Thanks. As an aside, that partially explains why navies were so eager to replace guns with guided missiles as soon as those were even rudimentarily functional post WWII.
Same goes for SAMs vs gun based heavy AA.
British 1936-42 purchase options, logistics and export/import of military hardware
- Thread starter tomo pauk
- Start date
Thanks. As an aside, that partially explains why navies were so eager to replace guns with guided missiles as soon as those were even rudimentarily functional post WWII.
Same goes for SAMs vs gun based heavy AA.
Well, all of this is unrealistic. We are arguing in 2025 about what people should have done in the 1930s. The post didn't spell out what level of hindsight. Not being sarcastic, is there some forum rule about this that I have missed?
If we are arguing about what they should have done with what they knew, I wouldn't claim I would have done better.
Bullet proof tanks armed mainly with MGs and a hole puncher in case they run into enemy tanks? Why not! They are only supposed to be "cruising" around behind enemy lines. Much slower bullet proof tanks helped break trench lines in WW1 despite field guns being everywhere. And if we're using a single off-the-shelf truck engine you can't add more armour without wrecking speed (and track life and general reliability which is probably more important).
Have them designed by inexperienced car/locomotive firms rather than the established monopoly (Vickers) or a government bureau? Promote competition and innovation! (And the A13 worked out pretty well, as you have argued. Edit: Actually I should say Cruiser III/IV, the Covenanter also comes under specification A13!)
Bomber will always get through? If it wasn't for radar they would have.
Build more battleships? Actually I have less sympathy with this one, they knew contemporary AAA was almost useless (a drone flew over the fleet for an hour with everyone shooting at it in an early 1930s exercise and was unhit) and they knew enough torpedoes & bombs would cripple if not kill.
Stay off the continent and let the French do the fighting? The last war bled us white and they have the Maginot line now. German tanks didn't set the world on fire in the Spanish civil war. And Liddell Hart is arguing technology favours the defensive even more than in WW1 (which turned out to have some truth tactically, if not operationally/strategically).
"Hundreds more British [fighter] planes" and "hundreds more tanks" is exactly what I want and doesn't need magic if you make sacrifices elsewhere. I think the French, Belgians and British between them had enough infantry already - numbers were about equal overall. (In fact the French might have been better with a few less 2nd line infantry divisions and a few more skilled workers in factories.) Possibly requires an unrealistic level of hindsight by your standards.
z42 has already hinted at this but if ship-to-ship accuracy was so bad this does cast doubt on building expensive warships purely to carry AAA! (And add "destroyer smoke screen and torpedoes" to the "how to protect convoys from Tirpitz without new BBs" list.)
Last edited:
No rule I'm aware of, but IMHO interesting what-if scenarios are alternative choices people at the time could have chosen with the information they had at hand then. With hindsight we can then speculate whether said choices would have been more or less fortunate than the historical choices.
Well, people at the time weren't idiots (or well, some of them were, just like some people today are idiots).
Still, there's many things they could have done better, even with the information they had then. Or making larger R&D bets on things which later turned out to be huge isn't implausible either (radar or jet engines, for instance).
I've read somewhere that the expectation wasn't that heavy AA by itself would cause heavy losses to attackers, but would break up formations making it easier for the light and medium AA to defend the ship against individual or small groups of attackers at a time rather than the entire formation all at once.
Might be that wartime experience showed that this idea wasn't worth much against experienced and determined attackers.
I'm not sure that's the conclusion to draw. Guided missiles weren't an option during WWII (or could they have been, given a massive R&D project, maybe an interesting what if scenario?!), so shooting a huge number of shells to achieve a result might still be a better option than doing nothing.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Unpacking a lot of this and I actually agree with most so I am just expanding on it.
There was a lot of information from WW I and the 1920s and early 30s but the "experts" did not always agree so it is sometimes not new technology but a different path.
For the army was WW II going to be a repeat of WW I with slightly better tanks and aircraft or was there going to be a different way of fighting (no more massed charges?).
