I think the comment from tyrodtom was more in response to Aozora. One should not forget that the first F models were either equipped with the MG-FF or the MG151/15. Those were markedly less powerful than the MG151/20. If Galland's comments were in response to the armament of the very first Friedrichs (and I think it's kind of likely he was referring to the F-2) then the situation changes with the introduction of the F-4. For what it's worth Anthony Williams estimates the 20mm MG151 to be about twice as powerful as the 15mm version.
Centerline weapons vs wing mounted weapons.
- Thread starter davebender
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I think so, too. But as a note: Unlike the cowl guns, which fired parallel to each other, the wing root guns were zeroed along both axes iirc (so y and x).
CobberKane
Banned
- 706
- Apr 4, 2012
I remember reading about that. it was single shot and the pilot had to reload by hand. Those were the days when men were real men, women were real women and small furry creatures from Alpha Centuri were real small furry creatures from Alpha Centuri...
This seems obvious. But is there a quote about this anywhere?
I also wonder if the cowl guns were aligned to meet the motor cannon's line of fire (y-axis)?
GregP
Major
From years of reading about WWII aircraft (no particular reference stands out), I recall that any particular aircraft could be zeroed like the pilot wanted it. There might have been "standards" (very likely) but, in the field, the crew chiefs pretty much did what the pilot asked of them when it came to customizing his aircraft ... assuming anythig like a decent relationship. Most pilots tried very hard to have a good relationship with their crew chief; after all, his work could save their lives.
I have read that some pilots in the Bf 109 wasnted the guns parallel to one another and some wanted convergence at some distance. The gun mounts would allow either. It is worth remembering that even if they converged at, say 400 yards, then they were no farther apart at 800 yards than where they started, so it wouldn't make all that much difference unless the convergence was pulled in significantly.
I have read that some pilots in the Bf 109 wasnted the guns parallel to one another and some wanted convergence at some distance. The gun mounts would allow either. It is worth remembering that even if they converged at, say 400 yards, then they were no farther apart at 800 yards than where they started, so it wouldn't make all that much difference unless the convergence was pulled in significantly.
Exactly. With cowl guns being that close together and, more importantly, that close to the sight, the inherent spread caused by the gun, its mount and the vibrations of the aircraft will likely make any convergence on the x axis rather cosmetical.
As for a quote. I remember HoHun had the original documents for the convergence setup. I think he's banned here though.
As for a quote. I remember HoHun had the original documents for the convergence setup. I think he's banned here though.
There were far more fundamental problems with air to air gunnery than the arrangement of the weapons. Whether one arrangement was or wasn't marginally better than the other would have had a minute effect on the outcome of most combat.
Here is an 8th AF report on the P-47. I can post it because it is easy to find on my computer. If I was at home I could post similar reports from just about every combatant air force in the ETO from throughout the war.
Cheers
Steve
Here is an 8th AF report on the P-47. I can post it because it is easy to find on my computer. If I was at home I could post similar reports from just about every combatant air force in the ETO from throughout the war.
Cheers
Steve
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Pretty much sums it up Steve.
GregP
Major
Steve, What is the date of that report? Is it early in the war with green pilots or is it late 1944 or later? It is certainly understandable early in the war. If late, the question is why the air-to-air gunnery training level isn't better. Also, if they were firing at towed sleves then I understand how they can know the real range. But if this was based on combat reports, then the writers weren't there and could not possibly know the real range. Makes me wonder.
Can you tell us what report by number this came from and where you got it? Please understand, I'm not saying it is wrong in any way at this time, just wondering how and when they got the data.
As I understand it, green pilots typically opened up at long range while the veterans usually closed to a good distance before ever firing the first shot. It's one reason why green wingmen were usually assigned to veteran flight leads ... so they would learn both when to start firing and proper tactics. All air forces did that with the Germans starting it in the Spanish Civil war, at the start of WWII. The practice started in WWI, when ALL pilots were pretty green out of flight school.
Can you tell us what report by number this came from and where you got it? Please understand, I'm not saying it is wrong in any way at this time, just wondering how and when they got the data.
