Churchill agrees to RAF reinforcements to Malaya. What to send?

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The question for me is not when or what triggers the US into action but what the Japanese are willing to risk.

There was a squadron of B-17Es at Hawaii on Dec 7 bound for the Philippines. With Only 30 delivered by Nov 40th 1941 it certianly looks like the Philippines was priority.
A squadron or group of A-24s was on board ship heading for the Philippines on Dec 7th, they were re-routed to Australia.

I don't know what other aircraft were planned to be deployed to the Philippines or what naval forces were planned on going their in early 1942.
Military equipment was certainly being sent, M3 light tanks, and 1/2 tracks with 75mm guns. How much artillery?

The US lead the oil embargo, how the US would react to the Japanese invasion of the DEI 4 months after the Dutch join the embargo is subject to question, but the DEI would not have been invaded had they kept their oil treaty with Japan and not broken it to join the Allied embargo, How much choice they had being a government in exile dependent o the British and Americans after the German invasion I don't know.

For the Japanese you have the leader/organizer of the oil embargo(and other sanctions) against Japan adding multiple squadrons a month of first line military planes (and other equipment) to an archipelago sitting astried your desired oil supply line. can you afford to ignore it even for a few months?
 
I'm not denying that the Philippines was a priority. However, the presence of forces does not mean they'll be used. I struggle with the concept that the US would ignore a Japanese invasion of the DEI oilfields and yet take umbrage at oil tankers sailing past the Philippines. I'm also skeptical about the utility of the Fortress as an anti-shipping weapon. Experience at Midway suggests it performed rather poorly against ships in general (although I freely admit that slow oil tankers are a different (easier) target problem than fast aircraft carriers).

I'm still not convinced any amount of force in the Philippines could defend the archipelago against an assault...and if Japan waited until after Malaya and the NEI had fallen, then it would have more forces available for the Philippines.
 
True, but the Japanese clung tenaciously to their concept of the submarine as a warship killer, even in the face of staggering merchant losses, and discouraged skippers from "wasting" their precious Long Lances on "low value" "non-combatant" transports and tankers.
Cheers,
Wes

As per Wiki, the Long Lance was only fired from surface vessels.
 
The idea that FDR imposed sanctions to provoke an attack is almost certainly false. FDR imposed sanctions on Japan hoping for their reining in their aggression in China; the US had long had a "proprietary" interest in China. Since the Western democracies were all highly concerned with improving standards of living of their populaces, FDR and any other US leader would almost certainly expect the financial burden of sanctions would influence the Japanese government to be less aggressive; these sort of sanctions would most likely have worked against, say, Britain or France, but not against the military dictatorship that was Japan.

Imposition or not of sanctions by the US (and presumably all other countries) is deeply connected with domestic politics and upon whom they're being imposed.

Wait a minute, are you talking about Imperial Japan or contemporary Russia - or Iran?
 
That's not a bad one. Given that a USN ship was sunk in October 1941 by a German U-boat, I'm still not convinced that the loss of even a few ships would be enough to trigger a war declaration in Washington. The key question is whether MacArthur would abide by direction that he perceived as constraining his actions.
Reuben James was an ancient "four stacker" tin can that was operating under British authority in international waters, and "legitimately" in harm's way. Its loss wasn't presented or viewed as an affront to American sovereignty, although its presence was denounced as a violation of our neutrality. A major confrontation with Japanese ships and planes, especially if followed by a strike at the Philippines, would certainly raise some hackles.
Remember, MacArthur was a feisty old coot, having risen to Chief of Staff in the US Army, then retired and then hired to whip the Philippine Army into shape. As far as the US was concerned, he was a civilian (reserve officer) until things began to heat up in Asia.

The key question is whether MacArthur would abide by direction that he perceived as constraining his actions.
If his behavior in Korea is any indication, I would say no. He was determined to nuke N Korea and China and had to be relieved.
Cheers,
Wes
 
Reuben James was an ancient "four stacker" tin can that was operating under British authority in international waters, and "legitimately" in harm's way. Its loss wasn't presented or viewed as an affront to American sovereignty, although its presence was denounced as a violation of our neutrality. A major confrontation with Japanese ships and planes, especially if followed by a strike at the Philippines, would certainly raise some hackles.

Again, we're talking about "major confrontation" when I very much doubt that the USN would maintain main battle forces in the Philippines, at such remote distance from the US. Again, a few submarines and destroyers probably aren't worth going to war over. A couple of cruisers is much more likely...but would they be positioned in such proximity to the IJN? I suspect not.

The efforts to reinforce the Philippines were a bluff to try and deter further Japanese aggression. It was broadly accepted in Washington that the Philippines couldn't be defended and so may have to be sacrificed. Again, under those conditions, I don't see a major naval engagement developing because the USN simply wouldn't have forces in place.


If his behavior in Korea is any indication, I would say no. He was determined to nuke N Korea and China and had to be relieved.

Precisely why I asked the question about how well he'd follow orders from Washington. :)
 
. I struggle with the concept that the US would ignore a Japanese invasion of the DEI oilfields and yet take umbrage at oil tankers sailing past the Philippines.