By the end of 1918 the British had a very good idea of what worked and what didn't against submarines (given the technology of the time) and this goes for both surface escorts and Aircraft and types of patrols. However this didn't fit the narrative that some air force advocates were trying to push (The Air Force could win the war by itself) and 'defensive measures' like anti-sub work was not winning the war with offensive bombing.
SO yes, there were a lot of bad ideas/policies enacted that hurt procurement, doctrine, tactics and so on.
This was the 'standard' British bomber of the early 1930s. Some served in aux roles until in 1941? but some were replaced in service squadrons by the first Whitley's, Wellingtons and Hampdens. Also note that while the several WW I British fighters that could do 130-140mph it took until after 1930 to get a service fighter that could go over 200mph.
Germans kept these a secret for several years in the early 30s.
A claimed top speed of 160mph, perhaps with a tail wind?
Things (speed and altitude) started changing a lot quicker in the mid 30s.
Portable radios (that did not need a truck or ship) were showing up in 1917 but a lot them were heavy, used dry cell batteries and sometimes only had ranges of around 6000meters even in an aircraft. The British army went through at least 3 tank radios in the 1930s to 1940 when the No 19 set showed up, there some tweaks to the No 19 but it lasted until the mid 50s.
Some other armies and air forces showed a similar pattern. In just a few years a radio could offer voice communications at longer ranges than a older radio could offer code/key communications, which is why so many late 1930s aircraft had a radio operator (as did tanks). Voice communications over radio was not possible over long ranges in a radio/antenna that could be used in a small plane or tank.
Drawing of a Defiant fighter showing the radio masts/antenna
Somebody had to crank the antenna/masts into position after take off and raise them before landing.
As far as firing off electronics as rounds of ammunition goes. It is often said that the proximity fuse program cost more money than the Atomic bomb program. This maybe subject to debate but the idea that working guided missiles only needed the "idea" and little effort to get rid of Battleships and Cruisers in the late 30s or early 40s doesn't hold water.
Even 1950s missiles were found to have a hit rate of 5% or under when actually used in service conditions, not tests firing, often done/assisted by manufacture's personnel.
And in the 1950s the electronics industry was much more advanced and commercialize (large plants) than it was in the 1930s and early 40s.
en.wikipedia.org
gives an idea of US experiments with a reverse engineered V-1 that lasted until until 1953. It also details some of the bickering between the Army and Airforce (and Navy) over who should control such a weapon and it's kin.
It also a lot easier to design a missile to attack a sizeable ground target than cannot move vs ships and aircraft that can. By 1944 radar aimed AA batteries with proximity fuses were using 1/10 to 1/ 100 the amount of shells they were in 1940 to kill an attacker. Need for guided missiles for AA work was a lot less. USN had a different requirement, after late 1944 they needed to stop Kamikazes which were sort of flying guided bombs (guided by pilot) and they had to be destroyed while incoming.
Agree there is no "rule" but without some constraints we can wind up with Nuclear Carrier with F-14s at Pearl Harbor
There was a lot of information from WW I and the 1920s and early 30s but the "experts" did not always agree so it is sometimes not new technology but a different path.
For the army was WW II going to be a repeat of WW I with slightly better tanks and aircraft or was there going to be a different way of fighting (no more massed charges?).
Sort of a repeat. You also had some "empire building" going on in a number of nations were the Air Force/s were trying to either become the dominate force or were trying to at least achieve parity and not be an after thought.
By the end of 1918 the British had a very good idea of what worked and what didn't against submarines (given the technology of the time) and this goes for both surface escorts and Aircraft and types of patrols. However this didn't fit the narrative that some air force advocates were trying to push (The Air Force could win the war by itself) and 'defensive measures' like anti-sub work was not winning the war with offensive bombing.
SO yes, there were a lot of bad ideas/policies enacted that hurt procurement, doctrine, tactics and so on.
Everybody thought that AA would be much more effective than it was. Of course some people thought that anything bigger than a 500lb was a waste, despite the British having 3 different studies of bomb damage that said otherwise. There was also around a 10-15 year pause in aircraft technology.
