BRITAIN 1939 – 1945: THE ECONOMIC COST OF STRATEGIC BOMBING

[michaelmaltby]

".... The view in Britain was that the night area bombing had caused more damage."

Carpet bombing ...carpet sweeping ...whatever. If RAF raids were terrorizing and off-target, they were nonetheless deadly. And starting with the Ruhr dams, when the RAF wanted to mount a pin-point, precision, night attack .... they did, viaducts, tunnels, prisons, etc. etc. (at whatever cost). And RAF Pathfinders in Mosquitos were arguably the best night flyers in WW2.

To sum up: Vengeance is ugly. Much of the RAF strategy was based on the personal experience of the British public - and called for payback. The moral of the German people did not collapse, but neither had British will. That does not mean the raids were either strategically misguided or a misuse of RAF-Commonwealth assets.

DaveBender started this thread. He is not participating because: ".... I found an interesting and well researched paper on RAF Bomber Command that I thought others might like to read also. No debate from my perspective." So the topic is closed in your mind, DB ? I read the "well researched paper" (dwelling on the areas I have some knowledge and skimming the mindless cost tables to build 303 machine guns and turn them into Lancaster turrets). I will post some examples from the paper shortly, supporting my view that whoever this PhD candidate is who wrote this thesis [John Fahey, University of Sydney], he doesn't deserve to be considered a serious researcher on Bomber Command and the WW2 campaign. This thesis illustrates everything that is wrong with much of academia today. Examples to follow

MM

From the Conclusion: [italics, mine]

"... Knowing the financial cost of the strategic air offensive allows a more useful
evaluation to be made of the value of the offensive. Now historians can begin to
compare the impact of strategic bombing on Germany with the cost of that
bombing to Britain. It is now possible to see how the strategic air offensive
affected Britain. The full implications of this remain to be teased out, but the
work here suggests that Britain derived very little long-term benefit from the
£2.78 billion spent on mounting the bombing of Germany. In the first three
quarters of 1945, the production of bomber aircraft fell by 52 percent on the levels for the same three quarters of 1944.

The slump in production continued and
within a few years, the British aircraft industry would make increasing demands
on British wealth in a futile effort to maintain Britain as a leading aircraft
manufacturer.
Bomber Command's airfields also represented a poor return on investment.
Unlike shipping ports, bomber airfields did not provide a generic set of services to
civilian and military craft. With the end of the war the British government
retained very few of Bomber Command's airfields and, with the major exception
of the new bomber station at Heathrow, they were not attractive as civilian
passenger terminals. The vast majority of these airfields were simply
decommissioned and left to deteriorate...."

No insights here folks ...

Manning the Offensive: [italics, mine]

".... In Canada, the authorities made additional efforts to increase recruitment,
including an aggressive campaign to recruit United States citizens for service as
pilots and aircrew.
Despite being illegal, the recruitment of United States
citizens for service in the RCAF and RAF appears to have enjoyed the blessing of
the USAAF. General Hap Arnold, the then Chief of the United States Army Air
Corps, and the later commander of the United States Army Air Forces during
World War II, suggested that the Canadians make use of men who had been
ejected from USAAF pilot training because they had been 'fractious', went in 'for
low stunt flying', got 'drunk one time', or had been discovered as being
'married'. Arnold believed these men, who were the 'kind I'd want to keep',
had the United States being fighting a war would be of value to Britain. Despite
Arnold's helpfulness in arranging the recruitment of pilots, the Canadians faced
the legal problem of how they could protect United States citizens who had
volunteered for service. The United States authorities had already demonstrated a
distinct lack of understanding for the men and women who had volunteered to
fight in Spain and the Canadian Government was keen to ensure that none of their
recruits would be subjected to the $US2,000 fine or risk losing their United States
citizenship because they were deemed to have 'expatriated' themselves.
In order to minimise these risks the Canadian Government dropped the loyal oath
so that US citizens did not have to swear allegiance to King George. The
Canadians also trod carefully so avoid aggravating Washington by being too
obvious in their recruitment of aircrew and the system of recruitment that the
Canadians developed for United States citizens became quite complex. The
process for recruiting a US citizen involved failing them as candidates for the
RCAF but offering them employment in a Canadian association called The
Dominion Aeronautical Association, which then supplied pilots for the RAF and
RCAF.
The United States Government finally reacted to the Canadian activity
when the State Department issued a note stating that the Canadian activities were
an embarrassment and were to stop. Roosevelt forced the State Department to
drop the matter and the Canadians continued their activities, but far more
cautiously.
The cost of recruiting United States citizens for service in the RCAF and the RAF
is unknown, but Newsweek reported that by March 1940 there were 2,000 United
States volunteers on the RCAF list already..."

