SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
And a second pilot.
British 1936-42 purchase options, logistics and export/import of military hardware (1 Viewer)
- Thread starter tomo pauk
- Start date
Elan Vital
Airman 1st Class
- 210
- Aug 24, 2024
With a 1936 starting date, funding the RAE and other organisations to get pressure carbs or injection for aircraft engines some time in WW2 is viable. I suspect something could also be done for turbochargers and turbine technology in general but superchargers will probably remain massively important for much of the war.
For ground equipment, I'd argue that funding new/expanded production facilities, expanding the skillbase of institutions (Mechanization and Artillery) and getting more manpower and equipment is the most impactful change one can make. Officials like Chamberlain did start rearmament early (1934 or even earlier) but deliberately prioritized the RAF and to a lesser extent the RN, at the expense of the ground Army. There was a decent rationale for it but even this ended up not being enough for the RAF or combined Anglo-French airforces to oumatch the Luftwaffe as one may have expected from this prioritization (notwithstanding the fact the UK still made an extremely impressive air effort).
However, the Limited Liability policy of 1937 which refocused Army buildup to the ME/Africa hurt efforts towards a new BEF, some measures were not taken until the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in Spring 1939 (expansion of territorials). It had been assumed that France (and Eastern European countries before Munich and the invasion of Poland) could deal with ground forces, but the reality is that France alone couldn't be expected to do it alone on the basis of its smaller population and industry compared to Germany. The wartime 1939-40 plans to grow the BEF to 20 and then 36 divisions after the first and second years of war (with plans for 55 divisions by year 2 not applied in industrial terms) were late and meant the ground balance would remain concerning until 1942 at best.
Timing is also of the essence for the year of maximum danger (1940). IMO, Entente forces OTL were such that just a few extra British divisions/an extra Army by Spring 1940 would reach the threshold for France to reinforce weak sectors or create an additional local reserve (as all mission requirements should now be met).
The part about expanding the skillbase in institutions is crucial. Development of the 6 pounder gun could not go as quickly as it could for lack of sufficent personnel, the limited ressources being prioritized for artillery and AA. Vulcan Foundry had only 2 draughtsmen to work on the A12 infantry tank for 6 months. The Ministry and Supply and other organisations clearly lacked skilled personnel for a while in the early war and prewar periods.
Today I was reading a British wartime assessment of tank development found in the national archives by Ed Webster. This problem of a lacking prewar tank development structure was well identified. Funding wasn't even enough to build one prototype a year during the 30s.
This can be contrasted with the French who, for all their ill-conceived ideas, managed to build up a strong technical research and industrial base for tank and armament developments from 1935 onwards with the Armament Direction (DFA), state design bureaus (APX, ARL, AMX, Bourges) with good partnerships with private industries (ARL partnering with Batignolles-Chatillon and Fives-Lille for turrets), and an industrial base which was already getting plenty of building experience from 1936 onwards. One can only wish the British had such a base to put their more open-minded ideas to use early on.
In analogy to French efforts and post-1939 British reflexions, one could obtain:
- a standardisation of turret designs for a given period, armament and turret ring size. All British tanks until 1941 bar Valentine had a near-54-inch turret ring diameter and a 2 pounder+coax armament with 3 men, but no real standardized turret (which was regretted later on). Ideally one could have one or two generations of 2 pounder turrets, and then a 6 pounder turret, ideally anticipated with a minimum 60-inch turret ring diameter to house 3 men; with the armour being adapted to the recipient tank (as with French APX-1 turret family with 40, 60 and 100mm bases, ARL-2 with 40, 60 and 75mm bases).
With the ressources needed for an early 6 pounder (if it doesn't outright start in 1936 as a closer contemporary development to French HV 47mm), development of a suitable turret and tanks could proceed before the war, possibly as early as the 1937 French studies for HV 47 and 75mm turrets.
- Early and timely deployment of armor piercing and ballistic caps for AP ammunition to anticipate thick, sometimes cemented armor, as well as HE ammunition in spite of their weakness in 40 and 57mm calibers.
- Suitable specifications and eventually deployment for thick cast and welded armor assemblies (French spec for 40 and 60mm castings in 1937, first welding spec in 1938). The British as is already had know-how for both prewar.
- a proper review of rail transport capabilities (the restrictions used for the first half of the war were based on outdated, overly restrictive assessments)
With the 25-ish tonne bridge and weight limit for A12, the British had more leeway at the lower weights than the French, and probably a higher weight category could be identified (their transport categories were at 20 tonnes and 35 tonnes which was updated to 45 tonnes). But this doesn't do much good when the limit isn't used by the Cruisers (Covenanter and Crusader designed to a 18 ton limit), or misused by other designs (A14 and A16). The A9/10 and A13 are screwed by their origins, but the new specs definitely need to use the 25 ton limit.
The 1937 proposal for a 40mm minimum armor thickness requirement should go ahead ASAP (the maximum amount of combat tanks should have more than the 14mm or 30mm bases), even with the historical recommendation of 70mm which had been used as a reason to not demand 40mm in 1937 (note: close match to French 40 and 60mm bases for most late 30's projects).
