IMHO this is incredible. Sources behind the percentages ?
BRITAIN 1939 – 1945: THE ECONOMIC COST OF STRATEGIC BOMBING
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IMHO this is incredible. Sources behind the percentages ?
This is interesting: can you provide a source or link for these orders? Do you know of records of actual targeting?
I've heard that, I doubt it was anything but a transient effect from comparing a seasonal periods of USAAF opperation in high cloud cover with Bomber Command opperation in situations when Oboe could be used.
The USAAF started using Oboe and its own implementation Micro-H and in addition H2X. While H2X/H2S was completely ineffective on 80% (thereabouts) cloudy days it did work well in conjunction with visual bombing on circa 50% obscured days presumably because the bomb aimer and his assistant H2X opperator where able to correlate visuals of the ground wth their radar 'images' and then ofset bomb if the target was obscured.
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parsifal
Colonel
There is not a single source that contains all of the information behind this. and some of it is estimation, but not significantly so. The main sources I rely on are
Overy, Richard "Germany, 'Domestic Crisis' and War in 1939" from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz Blackwell: Oxford, 1999
Hans-Joachim Braun, "The German Economy in the Twentieth Century", Routledge, 1990
From these sources it was possible for me to determine German Gross National Income, pegged to 1936 prices. Then I had another source that looks at the amounts spent on the Lufwaffe overall. This is photocopy that I have, and can scan if you want to see it, but its nearly 30 years old. I dont have the book title but I recall it was dealing with the economic costs of establishing and maintaining the Lufwaffe
The contained in this appendix are the cost of aircraft development, design and production. No figures were given on manning and training costs, this was extra.
So, from the source material we can produce a list, on a year by year basis that lists: Total income(in Billions)/Total expenditure on R&D and aircraft production/ and a percentage of gross Income. Just note that this costing is for aircraft design and developm,ent. It does not include manning costs, the costs of establishing the ground organizations, the costs of establishing or maintaining the flak arm ( have figure3s for this last item however), the costs of flak artillery ammunition (have figures for this as well).
Putting what I do have to hand we find the following:
1936:6.5/0.9/13.9%
1937:7.5/0.9/12.0%
1938:9.0/1.0/11.1%
1939:8.5/2.5/29.4%
1940:11.0/3.5/31.8%
1941:10.0/5.0/50%
1942:10/6.5/65%
1943
/9.0/?There are complications after 1941, because of Soviet involvement, and after 1943, the USAAC is also being shot at
Flak and flak expenditures I will post later tonite...want to go for a ride right now. I dont have figures on manning costs.
Also the above figures represent the total aircraft expenditures.....for evrything the Germans were building. However in 1936-40, before they were engaged in defending their own skies, they were spending a maximum of 30% of their national income on aircraft procurement. From 1941 when the continuous offensive began along with the invasion of Russia, expenditures on aircraft development and procurement shot to, and beyond 50%, and from the production figures its clear even at that early date they were concentrating on fighters and nightfighters...fighter production in 1941 shot up nearly 50%, whilst other categories moved much more modestly. its clear that this added effort on aircraft design and production was mostly being directed into the fighter arm.
its going to quite easy to at least give ggod indication that a huge slice of the german pie was being ploughed into defending their skies from British Bombers
The debate over area bombardment included such as R.V.Jones and others insisting that better bombing aids could be developed that would be more effective than the area bombardment directive.
Opperation Sea Lion never got anywhere near being implemented, I fail to see then how it can then be blamed for instigating a terror bombing of British cities as a prepatory invasion effort.
My 'thesis' is that the area bombardment directive 'tunneled' efforts down one path.
The Luftwaffe had in anycase rejected Douhets theories (Luftwaffe Directive 16). You will note a dive bombing obsession even on Bomber A and Bomber B (Ju 88 and He 177)
Hitler did not initially like the V2, he disparaged it as fantastic parquetry that could not be walked upon because it would explode, he had a nightmare that it was destroying the earths protective mantle. Nazis were pagan nature whoreshippers at heart. Speer kept it going as a matter of national pride and interest in space travel. Hitler only changed his mind when he saw film of succesfull launches and authorised production in October 1942.