[Source for this attributed to Dunmore, Wings for Victory] Mr. Dunmore holds a Canadian passport, I believe, and successfully writes a mix of WW2 history and fiction].

Nothing new here folks, and what's it got to do with bombing Germany.

And this nugget:

"... The other problem facing the historian is the paucity of information available on
the numbers of aircrew that served in Bomber Command. It is impossible at this
time to allocate a proportion of the training wages of these individuals to Bomber
Command because of the absence of records relating tho the actual size of the
Command during the period of the strategic air offensive. The calculation I have .....
... has been calculated by assuming an average wage of 6s/0d per day for an average
period in training of 12 months for the 125,000 non-Canadian students. A percent of 41.6 percent
of the resulting cost is allocated to Bomber Command on the basis that the Command absorbed
41.6 percent (125,000 out of 300,000) of all aircrew graduates from the EATS and other schemes
during the course of the war .... is based upon an estimate of probable personnel levels extrapolated from the
July 1943 and 1944 figures. This approach suggests a figure of 56,515 for the
size of Bomber Command in December 1941 rising to 183,172 in June 1945.
The calculation for Bomber Command's wage bill for the war is obtained by
multiplying the base daily wage rate of 3s/6d by the average strength of Bomber
Command per year. The base daily wage is the amount paid without taking
into account allowances, payment for rank or qualifications, or any other financial
payments such as the higher rates paid to Canadian and Australian servicemen.
The average annual base wage bill for Bomber Command over the period of
World War II was £6.7 million, a total of £39.1 millions for the five years and ten
months of the conflict..."

Gripping stuff. Data without context is good for what ....?

Thanks for contributing the serious research and input, DB.

MM

 

[Kryten]

if you want to understand why area bombing was used try reading "Bomber Boys" by Kevin Wilson for instance, you grossly overestimate the ability of bomber command to put bombs any where near the actual targets chosen (which by the way always featured industrial targets in the location) they even managed to miss the target city on occasions, its a real eye opener how innacurate bombing in the dark was when you were out of Oboe range and in cloud, the pathfinder force stumbled from one crisis to the next over the 41 to 43 period!

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... the pathfinder force stumbled from one crisis to the next over the 41 to 43 period".

War. Learning curve. Courage.

What's your point, please, Kryten? ".... you grossly overestimate the ability of bomber command to put bombs any where near the actual targets chosen .... they even managed to miss the target city on occasions".

We know. We're not happy about it. But the aircrew that went out those nights weren't planning to miss the target and it took as much courage to go out that night as it did all the other nights we hit (aproximately) the target . Not so?

MM

 

[parsifal]

Just remember alsothat only a proportion of BCs attacks were carried out as "area bombing raids". as the war progressed, and blind bombing techniques and technologies improved, the proportion of raids that were consistent with "precision" bombing standards rose. OBOE permitted blind bombing that was as accurate or better than visula bombing. An increasing proportion of BC raids were daylight raids. And BCs bombing policy was not a blanket "area bombing" policy. For much of the war it included a variety of specific targets, including oil. What is true is that in 1944, Harris resisted calls until quite late to switch to the petrochemical industry. A definite error in targetting priotities. On the flip side, BC had its share of successes. The destruction of the transport network, within Germany and the occupied territorries paid off very well in the Normandy campaign and in italy, where the frontline forces of the heer were chronically short of men and supplies. Whilst some of this work was done by the US and the tactical Air force, most of the deep penetration stuff....such as the destruction of marshalling yards within Germany, was done by BC.

OBOE incidentally was not the only beam riding blind bombing aid. Whilst true that airborne OBOE was not employed (or if it was, not until very late) the RAF did develop a sort of "reverse OBOE" (Gee-H or G-H) that was airborne, and was used from 1943 (there was a gap in its use from the end of 1943 until just after Normandy, for security reasons). Its initial operational tests were failures, but eventually it became a very effective navigational and bombing aid, able to control a much larger number of aircraft, and with a greatly increased range. And most of the guidance systems mentioned (EGON, or ERGON in particular) developed by the germans were generally based on captured material they had scrounged from BC crash sites. So their effectiveness at resistance to counterrmeasures, had they been implemented has to be seriously doubted.

