Build a better Sea Hurricane 1938 (1 Viewer)

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Fairey, Heaton Chapel, Errwood Park, Stockport, Manchester, Lancashire, the site sort of grew so the given names changed.
Fulmar begin April 1940
Battle end November 1940
Beaufighter begin February 1941 (built C (Coastal) versions apart from 25 If)
Barracuda begin July 1942
Halifax begin October 1942
Fulmar end February 1943
Beaufighter end April 1943
Halifax end October 1945

As far as the wartime production reports are concerned, Errwood Park built Beaufighter and Halifax, Heaton Chapel built Fulmar and Barracuda. Alternatively they all plus the Battle came from Stockport before the decision was made to call the complex 2 different sites.

Fairey, Hays, Middlesex
Albacore begin September 1939 (10 built to end February 1940)
Swordfish end February 1940
Firefly begin June 1942 (but essentially 5 prototypes to end October, production from March 1943)
Albacore end December 1942

Barracuda, the Blackburn line began production in October 1942, the Boulton Paul line and the short lived Westland line in December 1942. All up 23 Barracuda built to end November 1942, then 27 in December 1942.

Albacore contracts, for 100+200 signed in 1937 (L and N serials), for 250 in 1939 (T and X serials) then a supplement to the 1939 contract for another 150 (BF serials). By the looks of the requisition numbers, first contract batches in 1936 and 1938, 100 in 1939, 250 in 1940 with the final 150 added to the 1940 requisition at an unknown date. Fairey build 161 Albacore March to December 1942 inclusive.

Fulmar contracts, for 250 in 1938 (N serials), for 200 in 1940 (X serials), then supplements to the 1940 contract for 50 (BP serials) and then 100 (DR serials). The contract card list the 1940 order has either 250+100 or 200+50+100 with the 100 added on Admiralty requisition 30/E1 probably dated 5 July 1941. Fairey built 106 Fulmar February 1942 to February 1943 inclusive.

The first 2 Fulmar N1854 and 5 A&AEE "Ship plane", N1856 and 7 MAEE "Seaplane"

71 Martlet imports by end 1940.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

I for one, really like the idea of a properly sorted out Sea Hurricane. Retractable tail wheel, constant speed prop, manual fold wings, plumbing for external tanks, etc. Ready for the fleet by mid to late 1940.
Of course its all revisionist history, but its still interesting to think about

 

[Shortround6]

In some "what if's" there may things just could not be done. Sticking an R-2800 in a Wildcat was not going to work.
Then there are some "what if's" that require time travel.
Then there are some "what if's" that were possible but were not done because they didn't think of it at the time. Dr. Sanford Moss of turbo-charger fame was asked why didn't they stick a combustion chamber in-between the compress and the Turbine of a turbocharger to make a small jet engine. He is supposed to have replied "dumb, just dumb". They already had 2/3rds of jet engine.

Building a folding wing Hurricane seems to certainly be possible. No reason it could not be done. And the Hurricane, while not ideal, was certainly better than some other candidates from around the world. The 10 out of 10 successful landing by RAF pilots in their first attempt at carrier landing with no hooks certainly points to the Hurricane having few problems.
But this was in June of 1940, a little late to cancel the Fulmar program. Experiments could have bee done earlier.