To put that in context: The first 1,000 bomber raid by the RAF was codenamed Operation Millennium, Cologne was chosen as the target and the raid took place on the night of 30/31 May 1942.
I do not see that he was irrantional about 'exotic weapons'. The outsize Artillery was designed for deep earth penetration of fortifications such as the Maginot line. It was of unprecedented capabillity as results in Sevestapol show, only matched by latter weapons such as tallboy (1944) and grand slam (1945). He many have induged fantasies of monumentally large architecture and super H class battleships but he knew they were impractical and saw them (the battleships) as some post war symbol.
Re the V2. Its original accuracy objectives, that von Braun 'promised' was about 1 mil (milliradian) ie 1m at 1000m and 300m at 300km: about the same as the best artillery.
The system to achieve this was to use beam riding with 0.05 degree accuracy, a doppler speed measure, a range measure to ensure perfect cuttof equation about 65 seconds after launch. This system, which used a 50cm frequency and a 7m Wurzburg dish, got into trouble with ground wave interferance. Interim systems were used instead but development continued. A fequency increase to 27cm was not enough so efforts continued. They were apparently succesfull because they were being built as the war closed.
Basic system:
1 LEV-3 a pair of gyros with potentiometers and one accelerometer. Best accuracy CEP 4.5km.
2 Alternative beam system Viktoria-Hawaii, a single dimensional beam which could use doppler instead of accelerometer cutoff. Halves lateral dispersion, takes 10% of down range dispersion if used with doppler. This was used in 25% of launches though doppler on few or none.
Advanced system.
1 SG-66 (to be productionised as SG-70) 3 gyros on a stable platform, two accelerometers: one for lateral control the other for down range and slant range control.
Was test flown a few times. Probably incorporated more advanced cuttof equation: speed plus down range.
2 Vollzirkel. Columated beam riding, dopper velocity and transponder range. Expected accuracy at about 500m at full range from desired re-entry point; re-entry wind drift excluded.
A few other things, air bearing gyros were planed but only being used experimentally in a u-boat INS.
The first oders on V2 were at RM38500 or RM40,000, about half the cost of a single engined fighter with engine.
Assembly hours were
1 First 1000 about 10,000 hours
2 After first 1000 times drop to 7500
3 After 10,000 cost to be less than 4000 hours each.
IE a workforce of 25,000 could in theory produce 1000 missiles/month
.
The point is this: von Braun begged for another year of development to get the production costs down and the accuracy up. It was rushed into production precisely because it was a reprisal weapon.
A missile with 1 mil accuracy (potentially 100m at short range) is a tactically usefull weapon. The abillity to land 1000 missiles of about 1000 missile lauched within 1km of target also makes it strategically usefull and likely cost effectve.
Hence its premature introduction was heavily motivated by it being seen as a reprisal terror weapon. It made more sense to wait another 6-12 months for the more accurate versions.
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parsifal
Colonel
Looking at the flak arm, main source for me is Edward B westermann, "Flak - German Antiaircraft Defences" Kansas University Press 2001.
The way the information is presented in this book makes it incompatible to the way Overy and Braun and my photocopied appendix present their information. Main problem is Westermann does not use dollar values for his costs just percentages of military budgets. So its not entirely possible to give a dollar figure, but it is possible to determine the proportion of German military effort that was going into the flak defences.
Westermann examines a lot of things about flak that are absolutely eye opening, and i should say his general position is as an ardent supporter of the flak arm, not as a detractor. But with respect to the conoiomic costs ogf flak he looks at the costs of equipment procurement (new guns and detection equipment mostly), as one part of his analysis. in the second part he looks at the cost of ammunition expenditure by the flak arm.
