Bomber offensive vs. Gemany: you are in charge

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There was a finite supply of fuel in 1942. Churchill and his commanders chose the most effective use of all resources to wage war.
We tend to forget the human cost as well as inanimate objects of war.
There only so many people available to fight and once they have gone that's pretty much game over.
If Harris was right, the rate of attrition of German lives with the firestorms and 1000 bomer raids would have had an impact on Germany's ability to continue with the war.

This civilian lives issue must have been in mind when the V2 / V1's were planned and also, perhaps, with the A bomb too.

John
 
I think the Germans could defend themselves very well during 1942, no matter how many RAF bombers were thrown at them. Germany's biggest mistake was attacking Russia, without that front to worry about lets say, it would have been a fatal outcome for the RAF. IMO.
 
I have been giving this some thought.

If an enemy nation sends light bombers into the Ruhr Germany will waste no time installing smoke generators to augment existing smog. Visibility will be about 10 feet. Next time a light bomber dives into the Ruhr enemy aircrew won't be able to see their own wingtips. Targeting individual factory buildings would be impossible.
 
There are a lot of things that could have been done differently, however one also has to look at the scale of the operations. With something like 50% of all bombs dropped in Europe being dropped in 1944 the chances of even a major change in 1940-41-42 using anything like the existing forces causing a major change (affecting the war by months) is pretty slim. Certainly British losses could have been reduced for the same effect, or even a few more plants taken out of operation for weeks at a time but the bomber forces involved we too small to make the need repeat raids to stop factories from being repaired/ rebuilt. It took a long time to realize that bombed factories, on both sides, were not permanently destroyed and could be rebuilt in weeks if not months. Supermarines South Hampton factory could have been rebuilt, but it also could have been bombed again almost as easily. The British accepted the delay in production in dispersing the factory as a way to guard against future bomb raids.

Harris does have a lot to answer for but the British bombing effort in 1941-42 was but a pale indicator of what it would be in 1944 and different target selection, different tactics, or different training cannot change that.
 
I'm at a slight loss as to why Harris has anything to answer for?
He was a man of the moment like all great commanders in history.
John
 
I have to agree with John here.
I also find the bombing of civillians horrific and every other adjective for horrified appalled you care to list........ but given the tech of the day and the thinking of the time and the actions of the major adversary to that point it is perfectly understandable why Harris the British Gov pursued the bombing campaign, despite the horrific costs to both civillians those crews involved.

Germany thought it was fair to behave in this way and also believed all the stuff about breaking the populations' morale etc.

Even at the end I have every sympathy with those who look in horror at the cost to German civillians when it appeared the war was already long won.
Again a 'but'......but hindsight is a wondeful thing when the German leadership was continually talking about surprise revenge weapons of incredible power (and unveiling using some in that last year) and the allies knowing what they knew about their own race for the A-bomb (and knowing that they could not possibly know the absolute and total picture of the German program......which it has to be remembered they knew for sure existed) then I am not surprised they kept on hammering away relentlessly until the thing was done.

The fault and any questions to be answered for reside entirely with the political leadership of Germany, it was entirely thanks to thier actions that that dreadful catastrophe fell upon the German people.

We certainly know that regardless of the original restraint it didn't take long so that when the boot was on the other foot the German leadership had no qualms about hammering the non-combatant civillian populace as hard as their means allowed.
I have no doubt that a nazi Germany equpped with a similar heavy bomber force the fuel to operate it at the level the British Americans operated theirs would have been at least as ruthless and probably a heck of a lot more so.
 
Bomber command "hogged" a fair amount of British production at times without a corresponding impact in effect.