This was the 'standard' British bomber of the early 1930s. Some served in aux roles until in 1941? but some were replaced in service squadrons by the first Whitley's, Wellingtons and Hampdens. Also note that while the several WW I British fighters that could do 130-140mph it took until after 1930 to get a service fighter that could go over 200mph.
Germans kept these a secret for several years in the early 30s.
A claimed top speed of 160mph, perhaps with a tail wind?
Things (speed and altitude) started changing a lot quicker in the mid 30s.
I have big, big problem with anything that requires a major shift in time for electronic capabilities. Electronics were undergoing a rapid shift in development in the 1920s and 1930s and 40s. We can argue if it was as fast as cell phones were developing in the last 20-25 years
Portable radios (that did not need a truck or ship) were showing up in 1917 but a lot them were heavy, used dry cell batteries and sometimes only had ranges of around 6000meters even in an aircraft. The British army went through at least 3 tank radios in the 1930s to 1940 when the No 19 set showed up, there some tweaks to the No 19 but it lasted until the mid 50s.
Some other armies and air forces showed a similar pattern. In just a few years a radio could offer voice communications at longer ranges than a older radio could offer code/key communications, which is why so many late 1930s aircraft had a radio operator (as did tanks). Voice communications over radio was not possible over long ranges in a radio/antenna that could be used in a small plane or tank.
Drawing of a Defiant fighter showing the radio masts/antenna
Somebody had to crank the antenna/masts into position after take off and raise them before landing.
As far as firing off electronics as rounds of ammunition goes. It is often said that the proximity fuse program cost more money than the Atomic bomb program. This maybe subject to debate but the idea that working guided missiles only needed the "idea" and little effort to get rid of Battleships and Cruisers in the late 30s or early 40s doesn't hold water.
Even 1950s missiles were found to have a hit rate of 5% or under when actually used in service conditions, not tests firing, often done/assisted by manufacture's personnel.
And in the 1950s the electronics industry was much more advanced and commercialize (large plants) than it was in the 1930s and early 40s.
Republic-Ford JB-2 - Wikipedia
gives an idea of US experiments with a reverse engineered V-1 that lasted until until 1953. It also details some of the bickering between the Army and Airforce (and Navy) over who should control such a weapon and it's kin.
It also a lot easier to design a missile to attack a sizeable ground target than cannot move vs ships and aircraft that can. By 1944 radar aimed AA batteries with proximity fuses were using 1/10 to 1/ 100 the amount of shells they were in 1940 to kill an attacker. Need for guided missiles for AA work was a lot less. USN had a different requirement, after late 1944 they needed to stop Kamikazes which were sort of flying guided bombs (guided by pilot) and they had to be destroyed while incoming.
Last edited:
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Great stuff!
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Somethings like tactics, doctrine and strategy took a while to change.
Merchant raiding had been a tactic/strategy for several thousand years. They had only been using steam for 80-90 years in 1940. They had only been using radios for a bit less than 40 years and merchant ships didn't a real push towards radios until the Titanic so under 30 years. For the Battle of Coronel the British squadron had to communicate with the admiralty with relay stations that sometimes used telegraph lines for the long distances. The poor communications helped lead to the British loss.
In 1934/35 when the British were noodling around with the drawings that lead to the KGV class this was the best British long range recon/patrol plane.
Shorts was working on the Sunderland design but the first prototype didn't fly until Oct 1937 and the first semi-production aircraft (trial batch) didn't fly until
April 1938. Shorts worked hard and there 40 Sunderlands in service in Sept 1939 but they had to cover a large area and there were not enough of them to cover the whole world.
Sunderland did not start getting radar until until Sept 1941 which is a bit later than some other types. But it take quite a while for radar to become standard.
Changes were happening in a lot of areas very quickly in the 1930s and it is easy to use hindsight. But also in the 1930s in Europe (US had it somewhat easier) they also could not wait for a best solution. They sometimes had to go with what was best this month. And while each of the 3 services were arguing over who should get more of the Budget
IN WW I on land there had a been some major changes in weapons/tactics.
Machine guns took over from rifles as the major infantry weapon system.
HE shells took over from Shrapnel shells as the predominate type of artillery ammunition.