As far as I can tell he does not examine as a budgetry analysis, the cost of the manpower used to man the flak batteries, but he does provide some information on the amount of manpower needed to man the flak batteries....suffice it to say it was enormous....I will look at this part of the problem in subsequent posts.
Staring with 1940, Westermann notes that the Germans expended 15% of their military budget on Flak artillery, and associated gizmos as well as ammunition. For each of the quarters of the year, they flak ammunition production as a percentage of the military budget had been 8, 11, 8 and 14%. The last quarter is significant, because that was the first time that BC made a significant effort over germany. Prior to that, the ammunition expended outside the Reich had been roughly equal to that expended inside the Reich, but in the last quarter, when ammunition expeniture started to rise, over 80% of ammunition expenditure was expended within germany. So at least 80% of ammunition expended in that last quarter had to be directed against BC, and the total proportion of the budget used as flak ammunition amounted to 14% of the budget. Thats 11.2% of the german military budget being shot at BC already. Not a bad return for 12.19% of the british Budget IMO....Of the new equipment acqired, some was captured, but the germans found this to be of only a limited saving. They still had to provide transport and directors for a lot of these guns.
Westermnn says that 74% of flak guns were deployed into the Reich itself.
In 1941, Germans began to introduce gun laying radar for their flak on a large scale, which had a profound effect on its effectiveness. Still, deployment of radar was incomplete by a wide margin, and ammunition expenditure per kill remained very high. about 8250 rounds of heavy and 18232 of Light. total flak ammunition expenditure for just January to April had been just under a million rounds of heavy flak and 1.9 million rounds of light.
For the whole of 1941, about 80% of flak ammunition and deployment remained in either occupied france or Germany. The relatively small effort in the east had paid very big dividends, however. The average ammunition expenditure per kill on the eastern front had been only 1320 rounds per kill.
Looking at the whole year, flak as a percentage of the military budget absorbed 15%, in the first quarter, 17% in the second quarter, 19% in the third quarter and 24% of the overall military budget in the fourth quarter. According to Westermann, fully 1/3 of the German budget for ammunition had been used for flak, and of this more than 70% was expended in Western Europe. Admittedly, however there was a trend to send equipment to the east, though still less than 50% of overall production.
1942 was the peak year of efficiency for the Flak arm. With the introduction of gun laying radars, the average heavy flak expenditiure per kill droped to 4000 rounds per kill. However, manpower shortages forced a number of expedients that in the end cost the flak arm its efficiency. From 1942, and incresing percentage of the home based flak batteries were manned by workers....part timers (heimatflak-artillierien), which had the unfortunate effect of pushing up the average rounds per kill to more than 16000 heavy flak rounds. Burst guns incidents also shot up markedly from 1942 (I think as a direct result of using home guardsmen in the flak, as well as excessive barrel wear that started to affect the flak park from 1942) ) to around 300 incidents per month in 1944.
A budget breakdown isnt given as it is for 1940 and 1941, for the chapter dealing with 1943, he gives actual figures (in RM) for military spending. The budget for 1943 for weapons and ammunition amounted to RM 132 million, and envisaged RM 34 million for the flak arm. However the Flak budget blew out, they spent 29% on weapons and 14% on flak ammunition....I expect that 1942 was somewhere between 1941 and 1943.
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parsifal
Colonel
yes, I think so, but before writing off flak as over costly, just remember that expenditure on aircraft as a proportion of the overall military budget was even higher. And until well into 1942, flak remained BCs biggest killer by a wide margin, and forced the british bombers to fly high which cost accuracy. German flak whilst not equipped with radar (to any great extent) had a hard time hitting BC night bombers.....the main reason the british adopted night bombing incidentally, but as radar became more and more prevalent, the differnce in kill rates between night and day shrank almost to nothing.
