Boeing Opposed Training 737 Max 8 Pilots

XBe02Drvr said:

The type of challenging drills that my friend Kathleen was subjected to in the 737-800 sim at American. (Including a single engine ILS to minimums at DCA with a runaway trim inside the FAF, a manual trim missed approach on one engine, then another single engine ILS to a landing on manual trim only.) Very busy cockpit. I'm guessing that sort of thing doesn't happen at outfits like Lion and Ethiopian.

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IDK about Ethiopian, but investigations of Lion Air show how the pilot farms would have eight or more trainees in the simulator to observe the two trainees at the controls. All of the trainees would run the same simulation program over and over again, so the eight chaps observing could easily foresee and plan for their time in the chair. There's a reason Lion Air isn't permitted to fly into western airspace. When your rigging the sim training and rushing pilots through their qualifications IDK if prominent inclusion of MCAS in the manual and QRH would have helped. But that was the point I think of MCAS, it's supposed to work with these third world pilots, where Boeing was aggressively selling the 737 since the system, not the pilot runs the ship. Had redundant sensors been mandatory instead of an optional upgrade this wouldn't have been an issue. Here in Canada, all four of our 737 operators (AC, Westjet, Sunwing and Air Transat) opted for the multiple sensors and thus never experienced the MCAS issue.

I wonder if all the 737 Max now sitting in Seattle and elsewhere will need to be chopped up and recycled. Boeing might be demanding a taxpayer bailout, whilst its customers who already paid for their planes will be demanding credit on future buys or never looking at Boeing again.

When my Ercoupe was first built it's "trim system" consisted of a bungee cord and a crank on the panel that you turned to add or remove pressure from the elevator control. Later an actual trim tab was added to the elevator, controlled via a Bowden cable and a lever that is set for Landing or for Takeoff - or in between for lower speed cruise.

So "Trim" may have nothing to do with aerodynamic control surfaces directly but just adding or removing pressure on the cockpit controls

Admiral Beez said:

There's a reason Lion Air isn't permitted to fly into western airspace. When your rigging the sim training and rushing pilots through their qualifications

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I've read some articles about the founder and CEO of Lion Air. He's a money wizard with little knowledge of or patience with the technical complexities of aviation and zero social conscience, and a disciple of the IIC (Idjit In Charge) at Ryan Air, both of whom make the Frank Lorenzos and Carl Icahns of our own airline history look like altar boys.

Admiral Beez said:

I wonder if all the 737 Max now sitting in Seattle and elsewhere will need to be chopped up and recycled.

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I doubt that, unless it turns out to be uncertifiable (which IS a real possibility), but I'm GUESSING that they'll all have to be retrofitted with a multi sensor comparative voting AOA system, MCAS software corrected, simulators and training modified, and each individual airframe tested by a third party, all on Boeing's dime.
This will likely put Boeing Commercial under, and a taxpayer bailout may be necessary to save the company's military and space programs from the bankruptcy courts.
Cheery thought, huh?
Wes

MIflyer said:

So "Trim" may have nothing to do with aerodynamic control surfaces directly but just adding or removing pressure on the cockpit controls

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It's all a matter of SCALE!

The control response of my airplane at 104 mph is very different from 60 mph, but of course there is nothing between the cockpit and the aerodynamic control surfaces except some clever design for such things as differential ailerons.

In contrast I know that the F-106 has a Q Feel system that adjusts the control pressures according to altitude and airspeed so that radically different control movements are not required under different flight regimes. The F-111 has a computerized flight control system using a voting system to do the same thing, and a lot more besides, as in "The idiot at the controls is trying to break the airplane! Now I'll give him as much as I can, as fast as I can and as smoothly as I can, without busting something off."

I assume that aircraft such as the 737 have something similar, to some degree.

XBe02Drvr said:

but I'm GUESSING that they'll all have to be retrofitted with a multi sensor comparative voting AOA system, MCAS software corrected, simulators and training modified, and each individual airframe tested by a third party, all on Boeing's dime.

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At which point they'll probably be the safest airliner in the world. My friends who say they'll never fly on a Max have it backwards. If I'm boarding a Max operated by a western airline I'll rest assured that this bird has been well gone over and the pilots know their biz.

