Every Scotsman (and more than a few gullible tourists) trying to buy a pint at an English pub...
BoB Mathematical Modeling of Alternative Outcomes
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Every Scotsman (and more than a few gullible tourists) trying to buy a pint at an English pub...
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I'm seeing a side of you I've never seen before. I like the cut of your jib, Mister!
They actually have three "pound notes" how many 1 Dollar notes does the USA have? How many Yuan notes do the Chinese have? They have ONE because you only should have one, the Scots have three and claim it isn't toytown money. I suspect you went to Scotland in the post Braveheart era.
Ah yes, the days before paywave, my friend. Still got a wee bit of blue facepaint encrusted under my left earlobe...
Anyhoo. Another wee note about Sealion. on the night of 12/13 August, five Hampden bombers attacked an aqueduct on the Dortmund Ems canal and although the raid was considered a failure since the canal was not destroyed, it was blocked up sufficiently for ten days to cause a delay in the supply of equipment and barges for the invasion. This was the raid on which Flt Lt Learoyd earned himself a VC for sustaining his attack amid fierce AA fire and nursing his damaged aircraft home. This raid and its after-effects caused significant delay to preparations and forced Hitler to postpone Sealion from the 15th September to possibly the 21st, but a final decision was not going to be made until three days beforehand.
That's because each Scottish bank prints its own notes. The Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and the Clydesdale Bank, each given to printing their own notes with their own pretty logos on them. They still have the same legal tender value as the English Pound Sterling as set by the Bank of England (this is another reason Scots want independence - autonomy from the Bank of England).
In a documentary on the Battle of Britain Adolf Galland himself said the LW preparations were "ridiculous".
When they are independent will they still have three banks issuing currency? RBS is bankrupt and owned by the UK state at present, its all a comedy.
One that the Scots take mightily serious. All British banking is conducted under the auspices of the Bank of England - it controls every financial transaction in the country, no matter where it takes place. The entire 'bankruptcy' of a banking institution is a farce in the UK as a result. It's smoke and mirrors to make a point.
On our very first meeting which was in a bar in Japan, the barmaid asked "Bob from Oregon" if we were engineers. Bob replied "watashi wa ingineeri, core was baka ingineeri" Which means "I am an engineer, these are stupid engineers". Bob didn't realise I had been in Japan before and spoke Japanese. So I burst out laughing and said "Anatta wa hoso bosu sukebe nohnbei kokan kensakan" Which means "you are a drunken lecherous pipe inspector who is making a poor living". Things kinda went down hill from there. "Bob" was from Oregon but he had been abroad for so long he had gone bush, nothing like any other American I have ever met, it was a pleasure falling out with him.
RBS became the bankrupt institution that it is when the UK had a Scottish chancellor who wanted it to be the biggest bank in the world, I kid you not and I have a lot of almost worthless shares in it.
Don't get me wrong, I don't especially think Scottish independence is a sensible thing, but such things are always driven by passion and it's kinda' hard to deny that instinct. Brexit, quite rightly has given the Scots something extra to get behind, remaining in the EU. It's a bit like following Scottish Football or the SRU (I had a mate who was a member of the SRU and we used to go watch internationals at Murrayfield, which was cool), you support them because they play with heart and passion even though they're guaranteed to fall short - a Scottish friend once said to me, the Scots follow the same formula every sports season, they snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
Blame the Bank of England. Honestly. EVERY financial transaction in the UK goes through its doors. Everything. Financially, things don't happen in the UK the way they do without its input.
I am more inclined to blame the Scottish Chancellor and his Scottish friend at the top of RBS, they managed to pay a fortune for a Dutch bank that wasn't worth a cent (Ibn Amro) Gordon Brown didn't believe in "regulation".
Ultimately it's semantics, but Gordon Brown doesn't/didn't control the Bank of England; it's privately run within the structure of the City of London, a city-state as a separate entity to the London City Council. The UK is the world's leading net exporter of financial services, making the Bank of England the most powerful financial institution in the world.
City of London - Wikipedia
I know its wiki but it illustrates the point. The City has its own mayor, police force, fire department, coat-of-arms, financial and cultural status as an independent entity - and it, not the government, runs the Bank of England.
City of London - Wikipedia
I know its wiki but it illustrates the point. The City has its own mayor, police force, fire department, coat-of-arms, financial and cultural status as an independent entity - and it, not the government, runs the Bank of England.