The A9s and A10s are good insofar as they can be produced in numbers in time for 1939/40 before newer designs.
Vickers could possibly have doubled down on the initial idea of the A10 as a light infantry tank, especially if the armor basis is reinforced to 40mm or as much as a 16 tonne weight limit could allow (functionally earlier 3-man, less armored Valentine), on the grounds of the suspension and engine not being that conducive to high speeds and the need for a lot of decently well armored tanks. As infantry tanks of the time didn't require a biw LG, the more efficient sloped front armor of the A10 prototype could be retained unless a full-width driver's visor plate is still needed (as A17 Tetrarch prototype to production). Val could still go ahead later. 1936 might not be too late to get A9 and A10 with diesel engines as originally intended by Vickers and finally done on Valentine. The AEC petrol engine used in the former was actually derived from the diesel of the latter, but not much power was gained and I'd argue the lower fuel consumption and improved characteristics of the diesel version would actually be preferable. If petrol is retained, the RR Phantom III (II was used on prototypes) would be more efficient than the AEC petrol conversion.
At one point an A9 without the MG turrets had been mooted as a cheaper version, and an A15 Crusader with an A10-style MG mount was mooted before and after production started. Killing the MG turrets before the war was probably doable.
For engines, the example of the V12s based on petrol truck-engine blocks (Bedford and Meadows flat 12s) could have been applied to diesels (Matilda IIs for nearly 200hp or AECs for 260 hp before the midwar upgrades) to at least get a more powerful unit and a more space/weight-efficient setup than the twin engines on Matilda II.
But the UK will have to spend effort on a powerful engine regardless, be it special or adapted from aircrafts or railcars.
Starting the purpose-designed Leyland, Vauxhall, Harland & Wolff 300-350 hp diesels from 1940-42 earlier could at least have improved the early war designs (A12, 25 ton class Cruiser, follow-on infantry tank). Pursuing Harry Ricardo's schemes for dedicated 350-580 hp diesels from 39-41 is also doable. Putting the foot down for a tank Kestrel/Merlin that the Air Ministry would not be allowed to touch works.
Ricardo argued that even the Meteor work may not have been much faster than a dedicated petrol engine, for what it's worth. As Ricardo deplored, the lack of a dedicated tank engine effort also directly led to the plethora of engines and tank designs in use until 1942.
The TL
R of this is that even if the Infantry/Cruiser tank dichotomy can still be relevant, at least having a 25-ton basis Cruiser with a modern engine, 50 or 60mm of armour in places and a 3-man 6 pounder turret in the second half of 1940 as the A13 follow-on is absolutely credible.
For ground equipment, I'd argue that funding new/expanded production facilities, expanding the skillbase of institutions (Mechanization and Artillery) and getting more manpower and equipment is the most impactful change one can make. Officials like Chamberlain did start rearmament early (1934 or even earlier) but deliberately prioritized the RAF and to a lesser extent the RN, at the expense of the ground Army. There was a decent rationale for it but even this ended up not being enough for the RAF or combined Anglo-French airforces to oumatch the Luftwaffe as one may have expected from this prioritization (notwithstanding the fact the UK still made an extremely impressive air effort).
However, the Limited Liability policy of 1937 which refocused Army buildup to the ME/Africa hurt efforts towards a new BEF, some measures were not taken until the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in Spring 1939 (expansion of territorials). It had been assumed that France (and Eastern European countries before Munich and the invasion of Poland) could deal with ground forces, but the reality is that France alone couldn't be expected to do it alone on the basis of its smaller population and industry compared to Germany. The wartime 1939-40 plans to grow the BEF to 20 and then 36 divisions after the first and second years of war (with plans for 55 divisions by year 2 not applied in industrial terms) were late and meant the ground balance would remain concerning until 1942 at best.
Timing is also of the essence for the year of maximum danger (1940). IMO, Entente forces OTL were such that just a few extra British divisions/an extra Army by Spring 1940 would reach the threshold for France to reinforce weak sectors or create an additional local reserve (as all mission requirements should now be met).
The part about expanding the skillbase in institutions is crucial. Development of the 6 pounder gun could not go as quickly as it could for lack of sufficent personnel, the limited ressources being prioritized for artillery and AA. Vulcan Foundry had only 2 draughtsmen to work on the A12 infantry tank for 6 months. The Ministry and Supply and other organisations clearly lacked skilled personnel for a while in the early war and prewar periods.
Today I was reading a British wartime assessment of tank development found in the national archives by Ed Webster. This problem of a lacking prewar tank development structure was well identified. Funding wasn't even enough to build one prototype a year during the 30s.
This can be contrasted with the French who, for all their ill-conceived ideas, managed to build up a strong technical research and industrial base for tank and armament developments from 1935 onwards with the Armament Direction (DFA), state design bureaus (APX, ARL, AMX, Bourges) with good partnerships with private industries (ARL partnering with Batignolles-Chatillon and Fives-Lille for turrets), and an industrial base which was already getting plenty of building experience from 1936 onwards. One can only wish the British had such a base to put their more open-minded ideas to use early on.