MIflyer said:

I assume that aircraft such as the 737 have something similar, to some degree.

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That's Airbus stuff. You can still break a Boeing if you try hard enough. And then there's the Airbus demonstration crew that broke their bird at an airshow because the control laws wouldn't allow them enough pitch up to fly out of the low slow and dirty pass they were making. Terra FIRMA tends to be kind of unyielding in cases like that.

The one that got me was the Russian Airbus that was flying over Siberia at night and the pilot let his young son fly the airplane - while it was on autopilot. The kid overpowered the autopilot, which gave up control of the ailerons. The kid could not fly the airplane with just the ailerons and the autopilot could not fly the airplane without the ailerons. And the two were working at cross purposes; they went in inverted.

There was not a light and a klaxon that said the ailerons had been disconnected, which seems like a basic error. Airline pilots have told me that the ability to take the ailerons away from the autopilot is useful for correcting an off-of-runway-centerline condition on final, so I guess it is not as bad an idea as it sounds at first.

MIflyer said:

In the first Max 8 crash, I believe the FO had 250 hours?

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The Lion Air pilots --

Captain Bhavye Suneja -- 6028 hrs total, 5176 hrs B737

First Officer Harvino -- 5174 hrs total, 4286 hrs B737

Ethiopian Airlines pilots --

Captain Yared Getachew -- 8122 hrs total, 1437 hrs B737

First Officer Ahmed Nur Mohammod Nur -- 361 hrs total*, 207 hrs B737

*Nur was a graduate of Ethiopian Airlines in house flight training program.

MIflyer said:

Airline pilots have told me that the ability to take the ailerons away from the autopilot is useful for correcting an off-of-runway-centerline condition on final

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When you get down to ILS minimums the human eyeball can react more quickly to a lateral displacement than an autopilot tracking the localizer signal.
When I was training an instrument student in a privately owned plane with a coupled autopilot, I would have them fly a coupled ILS in visual conditions with a gusty crosswind and stay coupled right down to just before the flare, so they could experience the autopilot "chasing" the localizer signal as the crosswind drift kept changing. Down low and in close it can get darn close to acrobatic. The human eye can observe, predict, and correct before the needle deflection becomes significant; the autopilot will only respond after the deflection exceeds its tolerance threshold, so it's always chasing to catch up. This little exercise was intended as an antidote to the temptation to bust minimums by a tired pilot frantic to get home after a long trip. A hundred feet over the runway threshold and still IMC is not the place to experience this phenomenon for the first time. Get-there-itis will surely bite us!
Cheers,
Wes

I read recently where one airliner was landing under IFR conditions while another was staking off. The airplane taking off managed to block the ILS signal just long enough to leave the autopilot on the landing airplane confused about where the runway was. They had an off-runway excursion.

MIflyer said:

The airplane taking off managed to block the ILS signal just long enough to leave the autopilot on the landing airplane confused about where the runway was. They had an off-runway excursion.