Gas shells were used in large numbers and then outlawed (wink/wink, nudge/nudge------everybody was designing them and stockpiling some just in case)
Field artillery with low elevation was being replaced with higher elevation guns for plunging fire as soon as budgets would allow.
Field phones were introduced and radios were starting to be used in 1917/1918 but not common.
Short bombardments had been replaced by bombardments of 4-7 days and then back to just a few hours when they figured out that the longer bombardments didn't work.
And yes, tanks showed up, but they were difficult to use and could be useful but they could not just be thrown into the existing doctrine (long bombardments) as the ground was not suitable for the tanks to cross. Signal flags and carrier pigeons were not really suitable means of communication for tanks
On even basic levels many armies knew that somethings needed to change. Nobody had enough horses to move really large armies. The Bigger guns that became common in WW I needed mechanical traction, not 3 teams of horses just to move one gun. Amount needed haul ammo was staggering.
The amount of industry need to supply modern guns (post 1897) was staggering, some 75mm-83mm guns were firing 400-500 rounds per day in some battles, for 5-7 days.
There was a lot of stuff that needed shorting out in the 1920s and 30s. They had had 40-50 years to go from black powder rifles (mostly muzzle loaders) and muzzle loading cannon to repeating breech loading rifles with smokeless powder and breech loading steel cannon. They were still trying to figure out recoil systems. They had 21 years from the end of WW I to Poland.
Merchant raiding had been a tactic/strategy for several thousand years. They had only been using steam for 80-90 years in 1940. They had only been using radios for a bit less than 40 years and merchant ships didn't a real push towards radios until the Titanic so under 30 years. For the Battle of Coronel the British squadron had to communicate with the admiralty with relay stations that sometimes used telegraph lines for the long distances. The poor communications helped lead to the British loss.
In 1934/35 when the British were noodling around with the drawings that lead to the KGV class this was the best British long range recon/patrol plane.
Shorts was working on the Sunderland design but the first prototype didn't fly until Oct 1937 and the first semi-production aircraft (trial batch) didn't fly until
April 1938. Shorts worked hard and there 40 Sunderlands in service in Sept 1939 but they had to cover a large area and there were not enough of them to cover the whole world.
Sunderland did not start getting radar until until Sept 1941 which is a bit later than some other types. But it take quite a while for radar to become standard.
Changes were happening in a lot of areas very quickly in the 1930s and it is easy to use hindsight. But also in the 1930s in Europe (US had it somewhat easier) they also could not wait for a best solution. They sometimes had to go with what was best this month. And while each of the 3 services were arguing over who should get more of the Budget
IN WW I on land there had a been some major changes in weapons/tactics.
Machine guns took over from rifles as the major infantry weapon system.
HE shells took over from Shrapnel shells as the predominate type of artillery ammunition.
Gas shells were used in large numbers and then outlawed (wink/wink, nudge/nudge------everybody was designing them and stockpiling some just in case)
Field artillery with low elevation was being replaced with higher elevation guns for plunging fire as soon as budgets would allow.
Field phones were introduced and radios were starting to be used in 1917/1918 but not common.
Short bombardments had been replaced by bombardments of 4-7 days and then back to just a few hours when they figured out that the longer bombardments didn't work.
And yes, tanks showed up, but they were difficult to use and could be useful but they could not just be thrown into the existing doctrine (long bombardments) as the ground was not suitable for the tanks to cross. Signal flags and carrier pigeons were not really suitable means of communication for tanks
On even basic levels many armies knew that somethings needed to change. Nobody had enough horses to move really large armies. The Bigger guns that became common in WW I needed mechanical traction, not 3 teams of horses just to move one gun. Amount needed haul ammo was staggering.
The amount of industry need to supply modern guns (post 1897) was staggering, some 75mm-83mm guns were firing 400-500 rounds per day in some battles, for 5-7 days.
There was a lot of stuff that needed shorting out in the 1920s and 30s. They had had 40-50 years to go from black powder rifles (mostly muzzle loaders) and muzzle loading cannon to repeating breech loading rifles with smokeless powder and breech loading steel cannon. They were still trying to figure out recoil systems. They had 21 years from the end of WW I to Poland.