The arguments seem to be if the Hurricane could do the intended job/s and that means all of them, not just defending carrier/fleet over the carrier/fleet.
Part of this is the navigation question. British actually had a pretty good system. Seems to be better than the US and Japanese in 1939/40. What the Americans could or could not do in 1942 or 1944 does not have a lot of bearing on what the British could do/buy/make in 1939/40. We are starting to get into time travel.
The Hurricane didn't have the desired range/endurance. Which was solved later with drop tanks, could have been solved in the early 30s or even sooner. However carriers, especially small ones, don't have a lot of storage space. If you are carrying several hundred empty drop tanks what else did you leave home to make space?
And for some reason (dumb?) the British were fooling around with fixed external tanks, not drop tanks, for the Spitfire in 1939/40. Sticking fixed tanks on a Hurricane reduces the margin of performance over the Fulmar.
We have a fuel question, When did the RN know they were going to get 100 octane on their carriers. Not when did they get it, when did they know so they could make plans (order planes that could use it, like a year or more earlier).
A Fulmar at low altitude could do 216mph at 1000ft but the account says that was using 4lbs of boost which does not seem right (typo? or 2 typos?) A different plane was tested using 9lbs of boost (100 octane) and did 250mph at 1000ft and 255.5mph at 2400ft which seems unbelievable. Hurricane I gained about 20mph going from 6lbs of boost to 12lbs of boost.
Hurricane I (land plane) did about 265-270mph at 1000-2000ft using 6lbs and a CS prop. Did around 290mph using 12lbs of boost.
The Fulmar I using 100 octane fuel was no faster once 10,000ft was reached which would probably be the case for a Sea Hurricane using a Merlin VIII engine.

To me there are two points at which a Sea Hurricane with folding could have been introduced or introduced earlier. The late 39/early 40 point where it replaces the Fulmar.
And the 2nd point in the Spring of 1941, The Hurricane II with Merlin XX engine had been in production for over 6 month, The Spitfire was the choice of the RAF, they just needed more of them.
The FAA did not get a Sea Hurricane II with Merlin XX for another full year. Spring of 1942 was when they started work converting the first Hurricane IIs.

The lack of a folding wing Hurricane in late 1939 maybe quite understandable. Waiting until May of 1942 to make fixed wing Hurricane IIS takes a lot of explaining.

 

[EwenS]

The RN didn't get to choose the Hurricanes for conversion to Sea Hurricanes. It had to make do with what the RAF would release.

Minute from Prime Minister1 to Secretary of Chiefs of Staff Committee [ADM 116/5348] 30 September 1941

Fighters for aircraft carriers
When I visited INDOMITABLE last week, I was astonished to learn that the handful of Hurricanes to be allotted to this vital war unit were only of the lower type Hurricane Ones. I trust it may be arranged that only the finest aeroplanes that can do the work go into all aircraft-carriers. All this year it has been apparent that the power to launch the highest class fighters from aircraft-carriers may reopen to the Fleet great strategic doors which have been closed against them. The aircraft-carrier should have supreme priority in the quality and character of suitable types.

Letter from Vice Admiral, Naval Air Stations1 to Secretary of Admiralty [ADM 1/13522] 21 September 1941

Selection of Hurricanes for conversion to Sea Hurricanes

Be pleased to represent to Their Lordships that the Vice Admiral Naval Air Stations does not consider that the selection of Hurricanes for conversion to Sea Hurricanes has up to the present been altogether satisfactory.

2. Many of those selected have been of the L.P. and N. series, and most of these have had previous service in Royal Air Force Operational Squadrons. One particular case may be quoted; N.2455 has since October 1939 been in two different Royal Air Force Squadrons, took part in the Battle of Britain, and was twice extensively damaged, once by forced landing and once by enemy action, before being converted to Sea Hurricane.

3. All these old aircraft suffer from a multitude of minor defects and the Stations have had to expend many weeks' work in rendering them fit for allotment to a Squadron, and although after this work had been completed the aircraft can be considered as serviceable, it is thought from consideration of their age and previous history that it is most likely that they will continue to suffer from minor defects during their remaining life.

4. It is further considered that even if they can be maintained serviceable, the effect on morale of allotting aircraft of this type to a new Squadron forming is deplorable. Many of the Pilots joining will be young and enthusiastic officers, joining an Operational Squadron for the first time, and to be given an aircraft which can only be described as a 'cast off from the Royal Air Force' causes a considerable damping of their ardour.

5. It is submitted that in future only new Hurricanes or those with a minimum of flying hours should be selected for conversion to Sea Hurricanes.


It was summer 1942 before Sea Hurricane II became available to FAA squadrons. Too late for the Malta convoy Operation Pedestal. Just in time to allow them to work up for Operation Torch.