In analogy to French efforts and post-1939 British reflexions, one could obtain:
- a standardisation of turret designs for a given period, armament and turret ring size. All British tanks until 1941 bar Valentine had a near-54-inch turret ring diameter and a 2 pounder+coax armament with 3 men, but no real standardized turret (which was regretted later on). Ideally one could have one or two generations of 2 pounder turrets, and then a 6 pounder turret, ideally anticipated with a minimum 60-inch turret ring diameter to house 3 men; with the armour being adapted to the recipient tank (as with French APX-1 turret family with 40, 60 and 100mm bases, ARL-2 with 40, 60 and 75mm bases).
With the ressources needed for an early 6 pounder (if it doesn't outright start in 1936 as a closer contemporary development to French HV 47mm), development of a suitable turret and tanks could proceed before the war, possibly as early as the 1937 French studies for HV 47 and 75mm turrets.
- Early and timely deployment of armor piercing and ballistic caps for AP ammunition to anticipate thick, sometimes cemented armor, as well as HE ammunition in spite of their weakness in 40 and 57mm calibers.
- Suitable specifications and eventually deployment for thick cast and welded armor assemblies (French spec for 40 and 60mm castings in 1937, first welding spec in 1938). The British as is already had know-how for both prewar.
- a proper review of rail transport capabilities (the restrictions used for the first half of the war were based on outdated, overly restrictive assessments)
With the 25-ish tonne bridge and weight limit for A12, the British had more leeway at the lower weights than the French, and probably a higher weight category could be identified (their transport categories were at 20 tonnes and 35 tonnes which was updated to 45 tonnes). But this doesn't do much good when the limit isn't used by the Cruisers (Covenanter and Crusader designed to a 18 ton limit), or misused by other designs (A14 and A16). The A9/10 and A13 are screwed by their origins, but the new specs definitely need to use the 25 ton limit.
The 1937 proposal for a 40mm minimum armor thickness requirement should go ahead ASAP (the maximum amount of combat tanks should have more than the 14mm or 30mm bases), even with the historical recommendation of 70mm which had been used as a reason to not demand 40mm in 1937 (note: close match to French 40 and 60mm bases for most late 30's projects).
The A9s and A10s are good insofar as they can be produced in numbers in time for 1939/40 before newer designs.
Vickers could possibly have doubled down on the initial idea of the A10 as a light infantry tank, especially if the armor basis is reinforced to 40mm or as much as a 16 tonne weight limit could allow (functionally earlier 3-man, less armored Valentine), on the grounds of the suspension and engine not being that conducive to high speeds and the need for a lot of decently well armored tanks. As infantry tanks of the time didn't require a biw LG, the more efficient sloped front armor of the A10 prototype could be retained unless a full-width driver's visor plate is still needed (as A17 Tetrarch prototype to production). Val could still go ahead later. 1936 might not be too late to get A9 and A10 with diesel engines as originally intended by Vickers and finally done on Valentine. The AEC petrol engine used in the former was actually derived from the diesel of the latter, but not much power was gained and I'd argue the lower fuel consumption and improved characteristics of the diesel version would actually be preferable. If petrol is retained, the RR Phantom III (II was used on prototypes) would be more efficient than the AEC petrol conversion.
At one point an A9 without the MG turrets had been mooted as a cheaper version, and an A15 Crusader with an A10-style MG mount was mooted before and after production started. Killing the MG turrets before the war was probably doable.
For engines, the example of the V12s based on petrol truck-engine blocks (Bedford and Meadows flat 12s) could have been applied to diesels (Matilda IIs for nearly 200hp or AECs for 260 hp before the midwar upgrades) to at least get a more powerful unit and a more space/weight-efficient setup than the twin engines on Matilda II.
But the UK will have to spend effort on a powerful engine regardless, be it special or adapted from aircrafts or railcars.
Starting the purpose-designed Leyland, Vauxhall, Harland & Wolff 300-350 hp diesels from 1940-42 earlier could at least have improved the early war designs (A12, 25 ton class Cruiser, follow-on infantry tank). Pursuing Harry Ricardo's schemes for dedicated 350-580 hp diesels from 39-41 is also doable. Putting the foot down for a tank Kestrel/Merlin that the Air Ministry would not be allowed to touch works.
Ricardo argued that even the Meteor work may not have been much faster than a dedicated petrol engine, for what it's worth. As Ricardo deplored, the lack of a dedicated tank engine effort also directly led to the plethora of engines and tank designs in use until 1942.
The TL
R of this is that even if the Infantry/Cruiser tank dichotomy can still be relevant, at least having a 25-ton basis Cruiser with a modern engine, 50 or 60mm of armour in places and a 3-man 6 pounder turret in the second half of 1940 as the A13 follow-on is absolutely credible.- Thread starter
- #23
And this is a biggie.
