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IIRC Roosevelt finally agreed around December 3rd 1941 to come to Britain's assistance in the Far East.Wes,
Not sure I agree. Roosevelt was steadfast in maintaining the line that US forces would not be used to defend or deter attacks against British Imperial outposts. Churchill tried numerous times to persuade Roosevelt to base a cruiser squadron or destroyer flotilla in Singapore, all to no avail. Yes, the ABDA conferences were proceeding but Roosevelt was very attuned to US public opinion which was broadly opposed to joining "another European war" or helping prop up imperial powers.
It's an interesting question of whether the US would have entered the war against Japan without a trigger like the attack on Pearl Harbor. The presence of US forces in the Philippines was clearly the catalyst but I wonder what might have happened had Tokyo accepted the risk and not directly attacked the US? My suspicion is that the US would have been forced into the war eventually, but probably not for some time in 1942 or, perhaps, even into 1943. Under those circumstances, we'd be living in a very different world today.
Cheers,
Mark
Given what was done during the preceding 12 months or so in defending the UK, taking East Africa from the Italians, dealing with assorted troubles in the Middle East, defeating the French in Syria, defeated the French in Madagascar, sending vital material to the Soviet Union, fighting a war in Greece as well as the major action in the Western Desert, whilst being heavily bombed and maintaining shipping across the globe and having fought and lost major actions in Norway and France just before it was not all that unreasonable to gamble on simply deterring Japan before 1942. The miracle was that they actually did what they did in the time and circumstances. We see it with perfect hindsight but what you gave Malaya (and Burma) you took away from an active front during a period when there was a perception that an invasion attempt on the UK was a real possibility and that sea communication with the UK in danger of being degraded severely.
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True, but despite the heavy drag of public opinion, Roosevelt was an astute practitioner of global realpolitik, and didn't fancy the image of the US facing a united Axis dominated world alone. The key to preventing that was to keep the UK alive and prevent the geographic linking of Germany and Japan. I believe, if necessary, he would have engineered some sort of offensive act by the Japanese, as he did Pearl Harbor. "Back any creature into a corner, and it will bite." Perhaps the forces in the Phillipined might have been used to advantage, rather than squandered.Yes, the ABDA conferences were proceeding but Roosevelt was very attuned to US public opinion which was broadly opposed to joining "another European war" or propping up imperial powers.
True, but despite the heavy drag of public opinion, Roosevelt was an astute practitioner of global realpolitik, and didn't fancy the image of the US facing a united Axis dominated world alone. The key to preventing that was to keep the UK alive and prevent the geographic linking of Germany and Japan. I believe, if necessary, he would have engineered some sort of offensive act by the Japanese, as he did Pearl Harbor. "Back any creature into a corner, and it will bite." Perhaps the forces in the Phillipined might have been used to advantage, rather than squandered.
Cheers,
Wes
True enough, but he didn't so much encourage them to attack, as back them into an economic corner which would force their hand. Shutting off the supply of strategic materials, especially oil, was going to force them to either come begging in submission or strike out. It was no secret to anybody that the Japanese were too proud for option one, so the only question was where would the strike come? Conventional wisdom would suggest the Philippines, but FDR was a lifelong student of naval warfare, and had been Secretary of the Navy, and knew that both sides had ops plans and wargames centered on Oahu. I think the only surprise to him was the direction from which it was delivered and the incompetent patrol regimes instituted by local commanders, which left the entire northern quadrant uncovered. War gaming had always hypothesized a surface fleet approaching from the west.However, not attacking first is not the same as encouraging an adversary to attack.
True enough, but he didn't so much encourage them to attack, as back them into an economic corner which would force their hand. Shutting off the supply of strategic materials, especially oil, was going to force them to either come begging in submission or strike out. It was no secret to anybody that the Japanese were too proud for option one, so the only question was where would the strike come? Conventional wisdom would suggest the Philippines, but FDR was a lifelong student of naval warfare, and had been Secretary of the Navy, and knew that both sides had ops plans and wargames centered on Oahu. I think the only surprise to him was the direction from which it was delivered and the incompetent patrol regimes instituted by local commanders, which left the entire northern quadrant uncovered. War gaming had always hypothesized a surface fleet approaching from the west.