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Localizer signals are notorious for distortion by any objects, especially metallic, anywhere in the forward or rear arc of the antenna array. Fixed objects, such as steel hangars, are dialed in when the system is installed, but aircraft, vehicles, or construction or snow removal equipment can mess things up in a big way. Ever notice the special hold short lines on taxiways labeled HOLD SHORT HERE IN IMC? That's to keep you out of the ILS safety zone.
We were position and hold on 22R at JFK on a 200&1/2 day with the RVR at 1800, and three stripes visible out the windshield. "Brockway 5426,Tower, confirm holding in position, traffic's marker inbound, spool em up, be ready for an immediate. Break, Speedbird 81, right turn at the end, expedite across 22Right, report clear, ground will be .7."
"Brockway's holding, spooling."
"Speedbird's clearing 22 Left, to cross right side, Ground .7"
"Kennedy tower, this Aeroflot 571 inside marker, landing right side. Are we OK land?"
Brockway 5426 cleared IMMEDIATE takeoff. Expedite. Traffic an Ilyushin three mile final. Break, Aeroflot 571, traffic departing ahead of you, cleared to land, Runway 22 Right."
"Tower, Brockway's unable. Instrument malfunction. Both our ILSs just went bonkers."
"Shit! Brockway, cancel takeoff and taxi clear. Break, Aeroflot, expect missed approach. Break, Speedbird, you still with me, say position."
"Speedbird's clearing 22 Right....er.....now."
"Iss Aeroflot OK land or no?"
"Aeroflot 571 landing clearance cancelled, execute missed approach, fly runway heading, climb and maintain 2000, contact departure 118.75. Break, Brockway 5426, your IFR flight plan is cancelled. Taxi clear of the holding area and contact ground .7 for taxi back to your gate. They will give you a landline number to call the tower supervisor."
After a heated discussion with the supervisor and an unhappy British Airways 747 captain, and repeated playing of the tapes, it was determined that the controller erred in allowing a 747 to taxi in front of the localizer antennas with an aircraft cleared for takeoff and another on approach, exacerbated by the 747 taxiing slowly after being directed to expedite. The supervisor, a non-pilot, who had never seen a low visibility takeoff from the cockpit, took some convincing from both of us pilots as to why it would be unwise to take off into the soup with navigation instruments on the fritz. The BA captain offered him a jump seat ride to London and back, which was quickly declined. Makes you wonder how that sort of blockhead got so far up the FAA ladder.
Cheers,
Wes

I believe that the case with the ILS getting masked they said was due to the incoming airliner flying a Cat 2 approach. If he had been flying a Cat 3 then they would have spaced him so close to the departing aircraft. I guess no one there realized that masking the localizer was a problem for Cat 2.

One day we went TDY to San Diego and thought we would do something smart, drive the 60 miles to Santa Barbara and get a direct flight rather than going through LAX
out of Santa Maria. Worked fine on the way down - except that the overwing escape hatch on the Metro III was open when we boarded and the flight crew did not think to close it until they cranked up. I guess the noise must have sounded kinda funny to them; for a few minutes there I thought we were going to have a waist gunner.

On the way back we could see the fog coming in all up the coast, even beginning to obscure the Santa Barbara pier as we made a straight in. Then they added power and climbed, explaining that the visibility suddenly became too poor for VOR approach they were making. You could see the cars on the 101 freeway but the airport was socked in. They said they were going to get set up for an ILS approach, and after circling NW of the airport for a few minutes they announced that the visibility was now too bad even for ILS and they were diverting - to Santa Maria! Then they said it looked a bit clearer and were going to give Santa Barbara another try, and descended into the fog with a load of very nervous passengers. Then the engines revved up and we skimmed the fog, over the mountains and finally they announced we were on final to Santa Maria. Oh, great! Our cars were in Santa Barbara! We ran into wall of fog while we were on the runway

At first they said another flight was inbound and they would wait for that one and then put us all in van to Santa Barbara. Then the next flight diverted to Bakersfield and they told us we would be all issued vouchers for $5, the difference in ticket price between Santa Barbara and Santa Maria. We called around and got family members to give us rides home and then got a govt car and drove down the next morning and picked up our cars.

So much for clever planning - but I guess that if we had gone via LAX the delay would have led to us spending the night in Bakersfield. As recent events show, the visibility along the coast of California can worsen very quickly indeed.

MIflyer said:

As recent events show, the visibility along the coast of California can worsen very quickly indeed.

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If you're used to that, you'd feel right at home here in the Northeast.
One moonlit night, I landed on the south 3000 feet of the mile long runway at MPV while the north end was in solid fog. The FAA FSS (on the foggy side) had told me the field was IFR, below minimums when I reported runway in sight from 5 miles out. After landing, I walked 200 yards into the fog bank to the FSS, and was told they were writing me up for a violation of the FARs. The specialist on duty couldn't leave his radio panel, but his relief, who had just showed up, took a walk with me, and confirmed my story. I got written up anyway, but it was not pursued by the enforcement folks, who at the time didn't consider FSS specialists "real controllers", hence not always credible witnesses.
Cheers,
Wes

XBe02Drvr said:

I believe most seasoned, Boeing experienced crews, trained to US standards, would have had the situational awareness to handle those MCAS episodes as runaway trim issues and reverted to manual trim IF they caught it in time before airspeed got too high. Unfortunately, Boeing hadn't helped, as they had reduced the mechanical advantage of the manual system, narrowing the window of time before trim forces would exceed the strength of the average pilot. (As in fact happened.)