A pilot + copilot can fly a big bomber that can drop 5500 lbs of bombs at and around a target, say, 500 miles away (example of the Whitley; He 111 was about there - lower bombload, but better range - even in 1940). In order for small bomber, like the Blenheim or the Battle to do the same, 5-6 bombers will be needed, meaning 5-6 full-time pilots are needed. And barely, 1000 mile range does not allow for anything but an ideal flight path and slow cruise (no bursts of speed). Not a good math in the time trained manpower was worth their weight of gold.
Wellington I might do perhaps 4000-4500 lbs vs. the target 500 miles away (4500 lbs at 1200 miles range was the 'book' range at most economical speed).
Big bomber is also less picky about the bomb size.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Only if they have big bombs to begin with
and I am talking about 1000lbs bombs, not really big bombs.
Halifax showing the 4 wing bomb bays for the 500lb bombs, 2000lbs carried in the wing.
Whitley had 3 bays in each wing. When they prioritize lots and lots of 250 and 500lb bombs in the design stage you get some weird bomb bay arrangements.
Turned out to be useful for carrying bulky incendiaries.
Not so good for blowing up sturdy industrial buildings, large machinery and oil equipment.
As far as the light bombers go, yes they didn't offer much punch for the investment but we are also guilty of overlooking the doctrine/thinking of the time.
The Mosquito was designed around four 250lbs bombs. The same standard light bomber load that dated to the Battle even though they were going to use two Merlin engines.
2 Things happened in the development of the Mosquito. 1 was that RR and Hooker came up with the Merlin 21 engine by the time the prototype flew instead of using the Merlin X engine. 2nd thing was that they tried using first telescoping fins on the bombs and then just cutting the fins shorter. The short fins made the bomb within 1 in of the length of 250lb bomb.
One does wonder if the British actually had 1000lb bombs in service and not just in testing if the Mosquito might not have been designed to hold two of them ( a few extra inches of depth to bomb bay and/or a few extra inches of width?) and added to the Mosquito's repertoire to begin with.
The sticking with the 1000lb load limit for the light bombers should have been seen as a mistake even at the time.
The boosting of the bomb weight to just 1500lbs for the Beaufort was part of the same thinking. A small cheap bomber.
- Thread starter
- #25
Army aviation, anyone?
Lysander was an attempt to have an do-everything aircraft - a thing that sounds great to the money-counters (especially in the time when everyone wants money 6 material) - but it ended up as a too expensive artillery spotter, as a not so good bomber, and as a very limited transport and medevac. The very contested airspace of the ww2 will probably be better conductive to a small and agile spotter, as well as a fast-ish & nimble (once bombs are out) bomber. Perhaps the later role is better served with the bombed-up fighter, at least the Gladiator? A "monoplane Gladiator"?
For the artillery spotter and liaison - a lot of aircraft can be made around an under 300 HP engine and under 3500 lbs of all-up weight for these two roles.
Lysander was an attempt to have an do-everything aircraft - a thing that sounds great to the money-counters (especially in the time when everyone wants money 6 material) - but it ended up as a too expensive artillery spotter, as a not so good bomber, and as a very limited transport and medevac. The very contested airspace of the ww2 will probably be better conductive to a small and agile spotter, as well as a fast-ish & nimble (once bombs are out) bomber. Perhaps the later role is better served with the bombed-up fighter, at least the Gladiator? A "monoplane Gladiator"?
For the artillery spotter and liaison - a lot of aircraft can be made around an under 300 HP engine and under 3500 lbs of all-up weight for these two roles.
Hi
To understand many of the problems for decision makers in Britain prior to WW2 then reading the 'History of the Second World War, Grand Strategy Volume I' by N H Gibbs, will give a good overview (with lots of detail). Some sample text from 1936-1938 below:
A view reference the role of the Army:
Then there is RAF priorities and also the problems of finance:
It should be remembered that this was money being spent on defence in peacetime, with no idea when (or even if) a war would break out. Spending money on lots of equipment, which if war comes later rather than earlier risks having kit that is obsolete when it happens. The work force needs to be trained to work in the arms industry, however, the civil industry needs to be kept going to generate income for the country to pay for rearmament. The industries also compete for the workforce of course. The RAF also needs skilled men for servicing the aircraft, they would have to be trained, as do aircrew. So should training aircraft be prioritised or 'front line' aircraft, the latter probably if you expect the war to come quickly, but the former if you think there is a bit of time. However, in the real world it is usually a compromise. It should be noted that the Miles Master advanced trainer entered service just before the outbreak of, it was fitted with all the advanced features of a modern combat aircraft and included a Rotol Constant Speed prop from the outset (probably before some combat aircraft were fitted) so 'future proofed'.
If a larger and 'better' equipped army is decided on (for use in a continental war') what other aspect is reduced. Should, for example, aircraft orders from the USA reduced or not gone ahead with? That could reduce costs, if only a relatively small number of Havards and Hudsons are bought that could mean that Britain (and the French) would not have to pay for the expansion and equipping some US aircraft factories and only pay for the aircraft bought (not a decision I would like to make). That money could then be used to expand production for the army (one knock on effect would be that the increased production capacity of some US aircraft factories would not be there and more expansion would have to be done later, therefore slowing up future expansion).
