The bad reputation of the F2A is mostly based on the single engagement of the F2A-3's over Midway, neglecting that:
1. F2A-3 was the worst performing subtype of the F2A.
2. The marine pilots involved had no combat experience.
3. Opposing Japanese pilots were combat experienced, from previous combats in WW2 and in China.
4. Marine pilots were greatly outnumbered.
5. Marine pilots did not know the strengths/weaknesseses of their opponents, thus unable to use the best tactic.
I agree with most of that, but points 2, 3 and 5 were often or generally true of Allied fighters v the Japanese in 1941-2. These factors are worth noting as *part* of explaining general Japanese fighter v fighter combat success in that period, but they don't differentiate that sharply between the Buffalo and other Allied fighters in the Pacific.
As to point 2, British/CW units didn't lack all combat experience. But even though units usually had some pilots with combat experience v the Germans, the units as a whole seldom had previous combat experience together, and lacked a lot of training together. And the more junior pilots were often not very well trained. So in total Japanese fighter units usually had the edge in overall experience as units.
As to point 5, we should remember that 'wrong tactics' was an explanation or excuse of generally poor results by RAF/CW Hurricane and Spit units in fighter combat with the Japanese all the way through 1943, at least. So while I don't disagree entirely with the point either, IMO it's often stated as if to imply 'the right tactic' was very easy to determine and if applied would grant instant success. But the record of Pacific War air combat does not support that idea so neatly and clearly.
As to point 4, VMF-221 launched 20 F2A-3's and 7 F4F-3's, of which 25 attacked the Japanese formation consisting of 36 Type 97 Carrier Attack and 36 Type 99 Carrier Bombers escorted by 36 Zeroes. The Marines attacked in two groups, but both had an initial altitude advantage. So while it was far from a perfect tactical situation for VMF-221, it wasn't hopeless either. (13 F2A's and 2 F4F's were lost, others were damaged and not ready for immediate further combat but all were eventually repaired besides those 15; Japanese losses differ even in Japanese sources but the 4 carrier kodochosho reports give 2 Zeroes were lost outright w/ one definitely to AA per both sides' records; another returning Zero pilot died of wounds and his and another a/c were perhaps shot up enough to have been total losses...but of course the carriers were all sunk later anyway; the lost Zero and DOW pilot may both have been caused by F4F's; 5 Type 97's and a Type 99 were also lost or ditched, causes not certain, AA made many claims).
Like the claim for 'vastly outnumbered' Buffalo's in Malaya/Burma/DEI the numbers argument has some truth but tends to get exaggerated. Overall, the initial Japanese superiority in fighter numbers in the SE Asian campaigns (not including the Japanese carrier force, or the US one) was only around 3:2, and the number of Army Type 1's and Navy Zeroes was actually inferior to the number of retractable undercarriage Allied fighters: the Army Type 97 was the most numerous opponent. The Japanese usually achieved numerical fighter superiority at the point of combat, from having the initiative, having longer ranged planes (which could concentrate more easily as compared to short ranged Allied fighters spread out defending different points), and general lack of coordination and planning within and among the Allied forces. Then the numbers situation tended to deteriorate for the Allies as they suffered heavier losses (though in Malaya a pretty large number of Hurricanes were later sent). Anyway it was more complicated than some pure overwhelming superiority in Japanese numbers.
Again, it's true that the Marine Buffalo's at Midway and Brit/Dutch Buffalo's as well suffered from some of the disadvantages you noted (and others) in most combats. But as far as comparing the generally similar (and dismal) fighter combat performance of Brit/Dutch/USMC Buffalo's v the Japanese, that tends to wash out, if not exactly (the British/CW and Dutch Buffalo's established a somewhat better fighter to fighter kill ratio, around 1:5 v the Marines perhaps 0 or 1:13 in that Midway combat, but they often faced Type 97's). And as far as comparing results from completely different theaters v completely different opponents, well... this is always very hard to do in a way everyone can agree with. We can always make a list of the relevant factors besides the a/c itself (hoping to get stuff like numbers correct and not say 300 Type 1 Fighters in Malaya!
). But weighing the various factors and making the final 'corrected' assessment of what various a/c 'would of/should of' achieved in 'equal' circumstances is always subjective.
Joe