 

[Kryten]

".... the pathfinder force stumbled from one crisis to the next over the 41 to 43 period".

War. Learning curve. Courage.

What's your point, please, Kryten? ".... you grossly overestimate the ability of bomber command to put bombs any where near the actual targets chosen .... they even managed to miss the target city on occasions".

MM

my point being mate, its easy now to look back and berate the use of area bombing, but back then the war had to be taken to Germany, attacking the German infrastructure had a strategic effect on the war and unfortunatly flattening large portions of towns and cities was the only way you could have that effect!
destroying the water and power grid, driving the work force out of thier homes and flattening as much of the industrial base as possible made up for the inability to hit point targets, or in some cases towns!
call it terror bombing if you like but the options were severely limited by the realities!

 

[michaelmaltby]

Thank you, mate.

MM

 

[Kryten]

Thank you, mate.

MM

Nay Worries

 

[Siegfried]

@michaelmaltby

Britain never suffered successful V weapons reprisals because the entire V weapons program would need to have started 6-9 months earlier or sometime before the d-day landings to be effective. For instance a V1 campaign starting December 43 instead of late June 44 after the d-day landings. That would mean the V1's could be fired from multiple locations and prevent concentration of Allied defences (AAA, Barrage Balloons). Within 5 months of the V1 offensive beginning Argus/Fiesler had managed to get V1 Speed to 480mph and a month latter 495mph; they were beyond the ability of even the P80A and Meteor III to intercept. The Ewald II/Sauerkirsche II mid-course guidance system was also being built at the close of the campaign to improve accuracy (to about 1km) while long range versions (400 miles) were also on their way.

The initial purpose of the early inaccurate unguided autopilot versions was a kind of counter terror area bombardment. That's how it was conceived of; to push the allies into backing off what was completely seen as their terror campaign. It was seen purely tit for tat. Apart from the effects of the double cross system it can hardly have been less accurate than H2S/H2X estuarine city targets aside. The V1 was also extremely cheap: about 280-350 hours to build inclusive autopilot and was 50% by weight warhead.

The V2's crude LEV-3 guidance system basically just tilted the missile to 48 degrees and then cut the motor through an integrating accelerometer. Accuracy was CEP 4.5km from German tests. About 25% of missiles were launched using the Hawaii/Viktoria guidance beam which operated like a x-geraet beam to halve lateral dispersion. Doppler motor cut of could reduce down range dispersion 10%.

A full system was called 'vollzirkel' which used a beam riding system with 0.05 degree accuracy combined with both doppler and downrange distance cutoff to get a theoretical accuracy of 500m.

The winged A4b, probably another 6-12 months from service could've done even better.

Of course the desperate attacks on allied port operations in Antwerp without the more accurate systems was ineffective.

The point is that "reaping the whirlwind" could have gone both ways and it would have been triggered by the area bombardment campaign; which showed restraint only in legalistic terms: ie there was a nominal target (eg a railway) for the sake of RAF Airman POW's status as war criminals; but it was basically arse covering.

The attack on Coventry would have effected the British psyche deeply. However it was not an attack on "working class people" though the collateral effect was that. It was an attack on machine tools and engine production plants. Old cities had houses abutting the walls of factories. Had the factories of Coventry been in separate industrial estates I doubt the Luftwaffe would have been inclined to spread their attacks to those areas. It must be remembered that the Coventry attack itself was seen as a response to what appeared to be indiscriminate attacks on German towns.

Psychologically the Luftwaffe wasn't at this point by Coventry:

" the aim of the Combined Bomber Offensive...should be unambiguously stated [as] the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers, and the disruption of civilised life throughout Germany.
... the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives, the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale, and the breakdown of morale both at home and at the battle fronts by fear of extended and intensified bombing, are accepted and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not by-products of attempts to hit factories."
Arthur Harris.


I also make the assertion that H2S/H2X was bunk. I gave the illusion of blind bombing. It may have worked somewhat in estuarine coastal cities but 99% of the time it was off several miles. The transponder based navigation (Oboe and derivatives) was good but it was limited by horizon and the over the horizon versions were not properly perused, leaving only H2X.