Reference army co-op, then Chapter 2 'Army-Air Co-operation and the prelude to War, 1933-1939' in David Ian Hall's book 'Strategy for Victory - The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943' would be of use in any discussion. However, if it is only decided to send a 'substantial' expeditionary force to France in the spring of 1939, it is unlikely a large trained air element would be available. Also Hurricanes are not going to be diverted into being ground attack aircraft until the air defence requirements are met. Indeed what the BEF probably needed was more Hurricanes for top cover and preventing the Germans from achieving air superiority over the battlefield, so any aircraft used for supporting the army could survive better. After all it was soon seen during the BoB that the Ju-87 ran into problems when the Germans lacked air superiority.
I hope that is of interest.
Mike
To understand many of the problems for decision makers in Britain prior to WW2 then reading the 'History of the Second World War, Grand Strategy Volume I' by N H Gibbs, will give a good overview (with lots of detail). Some sample text from 1936-1938 below:
A view reference the role of the Army:
Then there is RAF priorities and also the problems of finance:
It should be remembered that this was money being spent on defence in peacetime, with no idea when (or even if) a war would break out. Spending money on lots of equipment, which if war comes later rather than earlier risks having kit that is obsolete when it happens. The work force needs to be trained to work in the arms industry, however, the civil industry needs to be kept going to generate income for the country to pay for rearmament. The industries also compete for the workforce of course. The RAF also needs skilled men for servicing the aircraft, they would have to be trained, as do aircrew. So should training aircraft be prioritised or 'front line' aircraft, the latter probably if you expect the war to come quickly, but the former if you think there is a bit of time. However, in the real world it is usually a compromise. It should be noted that the Miles Master advanced trainer entered service just before the outbreak of, it was fitted with all the advanced features of a modern combat aircraft and included a Rotol Constant Speed prop from the outset (probably before some combat aircraft were fitted) so 'future proofed'.
If a larger and 'better' equipped army is decided on (for use in a continental war') what other aspect is reduced. Should, for example, aircraft orders from the USA reduced or not gone ahead with? That could reduce costs, if only a relatively small number of Havards and Hudsons are bought that could mean that Britain (and the French) would not have to pay for the expansion and equipping some US aircraft factories and only pay for the aircraft bought (not a decision I would like to make). That money could then be used to expand production for the army (one knock on effect would be that the increased production capacity of some US aircraft factories would not be there and more expansion would have to be done later, therefore slowing up future expansion).
Reference army co-op, then Chapter 2 'Army-Air Co-operation and the prelude to War, 1933-1939' in David Ian Hall's book 'Strategy for Victory - The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943' would be of use in any discussion. However, if it is only decided to send a 'substantial' expeditionary force to France in the spring of 1939, it is unlikely a large trained air element would be available. Also Hurricanes are not going to be diverted into being ground attack aircraft until the air defence requirements are met. Indeed what the BEF probably needed was more Hurricanes for top cover and preventing the Germans from achieving air superiority over the battlefield, so any aircraft used for supporting the army could survive better. After all it was soon seen during the BoB that the Ju-87 ran into problems when the Germans lacked air superiority.
I hope that is of interest.
Mike
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
As far as tanks go, are we looking for the ideal or just a way to get a lot better return for the money/effort?
There was an awful lot of very low hanging fruit in the tank field.
1. Give the 2pdr HE ammo and capped ammo from the git-go. Not 2-3 years late. WW I (or before) technology.
2. Forget the fire on the move non-sense and the shoulder aim.
3. install and train with a better sight/telescope.
That will increase the effective engagement range by 300-500 yds with both the main gun and the co-ax machine gun.
4. Keep and improve the vision cupola for the commander instead of ditching it in the name of low silhouette. Just because you can't see the enemy doesn't mean he can't see you.
5. Keep the Liberty engine, not ideal but figure out want needs fixing and then fix it. Starting over with several different brand new engines is a luxury the British did not have. Use the Liberty to buy time to develop/test a new engine rather than trying several right off the drawing board.
Two of the main faults with the engine in Crusader were a result of trying to cut 6-7in in height out the engine so the tank would have lower silhouette. The shallower crankcase screwed up oil scavenging, especially on hills. They also changed the from a single large fan to two smaller ones and the fan drive was a constant problem that had a number of fixes applied to it. My own preference would be develop the Kestrel/Peregrine to a 450-480hp class engine. The "requirement" for a tank needing a power to weight ratio of 20hp per ton was a mistake. The existing and/or developing suspensions would not allow the tank to move at those speed the vast majority of the time without putting the crews in the hospital with broken bones.
Some of those pictures of airborne Cromwell's came at a cost.
Several hundred extra A 13s with beefed up armor in NA in late 1940/early 1941 could have made a big difference.
A taller A-15 with a Cupola and better ammo in 1941 could have also made a difference. The Germans don't have the long 50mm (or not many). Above listed improvements would help equalize the range difference.
