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Ever see a majestic, dominant, apparently healthy old tree snap off in a not particularly extreme wind storm, due to an extensive hidden case of core rot? I think the core borings taking place at Boeing are beginning to show a similar affliction.some of the most compelling evidence yet that Boeing consciously chose less costly approaches over safer, more conservative ones during the MAX's development.
From what I've read, properly trained and experienced pilots were able to deal with the MCAS issue by simply toggling the switch to switch off auto trim. The issue only became fatal when poorly trained aircrew from mass pilot farms in the developing world could not deal with an unexpected issue.I cannot conceive of why you would add such a flight control feature and not emphasize it to the pilots. I guess it was to keep a low profile with the FAA.
didnt the MCAS keep switching itself back on every time the pilots turned it off and eventually they lost control ?From what I've read, properly trained and experienced pilots were able to deal with the MCAS issue by simply toggling the switch to switch off auto trim. The issue only became fatal when poorly trained aircrew from mass pilot farms in the developing world could not deal with an unexpected issue.
'Don't Ground the Airplanes. Ground the Pilots.'
The Boeing 737 MAX: Is The Problem With The Plane Or The Pilots?
This is not to divert blame from Boeing for adding a critical system without telling anyone. What do our resident pilots here say?
AIUI, the MCAS turned itself off and on, something like five seconds on, ten seconds off.didnt the MCAS keep switching itself back on every time the pilots turned it off and eventually they lost control ?
Thought I'd read it somewhere, was going from memory, thanksAIUI, the MCAS turned itself off and on, something like five seconds on, ten seconds off.
Not a jet pilot, so take my musings with a grain of salt. As I see it, it's a tangled web involving competition driven miscalculations by Boeing, funding driven delegation of regulatory compliance by the FAA, pilot training and experience deficiencies in parts of the airline industry, as well as a general lack of understanding of the Max's new systems among the maintainers. Your basic "perfect storm".What do our resident pilots here say?
What flight was that?An Airbus went into the ocean off the coast of France a while back while on a post-overhaul flight test. They had washed the airplane and the water froze at high altitude and jammed the sensors for the automatic stall prevention system. They could have overridden the system with the trim, but they did not.
Apparently not just air speed. In the video I posted above, the pilot says the elevators on the 737 are relatively small and thus are unable to pitch the aircraft's nose up once a critical descent attitude is reached.experienced crews, trained to US standards, would have had the situational awareness to handle those MCAS episodes as runaway trim issues and reverted to manual trim IF they caught it in time before airspeed got too high.
The problem is the elevators are small and the stabilizer is large. The elevators will work at any speed IF the stabilizer trim is adjusted properly, they just can't overcome an out-of-trim condition at high speed, as I understand it. I used to work on a 727 simulator, and in typical Boeing big jet fashion, that beast had to be flown precisely with trim. Two or three units out of trim for speed and CG %MAC, and stick forces would get out of hand.Apparently not just air speed. In the video I posted above, the pilot says the elevators on the 737 are relatively small and thus are unable to pitch the aircraft's nose up once a critical descent attitude is reached.
The difference between participants and hostages.Maybe test flights with engineers on board ought to have the engineers actually in the cockpit during the testing?