Kevin J
Banned
IIRC Roosevelt finally agreed around December 3rd 1941 to come to Britain's assistance in the Far East.
Churchill agrees to RAF reinforcements to Malaya. What to send?
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
- Start date
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Hi
It should be pointed out that Madagascar was not attacked by the 'British' until 5 May 1942, Operation IRONCLAD, fighting going on until 6 November 1942. This was undertaken because of the Japanese attacks in the Far East and to prevent them from using the ports to attack the convoys to India (and North Africa), not before the Japanese attacks.
Mike
True, but despite the heavy drag of public opinion, Roosevelt was an astute practitioner of global realpolitik, and didn't fancy the image of the US facing a united Axis dominated world alone. The key to preventing that was to keep the UK alive and prevent the geographic linking of Germany and Japan. I believe, if necessary, he would have engineered some sort of offensive act by the Japanese, as he did Pearl Harbor. "Back any creature into a corner, and it will bite." Perhaps the forces in the Phillipined might have been used to advantage, rather than squandered.
Cheers,
Wes
buffnut453
Captain
I think you give Roosevelt too much credit. I don't think he did anything to "engineer" the attack on Pearl Harbor. He certainly did not want to fire the first shots (although there had been an unannounced shooting war in the Atlantic for some time as USN destroyers defended territorial waters by encroachment from German U-boats). However, not attacking first is not the same as encouraging an adversary to attack.
True enough, but he didn't so much encourage them to attack, as back them into an economic corner which would force their hand. Shutting off the supply of strategic materials, especially oil, was going to force them to either come begging in submission or strike out. It was no secret to anybody that the Japanese were too proud for option one, so the only question was where would the strike come? Conventional wisdom would suggest the Philippines, but FDR was a lifelong student of naval warfare, and had been Secretary of the Navy, and knew that both sides had ops plans and wargames centered on Oahu. I think the only surprise to him was the direction from which it was delivered and the incompetent patrol regimes instituted by local commanders, which left the entire northern quadrant uncovered. War gaming had always hypothesized a surface fleet approaching from the west.
Cheers,
Wes
buffnut453
Captain
The shutting off of strategic materials forced the push south to capture the oilfields of the NEI. The reason Japan attacked Pearl Harbor is because they perceived that the US, UK and Dutch were more tightly coupled in terms of policy against Japan than was actually the case. Conspiracy theorists maintain that Roosevelt knew the Japanese attack was coming although the "evidence" for such is circumstantial at best.
In reality, Japan could have pushed against Malaya and the NEI without triggering war with the US. Now, something may have happened later but it wouldn't have had the galvanizing impact that the Pearl Harbor attack had because, simply put, there wasn't anything of US national interest that Japan could affect. The common "Japanese tide" map depictions showing Japan's eastward expansion across the Pacific was, in reality, just a set of isolated outputs. It was not a coherent threat against vital US interests.
I question that assumption. To do so would have been to ignore the elephant in the living room, the US entrenchment in the Philippines, in easy striking distance of the sea lanes all these new resources would have to travel.
Japanese martial tradition and culture mandated against ignoring any threat at the back door, and their long rehearsed (since Tsushima) war strategy against the US was based on US forces being far away at the start of hostilities. A southern move without dealing with us first would have led to a US military buildup in the Philippines, which would have been an intolerable threat.
The "China faction", inspired by T V Soong, Madam Chiang, and Pearl Buck, had motivated a lot of loud rhetoric against Japanese aggression and the diplomatic issues within the ABCD community weren't apparent from Tokyo, no matter how distressing they may have seemed to our British friends.
Admittedly, the US was (and still is) a little hypocritical in our anti-imperial stance, given our empire of overseas possessions, the only one left in the world. Something our adversaries and competitors never tire reminding us of, and Putin, Peng, Kim, Khameni, and others would love to emulate.