I have big, big problem with anything that requires a major shift in time for electronic capabilities. Electronics were undergoing a rapid shift in development in the 1920s and 1930s and 40s. We can argue if it was as fast as cell phones were developing in the last 20-25 years
As far as firing off electronics as rounds of ammunition goes. It is often said that the proximity fuse program cost more money than the Atomic bomb program. This maybe subject to debate but the idea that working guided missiles only needed the "idea" and little effort to get rid of Battleships and Cruisers in the late 30s or early 40s doesn't hold water.
Even 1950s missiles were found to have a hit rate of 5% or under when actually used in service conditions, not tests firing, often done/assisted by manufacture's personnel.
And in the 1950s the electronics industry was much more advanced and commercialize (large plants) than it was in the 1930s and early 40s.
Not disagreeing with any of that per se. But we're not talking about anything like sea skimming anti-ship missiles with a 1000 nm range here, are we? If we're looking at something that would have a better hit probability than artillery for long range engagement. Like hitting a ship at, say, 25 km? Take something like a Fritz X and strap a rocket to it so you can shoot it from a ship or coastal artillery battery. And use radar rather than visual tracking? (Now, realistically, even if all the necessary pieces were in place during WWII, actually integrating them all into a functional weapon system, working out the bugs etc., and it's very unlikely to actually see service during WWII..)
Indeed, in all the excitement over hypothetical gee-whiz stuff it's easy to forget how big advancements were actually made during the war. (Well, one small improvement that might actually have been possible would be to have the 3" rapid fire guns with VT shells enter service before the end of the war.)
Germany spent a ridiculous amount of resources on heavy AA to shoot down heavy bombers. 16000 88mm shells for each four-engined bomber shot down, IIRC. And with a barrel life of about 1000 shells for the 88, that's about 16 new or relined barrels as well per heavy bomber. And next generation bombers were projected to fly higher and faster, which would make the ratio of shells/bomber even worse. So I'm not sure they were totally wrong either in trying to develop essentially SAMs.
- Thread starter
- #290
Seems like that the high-velocity Flak 41 was the one with low barrel life, 1000 rd. The 'normal' 8.8cm were with 5000 rd. barrel life; another data sheet says 7500 rd. barrel life.
(second to last populated column; note the typo on the item 3, 1000 instead of, presumably, 10000 rd.)
The 16000 rd per the downed aircraft was in 1944, when Allies were making a lot of jamming, spoofing, and when the servicemen fit to be infantrymen went into the infantry formations, while a lot of the manpower was either uncapable or unwilling (or both) to add to the German defenses. In 1942, the average was about 4000 of heavy shells per a downed aircraft.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
So the Germans (or anybody else) need to change several things. Like.................
Get a working rocket engine that will actually fire a 1500-1600kg warhead 25km (or cheat and just fire a 1500-1600lb warhead the same distance.)
It took the US till about 1952-53 to do that
except they didn't use much in the way of guidance. You need a lot of rocket to heave even 1500lbs 25,000meters. Complete rocket was about 5800lbs.
Now you need a new guidance system from what the Fitz X used. A command guidance system like a 1950s AT missile used is not going to work at 20,000 meters plus. Expecting the 'gunner' to track a flare at that distance???
And now we get into radar tracking? Which means a radar antenna system that can track the missile and provide information to the "gunner" to steer the missile both left and right and up and down (range). Or we try and put a radar system in the nose of the missile like the US BAT.
US got the BAT into service in April 1945 using a 1000lb as the warhead and about 600lbs worth of airframe and electronics. Now you just need about 4000lbs worth of rocket engine and a way for the guidance system in the BAT to actually steer the fast moving missile.
You are correct, chances of that actually happening in WW II are pretty darn slim
And we have the late 40s/early 50s actual accuracy standards. They thought they were doing good to get a 50% success rate.
While the 5in/38 proximity fused shell showed up in the Pacific in Nov 1942 with first kill in Jan 1943 it took a little longer to shrink the fuse down to smaller shells, this took several stages, like into British 4.7in, 4.5in and 4in shells and US 105mm howitzer shells. This was accomplished in 1943 or early 1944.