A hooked Spitfire V was deck landed for the first time during Xmas week 1941. Seafire Ib (conversions of Mk.V airframes) and Seafire IIc (built as such) began to arrive on the front line squadrons in June 1942, in time for the first to be worked up ready for Operation Torch.

 

[EwenS]

Even supplying Hurricane II to the USSR was rated a higher priority than supplying the FAA in late 1941 / early 1942. Any attempt to have given the Soviets such poor quality Hurricane I would have seen them rejected at the dockside.

 

[RCAFson]

In some "what if's" there may things just could not be done. Sticking an R-2800 in a Wildcat was not going to work.
Then there are some "what if's" that require time travel.
Then there are some "what if's" that were possible but were not done because they didn't think of it at the time. Dr. Sanford Moss of turbo-charger fame was asked why didn't they stick a combustion chamber in-between the compress and the Turbine of a turbocharger to make a small jet engine. He is supposed to have replied "dumb, just dumb". They already had 2/3rds of jet engine.

Building a folding wing Hurricane seems to certainly be possible. No reason it could not be done. And the Hurricane, while not ideal, was certainly better than some other candidates from around the world. The 10 out of 10 successful landing by RAF pilots in their first attempt at carrier landing with no hooks certainly points to the Hurricane having few problems.
But this was in June of 1940, a little late to cancel the Fulmar program. Experiments could have bee done earlier.

The arguments seem to be if the Hurricane could do the intended job/s and that means all of them, not just defending carrier/fleet over the carrier/fleet.
Part of this is the navigation question. British actually had a pretty good system. Seems to be better than the US and Japanese in 1939/40. What the Americans could or could not do in 1942 or 1944 does not have a lot of bearing on what the British could do/buy/make in 1939/40. We are starting to get into time travel.
The Hurricane didn't have the desired range/endurance. Which was solved later with drop tanks, could have been solved in the early 30s or even sooner. However carriers, especially small ones, don't have a lot of storage space. If you are carrying several hundred empty drop tanks what else did you leave home to make space?
And for some reason (dumb?) the British were fooling around with fixed external tanks, not drop tanks, for the Spitfire in 1939/40. Sticking fixed tanks on a Hurricane reduces the margin of performance over the Fulmar.
We have a fuel question, When did the RN know they were going to get 100 octane on their carriers. Not when did they get it, when did they know so they could make plans (order planes that could use it, like a year or more earlier).
A Fulmar at low altitude could do 216mph at 1000ft but the account says that was using 4lbs of boost which does not seem right (typo? or 2 typos?) A different plane was tested using 9lbs of boost (100 octane) and did 250mph at 1000ft and 255.5mph at 2400ft which seems unbelievable. Hurricane I gained about 20mph going from 6lbs of boost to 12lbs of boost.
Hurricane I (land plane) did about 265-270mph at 1000-2000ft using 6lbs and a CS prop. Did around 290mph using 12lbs of boost.
The Fulmar I using 100 octane fuel was no faster once 10,000ft was reached which would probably be the case for a Sea Hurricane using a Merlin VIII engine.

To me there are two points at which a Sea Hurricane with folding could have been introduced or introduced earlier. The late 39/early 40 point where it replaces the Fulmar.
And the 2nd point in the Spring of 1941, The Hurricane II with Merlin XX engine had been in production for over 6 month, The Spitfire was the choice of the RAF, they just needed more of them.
The FAA did not get a Sea Hurricane II with Merlin XX for another full year. Spring of 1942 was when they started work converting the first Hurricane IIs.

The lack of a folding wing Hurricane in late 1939 maybe quite understandable. Waiting until May of 1942 to make fixed wing Hurricane IIS takes a lot of explaining.