Pre war bomber command had first call on 2 speed supercharged engines and on adjustable/constant speed propellers.
The insistence on every bomber being used to bomb cow pastures in europe vs a few squadrons used for anti-sub patrols has already been mentioned. Anti sub work is very hard to measure as success is not measured by subs sunk but by cargo ships not sunk. It is like trying to prove a negative. While 20-40 cargo ships not sunk in the Atlantic won't end the war 6 months sooner, The aircraft, fuel and crews may have been better employed doing that than futzing about over Europe trying to find targets. How many planes/crews do you need to perfect navigation and bombing technique before you really gear up?
Granted a 500 bomber raid sounds much better in the papers than "patrol plane caused sub to submerge and miss convoy, maybe".
Going to a higher cruise speed for many of the missions flown would have hardly affected bomb load for many targets and yet save many bomber crews as the higher resulting speeds would have increased the difficulty of German interceptions.
Trading ammo for bomb load would have improved target results for little or no change in aircraft losses. A Lancaster carried some thing over ONE full minute of firing time worth of ammo for the rear turret. Better target result means fewer aircraft ( and air crew) needed and lost per 1000 tons dropped.
Better training earlier or admitting that some targets were beyond effective range, effective in the sense that closer targets mean less time for the navigation to go completely in the toilet.
 
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On the money there

Any options for the USAAF for 1943? Maybe RAF could chip in, during daylight that is?
 
No need to cut sentences out of context - I was trying to picture the RAF units going really deep, maybe as deep as Ruhr, in 1943, daylight. At least I'm not the one that does not believe that USAAF single-handendly destroyed the LW
 
tomo pauk said:
No need to cut sentences out of context - I was trying to picture the RAF units going really deep, maybe as deep as Ruhr, in 1943, daylight. At least I'm not the one that does not believe that USAAF single-handendly destroyed the LW
Click to expand...

Why? Night raids were chosen for very good reasons.
What could a raid in daylight achieve over a night raid?
Maybe I'm missing your point Tomo...
John
 
Maybe the raids could've made a mess out of, say, hydrogenation plants so next month less LW planes can take off - so LW is in fuel crisis in late 1943, 'stead in late 1944? Or maybe devastation of railroad junctions so the coal cannot be moved from mines towards wherever it's to go?
Attacking particular factories was not RAF's night bomber's forte in 1943, or at least one could gather that picture in this thread - night raids were chosen back in 1940/41 in order to protect bombers, with side effect that bombing accuracy plummeted.

So my point is that maybe RAF could use Spit VIIIs, Mossies etc to, say, harm badly the LW, so the USAAF has a better chance to hit something from the 1st sentence. Perhaps you might answer my question about Spit VIII?
 
Outside of the range of Oboe the RAF was only able to hit city centers, the rare exception being on moonlit nights, which were rather good for the nightfighters. A serious hit on refineries would be beyond its abilities in 1943. The accuracy was measured in miles. Once the area bombardment directive was issued more refined navigation that could accuratly hit at long ranges was given low priority, one such system used oboe like transponders from orbiting aircraft. Nor did the RAF move to improve their bombers so that they might survive during the day. In 1943 still had what was the best FLAK gun laying radar till then Wurzburg was only elipsed by SCR-584 in Feb 1944 so a bomber would need to be able to fly high or fast during the day.

In anycase, the refineries were being left alone untill just before d-day as the german response would soon make them relatively invulnerable.
 
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If BC could organize the Dams raids, Amiens , Copenhagen and other precision raids why were they unable to organize more precision raids rather then massacres like the Nueremberg fiasco and the Battle of Berlin which if given a close look appears to be very near a defeat . IIRC was there not a lo level daylight raid using Lancs in 42 into Germany that was close to being caualty free. Out of curiosity I`ve heard that very few Aussies were leaders of Squadrons why is that
 

Hmm, how many low level daylight ops did Lancs perform? I would venture a guess at NONE!

Mossies did a few low level daylight ops in 1942 without casualty. If we fast forward to January 1943 there were two low level operations to Berlin by Mosquitos. One broke up a speech by Goering, another a rally with Goebbels. The first raid was casualty free, teh second suffered one loss (3 aircraft in each raid).
 
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