The 3in fuse took longer and I think they had to try a second design? At any rate we then have the problem of what is meant by a 3" rapid fire gun?
US managed to get 45-50rpm just after the war, project was delayed while they chased the 3in/70 dream which took 12 years, they went back to the 3in/50 as a fall back by 1948.
You could fire the VT shells out of the older 3in/50s without auto loaders at about 15-20rpm and this was done in late 1944 or early 45?
The flak 41 did have the lower barrel life as it was made to have a higher effective ceiling. Assessments of flak accuracy
showed that above 15,000 feet things started to deteriorate per 5,000 feet higher.
In other words the chances of hitting dropped by 50% at 20,000 feet and another 50% at 25,000 feet. The flak 36 had an effective ceiling
of 26,000 feet but the spread around that height was bad. The 41 had a higher muzzle velocity to try to keep shells a bit straighter on
the way up.
The 41 and higher calibres were not produced in large numbers but the ammunition requirements took a large chunk out of German
production of other equipment / munitions.
showed that above 15,000 feet things started to deteriorate per 5,000 feet higher.
In other words the chances of hitting dropped by 50% at 20,000 feet and another 50% at 25,000 feet. The flak 36 had an effective ceiling
of 26,000 feet but the spread around that height was bad. The 41 had a higher muzzle velocity to try to keep shells a bit straighter on
the way up.
The 41 and higher calibres were not produced in large numbers but the ammunition requirements took a large chunk out of German
production of other equipment / munitions.
Last edited:
- Thread starter
- #293
(Un)ironically, the production of just the 'normal' 88mm AA guns was greater than the production of the 105 and 150mm howitzers combined.
Ammo production went to 1.6 millions of shells of the 88mm and greater AA calibers. And the heavy AA ammo was not cheap, with clockwork fuses, the good/the best steel, and while requiring a lot of propellant.
The British and Soviet approach, that favored greatly the fighters vs. the heavy AA guns, seem to be better.
The Flak 41 used a lot of propellant, and that, coupled with the high MV, is not conductive to the barrel life.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
The Flak 41 used 5.12kg of propellent. The Flak 18-37 used 2.41kg of propellent.
The 10.5cm Flak 38/39 used 5.63kg of propellent but other things come into play. Like the surface area of the bore, about 19% greater for the 10.5cm gun and there is a different bore volume to surface area.
This may (or may not?) be influenced by the available industry. The Germans were making about 40-50% more steel and iron per year than the USSR and the UK combined.
Increasing aircraft production by large amounts might not have been possible? Might depend on pre-war stocks?
We have talked about many generals in a number of countries preparing to fight WW I all over again.
In WWI the British manufactured the following numbers of field artillery shells and used the 2nd number on the western front.
13pdr.........................5,470,000............................1,500,000
18pdr....................113,000,000.........................99,300,000
4.5in How..............29,200,000.........................25,000,000
60pdr.......................-- -- -- --...........................10,125,321
It took a few years in WW I but both sides had figured out how to manufacture shells fairly quickly after some major mistakes in low quality. A few millions shells was a minor problem
AA guns tended not to get blown up. The British had built about 10,000 18pdrs before and during WW I and they had just under 4000 left at the end. Many of which were worn out. Production continued after the war in small numbers to replace the more worn out out guns.
It may have been the huge expenditure of ammunition in WW I that had the British specifying a lower (but not too low) grade steel for their shells. Both the British and French and 'shell scandals' in 1915. This had two parts. The stock of existing shells/ammunition was not anywhere great enough for the expenditure in battle in the first 4-5 months of the war which lead to severe shortages in late fall of 1914. Which lead to a lot of blame being placed in newspapers and in Parliaments in both countries, which then lead to a number of contracts being placed with companies that had never made artillery shells before and some rather questionable materials/processes being used to fill the ammo racks which lead to hundreds of guns being blown up and hundreds of gunners killed and thousands wounded which lead to more scandals.