As I understand it, green pilots typically opened up at long range while the veterans usually closed to a good distance before ever firing the first shot. It's one reason why green wingmen were usually assigned to veteran flight leads ... so they would learn both when to start firing and proper tactics. All air forces did that with the Germans starting it in the Spanish Civil war, at the start of WWII. The practice started in WWI, when ALL pilots were pretty green out of flight school.
It is from this document.
It was authorised for reproduction in October 1944 and was written post D-Day as it covers the period after the invasion into the third quarter of 1944.
I imagine the author(s) had good access to all the intelligence they would require in the writing of the report.
Cheers
Steve
It was authorised for reproduction in October 1944 and was written post D-Day as it covers the period after the invasion into the third quarter of 1944.
I imagine the author(s) had good access to all the intelligence they would require in the writing of the report.
Cheers
Steve
Gun Camera.
CobberKane
Banned
- 706
- Apr 4, 2012
The report is obviously referring to combat encounters and is comparing gun camera analysis to combat reports. Pilot X says "I opened fire at 300 yards..." whereas examination of silhouette of the target with reference to the borders of the film shows the range was actually 600 yards. Given that the report apparently refers to a time when the USAF was in the ascendency, we could draw a couple of conclusions:
1. It is extremely difficult for even well trained pilots to hit anything at 600 yards or more
2. Given that pilots were routinely underestimating range by a factor of 50%, and this was the cause of them miss-aiming, the results would have been the same with either centreline or wing mounted armament
This does not give lie to the assertion that experienced pilots might find value in the centreline arrangement at more reasonable ranges, as Greg pointed out. But sticking a hub mounted cannon on a fighter probably wasn't go enable even well trained pilots to start sniping opposition half a mile away.
What ranges did Bong, Macguire and other P38 aces typically fire at?
PS. Great doco, Stona. More please!
1. It is extremely difficult for even well trained pilots to hit anything at 600 yards or more
2. Given that pilots were routinely underestimating range by a factor of 50%, and this was the cause of them miss-aiming, the results would have been the same with either centreline or wing mounted armament
This does not give lie to the assertion that experienced pilots might find value in the centreline arrangement at more reasonable ranges, as Greg pointed out. But sticking a hub mounted cannon on a fighter probably wasn't go enable even well trained pilots to start sniping opposition half a mile away.
What ranges did Bong, Macguire and other P38 aces typically fire at?
PS. Great doco, Stona. More please!
GregP
Major
Thanks Steve, Since this was mostly pre late-1944, the problem was most likely green pilots. I'd bet this situation rapdily changed as they got seasoned ... at least one would HOPE so.
I have seen enough gun camera film to know that estimating range with the film was not an easy task, by any means. You could be right and, if so, then the "real" range was ± quite a bit and this was a case of "armchair quarterbacking" by the intelligence guys as feedback to the pilots. I don't know about any of you but while I was learning to fly, the right altitude for flaring for a landing was something you learned only by doing it. Once you learn, it sort of gets to be second nature and you don't even think about it when you land.
I'd venture to say learning to shoot at an enemy plane would be much the same. I've only done it with lasers in a Beech T-34 but, I learned quickly. It would seem to be the same with bullets ... except for learning the bullet drop and speed difference ... which it seems would be easily learned from shooting at towed targets with the occasional tracer for feedback. I'd bet the same study done in the first quarter of 1945 would have given significantly better results with mostly the newer, green pilots shooting at longer ranges.
But I also don't have the 1945 study to prove that ... just conjecture, which is worth what you paid for it. Thanks for the neat stuff Steve!
I have seen enough gun camera film to know that estimating range with the film was not an easy task, by any means. You could be right and, if so, then the "real" range was ± quite a bit and this was a case of "armchair quarterbacking" by the intelligence guys as feedback to the pilots. I don't know about any of you but while I was learning to fly, the right altitude for flaring for a landing was something you learned only by doing it. Once you learn, it sort of gets to be second nature and you don't even think about it when you land.
I'd venture to say learning to shoot at an enemy plane would be much the same. I've only done it with lasers in a Beech T-34 but, I learned quickly. It would seem to be the same with bullets ... except for learning the bullet drop and speed difference ... which it seems would be easily learned from shooting at towed targets with the occasional tracer for feedback. I'd bet the same study done in the first quarter of 1945 would have given significantly better results with mostly the newer, green pilots shooting at longer ranges.