The main point I make however is that once Bomber Command went down this path it developed tunnel vision and completely failed to develop better aircraft or systems and this was to a path set by Lindemann. There certainly were many dissenters with the crude method of area bombardment on both technical, strategic and moral grounds.

 

[parsifal]

Im not a great fan of H2s either, but its a bit of stretch to call it bunk, given that it (or derivatives of it) remained in operational usage until very recently. it could work, and more accurately than you are admitting, although often it failed as you say

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... The attack on Coventry would have effected the British psyche deeply. However it was not an attack on "working class people" though the collateral effect was that. It was an attack on machine tools and engine production plants. Old cities had houses abutting the walls of factories. Had the factories of Coventry been in separate industrial estates I doubt the Luftwaffe would have been inclined to spread their attacks to those areas. It must be remembered that the Coventry attack itself was seen as a response to what appeared to be indiscriminate attacks on German towns. "

IIRC, Siegfried, old Coventry was one of the last "wooden" cities in the UK in 1940. I'm sure German intelligence hadn't figured that out though ...

What you're posting is fascinating stuff, but, in what way does it refute, colour, change or reinforce what I posted: The Germans used V weapons to the extend that they were able to use V weapons ... for example, once Antwerp was in Allied hands it became a target.

If they ..., could they ..., would they .....? Yes.

".... The main point I make however is that once Bomber Command went down this path it developed tunnel vision and completely failed to develop better aircraft or systems .."

Like the B-29 perhaps, or the Norden ...?

The difficulty of strategic bombing had been seen on June 15th, 1944, when a raid on Yawata's iron and steel works resulted in just 2% of the complex being damaged. On August 20th, a raid on the same plant led to 18 bombers being shot down out of 70 planes – an attrition rate of 25%.The target was barely touched. Such losses for so little reward convinced many crews that strategic bombing was untenable.


MM

 

[kettbo]

the original estimations....AAA guns used at night against the British and Canadians and other Allies work just as well in the day against the Americans. So the math needs to be adjusted, 'cost' reduced as not a night-only asset

 

[parsifal]

the original estimations....AAA guns used at night against the British and Canadians and other Allies work just as well in the day against the Americans. So the math needs to be adjusted, 'cost' reduced as not a night-only asset

I agree, but the force was established principally prewar through to the end of 1942. thereafter there was a further expansion but a proportion of the guns manufactured were needed to replace worn or failing guns. for example, by 1944, there were an average of 300 gun failures per month in the LW.

The other issue is ammunition manufacture. When the british offensive kicked off, which really wasnt until the latter part of 1941, the germans found their prewar estimates on ammunition required was badly underestimated. throughout 1941 and '42 they spent a lot of manpower and cash rectifying that by expanding their munitions production (some for regular field weapons, some for AA). That required for AA arose all because of the british efforts.....US did not really kick off their bomber offensive until 2nd quarter of 1943.

So while true that AA costs can be spread, there needs to be a bias, a big one, towards the need driven by the RAF

 

[Siegfried]

Re Coventry; Yes, I have no doubt the Luftwaffe used the explosives and incendiaries on target and broadened the aimpoint enough around the target to ensure the area was broader than their overall accuracy and they exploited the flammable nature of the target area. No doubt they knew this would kill civilians. This still isn't 'area bombardment' which literally was aiming at the CBD of a city rather than specific areas where there was a target even if the area was broad. The attack on Coventry wasn't like the a decison to flatten 80 of Germanies biggest cities. (The Baedecker raids most be viewed in that light and the light of them being revenge for BS Lubeck raid) The Luftwaffe at the time were using X-geraet, which was about as accurate as oboe. Interestingly there were proposed amendments to the Hague conventions that would've precluded bombing had there been housing in the area: it was felt however that housing would literally be built there as 'human shielding'. The problem with area bombardment is you give up on not properly developing more accurate and 'decent' alternatives; which I think is what happened. I believe that when bomber command did specifically target areas in cities (railway stations) they hit less than with area bombardment but its likely that collateral damage was less and the expenditure of resources less.

The Lancaster was twaddle for instance from this perspective; romanised, vulnerable articulated lorry with poor escape systems. It was a system which could give accuracy only in unique circumstances and safety to its crews only at night and in large opperations. Its definciencies compelled the area bombardment campaign in many ways.

Yes, the V1 V2 campaign was terror, seen as counter terror. It's use against Antwerp was an act of pointless post invasion desperation in the hopes that it would slow port movements down. Using missiles now too far from Britain to reach it and to inaccurate to have the effect on the port facilities desired.