Cheers,
Wes
buffnut453
Captain
Let me put it another way...if Japan had attacked Malaya and the NEI, America would not have immediately declared war against Japan. Yes, it would have led to an increase in US military forces in the Philippines but...and here's a big BUT...the US would not unilaterally have attacked Japanese shipping prior to the official declaration of hostilities. If nothing else, not attacking Pearl Harbor would have gained Japan much-needed breathing room. Now...it's likely that war would still have erupted between the 2 countries but not in late 1941/early 1942. It's possible it wouldn't have broken out until 1943, at which time Japan would have been in a much better position.
It's also worth bearing in mind that the Philippines are a very long way from the US. Those long logistic chains would have been extremely vulnerable to Japanese submarine interdiction. Bottom line is that the Philippines is pretty much indefensible because the islands can be taken piecemeal. Defending forces can't be everywhere, and the nature of the geography means there will always be secluded spots where landings can be implemented successfully.
One final thought...would the US have gone to war if Japan had simply attacked the Philippines? It was, essentially, an American imperial outpost and so the answer would probably have been "yes". That said, I suspect many Americans, while angry at the assault against US military forces, may have shrugged their shoulders about the importance of the Philippines to the US. It certainly wasn't Hawaii. It certainly wouldn't have been as shocking as Pearl Harbor, particularly if it was preceded by a declaration of war.
It's also worth bearing in mind that the Philippines are a very long way from the US. Those long logistic chains would have been extremely vulnerable to Japanese submarine interdiction. Bottom line is that the Philippines is pretty much indefensible because the islands can be taken piecemeal. Defending forces can't be everywhere, and the nature of the geography means there will always be secluded spots where landings can be implemented successfully.
One final thought...would the US have gone to war if Japan had simply attacked the Philippines? It was, essentially, an American imperial outpost and so the answer would probably have been "yes". That said, I suspect many Americans, while angry at the assault against US military forces, may have shrugged their shoulders about the importance of the Philippines to the US. It certainly wasn't Hawaii. It certainly wouldn't have been as shocking as Pearl Harbor, particularly if it was preceded by a declaration of war.
Shortround6
Major General
The US was upgrading it's forces in the Philippines during the summer and fall of 1941, which had to have been known by Japan.
The deployment of B-17s to the Philippines in large numbers (at least large for the time) could not be ignored. Neither could the 29 or so submarines based in the Philippines. The Japanese may not have known how bad the US torpedoes were.
Could the Japanese leave the Philippines alone while pursuing other objectives and giving the Americans even greater opportunity/time to reinforce the Philippines?
If a conflict between the Japanese and Americans was viewed as inevitable by the Japanese or at least avoidable only with extreme difficulty and loss of face then leaving the American bases/outposts and Philippines alone might have been too big a gamble.
The deployment of B-17s to the Philippines in large numbers (at least large for the time) could not be ignored. Neither could the 29 or so submarines based in the Philippines. The Japanese may not have known how bad the US torpedoes were.
Could the Japanese leave the Philippines alone while pursuing other objectives and giving the Americans even greater opportunity/time to reinforce the Philippines?
If a conflict between the Japanese and Americans was viewed as inevitable by the Japanese or at least avoidable only with extreme difficulty and loss of face then leaving the American bases/outposts and Philippines alone might have been too big a gamble.
Shortround6
Major General
Japans position might have actually been worse.
Roosevelt had announced his plan for the 50,000 plane airforce in the summer of 1940. The six short modern battleships had all been laid down by Jan of 1940 and 2 of the Iowas were laid down in 1940, CV10, 11, 12 were all laid down in the spring of 1941, 4 of the Atalanta light cruisers were laid down in 1940 and 2 more in 1941, 4 of the Clevelands were laid down in 1940 and 5 more in 1941. 4 of the Baltimores were laid down in 1941. I won't go into the destroyers and submarines.
Japan was in a building race it couldn't win. Allowing the US 1-2 more years to really get it's production going and train it's forces is not going to be to Japanes advanatage unless most of those forces are tied up against Germany and Italy.
Right on! You've got to remember that Japanese policy wasn't driven by any coherent plan of action, but the vector sum of the tug of war between the Army, the Navy, the diplomatic faction, and the radical activists in both armed forces, who were not above "executing" policy by assassination or fear of same. Samurai tradition ranked high in the culture and the ethos was: attack!