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But the accident pilots were not dependent on manual trim. They could have used electric trim even with MCAS persistently trying to trim AND [aircraft nose down]. According to an NTSB safety recommendation report,

"As originally delivered, the MCAS became active during manual flight (autopilot not engaged) when the flaps were fully retracted and the airplane's AOA value (as measured by either AOA sensor) exceeded a threshold based on Mach number. When activated, the MCAS provided automatic trim commands to move the stabilizer AND. Once the AOA fell below the threshold, the MCAS would move the stabilizer ANU to the original position. At any time, the stabilizer inputs could be stopped or reversed by the pilots using their stabilizer trim switches. If the stabilizer trim switches were used by the pilots and the elevated AOA condition persisted, the MCAS would command another stabilizer AND trim input after 5 seconds."

In both fatal flights the FDR shows the crews overpowering MCAS with their yoke trim switches, and MCAS waiting 5 seconds before it starts messing with trim again. The Lion Air flight had about 20 cycles of that. The last couple times, for whatever reason, the crew didn't fully negate the MCAS input. There's no mention that they ever threw the stab trim cutout switches.

They did use the switches In the Ethiopian Airlines flight, after a two cycles of countering the MCAS input. However, this left the aircraft nose heavy, so the stab trim was re-enabled and two ANU inputs occurred. Five seconds later an AND input occurred, was not countered, and the plane pitched down fatally.

On the Lion Air flight before the fatal one, the MCAS problem occurred but the crew reacted differently. After several cycles of trimming ANU followed by the plane getting nose heavy, they observed it was automatically trimming AND. The behavior stopped after stab trim was cut out, and resumed after enabling stab trim. With the diagnosis confirmed, they completed the flight with manual trim. I give them full marks for troubleshooting, but pressing on with a continuous stick shaker on the captain's side and mismatched airspeeds and altitudes compared to the 1st officer seems sketchy.

Boeing did recognize the danger of a runaway MCAS and tested the scenario in a sim. However, it was a "quiet" failure. The distractions of a stick shaker and alerts for speed and altitude disagreement were not included. The NTSB is recommending that "manufacturers ensure that system safety assessments for which they assumed immediate and appropriate pilot corrective actions in response to uncommanded flight control inputs consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts and indications on pilot recognition and response."

NTSB safety recommendation

Joe Broady said:

But the accident pilots were not dependent on manual trim. They could have used electric trim even with MCAS persistently trying to trim AND [aircraft nose down].

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If they had been informed all the details of MCAS and trained accordingly. But they weren't. They were ambushed by unexpected, unexplained behavior accompanied by conflicting and confusing alarms and warnings in combinations that training had never prepared them for. Totally unacceptable.
Cheers,
Wes

Maybe the MCAS ought to be like other computers and have a big plug right in the middle of the panel they can pull out and shut it down.

MIflyer said:

Maybe the MCAS ought to be like other computers and have a big plug right in the middle of the panel they can pull out and shut it down.

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It does, AFAIK, the stabilizer trim cutoff switch. Looks like this... move it to CUT OUT and MCAS turns off. Speaking as a non-pilot, it seems the Indonesian and Ethiopian pilots should have known that they were having a runaway trim issue and flicked this switch.

Admiral Beez said:

it seems the Indonesian and Ethiopian pilots should have known that they were having a runaway trim issue and flicked this switch.

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It does, doesn't it? But like most things in aviation, it's not that simple. Read post #35, by Joe Broady, for a more thorough explanation. I'd be wasting my breath trying to expand on that. My only reservation about it is that, given the runaway trim training that 737 pilots get, and without any training on MCAS, the strategy of "beating MCAS at its own game" using the electric trim system would require seemingly counterintuitive actions amidst the cacophony of alarms and warnings the situation sets off. For the unprepared, it would be "high speed detective work in the midst of a battlefield", as one interviewed expert put it.
Cheers,
Wes