Re B-29's. Again another ill conceived bomber whose conception preceded any ww2 combat experience. A proper bomber design is dimensioned to achieve the same speed as friendly and enemy fighters not 20%-40% less. This does not cover the B-29. A faster B-29 can come in lower, faster and more accuratly.

The ultimate expression of 'cost effectiveness' were bombs like Fritz-X (a 1942/42 weapon) and azon.

I'd like to add that what I was getting at that if parties stop showing that they are exercising restraint then a cycle of escalation starts. Had bomber command given some indication that it was exercising restraint or prepared to then it may just have been that the V weapons campaign would have been delayed until it also produced more accurate results since the Germans also would then not wish to escalate. The V weapons didn't have too much effect but only because they came too late to reach numerical and technical maturity. The potential for 4000-5000 V2 month combined with similar numbers of V1 existed.

From what I can see greater use of precision daylight raids should have been possible with the right bombers.

It would also have been possible to improve the night bombing campaign to one of accuracy throught the reich.

 

[Hop]

The attack on Coventry would have effected the British psyche deeply. However it was not an attack on "working class people" though the collateral effect was that. It was an attack on machine tools and engine production plants. Old cities had houses abutting the walls of factories. Had the factories of Coventry been in separate industrial estates I doubt the Luftwaffe would have been inclined to spread their attacks to those areas.

The Luftwaffe orders for Coventry stated that worker's housing was a deliberate target because it would hinder reconstruction. This was deliberate area bombing of exactly the sort Bomber Command later adopted.

In fact, nearly everything BC did was an adaption of techniques the Luftwaffe practiced against Britain.

It must be remembered that the Coventry attack itself was seen as a response to what appeared to be indiscriminate attacks on German towns.

Hardly. British bombing at the time consisted of small numbers of bombers trying to hit specific military and industrial targets. In other words, exactly the same tactics the Luftwaffe had been carrying out in the west since the night of 9/10 May 1940.

The only differences in British and German bombing at the time were that the Luftwaffe were operating on a much larger scale, and the Luftwaffe had already carried out area bombing attacks, starting with Rotterdam, moving on to London, Southampton and other British cities.

In the whole of 1940 Bomber Command killed about 350 civilians in Germany.

The Luftwaffe killed 257 British civilians in July, over 1,000 in August, 6,954 in September, 6,334 in October, 4,588 in November and 3,793 in December.

It wasn't until mid December that Bomber Command carried out their first area attack, on Mannheim.

Re Coventry; Yes, I have no doubt the Luftwaffe used the explosives and incendiaries on target and broadened the aimpoint enough around the target to ensure the area was broader than their overall accuracy and they exploited the flammable nature of the target area. No doubt they knew this would kill civilians. This still isn't 'area bombardment'

It is exactly area bombardment. It taught the RAF the technique. Everything they did later in the war, electronic navigation, pathfinders, blast bombs, incendiaries, the focus on housing, were all features of the Luftwaffe attack on Coventry. The first RAF area attack, on Mannheim, was planned as a direct response to Coventry.

The problem with area bombardment is you give up on not properly developing more accurate and 'decent' alternatives; which I think is what happened.

But BC didn't give up on accuracy. They turned themselves in to the most accurate heavy bomber force of the war. They developed all the electronic aids the US adopted.

The Lancaster was twaddle for instance from this perspective; romanised, vulnerable articulated lorry with poor escape systems. It was a system which could give accuracy only in unique circumstances and safety to its crews only at night and in large opperations. Its definciencies compelled the area bombardment campaign in many ways.

The Lancaster was an aircraft focused on what bombing was about: dropping bombs. No bomber was safe in daylight without heavy escort. No bomber was particularly accurate. Indeed, darkness enabled Lancasters to bomb from lower altitude which made them more accurate than the US heavies.

I'd like to add that what I was getting at that if parties stop showing that they are exercising restraint then a cycle of escalation starts.

Definitely. Bomber Command started the war with a ban on attacking any targets in Germany in case of civilian casualties. They were allowed to bomb in the immediate rear of the German advance following Luftwaffe raids on France, Belgium and the Netherlands. They were allowed to bomb military targets elsewhere in Germany after Rotterdam. They were first allowed to attack targets of opportunity following the beginning of the Blitz on London, and they carried out their first area attack after Coventry.