If you want
6. Install more smoke grenades/launchers.
There was an awful lot of very low hanging fruit in the tank field.
1. Give the 2pdr HE ammo and capped ammo from the git-go. Not 2-3 years late. WW I (or before) technology.
2. Forget the fire on the move non-sense and the shoulder aim.
3. install and train with a better sight/telescope.
That will increase the effective engagement range by 300-500 yds with both the main gun and the co-ax machine gun.
4. Keep and improve the vision cupola for the commander instead of ditching it in the name of low silhouette. Just because you can't see the enemy doesn't mean he can't see you.
5. Keep the Liberty engine, not ideal but figure out want needs fixing and then fix it. Starting over with several different brand new engines is a luxury the British did not have. Use the Liberty to buy time to develop/test a new engine rather than trying several right off the drawing board.
Two of the main faults with the engine in Crusader were a result of trying to cut 6-7in in height out the engine so the tank would have lower silhouette. The shallower crankcase screwed up oil scavenging, especially on hills. They also changed the from a single large fan to two smaller ones and the fan drive was a constant problem that had a number of fixes applied to it. My own preference would be develop the Kestrel/Peregrine to a 450-480hp class engine. The "requirement" for a tank needing a power to weight ratio of 20hp per ton was a mistake. The existing and/or developing suspensions would not allow the tank to move at those speed the vast majority of the time without putting the crews in the hospital with broken bones.
Some of those pictures of airborne Cromwell's came at a cost.
Several hundred extra A 13s with beefed up armor in NA in late 1940/early 1941 could have made a big difference.
A taller A-15 with a Cupola and better ammo in 1941 could have also made a difference. The Germans don't have the long 50mm (or not many). Above listed improvements would help equalize the range difference.
If you want
6. Install more smoke grenades/launchers.
Hi
Probably a mistake made by every major arm in the world, even the Germans with the Hs 126, the US with the O-47 etc. Obviously a common military doctrine for army co-operation was around at the time.
Mike
- Thread starter
- #29
Not getting at the 2pdr in the 1st place would've been my choice
Sticking with a 6pdr removes the shoulder aim by default.
Excellent comment.
The twinned off the shelf engines - perhaps go with the bus engines on a lighter tank (ie. 190 HP total on something like Valentine, instead of 131 HP AEC), and with the AEC engines on a 25+ ton tank (260 HP instead of 190 HP as on the Matlida).
Granted, having the dedicated and debugged tank engines is the best.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
If you want more Hurricanes then stop with the Gladiator as a fighter bomber stuff.
There was lower level of aircraft manufactures that could make "Storch" type of aircraft.
Especially in the US as opposed to Britain but purchase/license?
The British had tested at least one US Taylorcraft model D prewar.
3 and a Stinson were in France in 1940 and all made it back to the Britain.
The RAF wanted nothing to do with army co-operation after France.
The RAFs mission was to bomb Germany into submission and anything else was a distraction. Defending England was distraction but the politicians could not understand that with just a few more raids the Germans wouldn't have enough replacement bombers to attack England (sarcasm).
So after you break a few cricket bats over the heads of some of those clowns the idea of light 55-250hp engined planes doing spotting, liaison and causality evacuation does make sense. Britain did not have a sizeable private airplane industry (some design but actual numbers manufactured was small) but since a WW II liaison plane isn't much different than a WW I fighter
you need different skill sets and tools than metal aircraft. Still need Spruce wood though.
Taylorcraft had opened up a British Branch in 1938(?)
see
en.wikipedia.org
There is no technical reason that things could not have been done a year or two sooner.
The US had several designs of 3-4 seat aircraft using 125-200hp Ranger and Warner engines that might have made good starting points.
There was lower level of aircraft manufactures that could make "Storch" type of aircraft.
Especially in the US as opposed to Britain but purchase/license?
The British had tested at least one US Taylorcraft model D prewar.
3 and a Stinson were in France in 1940 and all made it back to the Britain.
The RAF wanted nothing to do with army co-operation after France.
The RAFs mission was to bomb Germany into submission and anything else was a distraction. Defending England was distraction but the politicians could not understand that with just a few more raids the Germans wouldn't have enough replacement bombers to attack England (sarcasm).
So after you break a few cricket bats over the heads of some of those clowns the idea of light 55-250hp engined planes doing spotting, liaison and causality evacuation does make sense. Britain did not have a sizeable private airplane industry (some design but actual numbers manufactured was small) but since a WW II liaison plane isn't much different than a WW I fighter
you need different skill sets and tools than metal aircraft. Still need Spruce wood though. Taylorcraft had opened up a British Branch in 1938(?)
see
Taylorcraft Auster - Wikipedia
There is no technical reason that things could not have been done a year or two sooner.
The US had several designs of 3-4 seat aircraft using 125-200hp Ranger and Warner engines that might have made good starting points.
- Thread starter
- #31
True.
A number of British companies might've did that job, too, whether by designing, or by producing it, or both - Westland (since there is no requirement for Lysander), Miles, De Haviland, Percival, Gloster, Vickers, Airspeed, and indeed Taylorcraft.