I would say that in early 1942, the Germans had the most finely developed flak arm in the world, though General Pile in the British Isles was starting to challenge that position
I would say that in early 1942, the Germans had the most finely developed flak arm in the world, though General Pile in the British Isles was starting to challenge that position
Flak was indeed killing as twice as many of BC's night bombers vs. what radar-less LW night-fighters were managing, in the 1st half of war. But, if we put absolute numbers at the desk, its a case of 3-4 kills per night by Flak, vs. 1-2 by NFs - during secong half of 1941. That's for 3000-4000 heavy flaks, plus a plethora of 37mm and smaller guns, in Reich defense. Was RAF loosing more bombers operationally, than via German effort?
It would be nice to have numbers for 1942-45.
As for reduced accuracy of RAF's bombers, here is how they were accurate (no offense for the valiant crews - it took far better equipment to achieve the really accurate night bombing):
It had started with a report initiated by Cherwell and delivered on 18 August 1941 by D M Butt, a member of the War Cabinet Secretariat.[note 3] [5] The report based on analysis of aerial photographs concluded that less than one third of sorties flown got within five miles (eight km) of the target. As Butt did not include those aircraft that did not bomb because of equipment failure, enemy action, weather or getting lost, the reality was that about five per cent of bombers setting out bombed within five miles of their target.[6]
As far as Flak effort goes, it could hardly make RAF bombers to miss that far.
So while I'll readily agree that Germans have had the finest/best heavy Flak arm, their best was not good enough.
edit: the quote (in italic) is from Wiki; more about the Butt report: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butt_Report
It would be nice to have numbers for 1942-45.
As for reduced accuracy of RAF's bombers, here is how they were accurate (no offense for the valiant crews - it took far better equipment to achieve the really accurate night bombing):
It had started with a report initiated by Cherwell and delivered on 18 August 1941 by D M Butt, a member of the War Cabinet Secretariat.[note 3] [5] The report based on analysis of aerial photographs concluded that less than one third of sorties flown got within five miles (eight km) of the target. As Butt did not include those aircraft that did not bomb because of equipment failure, enemy action, weather or getting lost, the reality was that about five per cent of bombers setting out bombed within five miles of their target.[6]
As far as Flak effort goes, it could hardly make RAF bombers to miss that far.
So while I'll readily agree that Germans have had the finest/best heavy Flak arm, their best was not good enough.
edit: the quote (in italic) is from Wiki; more about the Butt report: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butt_Report
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From The Night Blitz by John Ray:
In the judgment of Richard G Davis, one of the USAF's official historians, it's "overall".
The USAAF operated in cloud cover most of the time. 48% of 8th AF sorties used radar bombing, the tonnage was probably over 50% (they found they could fly lower and carry heavier loads in worse weather because the Luftwaffe were less likely to attack effectively).
They never put the same sort of effort in to electronic bombing aids the RAF did. The 8th would bomb as soon as the lead aircraft did. The RAF would send in a master bomber who hung around the target area, who could order fresh markers put down, and who could direct bombers in to how much to offset from the markers.
What that means is if the lead bomber in a US formation dropped in the wrong place, every other crew did as well. If the RAF's first markers went down wrong, more markers could be put down, and crews could be instructed to bomb away from the markers.
According to a USAAF report on bombing 1 September - 31 December 1944, bombing through 80%+ cloud made up 50% of total bombing. Bombing through 50% with radar accounted for 3% of tonnage.
When bombing using radar through complete cloud, 0.2% of bombs dropped within 1,000 ft of the aiming point, 5.6% within a mile. 50% cloud wasn't much better, just 4.4% within 1,000 ft, although nearly half of bombs were within a mile.
"From The Night Blitz by John Ray:
A Luftwaffe order declared that reconstruction and the resumption of manufacturing would be hindered 'by wiping out the most densely populated worker's settlements'. This objective was reinforced by the announcement that each aircraft would carry two parachute mines. Stahl, who flew a Ju 88 that night, wrote that the mines he carried 'are shaped like big barrels and are intended to float down on to the target under parachutes'. Obviously there was no chance of aiming these with pinpoint accuracy."
