engine but it took time and a lot of redesigning. (or course the R-2600 was redesigned twice after the initial 1500-1600hp versions)