Comparison of Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and North Atlantic naval combat

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Thumpalumpacus,

You are asking for kill and loss data that have been chased around by many people without actual success since WWII. The U.S.A. has some fairly reliable kill and loss data for WWII simply because the U.S.A. invested time and effort into a study of same AFTER the war. The USAAF/C came up with the "Army Air Forces Statistical Digest of World War II" dated Dec 1945

Is this that same document? Or is the 1946 version different?
 
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Thumpalumpacus,

You are asking for kill and loss data that have been chased around by many people without actual success since WWII. The U.S.A. has some fairly reliable kill and loss data for WWII simply because the U.S.A. invested time and effort into a study of same AFTER the war. The USAAF/C came up with the "Army Air Forces Statistical Digest of World War II" dated Dec 1945 and the U.S. Navy came up with "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics Wolrd War II" dated 17 Jun 1946. Both are vailable in pdf rorm online. These studies were done using the avilable information and combat reports at that time, and are likely the best that can be done since nobody else to date has done anything better except to try to sew doubts about them somehwat unsuccessfully. They remain the best source for combat statistics for the U.S.A., and do NOT show individual kills and losses. You can find those for the USAAF in "USAF Study 85," but that document is not readable as text and must be painstakingly entered line by line if you want to get anything useful from it electronically. It IS available online as a pdf, but a text OCR program cannot read it since it is a copy of a report printed with a dot matrix printer that was sometimes a bit out of line. You can read it manually, but it just doesn't translate well digitally.

I have not come across any primary source documents for the entire war for any other nation that are anywhere near as comprehensive as these two reports are, but there are some partial reports. In the UK, they seem to be obsessed with the Battle of Britain or operations in some specific battle or battle set, and not with the war as a whole. Fair enough but not very useful unless you are looking at that particular battle or action. Good luck coming up with ANY primary source documents from the USSR. There are a couple of palces to look for German claims, but the German records are incomplete due to war damage and some lost records. Some people claim to have data about actual German aircraft production (I know, unrelated to victory claims), but they only have the allocated werknumers for approved production, not the acutal production deliveries. Its like a list of allocated serial numbers; not actual deliveries.

I have a pretty good tabulation of what I have found over 40+ years of looking, but actual totals of victories are a tough thing to find. You CAN find things like actual totals for some single mission or single ongoing action.

Kill-to-loss ratios for air combat are a thing of some national pride and I seriously doubt the accuracy of the numbers. In the U.S.A., if a plane was damaged during air combat, stayed aloft during the fight, but suffered an engine failure on the way home after the action, it was likely recorded as an operational loss since it didn't happen during actual combat. But the damage that caused the loss DID happen in combat, and it SHOULD be a combat loss. Breaking out what really happened, even from these well produced reports can be difficult.

The subject of what actualy constitutes a "kill" is also a subject of debate. Some people say that if a plane was shot at, damaged, and forced to land during combat, but was later recovered and repaired ... it was not a kill. I say bunk. The job of the fighter pilot in combat was to knock enemy aircraft out of the mission and/or to disrupt the attack in progress. Sending a plane down is exactly that, achieving the mission. Yet the debate rages in some arenas and a lot of people are obsesed with matching up recorded kills with the losses the enemy actually reported. This despite the fact that both Hitler and Stalin were reliably reported to only be happy with positive combat reports. Handing either one of these two guys a bad combat loss report could result in death or, at least, demotion. So, just how reliable WERE the reported loss figures and what exactly did they call a "loss?" The definitions used at the time are largely lost to history.

Good luck finding hard data for "Sea Hurricanes" broken out for just "Hurricanes." Actually, good luck finding hard data on just "Hurricanes" that encompass the entire war. I've been trying but, to date, have only what might be termed partial success myself.

Cheers.
The Best sources for kill loss rates are from books that carefully examine the combat reports of both sides, and then compare kill claims to reported losses. Lundstrom's two volume First Team, and works like Shore's Hurricanes over Malta, and Malta the Spitfire Year, are also excellent
 
I defer to your knowledge regarding the cause of Hurri losses (and I appreciate the info), but that doesn't obviate my main point, which is that they weren't very effective in PQ18. Didn't shoot down very many attackers, nor deter them from launching attacks.