Thanks. This is an assertion or opionion by a historian, not cited reference or reference to a witness or some first hand or second hand source that can tell us about Luftwaffe targeting policy, tactics and stratagy that night. The segway to Stahls opinion on the relative inaccuracy of parachute mines tells us little about targeting.
The parachute mines should really be called droque mines. Unlike a parachute they sank at 200ft/sec not 20ft/sec (so they fell at 1/3rd the rate of normal bombs and would drift 3 times as far if incorrectly compensated). The idea was to increase the ratio of explosives to casing and prevent the explosives from spilling out of a split casing before the fuse could detonate it. Some may have had time delay fuses. They were a convenient adaption of sea mines I believe
A Luftwaffe order declared that reconstruction and the resumption of manufacturing would be hindered 'by wiping out the most densely populated worker's settlements'. This objective was reinforced by the announcement that each aircraft would carry two parachute mines. Stahl, who flew a Ju 88 that night, wrote that the mines he carried 'are shaped like big barrels and are intended to float down on to the target under parachutes'. Obviously there was no chance of aiming these with pinpoint accuracy."
Thanks. This is an assertion or opionion by a historian, not cited reference or reference to a witness or some first hand or second hand source that can tell us about Luftwaffe targeting policy, tactics and stratagy that night. The segway to Stahls opinion on the relative inaccuracy of parachute mines tells us little about targeting.
The parachute mines should really be called droque mines. Unlike a parachute they sank at 200ft/sec not 20ft/sec (so they fell at 1/3rd the rate of normal bombs and would drift 3 times as far if incorrectly compensated). The idea was to increase the ratio of explosives to casing and prevent the explosives from spilling out of a split casing before the fuse could detonate it. Some may have had time delay fuses. They were a convenient adaption of sea mines I believe
Davis" numbers re: % of 8th Air Force bombs dropped on Germany by non-visual means, by month.
One of Davis' points is that the 8th AF was willing to take the fight to Germany without waiting for nice sunny days.
Will try to upload bomb spread patterns from the report referred to later on. Wife ack demands "vaccuuming" at the moment.
"Don't give me no hand-me down love
Got one already."
Do we need a new thread for this? Has little to do with the original thread title.
One of Davis' points is that the 8th AF was willing to take the fight to Germany without waiting for nice sunny days.
Will try to upload bomb spread patterns from the report referred to later on. Wife ack demands "vaccuuming" at the moment.
"Don't give me no hand-me down love
Got one already."
Do we need a new thread for this? Has little to do with the original thread title.
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parsifal
Colonel
Hi tomo, in reply to your post 48
im not trying to say that RAF accuracy issues in 1941 were solely, or mostly the result of german flak. But without a proper air dfence system, those 30% or so of bombers that located the city they were meant to hit, would not have been as likely to have missed the targets as badly as they did if the flak was not there..... If they could come in at say 5000 ft, instead of 15k, and taken their time to line upo the target, and bomb the target at a leisurely pace, without fear of flak or fighters at that time, how much more effective would the bombing have been at that time.......we'll never know really, but i can say that when flak was used as a barrage curtain, or when radar was not available, the bombers usually had a field day.
The RAF responded to the finidings of the Butt Report fairly decisively in my opnion. Foremost, the idea of area bombing grew from the report. But thats not the only thing that changed. Clearly dead reckoning and visual bombing at night were not working, so the british set to work to work out methods of bombing in a blind environment with improved accuracy. And their efforts paid off IMO. Notwithstanding the debate raging on beside us in this thread, British accuracy and devastation improved markedly. They knocked out the Krupp works in early'42....a precision target done at night in less than ideal conditions. They undertook the most destructive raid of the war a year later, in Operation Gommorah. They destroyed about 5% of german industry in 1943, and about 17% in 1944. Things did improve. The RAF did eventually hit its targets (even if they had to change the target from a factory to a city).