The 4lb boost was testing done using 87 Octane fuel, and that accounts for the increase in speed at 9lb boost. The FTH of the Merlin VIII was only 2400ft at 9lb boost:

Further speed trials were undertaken by N1854, which was flown at a take-off weight of 10,620 lb using 100 octane fuel and with the engine boosted to +9 lb/sq.in instead of the more normal +4 lb/sq.in. Its low-level performance was improved and at 1000 ft a top speed of 250 mph TAS was recorded. The maximum speed was 255.5 mph TAS at a full throttle height of 2400 ft but above this height performance was gradually reduced so that parity with N1858 was reached at 10,000 ft. (Flying to the Limit)

The Merlin VIII was rerated to 9lb boost by R-R, sometime after the initial tests, and authorization to mod the boost control had to wait for that to occur.

 

[Shortround6]

The 4lb boost was testing done using 87 Octane fuel, and that accounts for the increase in speed at 9lb boost. The FTH of the Merlin VIII was only 2400ft at 9lb boost:

What puzzles me is why the engine was only using 4lbs of boost using 87 octane fuel. The Merlin III with a higher supercharger gear (and higher temperature in the intake charge used 6lbs.
The Merlin X in the Whitley used 5 3/4s for both take-off and and the 5 minute limit.
In fact the Merlin X in the Whitley was allowed 5 3/4s at 2600rpm for 1/2 hr climb rating.
4lbs was the max rich cruise limit.
Whitley manual gives higher limits for 100 octane but 4lbs seems low even for 87 octane for the Fulmar I.

 

[RCAFson]

What puzzles me is why the engine was only using 4lbs of boost using 87 octane fuel. The Merlin III with a higher supercharger gear (and higher temperature in the intake charge used 6lbs.
The Merlin X in the Whitley used 5 3/4s for both take-off and and the 5 minute limit.
In fact the Merlin X in the Whitley was allowed 5 3/4s at 2600rpm for 1/2 hr climb rating.
4lbs was the max rich cruise limit.
Whitley manual gives higher limits for 100 octane but 4lbs seems low even for 87 octane for the Fulmar I.

Merlin VIII 87 octane TO power was 5.75lb boost at 3000rpm but boost levels fell above SL. I guess 4lb boost was used because it could be held until 7000ft in climb and 9000ft in level flight.

The Merlin X used a two speed SC and would switch to FS gear almost immediately after TO. Similarly the 87 Octane version Merlin X MS gear and rotor was chosen for max power at SL to get heavily laden bombers off the airfield and then they would switch to FS gear.

 

[Shortround6]

Merlin VIII 87 octane TO power was 5.75lb boost at 3000rpm but boost levels fell above SL. I guess 4lb boost was used because it could be held until 7000ft in climb and 9000ft in level flight.

The Merlin X used a two speed SC and would switch to FS gear almost immediately after TO. Similarly the 87 Octane version Merlin X MS gear and rotor was chosen for max power at SL to get heavily laden bombers off the airfield and then they would switch to FS gear.

I am still having trouble with it.
If the supercharger would only give 5.75lbs boost at sea level with 87 octane it would only give 5.75lbs with 100 octane.
There had to be some point were it was giving 5.75 with a wide open throttle and I am guessing some were around 5-6000ft.
Best rate of climb was at 7000ft which would indicate that was where the FTH was + whatever RAM effect they had from the climbing speed.
FTH in level flight was at 9,000ft as you say.

Merlin VIII used as 6.313 supercharger gear and the Merlin X used a 6.389 supercharger gear. 1.2% different.
we know that the Merlin X would give 1130hp at 5250ft in low gear from the Halifax data sheet. Or 1145hp at 5250ft from the 1938 Janes which is close enough, not going to argue about 15hp on an 1100hp engine from sources 3 years apart.
They were using 3.5lbs of boost in Kestrels with 87 octane fuel (and higher for take-off) . They were using 6lbs of boost in the Merlin C.

I am not saying the test wasn't done at 4lbs, but we don't know why.

 

[RCAFson]

I am still having trouble with it.
If the supercharger would only give 5.75lbs boost at sea level with 87 octane it would only give 5.75lbs with 100 octane.
There had to be some point were it was giving 5.75 with a wide open throttle and I am guessing some were around 5-6000ft.
Best rate of climb was at 7000ft which would indicate that was where the FTH was + whatever RAM effect they had from the climbing speed.
FTH in level flight was at 9,000ft as you say.