Cheers,
Wes
I question that assumption. To do so would have been to ignore the elephant in the living room, the US entrenchment in the Philippines, in easy striking distance of the sea lanes all these new resources would have to travel.In reality, Japan could have pushed against Malaya and the NEI without triggering war with the US.
Now...it's likely that war would still have erupted between the 2 countries but not in late 1941/early 1942. It's possible it wouldn't have broken out until 1943, at which time Japan would have been in a much better position.
Right on! You've got to remember that Japanese policy wasn't driven by any coherent plan of action, but the vector sum of the tug of war between the Army, the Navy, the diplomatic faction, and the radical activists in both armed forces, who were not above "executing" policy by assassination or fear of same. Samurai tradition ranked high in the culture and the ethos was: attack!If a conflict between the Japanese and Americans was viewed as inevitable by the Japanese or at least avoidable only with extreme difficulty and loss of face then leaving the American bases/outposts and Philippines alone might have been too big a gamble.
And, hey, we might have discovered our torpedo deficiencies even sooner.EI has to go within 4-500 miles of the Philippines.
True, but the Japanese clung tenaciously to their concept of the submarine as a warship killer, even in the face of staggering merchant losses, and discouraged skippers from "wasting" their precious Long Lances on "low value" "non-combatant" transports and tankers.Those long logistic chains would have been extremely vulnerable to Japanese submarine interdiction.
True enough, but he didn't so much encourage them to attack, as back them into an economic corner which would force their hand. Shutting off the supply of strategic materials, especially oil, was going to force them to either come begging in submission or strike out. It was no secret to anybody that the Japanese were too proud for option one, so the only question was where would the strike come? Conventional wisdom would suggest the Philippines, but FDR was a lifelong student of naval warfare, and had been Secretary of the Navy, and knew that both sides had ops plans and wargames centered on Oahu. I think the only surprise to him was the direction from which it was delivered and the incompetent patrol regimes instituted by local commanders, which left the entire northern quadrant uncovered. War gaming had always hypothesized a surface fleet approaching from the west.
Cheers,
Wes
American reinforcements to the Philippenes in late 1941 into 1942 if the Japanese do not attack the US in Dec?
Just remeber that ALL of that oil from the DEI has to go within 4-500 miles of the Philippines.
Try this on for size. The firebrands in Tokyo are screaming that Manilla is a threat astride imperial trade routes, and cannot be tolerated, but cooler heads prevail for the time being by erecting a naval blockade between the trade routes and Manilla. "Dugout Doug" MacArthur senses an existential threat and starts patrolling the sea lanes with PBYs, B17s, and subs. Japan protests and the US declares "legitimate defensive measures". The firebrands in Tokyo declare "national insult" and prevail on some of their sympathizers in the fleet to "push the envelope". A firefight ensues and a Fortress and a US sub go down while engaged in "alleged hostile activity". Feeling a threat, MacArthur launches an all out effort to drive Japanese forces farther away, and gets socked hard in return. We are at war.what key event might have triggered war between Japan and the US if Japan didn't actually attack Pearl Harbor or the Philippines?
Your description of his primary motives is true, but he was too much of a geopolitical strategist to not realize he was backing Japan into a corner and that the intended outcome of his actions would be unpalatable to the Japanese. They couldn't submit, so they would have to strike.The idea that FDR imposed sanctions to provoke an attack is almost certainly false.
Try this on for size. The firebrands in Tokyo are screaming that Manilla is a threat astride imperial trade routes, and cannot be tolerated, but cooler heads prevail for the time being by erecting a naval blockade between the trade routes and Manilla. "Dugout Doug" MacArthur senses an existential threat and starts patrolling the sea lanes with PBYs, B17s, and subs. Japan protests and the US declares "legitimate defensive measures". The firebrands in Tokyo declare "national insult" and prevail on some of their sympathizers in the fleet to "push the envelope". A firefight ensues and a Fortress and a US sub go down while engaged in "alleged hostile activity". Feeling a threat, MacArthur launches an all out effort to drive Japanese forces farther away, and gets socked hard in return. We are at war.
Cheers,
Wes