AD was needed but it was expensive. That was the cost of being on the strategic defensive , which I know you disagree with, but I cant see how you can stick to that view when it was the british dropping bombsw, and the Germans reacting defensively in the West from July '41 onwards.
im not trying to say that RAF accuracy issues in 1941 were solely, or mostly the result of german flak. But without a proper air dfence system, those 30% or so of bombers that located the city they were meant to hit, would not have been as likely to have missed the targets as badly as they did if the flak was not there..... If they could come in at say 5000 ft, instead of 15k, and taken their time to line upo the target, and bomb the target at a leisurely pace, without fear of flak or fighters at that time, how much more effective would the bombing have been at that time.......we'll never know really, but i can say that when flak was used as a barrage curtain, or when radar was not available, the bombers usually had a field day.
The RAF responded to the finidings of the Butt Report fairly decisively in my opnion. Foremost, the idea of area bombing grew from the report. But thats not the only thing that changed. Clearly dead reckoning and visual bombing at night were not working, so the british set to work to work out methods of bombing in a blind environment with improved accuracy. And their efforts paid off IMO. Notwithstanding the debate raging on beside us in this thread, British accuracy and devastation improved markedly. They knocked out the Krupp works in early'42....a precision target done at night in less than ideal conditions. They undertook the most destructive raid of the war a year later, in Operation Gommorah. They destroyed about 5% of german industry in 1943, and about 17% in 1944. Things did improve. The RAF did eventually hit its targets (even if they had to change the target from a factory to a city).
AD was needed but it was expensive. That was the cost of being on the strategic defensive , which I know you disagree with, but I cant see how you can stick to that view when it was the british dropping bombsw, and the Germans reacting defensively in the West from July '41 onwards.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
I'm gonna give a warning to all in this thread.
The Moderators are watching this. If people can't be civil and have a decent discussion, there will be bannings. No questions asked, no warnings given.
There is a lot of info being introduced into this thread that can get tempers going. Please, lets play nice.
The Moderators are watching this. If people can't be civil and have a decent discussion, there will be bannings. No questions asked, no warnings given.
There is a lot of info being introduced into this thread that can get tempers going. Please, lets play nice.
Ray cites the reference as "Blitz, ii, 257". After some digging, that turns out to be The Blitz Then and Now, vol 2, page 257.
I don't have that book, but a Google book search turns up an image snippet:
Those are quite clearly the orders given, not the opinion of a historian.
Surely the drift would be more than 3 times as much if they took 3 times as long to drop, because the parachute greatly increases the area for wind to act upon. You have perhaps 5 times the force over 3 times the duration.
Hi, parsifal,
Think we agree that BC's bombers were in need to improve both their navigational targeting accuracy, and they were taking steps in that direction. From electronics, management, training points of wiev - the efforts paid back, augmented by the increase in bomb tonnage per sortie.
It could be argued that a real, or perceiver threat from Flak was forcing BC's bombers to fly at 15K instead at lower altitudes. But in 1941 (the time of Butt report), wast number of German defences was a part of Kamhumber line, not the part of AAA of particular factories the bombers were to attack. So I don't take it for granted that a mere suspicion that Flak forces were around a targeted factory will force the bombers to go high inaccurate.
As for Germanan Flak being on the defence vs. RAF/BC, my take is that a defence is to be significantly cheap to be worthwhile. Judging by the part of German military budget Flak arm consumed, looks that was not the case.
Think we agree that BC's bombers were in need to improve both their navigational targeting accuracy, and they were taking steps in that direction. From electronics, management, training points of wiev - the efforts paid back, augmented by the increase in bomb tonnage per sortie.
It could be argued that a real, or perceiver threat from Flak was forcing BC's bombers to fly at 15K instead at lower altitudes. But in 1941 (the time of Butt report), wast number of German defences was a part of Kamhumber line, not the part of AAA of particular factories the bombers were to attack. So I don't take it for granted that a mere suspicion that Flak forces were around a targeted factory will force the bombers to go high inaccurate.