People used to western concepts of policy formulation and command and control have a hard time digesting this.
Cheers,
Wes
buffnut453
Captain
True enough but, equally, if Japan didn't waste resources on a futile eastward push across the Pacific, it would have had a much better chance at achieving its primary war objectives using oil from NEI to enhance prosecution of its war in China.
However, we're now a loooong way from British reinforcements for Malaya, so it's probably time to steer back on course.
However, we're now a loooong way from British reinforcements for Malaya, so it's probably time to steer back on course.
Shortround6
Major General
American reinforcements to the Philippenes in late 1941 into 1942 if the Japanese do not attack the US in Dec?
Just remeber that ALL of that oil from the DEI has to go within 4-500 miles of the Philippines.
Just remeber that ALL of that oil from the DEI has to go within 4-500 miles of the Philippines.
And, hey, we might have discovered our torpedo deficiencies even sooner.
True, but the Japanese clung tenaciously to their concept of the submarine as a warship killer, even in the face of staggering merchant losses, and discouraged skippers from "wasting" their precious Long Lances on "low value" "non-combatant" transports and tankers.
Cheers,
Wes
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,030
- Jun 25, 2013
The idea that FDR imposed sanctions to provoke an attack is almost certainly false. FDR imposed sanctions on Japan hoping for their reining in their aggression in China; the US had long had a "proprietary" interest in China. Since the Western democracies were all highly concerned with improving standards of living of their populaces, FDR and any other US leader would almost certainly expect the financial burden of sanctions would influence the Japanese government to be less aggressive; these sort of sanctions would most likely have worked against, say, Britain or France, but not against the military dictatorship that was Japan.
Imposition or not of sanctions by the US (and presumably all other countries) is deeply connected with domestic politics and upon whom they're being imposed.
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buffnut453
Captain
Ok...tried to pull us out of the mire but you jumped right back in.
Yes, all that oil does pass relatively close to the NEI...but that's ok if Japan isn't at war with the US. We're looking at this through the retrospectroscope knowing that Japan and the US did go to war. Without the trigger of Pearl Harbor, Japan could have shipped oil from the NEI back past the Philippines, unless the US was willing to attack first...and I just don't see that happening. It's entirely possible that increased USN presence in the area may have led to some tense exchanges, but that was already happening in the Atlantic without the US declaring war on Germany.
Yes, it's a big risk for Japan to take, and the leaders of the time in Tokyo may have been unwilling to accept that risk. The key question, for me, is what key event might have triggered war between Japan and the US if Japan didn't actually attack Pearl Harbor or the Philippines? Would the US go to war over China? Or over British loss of Malaya? If not, then what would tip things over the edge?
Try this on for size. The firebrands in Tokyo are screaming that Manilla is a threat astride imperial trade routes, and cannot be tolerated, but cooler heads prevail for the time being by erecting a naval blockade between the trade routes and Manilla. "Dugout Doug" MacArthur senses an existential threat and starts patrolling the sea lanes with PBYs, B17s, and subs. Japan protests and the US declares "legitimate defensive measures". The firebrands in Tokyo declare "national insult" and prevail on some of their sympathizers in the fleet to "push the envelope". A firefight ensues and a Fortress and a US sub go down while engaged in "alleged hostile activity". Feeling a threat, MacArthur launches an all out effort to drive Japanese forces farther away, and gets socked hard in return. We are at war.
Cheers,
Wes
Your description of his primary motives is true, but he was too much of a geopolitical strategist to not realize he was backing Japan into a corner and that the intended outcome of his actions would be unpalatable to the Japanese. They couldn't submit, so they would have to strike.
Cheers,
Wes
buffnut453
Captain
That's not a bad one. Given that a USN ship was sunk in October 1941 by a German U-boat, I'm still not convinced that the loss of even a few ships would be enough to trigger a war declaration in Washington. The key question is whether MacArthur would abide by direction that he perceived as constraining his actions.