For the French the numbers went like this just for the French 75
Dec 1914..........................6
Jan 1915.........................30
Feb 1915........................30
Mar 1915.....................230
April 1915...................274
May 1915...................150
Sept 1915...................279
Oct 1915.......................46
after that it dropped to single digits.
The British might not have been as bad but the British numbers were in the high hundreds total. Nobody wanted a repeat of those events when planning things in the 1920s or early 30s. And the British erred on the side of caution when it came to Shell design, which lead to shells with a poor explosive to weight ratio which meant you needed more of them to get the same effect. Having to ship them around Africa and to the Far East may not have been a consideration in the design/purchase process.
Soviet air defense aviation was rather extremely weak - German bomber pilots wrote in their memoirs that they feared Soviet anti-aircraft artillery rather than fighters. Soviet air defense failed both in 1943, when the Germans bombed important factories in the Volga region, and in 1944, when they failed to prevent the Germans from bombing airfields used for shuttle raids by Allied bombers during Operation Frantic.
It was easier for the Soviets to produce thousands of cheap wooden fighters that would rot before they ran out than to produce large caliber anti-aircraft artillery, and more importantly, the targeting equipment (AA radars and directors).
By and large, the Soviets had no choice - they acted forced by technological weakness.
Hi
Reference radio (wireless) during WW1, all nations went to war with wireless/telegraphy systems in limited numbers (particularly useful for cavalry formations) both on the ground and at sea. Also used for air ground communications in limited numbers during 1914 (alongside lamp and pyrotechnics) this had already been experimented and tried out pre-war. The size of the early sets was rather large, as can be seen on early aircraft fits where the observer had to be left behind, although the power source for the equipment was rather more problematic, especially for ground sets, throughout the war as 'batteries' were heavier than the sets in many cases and did not last long. The British Army during 1915 tried out the RFC's Stirling set as a Trench Set and decided to produce a proper trench set after the former was used with some relative success. By the end of the war a single British Army had 66 spark sets and 49 C.W. sets in their area, this is not counting sets used in their area by specialist units such the RAF. This still caused some self jamming but less than earlier in the war, jamming was also caused by German sets (not deliberate in most cases but just by their use in close proximity). Wireless was never the only communication system, but landline, pigeons, message dogs, lamp signalling, flag signalling, shutter and disc signalling, runners, pyrotechnics etc. were used by all sides throughout the war depending on the battle situation. According to R. E. Priestley's 'The Signal Service (France)' p.222, during 1917:
"The pigeon service at this period of the war had far outstripped the forward wireless service in its practical utility." however, during 1918 there was a reversal in importance of the two methods.
The Tank Corps used many of the same methods depending on who they had to communicate with including a coloured light system and later semaphore system to contact the supporting infantry and/or other Tanks, also wireless/telegraphy tanks from about June 1917 to contact the rear. Wireless/Telephony experiments also were undertaken mainly to communicate with supporting aircraft, some documents of the period follow, indicating the problems with aerials:
Other aerials tried out:
An example of a Tank wireless system from a 3rd Tank Brigade War Diary is:
Plus a wider view of tank communications, telephone inter-connections:
I hope that is of interest. Other information on inter-war comms will follow.
Mike
Reference radio (wireless) during WW1, all nations went to war with wireless/telegraphy systems in limited numbers (particularly useful for cavalry formations) both on the ground and at sea. Also used for air ground communications in limited numbers during 1914 (alongside lamp and pyrotechnics) this had already been experimented and tried out pre-war. The size of the early sets was rather large, as can be seen on early aircraft fits where the observer had to be left behind, although the power source for the equipment was rather more problematic, especially for ground sets, throughout the war as 'batteries' were heavier than the sets in many cases and did not last long. The British Army during 1915 tried out the RFC's Stirling set as a Trench Set and decided to produce a proper trench set after the former was used with some relative success. By the end of the war a single British Army had 66 spark sets and 49 C.W. sets in their area, this is not counting sets used in their area by specialist units such the RAF. This still caused some self jamming but less than earlier in the war, jamming was also caused by German sets (not deliberate in most cases but just by their use in close proximity). Wireless was never the only communication system, but landline, pigeons, message dogs, lamp signalling, flag signalling, shutter and disc signalling, runners, pyrotechnics etc. were used by all sides throughout the war depending on the battle situation. According to R. E. Priestley's 'The Signal Service (France)' p.222, during 1917:
"The pigeon service at this period of the war had far outstripped the forward wireless service in its practical utility." however, during 1918 there was a reversal in importance of the two methods.