As for Germanan Flak being on the defence vs. RAF/BC, my take is that a defence is to be significantly cheap to be worthwhile. Judging by the part of German military budget Flak arm consumed, looks that was not the case.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
".... As for German Flak being on the defense vs. RAF/BC, my take is that a defense is to be significantly cheap to be worthwhile..."
Interesting perspective, Tomo.
What would the offensive alternative to flak have been .....? Night fighter intruders in RAF flight patterns over the UK?
MM
Interesting perspective, Tomo.
What would the offensive alternative to flak have been .....? Night fighter intruders in RAF flight patterns over the UK?
MM
parsifal
Colonel
flak was still cheaper than fighters, its just thatmounting any sort of air defence does not come cheap. The germans increased their aircraft procurement budget by at least 50% in 1941, just to build additional fighters. I dont know the exact percentages of the German military budget was spent on aircraft production but it was nudging 40% overall for bombers and fighters by the end of 1941.
Moreover German night fighter defences did not return much until the last quarter of 1942. Flak remains the underappreciated champion of the German air defenc system. It was not my intention ever to say that Flak was unimportant or inneffective, just that the British effort into its Bomber offensive was worth every penny, purely because the costs to the germans in countering it was enormous.
According to Westermann from September through to December the RAF in both day and night operations over Germany and western Europe lost 382 aircraft to flak. This is more or less corroborated by Foreman, and even german records more or less corroborate that figure. At the same time, German fighters, both day and night managed to shoot down just 221 aircraft (this says volumes about what was happening to Fighter Command over france in 1941....it was not the JGs that were inflicting most of the hurt on the RAF, it was the flak arm). Moreover the proportions of aircraft damage due to falk and fighters is worth mentioning. just under 14% of RAF aircraft despatched were damaged to some degree, with 10.7% being due to flak and the remainder to fighters. I dont know how many of these dmaged aircraft were scrapped as a result damage but i expect a portion at least would have been lost as write offs. German writes offs of amaged aircrafdt were at least 50% of aircraft damaged, but there were special difficulties that inflated this figure for the East. I would guess about 30% of aircraft damaged in the RAF would be scrapped due to damage
Moreover at about the same time as the tabling of the Butt report, but not in direct connection to it, there was a lively exhange of Memos between Peirse, Portal and Tizard on the increasing effectiveness of radar directed flak on BC operations. In a letter dated September 23, Peirse complained about the increasing effectiveness of German flak, and how it was badly affecting accuracy and increasing losses. Peirse wanted to drop "metallic strips" to confuse the gun laying radars (sounds a lot like window). He was overulled on advice given by Tizard that they were not sure the searchlights were controlled by RDF, and beciuse the strips needed to be cut to the right length so as to interfere with the German operating frequencies.
Fast forward a year. Between July and December 1942, BC lost a further 696 A/C to all causes whilst on operations. 169 were to fighters, 193 to flak, the rest to unknown causes. Aircraft damaged to flak remained about 2-3 times that achieved by fighters
A note also needs to be said about the flak forces on the eastern Front. The resources sent to that from, in October and November alone destroyed some 1400 Soviet Aircraft, and destroyed 320 tanks
So no whilst there was an aenormous cost for the germans, if they had opted for a fighter only defence, the cost to them would have been even higher, and they would have suffered more damage to their infrastructure within Germany
Moreover German night fighter defences did not return much until the last quarter of 1942. Flak remains the underappreciated champion of the German air defenc system. It was not my intention ever to say that Flak was unimportant or inneffective, just that the British effort into its Bomber offensive was worth every penny, purely because the costs to the germans in countering it was enormous.
