Boeing Opposed Training 737 Max 8 Pilots

[MIflyer]

From Aviation Week:

Boeing's efforts to keep 737 Next Generation and MAX training as similar as possible included limiting external discussion of the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) as early as 2013, as well as an aggressive lobbying effort to dissuade Lion Air from requiring simulator sessions for its pilots, new documents released by the manufacturer reveal.

The documents, comprising external and internal emails and internal instant message exchanges, underscore the priority Boeing placed on positioning the MAX as nearly the same as its predecessor, the 737 Next Generation (NG). They also offer some of the most compelling evidence yet that Boeing consciously chose less costly approaches over safer, more conservative ones during the MAX's development.

Boeing determined early on that ensuring 737 pilots could transition to the MAX without simulator time would be a huge cost advantage when pitching the model to customers. It also realized that regulators could consider some of the MAX's new features as too much to cover in computer-based training (CBT). The MCAS, a flight control law that commands automatic stabilizer movements in certain flight profiles, was chief among them.

A version of the MCAS was developed for the 767 tanker program, "but treated as analogous function, as a speed trim-type function," a Boeing document summarizing a June 2013 MAX program meeting said. "If we emphasize MCAS is a new function there may be a greater certification and training impact."

Boeing's solution: refer to the MCAS externally as an addition to the 737 Speed Trim, not by its name.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

some of the most compelling evidence yet that Boeing consciously chose less costly approaches over safer, more conservative ones during the MAX's development.

Ever see a majestic, dominant, apparently healthy old tree snap off in a not particularly extreme wind storm, due to an extensive hidden case of core rot? I think the core borings taking place at Boeing are beginning to show a similar affliction.

 

[MIflyer]

I cannot conceive of why you would add such a flight control feature and not emphasize it to the pilots. I guess it was to keep a low profile with the FAA.

 

[pbehn]

Hard to believe one last stretch of the 737 could take Boeing down, it is nearly as old as me.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I cannot conceive of why you would add such a flight control feature and not emphasize it to the pilots. I guess it was to keep a low profile with the FAA.

From what I've read, properly trained and experienced pilots were able to deal with the MCAS issue by simply toggling the switch to switch off auto trim. The issue only became fatal when poorly trained aircrew from mass pilot farms in the developing world could not deal with an unexpected issue.

'Don't Ground the Airplanes. Ground the Pilots.'

The Boeing 737 MAX: Is The Problem With The Plane Or The Pilots?

This is not to divert blame from Boeing for adding a critical system without telling anyone. What do our resident pilots here say?

 

[rochie]

From what I've read, properly trained and experienced pilots were able to deal with the MCAS issue by simply toggling the switch to switch off auto trim. The issue only became fatal when poorly trained aircrew from mass pilot farms in the developing world could not deal with an unexpected issue.

'Don't Ground the Airplanes. Ground the Pilots.'

The Boeing 737 MAX: Is The Problem With The Plane Or The Pilots?

This is not to divert blame from Boeing for adding a critical system without telling anyone. What do our resident pilots here say?

didnt the MCAS keep switching itself back on every time the pilots turned it off and eventually they lost control ?

 

[MIflyer]

Well, given that the airplane may be flown by pilots that are not all that experienced, does that not argue for more training and providing more information, rather than less?

The A-7D had a problem. Following a stall it could enter not a spin but "Post Stall Gyration." If the pilot applied spin recovery techniques and he was instead in Post Stall Gyration, the airplane would not recover. The proposal was to install a system that would measure both static and dynamic (ram) air pressures and automatically deploy a flap that would bring the aircraft out of Post Stall Gyration and into a spin, where the standard recovery techniques would work.

If you had installed such a system, why would you not tell the pilots about it?

 

[Admiral Beez]

didnt the MCAS keep switching itself back on every time the pilots turned it off and eventually they lost control ?

AIUI, the MCAS turned itself off and on, something like five seconds on, ten seconds off.

This pilot tells us below how to address MCAS with only regular 737 training. In short, in any trim issue, turn off the auto trim master switch - AIUI that IS in the user manual.



I imagine engineers at Boeing we're slapping their foreheads in frusration, shouting why didn't the pilots follow SOP for runaway trim or other trim system issues, that is turn off the trim master switch and fly the plan manually.

United Pilot Leader Says Boeing 737MAX and 727 Runaway Trim Recovery Procedures Are Similar

"The addition of MCAS to the 737MAX is not specifically referred to in the United manual, but the procedure for recovery from automatic unwarranted deployment of similar systems is clearly spelled out and long has been"

 

[rochie]

AIUI, the MCAS turned itself off and on, something like five seconds on, ten seconds off.