The Sea Hurricanes shot down five for one loss (Hurricats got a couple more, IIRC) but they also forced the Luftwaffe to use tight formation attacks and then the AA really went to work on them.
 
The Sea Hurricanes shot down five for one loss (Hurricats got a couple more, IIRC) but they also forced the Luftwaffe to use tight formation attacks and then the AA really went to work on them.

Sure, and as such the Germans suffered heavy losses even as they sank what, 12 ships? The point is that fighters against unescorted bombers should do better than that, in my humble opinion. If the lightweight armament they carried was stymied to a degree by German armor, that indicates to me that the Hurri was not up on the times in terms of armament.

This is especially, to me, significant in the case of the Sea Hurricane, because it was expected that their primary opposition would indeed be bombers, rather than fighters. If you know you're going to be bustin' bombers, you might want a cannon or two on your birds.
 
The main problem with the Sea Hurricane wasn't the armament, it was the endurance. For example the Wiki notes: "[Royal Navy commander]Colthurst decided that the Sea Hurricanes henceforth would fly standing patrols of 25 minutes duration per fighter, to ensure that some were always available to break up Goldene Zange formations, even if they were too slow and ill-armed to inflict many losses. The captain of Ulster Queen resolved to ignore the standing orders to keep station and steer towards incoming aircraft instead.[42] "

Combat performance was also pretty bad, during PQ 18 insufficient in many cases to shoot down unescorted He 111s or even lumbering, unescorted He 115 float planes on several occasions or for example to prevent even slower Blohm and Voss BV 138 flying boats from driving Swordfish away from U-boats they were trying to attack.
 
Sure, and as such the Germans suffered heavy losses even as they sank what, 12 ships? The point is that fighters against unescorted bombers should do better than that, in my humble opinion. If the lightweight armament they carried was stymied to a degree by German armor, that indicates to me that the Hurri was not up on the times in terms of armament.

This is especially, to me, significant in the case of the Sea Hurricane, because it was expected that their primary opposition would indeed be bombers, rather than fighters. If you know you're going to be bustin' bombers, you might want a cannon or t wo on your birds.

The problem with this argument is that the Sea Hurricane had far more performance than a Martlet and if the Sea Hurricane was having problems intercepting Luftwaffe bombers then the Martlet would do a lot worse and we have to balance that with a probable higher kill rate when an interception did happen.

The 4 x 20mm cannon, Sea Hurricane IIC, was just entering service as the Battle for PQ18 was being fought.
 
The problem with this argument is that the Sea Hurricane had far more performance than a Martlet and if the Sea Hurricane was having problems intercepting Luftwaffe bombers then the Martlet would do a lot worse and we have to balance that with a probable higher kill rate when an interception did happen.

The 4 x 20mm cannon, Sea Hurricane IIC, was just entering service as the Battle for PQ18 was being fought.

The Sea Hurricane had inferior or equivalent performance to the Martlet (depending on the specific metric and specific version of each aircraft) and less than half the endurance. The 20mm cannon armed versions didn't do much better in combat, partly because their guns were limited to 60 rounds.

During PQ 18, Sea Hurricanes were not only having problems intercepting Axis bombers, once intercepted they had a very hard time shooting them down. One He 115 (top speed 203 mph) held off four Sea Hurricanes and shot one down. It's only armed with 1 x 7.92mm defensive machine gun. A drum fed MG 15.

By comparison Wildcats shot down several H6K and H8K float planes, the latter with a top speed of 290 mph and an armament of 5 x 20mm cannon (with two turrets) and 5 x 7.7mm machine guns. The H8K was also armored and had some self-sealing fuel tanks. USMC Brewster Buffalos even shot those down.

I don't think the He 115 would have fared well in the Pacific, and obviously neither would the Sea Hurricane. That's why the RN wanted Martlets.
 
The problem with this argument is that the Sea Hurricane had far more performance than a Martlet and if the Sea Hurricane was having problems intercepting Luftwaffe bombers then the Martlet would do a lot worse and we have to balance that with a probable higher kill rate when an interception did happen.

Perhaps. But the discussion is about armament and not performance.

The 4 x 20mm cannon, Sea Hurricane IIC, was just entering service as the Battle for PQ18 was being fought.