Two factories are free since the Botha is killed, for whatever that is worth; but perhaps these are better used to make 1-st line aircraft.
Yes, Army will need to be quick on the ball before 1940 in order to get themselves some nifty aircraft.
A-S Cheetah is probably at the high end; a 5 cyl sibling perhaps as more appropriate choice?
A 6-cyl inline, like the Gipsy 6, is mid-range here, close to the 200 HP Ranger. Really small and light A/C have even better engine choice.
HiIf you want more Hurricanes then stop with the Gladiator as a fighter bomber stuff.
There was lower level of aircraft manufactures that could make "Storch" type of aircraft.
Especially in the US as opposed to Britain but purchase/license?
The British had tested at least one US Taylorcraft model D prewar.
3 and a Stinson were in France in 1940 and all made it back to the Britain.
The RAF wanted nothing to do with army co-operation after France.
The RAFs mission was to bomb Germany into submission and anything else was a distraction. Defending England was distraction but the politicians could not understand that with just a few more raids the Germans wouldn't have enough replacement bombers to attack England (sarcasm).
So after you break a few cricket bats over the heads of some of those clowns the idea of light 55-250hp engined planes doing spotting, liaison and causality evacuation does make sense. Britain did not have a sizeable private airplane industry (some design but actual numbers manufactured was small) but since a WW II liaison plane isn't much different than a WW I fighter
Taylorcraft had opened up a British Branch in 1938(?)
see
Taylorcraft Auster - Wikipedia
There is no technical reason that things could not have been done a year or two sooner.
The US had several designs of 3-4 seat aircraft using 125-200hp Ranger and Warner engines that might have made good starting points.
For interest the production of light aircraft in Britain is as follows (details from 'British Light Aeroplanes 1920-1940' by Arthur Ord-Hume):
Yes, lots of one offs, as every designer wanted to sell 'his' design, but de Havilland dominates.
Reference Taylorcraft England (later Auster), their first aircraft flew on 3rd May 1939, modified from the US built ones by using 45-ton steel tubing instead of the weaker 22-ton used in the USA, the main spar was also made thicker. (source - 'Auster - The Company and Aircraft' by Wenham, Simpson and Filimore, Air-Britain 2018.
Mike
You might also look at 4 and 6 cylinder air cooled boxer engines, that dominate GA to this day. Not sure if any such engines were produced in the UK, though.
For a tank diesel, I'd be intrigued by the concept of a two-stroke design with reverse flow port scavenging. Look ma, no valves! Of course with a two stroke diesel you need a blower, but that's probably a good idea anyway to improve power density. These were widely used in two-stroke marine diesels until the 1960'ies or such until the pursuit of ever greater fuel efficiency by increasing the stroke/bore ratio forced the adoption of the uniflow type that dominates today. But if you value simplicity, robustness and cost more than a modest improvement in fuel consumption, a valveless design still has merits I think.
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
This thread is somewhat daunting in having so many long multi part posts making responding to any part a touch more wearisome to separate out any particular item. But then that is the prerogative of the poster of course.
I shall simplify into:
Air: Buy the RAE a decent wind tunnel that will not fool them into thinking that thick wings are not a high speed compressibility issue.
Land: A dual purpose tank gun.
Sea: Here I am torn between a single item for fleet air defence or for North Atlantic convoy anti submarine defence.
I shall simplify into:
Air: Buy the RAE a decent wind tunnel that will not fool them into thinking that thick wings are not a high speed compressibility issue.
Land: A dual purpose tank gun.
Sea: Here I am torn between a single item for fleet air defence or for North Atlantic convoy anti submarine defence.
ThomasP
Chief Master Sergeant
re the Lysander
I may be wrong, but I think the Lysander is under appreciated.
Yes, it was expensive and large for the spotter and minimal liaison requirements. However, the Lysander was in effect an aircraft designed to also fill what is called the COIN (COunter INsurgency) roll in modern terms, with an added general small cargo capability - and be able to do so in the far reaches of the Empire in relatively primitive conditions. This required a significantly greater range/endurance and cargo/armament load carrying than something like the Piper or Taylorcraft derivatives the US used for only the spotter and liaison roles. Plus, look at how many different airframes the US used to fill the same rolls that the Lysander could perform.
In its design requirements the Lysander was asked to do the following:
spotting (including dropping flares at night)
general liaison/communication
tactical reconnaissance
light bomber using small bombs and guns in low intensity conflict environments
light cargo transport
And in service we can add the following:
light bomber in a high intensity conflict environment
medium cargo transport (upto 4000 lbs
)
personnel transport (upto 6 passengers?)
SOE agent and/or medium cargo delivery behind enemy lines (I have read of missions as far as 350 miles behind the lines)
Design TOGWmax was ~6000 lbs. On some cargo missions for in the ME or for in SOE the TOGW was ~10,000 bs - this number being set at some point after the aircraft had managed to take-off at greater weights but damaged its landing gear more often than was acceptable.