There weren't really any more gloves to come off after that, other than gas, and thankfully that's one tactic the Germans chose not to pioneer.

From what I can see greater use of precision daylight raids should have been possible with the right bombers.

It would also have been possible to improve the night bombing campaign to one of accuracy throught the reich.

Bomber Command did improve accuracy to a point where they were more accurate than the USAAF. I don't think the technology of the day allowed anything better.

 

[rochie]

well congrats davebender, you got what i belive you were after, that is a debate about how all who served in bomber command were war criminals and all other who area bombed were not because they had a good reason for it, well done.

there is zero difference between what BC did to German cities and to what the LW di to British and other european ones or what the US did to japenese cities
and i believe the USAF in Europe were hardly more accurate in daylight than BC were at night, they were not only dropping bombs within factory walls or railway staitons etc

this is what i thought would happen to this thread

 

[michaelmaltby]

"..... From what I can see greater use of precision daylight raids should have been possible with the right bombers."

OK, I'll bite. Bombers such as .....?

"..... A proper bomber design is dimensioned to achieve the same speed as friendly and enemy fighters not 20%-40% less."

Beyond the Mosquito, Arado and Me-262 jet bombers .... do any examples of your thesis actually exist in WW2 (or Korea) ..? By Viet Nam the USAF has the F-105 Thunderchief, a successful heavy bomber (by WW2 payload standards) but which incurred tremendous losses despite the parity you extol, Siegfried.

MM

 

[Kryten]

@michaelmaltby

Britain never suffered successful V weapons reprisals because the entire V weapons program would need to have started 6-9 months earlier or sometime before the d-day landings to be effective. For instance a V1 campaign starting December 43 instead of late June 44 after the d-day landings. That would mean the V1's could be fired from multiple locations and prevent concentration of Allied defences (AAA, Barrage Balloons). Within 5 months of the V1 offensive beginning Argus/Fiesler had managed to get V1 Speed to 480mph and a month latter 495mph; they were beyond the ability of even the P80A and Meteor III to intercept. The Ewald II/Sauerkirsche II mid-course guidance system was also being built at the close of the campaign to improve accuracy (to about 1km) while long range versions (400 miles) were also on their way.]]]quote

Bear in mind the whole programme was delayed by several months by the RAF raid on Peenemunde!

without that the V weapons would have been available earlier!

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Bear in mind the whole programme was delayed by several months by the RAF raid on Peenemunde! without that the V weapons would have been available earlier!"

Agreed.

MM

 

[nuuumannn]

"... Bear in mind the whole programme was delayed by several months by the RAF raid on Peenemunde! without that the V weapons would have been available earlier!"

Agreed.

MM

Yep, me too. From reading your posts Siegfried, you have a very subjective and simplistic point of view on many things. Firstly, the Germans chose direct attacks on British cities at night in an attempt to break British morale since their daylight bombing campaign during the Battle of Britain was falling short of what they hoped to achieve. Sure, it is widely publicised that the LW were bombing London because the RAF bombed Berlin, but there is ample evidence that supports the notion that direct attacks on British cities by the LW were to be made in support of the German invasion of Britain. This does not support claims of tit for tat, also...

Had bomber command given some indication that it was exercising restraint or prepared to then it may just have been that the V weapons campaign would have been delayed until it also produced more accurate results since the Germans also would then not wish to escalate.

...is utter nonsense. Hitler had a particular fancy for exotic weaponry and he would not have failed to use them at any time of the war had they become available sooner.

Another thing; H2S was was a ground mapping radar; it aided the bombers finding their way to the enemy cities. We've been over this in another thread. Sure, it had its faults, but for its time it was effective enough to improve BC's ability to reach the target area over their previous efforts. I'm sure the scientists who developed it thought it was the best they could do with the technology of the day. Unfortunately for you, your enormous knowledge of electronics gives you a better idea of how more advanced systems might have or should have worked, but this means you disregard contemporary efforts out of hindsight rather than based on what was considered advanced and effective for the time. Have you read "Bomber Command" by Max Hastings as I suggested in the Game Changers forum? I suspect not.

Parsifal; Intellectually challenging, supremely accurate and thoroughly enjoyable reading as always.

Too tired tonight, but enjoying very much.

 

[Tante Ju]

The Luftwaffe orders for Coventry stated that worker's housing was a deliberate target because it would hinder reconstruction.

Do you has this orders? A link maybe?