According to Westermann from September through to December the RAF in both day and night operations over Germany and western Europe lost 382 aircraft to flak. This is more or less corroborated by Foreman, and even german records more or less corroborate that figure. At the same time, German fighters, both day and night managed to shoot down just 221 aircraft (this says volumes about what was happening to Fighter Command over france in 1941....it was not the JGs that were inflicting most of the hurt on the RAF, it was the flak arm). Moreover the proportions of aircraft damage due to falk and fighters is worth mentioning. just under 14% of RAF aircraft despatched were damaged to some degree, with 10.7% being due to flak and the remainder to fighters. I dont know how many of these dmaged aircraft were scrapped as a result damage but i expect a portion at least would have been lost as write offs. German writes offs of amaged aircrafdt were at least 50% of aircraft damaged, but there were special difficulties that inflated this figure for the East. I would guess about 30% of aircraft damaged in the RAF would be scrapped due to damage
Moreover at about the same time as the tabling of the Butt report, but not in direct connection to it, there was a lively exhange of Memos between Peirse, Portal and Tizard on the increasing effectiveness of radar directed flak on BC operations. In a letter dated September 23, Peirse complained about the increasing effectiveness of German flak, and how it was badly affecting accuracy and increasing losses. Peirse wanted to drop "metallic strips" to confuse the gun laying radars (sounds a lot like window). He was overulled on advice given by Tizard that they were not sure the searchlights were controlled by RDF, and beciuse the strips needed to be cut to the right length so as to interfere with the German operating frequencies.
Fast forward a year. Between July and December 1942, BC lost a further 696 A/C to all causes whilst on operations. 169 were to fighters, 193 to flak, the rest to unknown causes. Aircraft damaged to flak remained about 2-3 times that achieved by fighters
A note also needs to be said about the flak forces on the eastern Front. The resources sent to that from, in October and November alone destroyed some 1400 Soviet Aircraft, and destroyed 320 tanks
So no whilst there was an aenormous cost for the germans, if they had opted for a fighter only defence, the cost to them would have been even higher, and they would have suffered more damage to their infrastructure within Germany
NJG 2 was flying intruder sorties, attacking BC's bombers as they were returning home, between late 1940 late 1941. Just after they perfected the technique, with North Sea as a favoured killing ground, they were transferred to Sicily. Our own Erich was mentioning that in the thread about German NFs.
Think that we can analyse who was managing to kill BC's stuff. In 1940, LW night fighters were almost non-existant, yet accounted for 15% of kills. By 1941, LW NJ grew to 3 Geschwaders (circa 150 planes, but in Oct 1941 NJG 2 is transfered away), downing more bombers than all Flak arm ( 4000+ heavy guns + 12000 light ones for the 1st half of war, later many light guns are transfered east, but heavies remain mostly at West). Flak has some radars, night fighters have none. Further, during the 1000 bomber raid, Source: Nachtjaeger, David P. Williams.
One could just wonder how BC would've fared if the NJ arm was properly equipped.
The people back in Britain have found the cure for a radar-guided Flak - and without radar support, Flak is barely adequate for night job.
NJ is at some 250 fighters, bettering the Flak (with radars experienced crews, now at peak of it's efficiency) with thousands of cannons.
Eastern front indeed seem like much better 'fishing area' for the Flak arm. Too bad for Germans for not sending way more guns there, plenty of (day, low-level) planes there, plus plethora of Soviet tanks to be hit.
Think I've showed just the opposite - a hadfull of night fighters equates the achievements of thousands of cannons.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
".... Think I've showed just the opposite - a handful of night fighters equates the achievements of thousands of cannons."
The cost-effective "offensive" ...?
MM
The cost-effective "offensive" ...?
MM
That last quarter of 1940 was special, for it was about the only time when the German army did not fight. So only the flak, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine caused significant costs at the time.
It is easy to understand that over 80% of ammunition was used over Germany as it was the only area with enemy aerial activity ( I think the rest was in France at the time).
The whole war period must be accounted, and also all arms.
Of the costs of the night fighters:
The production was perhaps some 6000 fighters (my rough estimate, I admit) or 5% of the total of 120000 planes produced in the war. Assuming that the Lufwaffe took 40% of the total, that is 2% of the total expenditure. Even taking into account that the typical twin engined night fighter was more expensive than the average LW plane, I don't believe that the Luftwaffe night fighter arm took more than 3-4% of the total resources.