Merlin VIII used as 6.313 supercharger gear and the Merlin X used a 6.389 supercharger gear. 1.2% different.
we know that the Merlin X would give 1130hp at 5250ft in low gear from the Halifax data sheet. Or 1145hp at 5250ft from the 1938 Janes which is close enough, not going to argue about 15hp on an 1100hp engine from sources 3 years apart.
They were using 3.5lbs of boost in Kestrels with 87 octane fuel (and higher for take-off) . They were using 6lbs of boost in the Merlin C.

I am not saying the test wasn't done at 4lbs, but we don't know why.

According to Fulmar Pilot's Notes Merlin VIII 87 octane TO was 3000rpm/5.75lb and the 5min limit was 3000rpm/4lb.

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

Even supplying Hurricane II to the USSR was rated a higher priority than supplying the FAA in late 1941 / early 1942. Any attempt to have given the Soviets such poor quality Hurricane I would have seen them rejected at the dockside.

Which in hindsight seems extraordinarily silly. The Soviets didn't really want the Hurricanes anyway

 

[Clayton Magnet]

Obviously a different thread topic, but maybe a Perseus powered Gloster F.5/34 would have been a better option for development for the FAA

 

[Shortround6]

Weren't the FAA pilots suffering enough?
And the Mechanic/fitters.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

British mechanics were all ready used to working on bizarre British stuff, one more wouldn't kill them

 

[yulzari]

What it comes down to is that a better Sea Hurricane starts with replacing the Hawker Nimrod not the Fairey Fulmar. That it did not was down to the RAF snapping up all the production of Hurricanes and Spitfires.

After all, the Nimrod was the naval Fury and the Hurricane was the replacement for the land Fury.

 

[Glider]

Just one observation regarding the use of 100 Octane fuel. It was the standard fuel in RAF fighters around May 1940 and use had been approved in Sept 1939. The changes needed to convert an aircraft to use 100 Octane from 87 octane were minimal and you didn't need to make any plan to purchase new aircraft.

 

[Shortround6]

Just one observation regarding the use of 100 Octane fuel. It was the standard fuel in RAF fighters around May 1940 and use had been approved in Sept 1939. The changes needed to convert an aircraft to use 100 Octane from 87 octane were minimal and you didn't need to make any plan to purchase new aircraft.

You just needed to get the 100 octane fuel to your carrier. Not really a problem in the summer of 1940 and later. Might make difference on what you planning to buy in 1939 and build in 1940. The 100 octane supply turned out to be not as big a deal as they thought but that is hind sight.

 

[Shortround6]

British mechanics were all ready used to working on bizarre British stuff, one more wouldn't kill them

The Perseus used 9 Hercules cylinders instead of 14 for good and for ill.
The Perseus had a decent reputation (?) in 1938/39 but who knows after that. The Hercules engines in late 1939 and 1940 were pretty horrible as they found that the mass produced cylinders would often go out of round within 20 hours and oil consumption went through the roof. Which also meant fouled spark plugs.
Perseus engines in Bothas did not have a good reputation. Perhaps over worked or shared quality control problems?
The next problem was growth. The Perseus was a small engine, just look at any Hercules, divide by 14 and multiply by 9. A 1600hp Hercules was good for 114hp per cylinder. A 9 cylinder Perseus would have been good for about 1030hp. Unfortunately that is in 1941 and into 1942 and a 1030hp (take-off) radial powered fighter was pretty much toast.
You can get that kind of power in 1940 out of used airliner engines in Brewster Buffaloes.

The idea is to make things better for the FAA, not worse.

 

[EwenS]

Which in hindsight seems extraordinarily silly. The Soviets didn't really want the Hurricanes anyway

And yet they accepted around 3,000 of them from British and Canadian production lines between 1941 & 1944. By Sept 1942 some 15 regiments had been trained to use them. On 1 May 1945 some 750 remained in the Red Army Air Force inventory, mostly with the Air Defence Force.

They could have said "nyet" anytime, but didn't.