Thought I'd read it somewhere, was going from memory, thanks

 

[MIflyer]

An Airbus went into the ocean off the coast of France a while back while on a post-overhaul flight test. They had washed the airplane and the water froze at high altitude and jammed the sensors for the automatic stall prevention system. They could have overridden the system with the trim, but they did not.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

What do our resident pilots here say?

Not a jet pilot, so take my musings with a grain of salt. As I see it, it's a tangled web involving competition driven miscalculations by Boeing, funding driven delegation of regulatory compliance by the FAA, pilot training and experience deficiencies in parts of the airline industry, as well as a general lack of understanding of the Max's new systems among the maintainers. Your basic "perfect storm".
I believe most seasoned, Boeing experienced crews, trained to US standards, would have had the situational awareness to handle those MCAS episodes as runaway trim issues and reverted to manual trim IF they caught it in time before airspeed got too high. Unfortunately, Boeing hadn't helped, as they had reduced the mechanical advantage of the manual system, narrowing the window of time before trim forces would exceed the strength of the average pilot. (As in fact happened.)
Now what do you think the likelihood of a third world 5,000 hour captain and 1200 hour FO, new to Boeing, and new to jets, but not new to automation, is of getting this right with the telltale panel lighting up like a Christmas tree and the cockpit sounding off like a clock shop at midnight?
Like every aviation disaster, there's no simple single cause. Plenty of blame to spread around.
No cheers here,
Wes

 

[MIflyer]

In the first Max 8 crash, I believe the FO had 250 hours?

 

[Admiral Beez]

An Airbus went into the ocean off the coast of France a while back while on a post-overhaul flight test. They had washed the airplane and the water froze at high altitude and jammed the sensors for the automatic stall prevention system. They could have overridden the system with the trim, but they did not.

What flight was that?

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

What flight was that?

XL Airways Germany Flight 888T - Wikipedia

 

[Admiral Beez]

experienced crews, trained to US standards, would have had the situational awareness to handle those MCAS episodes as runaway trim issues and reverted to manual trim IF they caught it in time before airspeed got too high.

Apparently not just air speed. In the video I posted above, the pilot says the elevators on the 737 are relatively small and thus are unable to pitch the aircraft's nose up once a critical descent attitude is reached.

I wonder if MCAS had been included in the training and manuals for the 737 if that would have made any difference to the two crashes, since they both seem to have shoddy training in place.

 

[MIflyer]

In that XL Airways/ New Zealand test flight, they had engineers on board that could have told them what to do. But they back were in the passenger compartment.

Maybe test flights with engineers on board ought to have the engineers actually in the cockpit during the testing?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Apparently not just air speed. In the video I posted above, the pilot says the elevators on the 737 are relatively small and thus are unable to pitch the aircraft's nose up once a critical descent attitude is reached.

The problem is the elevators are small and the stabilizer is large. The elevators will work at any speed IF the stabilizer trim is adjusted properly, they just can't overcome an out-of-trim condition at high speed, as I understand it. I used to work on a 727 simulator, and in typical Boeing big jet fashion, that beast had to be flown precisely with trim. Two or three units out of trim for speed and CG %MAC, and stick forces would get out of hand.
When you hear of pilots frantically pulling on the yoke, you're hearing of panicked people who aren't rational anymore and are being driven by their "reptile brains". It's all about trim. And trimming by muscle power is not as fast as the electric trim, so it's possible to get behind rather quickly, especially in a rapidly changing scenario. From what I've read and heard it sounds like it would take a seasoned crew with good teamwork and a good grasp of manual trim in unusual situations to cope with that type of MCAS failure. The type of challenging drills that my friend Kathleen was subjected to in the 737-800 sim at American. (Including a single engine ILS to minimums at DCA with a runaway trim inside the FAF, a manual trim missed approach on one engine, then another single engine ILS to a landing on manual trim only.) Very busy cockpit. I'm guessing that sort of thing doesn't happen at outfits like Lion and Ethiopian.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Maybe test flights with engineers on board ought to have the engineers actually in the cockpit during the testing?

The difference between participants and hostages.

 

[MIflyer]

"Hey! We did everything right! There is no way the pilots could 'eff it up. Let's go sit in First Class and break out the bubbly!"

Too bad they saw that dust on the new paint and decided to pressure wash the airplane before they test flew it. Of course if they had not been doing stall tests everything might have been Okay anyway.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Trim is a very difficult thing to explain to nonpilots. I found in teaching that students could draw the pictures and explain the details right out of the classroom, but still not intuitively understand it until they installed it in their "muscle memory" in flight. The dynamics of flight just aren't truly understood until they're experienced. It was that way for me when I learned (slowly) to fly and for almost all of my students over the years. I think a few hours of flight training would be an excellent investment for any aviation enthusiast or scholar who would like to enhance their understanding.
Cheers,
Wes