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At least one Luftwaffe commander did some 'mathematical modelling' of his own.
Theo Osterkamp actually bothered to do some sums. Osterkamp calculated that in order to protect the invasion beaches he would need two complete Geschwader (almost 150 aircraft) over the beach head at all times. By his maths this would require a strength of 12 Geschwader, almost 900 aircraft, more than the Luftwaffe started the Battle with. This implied that they could not sustain any net losses at all. This meant that a gross attrition rate of about 10% per month, say 75 aircraft, was the maximum acceptable. He further calculated that within these constraints and in order to reduce Fighter Command's strength by 50% the Luftwaffe fighters would have to achieve an exchange rate of 5:1. This was in fact the target he set JG 51 when it took up its position on the Channel coast in early July. He ordered his pilots only to attack when a tactical advantage assured them of success with minimal risk.
The problem was that the Luftwaffe could never shoot down something like 100 British fighters a week without taking risks. If the British lost 100 fighters in five weeks, to the Germans 20, achieving a 5:1 exchange rate, they would still be able to fight over the beaches and the Luftwaffe would have failed. Essentially, the German plan was dependent on the British committing large numbers of fighters to large air battles, allowing themselves to be bounced and shot down by the Luftwaffe's aces in their Bf 109s. Further raids would then be made on British airfields to mop up anything that was left. Unsurprisingly, the British did not oblige and events, even before the official 'Adlertag', clearly showed the scale of the problem the Germans faced. It's just that the Germans ignored it.
I think the modelling in the original link largely misses the point. Going after airfields would have made no difference. The Luftwaffe consistently bombed the airfields operated by other Commands while missing Fighter Command's. It required a better informed and coordinated campaign against a relative few targets. With better intelligence concentrating on just a dozen Chain Home stations between the Thames Estuary and Isle of Wight and 11 Group's Sector Stations, and maintaining the pressure on just these few targets, Dowding might have forced to reconsider his options, maybe even to withdraw north of the Thames before an invasion.
It's all moot, because the Luftwaffe decided very early that the RDF stations were not lucrative targets, and having no idea of how Fighter Command was controlled didn't realise the vital importance of Sector Stations, nor did it know which ones they were. You can't bomb something if you don't know what or where it is.
Welcome to the real world!
Theo Osterkamp actually bothered to do some sums. Osterkamp calculated that in order to protect the invasion beaches he would need two complete Geschwader (almost 150 aircraft) over the beach head at all times. By his maths this would require a strength of 12 Geschwader, almost 900 aircraft, more than the Luftwaffe started the Battle with. This implied that they could not sustain any net losses at all. This meant that a gross attrition rate of about 10% per month, say 75 aircraft, was the maximum acceptable. He further calculated that within these constraints and in order to reduce Fighter Command's strength by 50% the Luftwaffe fighters would have to achieve an exchange rate of 5:1. This was in fact the target he set JG 51 when it took up its position on the Channel coast in early July. He ordered his pilots only to attack when a tactical advantage assured them of success with minimal risk.
The problem was that the Luftwaffe could never shoot down something like 100 British fighters a week without taking risks. If the British lost 100 fighters in five weeks, to the Germans 20, achieving a 5:1 exchange rate, they would still be able to fight over the beaches and the Luftwaffe would have failed. Essentially, the German plan was dependent on the British committing large numbers of fighters to large air battles, allowing themselves to be bounced and shot down by the Luftwaffe's aces in their Bf 109s. Further raids would then be made on British airfields to mop up anything that was left. Unsurprisingly, the British did not oblige and events, even before the official 'Adlertag', clearly showed the scale of the problem the Germans faced. It's just that the Germans ignored it.
I think the modelling in the original link largely misses the point. Going after airfields would have made no difference. The Luftwaffe consistently bombed the airfields operated by other Commands while missing Fighter Command's. It required a better informed and coordinated campaign against a relative few targets. With better intelligence concentrating on just a dozen Chain Home stations between the Thames Estuary and Isle of Wight and 11 Group's Sector Stations, and maintaining the pressure on just these few targets, Dowding might have forced to reconsider his options, maybe even to withdraw north of the Thames before an invasion.
It's all moot, because the Luftwaffe decided very early that the RDF stations were not lucrative targets, and having no idea of how Fighter Command was controlled didn't realise the vital importance of Sector Stations, nor did it know which ones they were. You can't bomb something if you don't know what or where it is.
Welcome to the real world!