It is not a question of the US ignoring the Japanese invasion of the DEI and then (several months later) taking umbrage at tankers sailing past the Philippines,

It is, from the Japanese view point, the willingness to believe that the nation (the US) that had, in objecting to Japanese acts in China and Vichy controlled Indochina had cut off scrap metal shipments, Copper shipments, closed the Panama canal to Japanese shipping and in July of 1941 stopped selling oil to Japan. In August of 1941. the US had gotten the British (who controlled the Iranian oil Fields and the Dutch to join the embargo leaving only Rumania as one of the 4 largest oil producers and the chances of getting any Roumanian oil to Japan in 1941 are pretty darn slim). Will the Americans simply let the japanese invade The DEI and sit back and do nothing while the Japanese take over the oil fields and start sending the oil to Japan after doing everything they can short of actually going to war to stop the Japanese?

What did the Japanese think the Americans were going to do?
And what would be the Japanese response to American action or what could the Japanese do to prevent the Americans from reacting (at least for a while).
 
Why not negotiate with the Japanese for them to acquire the Philippians.
Make them feel like they're getting a really good deal.
LMAO! You should be Secretary of State! Now sell that to the American people.
Later on they learn that now they have to deal with the Moros
We could make a killing selling the Japanese in the Philippines Colt M1911s!
 
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Again, we're talking about "major confrontation" when I very much doubt that the USN would maintain main battle forces in the Philippines, at such remote distance from the US. Again, a few submarines and destroyers probably aren't worth going to war over. A couple of cruisers is much more likely...but would they be positioned in such proximity to the IJN? I suspect not.

The efforts to reinforce the Philippines were a bluff to try and deter further Japanese aggression. It was broadly accepted in Washington that the Philippines couldn't be defended and so may have to be sacrificed. Again, under those conditions, I don't see a major naval engagement developing because the USN simply wouldn't have forces in place.




Precisely why I asked the question about how well he'd follow orders from Washington. :)
One thing I think you might be leaving out of your equation is ego. Countries have egos just like people do. Japan puffing out it's chest and shooting down a few of our aircraft or sinking a couple of ships ON PURPOSE is not something that the USA is going to put up with. A torpedo from a submarine sinking a destroyer is a whole lot easier to call an accident than intentionally shooting down a B17 or sinking a warship with an air strike. Japan doing that to the USA at that time would have been like the short scrawny mouthy guy at the bar slapping the bouncer, it's not going to end well. If the Japanese wait until 1943 they will be facing Hellcats, Corsairs, P38's, and Avengers instead of Wildcats and Devestators along with a more mature aircraft industry that has been supplying the British and Russians.

But none of this matters, unless they develop nukes the Japanese are going to get stomped in a bad way by an enemy that produced more B24's in one year from the Willow Run plant than the entire Japanese aircraft industry produced that year.
 
LMAO! You should be Secretary of State! Now sell that to the American people. We could make a killing selling them Colt M1911s!
The US selling Japan the Phillipines because we are afraid of them would be like in the movie "The Naked Gun" when OJ Simpson kicked in the door, he finally gets in and like 10 bad guys all have their guns out, OJ (a cop) says "police! Drop your guns!" and that one bad guy throws his gun down!!!
 
We could make a killing selling them Colt M1911s!
Well, let's think about that...
China was imploding from a civil war, and Nature abhors a vacuum. Regardless of one's feelings or beliefs, something will eventually fill that vacuum.
Let Japan fill that vacuum.
Japan could be a viable trading partner (more profitable for the US that what was being reaped from China), potentially stabilize the area and provide a check to Asian communism.
 
Based on stoties told me by a person whp was 10 during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. They would never forgive the U.S. The Japanese had a pan=Asia vision with themselves as the master race. They were going to take the materials they needed from others in Asia and had no intention of becoming a long term trading partner with western countries. Its not much different than saying let Hitler win in Russia, he would make a better trading partner. You would be surprise at how much residual hatred of the japanese there still is in areas occupied by the japanese.
 
Let Japan fill that vacuum.
Riiighhtt...and establish the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" unopposed, "Asia for the Asians", kick westerners off the continent, expand westward, link up with Germany and Italy in the Middle East, crush the Soviets between them, sink the British Isles then mop up the rest of the world. Amazing what you can do with plenty of petrol!
Better fast-track B36 development.
Cheers,
Wes
 
To solve this problem, the UK has to start at least a decade earlier: promote industrial development in the Commonwealth outside of the UK, an action which had been strongly deprecated by the government in London for many years, so that the Dominions, especially India, can put enough locally produced tanks, aircraft, artillery, and even ships into Malaya so that the Commonwealth forces in Malaya aren't operating on a threadbare shoestring.

During the mission funded by Essington Lewis to decide which aircraft CAC would manufacture the British government put every obstacle they could in the way and promoted the assembly of less than stellar aircraft. When Lewis chose the Wirraway they insisted on charging Australia import duty, payable to London, on all the US components and materials.

In real terms Lewis probably did more to prepare Australia for WW2 than all the politicians in the UK (and Aus) combined. If not for CAC and the Wirraway Britian would not have ordered 90 Beauforts be built in Aus for the RAF as a face saving exercise.
Essington Lewis - Wikipedia
 

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