But I also don't have the 1945 study to prove that ... just conjecture, which is worth what you paid for it. Thanks for the neat stuff Steve!
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CobberKane
Banned
- 706
- Apr 4, 2012
Apart from anything else the report kinda gives an insight into how hectic air combat undoubtedly was, doesn't it? The pilot's sense of time and distance were completely warped. Not only did other aircraft seem to be half the distance they actually were, but there seems to be a discrepancy between the length of fire the pilots loosed and how long they were really firing - that is, if the combat reports were typical of the ones I've read, where bursts are usually recorded in multiples of seconds rather than the fractions of seconds spoken of here. As any cop knows, take the recollections of a. High stress situation from even the most well meaning witness with extreme caution. Also emphasises what a game changer the K 14 sight must have been for the average pilot by giving him some terms of reference in such a fluid environment.
Greg, re the experience of the pilots I this report - surely post D-day the USAAF would have been fielding a good mix of experienced pilots and well trained newbies? The report indicates that one third of engagements resulted in the destruction of the enemy, which seems like a pretty solid strike rate. And knowing the size of the film frame and the target getting a good idea of the range should have been a matter of maths rather than estimation
Greg, re the experience of the pilots I this report - surely post D-day the USAAF would have been fielding a good mix of experienced pilots and well trained newbies? The report indicates that one third of engagements resulted in the destruction of the enemy, which seems like a pretty solid strike rate. And knowing the size of the film frame and the target getting a good idea of the range should have been a matter of maths rather than estimation
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IIRC that wasn't the case, Galland was refering the spread and was in oppinion that the closely grouped armament of 109F suited well to good shooters like Mölders but not to majority of LW pilots who were rather poor shots. He wasn't the only LW Experte who thought so, e.g. one of the top JG 54 aces, IIRC Philipp, admired Hurricane's wing armament when he and some Finnish aces, who prefered, like most of Finns and Soviet pilots, fuselage mounted armament, talked about different armament layouts.
Juha
J.A.W.
Banned
While Spitfires P51s were fitted with the gyro-gunsight by `45, the Tempest was using a 40s HUD - with the old reflector image being projected directly onto the bullet-proof glass windscreen. Judging by those cine-shots of the Tempest in air-to-air combat, the ability to direct 4 20mm Hispanos on target didn`t seem to be much of an issue, it was really a question making sure the target was there when the shells arrived,either by fancy hard turning hi-angle deflection shots, or burrowing up his arse letting fly with the lot..
I have had a fairly close look at the 4 20mm [Shvak?] front fuselage La 9 set-up, it looked meaty enough..but was it any better than the Hawker set-up?
I have had a fairly close look at the 4 20mm [Shvak?] front fuselage La 9 set-up, it looked meaty enough..but was it any better than the Hawker set-up?
Well it was a serious problem for all combatant air forces of the period.
Most pilots were simply not capable of estimating range,let alone angle off,accurately and stood no chance of hitting anything using your first method. Noteable deflection shooters like Marseilles or Beurling (who favoured both methods) are remembered by name today.
Very few pilots had the ability or were brave enough to adopt your second method. Again the Baders and Hartmanns are known by name and method today.
These problems are referred to throughout the war in various analyses.
The RAF invested much time and effort trying to improve its pilots ability to make better judgements,I have a series of gunnery manuals somewhere which include various excercises to be completed. I'm sure the others did the same.
Cheers
Steve
By the time of the report,late 1944,post D-Day,there was less than six months of the war left! The P-47 had been active in the ETO for nearly eighteen months. Whether there was any improvement in the last three months of the war in 1945 would be a moot point.
Cheers
Steve
The flying up their butts method had a downside too, Hartmann crash landed 14 times, most of those crash landing was from damage caused by flying through his victim's debris. And there was also many times he had damage that didn't result in crash landings, but made it necessary to return to base early.
Hartmann knew the risk that went with his method, and considered the results justified the extra risk, but not everybody might feel that way after several crash landings and escapes.
Hartmann knew the risk that went with his method, and considered the results justified the extra risk, but not everybody might feel that way after several crash landings and escapes.