In effect the RAF got a slower WWII equivalent of the USAF OV-10 COIN aircraft used in Vietnam, but with a better STOL capability. It was not the Lysander's fault that it ended up being used for what effectively was the light bomber roll in a high intensity war.
When I ask myself the question "What kind of reputation would the Lysander have come out of the war with if they had not been used as a light bomber in the BoF?" I do not recall any complaints about the Lysander in its intended rolls, and I do recall many positive statements. There were various negative maintenance issues, particularly as the airframes aged (corrosion and cracks in the landing gear structure being two of them).
Also, although the manufacturing capacity may have been better used elsewhere, I do not know if I can agree with this statement either = not even in terms of numbers. The Lysander operated in its designed roll - important in its own way - in every(?) theater. How many airframes were needed to do this effectively - in comparison to a combination of other types such as the US used?
I may be wrong, but I think the Lysander is under appreciated.
Yes, it was expensive and large for the spotter and minimal liaison requirements. However, the Lysander was in effect an aircraft designed to also fill what is called the COIN (COunter INsurgency) roll in modern terms, with an added general small cargo capability - and be able to do so in the far reaches of the Empire in relatively primitive conditions. This required a significantly greater range/endurance and cargo/armament load carrying than something like the Piper or Taylorcraft derivatives the US used for only the spotter and liaison roles. Plus, look at how many different airframes the US used to fill the same rolls that the Lysander could perform.
In its design requirements the Lysander was asked to do the following:
spotting (including dropping flares at night)
general liaison/communication
tactical reconnaissance
light bomber using small bombs and guns in low intensity conflict environments
light cargo transport
And in service we can add the following:
light bomber in a high intensity conflict environment
medium cargo transport (upto 4000 lbs
)personnel transport (upto 6 passengers?)
SOE agent and/or medium cargo delivery behind enemy lines (I have read of missions as far as 350 miles behind the lines)
Design TOGWmax was ~6000 lbs. On some cargo missions for in the ME or for in SOE the TOGW was ~10,000 bs - this number being set at some point after the aircraft had managed to take-off at greater weights but damaged its landing gear more often than was acceptable.
In effect the RAF got a slower WWII equivalent of the USAF OV-10 COIN aircraft used in Vietnam, but with a better STOL capability. It was not the Lysander's fault that it ended up being used for what effectively was the light bomber roll in a high intensity war.
When I ask myself the question "What kind of reputation would the Lysander have come out of the war with if they had not been used as a light bomber in the BoF?" I do not recall any complaints about the Lysander in its intended rolls, and I do recall many positive statements. There were various negative maintenance issues, particularly as the airframes aged (corrosion and cracks in the landing gear structure being two of them).
Also, although the manufacturing capacity may have been better used elsewhere, I do not know if I can agree with this statement either = not even in terms of numbers. The Lysander operated in its designed roll - important in its own way - in every(?) theater. How many airframes were needed to do this effectively - in comparison to a combination of other types such as the US used?
Last edited:
- Thread starter
- #37
(my bold)
Is there a good source that confirms that the requirement for the Lysander included the COIN/low intensity conflicts?
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
The boxer engines only became a big thing near 1940 in the US. There were a lot of flat fours of around 40hp that powered single seat fliver sport planes in a number of countries during the 30s. Mainly because a 40hp twin tended to vibrate the little planes apart. The big 3 light engine makers in US were building 4, 6, 8, cylinder and Franklin (No 3) tried 12 cylinder engines using common cylinders. The Boxer engines really blossomed at the end of the war pushing the small 5 and 7 cylinder US radials out of the market.
For 3-6 passenger private planes vibration/smoothness sometimes were important factors that do not show up in data sheets.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Dual purpose or triple purpose?
French 37mm-47mm guns, German 37mm-50mm guns, Italian 47mm guns, Soviet 45mm guns are all "dual purpose" to some extent.
If you want smoke shells (triple purpose) you do need a 75mm shell to hold enough smoke compound. Granted a 75mm shell holds a lot more HE than the smaller HE shells.
The British kept the 2pdr a single purpose gun for about 5 years too long. Relying on the co-ax MG for ALL soft targets limited the British tank commanders choices/tactical flexibility.
Ordering 2pdr HE ammo was a simple solution. It wouldn't take out field fortifications but a single 40mm HE shell into a truck or small building/hut could be effective.
Again the 75-76mm tank guns don't show up in large numbers until 1941-42.
Do we want Ideal or just large improvement for small investment. Britain doesn't have enough money/resources to do everything the "ideal" way.
- Thread starter
- #40
Looking at the tries to reinvent the whell (ie. a small-calibre gun), they behaved like they actually had money and resources. Duplicating the 6pdr development with the Navy, introduction of the 2pdr - these were not just the ways of squandering the money, but also a way to waste time, the most precious commodity.
Neither the French, nor the Germans, not the Soviets received that memo. With caveat that French and German 75mm tank guns were really multipurpose - HE, AP, smoke.
British on their tanks could have had the gun similar to the 75mm the French or Germans had on their tanks before 1939, if not better.
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