The Tank Corps used many of the same methods depending on who they had to communicate with including a coloured light system and later semaphore system to contact the supporting infantry and/or other Tanks, also wireless/telegraphy tanks from about June 1917 to contact the rear. Wireless/Telephony experiments also were undertaken mainly to communicate with supporting aircraft, some documents of the period follow, indicating the problems with aerials:
Other aerials tried out:
An example of a Tank wireless system from a 3rd Tank Brigade War Diary is:
Plus a wider view of tank communications, telephone inter-connections:
I hope that is of interest. Other information on inter-war comms will follow.
Mike
Hi
A useful book on British Army 'radio' systems of WW2 and the inter-war period is Simon Godfrey's 'British Army Communications in the Second World War - Lifting the Fog of Battle', it includes a good appendix with a list of sets:
The RAF during the inter-war period had their single-seat fighters equipped with R/T from the Gloster Grebe of 1923 (HF T.25 transmitter and R.31 receiver, this was considered quite effective at the time) onwards. The TR.9 H/F wireless transmitting and receiving set was fitted to the Gloster Gauntlet of 1935. The radio communication was necessary for the fighters to operate in the RAF's air defence system, the detection system then in use was sound locators on the coastline, an upgraded sound system was being introduced in the mid 1930s, however, this was cancelled (after some had been built) when the RAF took a gamble on the RDF (Radar) system then being experimented with, this ended up being a correct decision. Prior to the BoB the RAF Fighter Command was introducing VHF, the roll out of this was delayed by the BoB, but it was the way forward.
Mike
A useful book on British Army 'radio' systems of WW2 and the inter-war period is Simon Godfrey's 'British Army Communications in the Second World War - Lifting the Fog of Battle', it includes a good appendix with a list of sets:
The RAF during the inter-war period had their single-seat fighters equipped with R/T from the Gloster Grebe of 1923 (HF T.25 transmitter and R.31 receiver, this was considered quite effective at the time) onwards. The TR.9 H/F wireless transmitting and receiving set was fitted to the Gloster Gauntlet of 1935. The radio communication was necessary for the fighters to operate in the RAF's air defence system, the detection system then in use was sound locators on the coastline, an upgraded sound system was being introduced in the mid 1930s, however, this was cancelled (after some had been built) when the RAF took a gamble on the RDF (Radar) system then being experimented with, this ended up being a correct decision. Prior to the BoB the RAF Fighter Command was introducing VHF, the roll out of this was delayed by the BoB, but it was the way forward.
Mike
These links will be of interest in relation to the performance of the TR.9 HF set, attempts to extend it and the switch to VHF. Page 3, probably of most interest, details the reasons for the short term reversal of the change during the BoB.
Note the significant differences between air to ground and air to air ranges, particularly with the TR.9
Note the significant differences between air to ground and air to air ranges, particularly with the TR.9
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
These changes in radio equipment and ranges may help to explain the lack of interest in single seat, long range escort fighters before the war and early in the war. If you want to be able to communicate at 'long ranges' you need a bomber size radio, a big antenna and often a Morse code key. There was a reason the Germans built the Bf 110 for 'escort' work and it wasn't just the lack of drop tanks. Now the progress of radio technology did not always match the progress in aircraft technology, it was often faster (new radio was developed faster than new air frame or new engine) but just because they could do something in 1943 does not mean it could be done in 1939/40.
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
One reason for the Royal Navy to have W/T instead of R/T in their aeroplanes was for range early in the war. This was another driver for having the TAG on board as well as the pilot, also the carrier finding device. As he was there he may as well have a gun, if only to give him something to make him feel better under attack.
Users who are viewing this thread
Similar threads