Yet the FAA saw fit to procure Grummans all the same, both Martlets and Hellcats. Apparently they didn't have a problem with .50s, but as your own statements lay out, the .303 had issues dealing with those German bombers. Perhaps the FAA considered the .50 a suitable compromise between weight (hence performance), trigger-time, and hitting power? By 1942, I'd reckon a .303 to really only be suitable against fighters, or unarmored bombers.

Do you happen to know which model Ju-88s were involved in this battle, and what was their armor layout? I'm having trouble finding it, but I'm curious. Was it the A-17 torp bomber variant? My understanding is that the armor was centered around the crew-space, but I could well be wrong.

I appreciate your patience with what might seem dumb questions.
 
It was mostly He 111

Odd, given that the Hurricane didn't seem to have much problem downing them in the BoB.

It isn't. He's basing that on a single assessment of the Wildcat based on who knows what conditions, and ignoring a half dozen others all of which you can read for yourself here

WWII Aircraft Performance

I was talking specifically about my discussion with him being about the armament deficiencies of the Hurricane. I'm of the opinion that a fighter sent up with arms that won't get the job done is worse than useless, insofar as one is sacrificing expensive pilots with low potential returns.

Thanks for the link, off to do some reading.
 
There were Ju 88s too, I think mainly A-4 type, and a variety of float planes (BV 138, He 115). I don't know if any other specific subtype of Ju 88 were available but PQ 18 took place in summer / fall of 1942 so it's not a very late design.

I think there was a big difference between attacking bombers in big, relatively slow moving formations vs. in faster moving more ad-hoc attacks.
 
There were Ju 88s too, and a variety of float planes (BV 138, He 115). I don't know the specific subtype but PQ 18 took place in summer / fall of 1942 so it's not a very late design.

I know the different airframes involved, was just curious which one had armor enough to reject eight .303s and assumed that the -88, being the latest, would likely be that one.

I think there was a big difference between attacking bombers in big, relatively slow moving formations vs. in faster moving more ad-hoc attacks.

Absolutely. On top of your point here, there's also the fact that the combat is happening immediately above the sea rather than at altitude -- such combat forces altitude into any decision-process any of the pilots would be making. You have much less room to recover, and the ground (or sea in this case) doesn't miss.
 
The Sea Hurricane had inferior or equivalent performance to the Martlet (depending on the specific metric and specific version of each aircraft) and less than half the endurance. The 20mm cannon armed versions didn't do much better in combat, partly because their guns were limited to 60 rounds.

During PQ 18, Sea Hurricanes were not only having problems intercepting Axis bombers, once intercepted they had a very hard time shooting them down. One He 115 (top speed 203 mph) held off four Sea Hurricanes and shot one down. It's only armed with 1 x 7.92mm defensive machine gun. A drum fed MG 15.

By comparison Wildcats shot down several H6K and H8K float planes, the latter with a top speed of 290 mph and an armament of 5 x 20mm cannon (with two turrets) and 5 x 7.7mm machine guns. The H8K was also armored and had some self-sealing fuel tanks. USMC Brewster Buffalos even shot those down.

I don't think the He 115 would have fared well in the Pacific, and obviously neither would the Sea Hurricane. That's why the RN wanted Martlets.

The BV138 and HE115 were commonly encountered over PQ18 and both aircraft would duck into the ever present cloud cover to escape interception and a Martlet would do worse than the Sea Hurricane in the same conditions. The sole SH loss was to a HE115, and by 1942 these had their defensive armament increased with extra armour added. Condemning an aircraft on the basis of a single combat, is more than a bit weird, to say the least. 33 verified HSHIB kills from June to Sept 1942 versus 9 losses, speaks for itself and several of those losses were from Axis fighters over Pedestal.

Sorry, but that's a lot of nonsense. The HSHIB weighed ~7000lb and had 1440HP. The Martlet II/IV weighed 7750lb and had 1200hp. The Martlets were completely outperformed by the Sea Hurricane. The numbers don't lie and power to weight and wing loading heavily favoured the Sea Hurricane.

The IIC carried 91RPG of 20mm.
 
Wiki for PQ 18 says:

35 x Ju 88 A-4 dive bombers,
28 He 111 H-6 level bombers
14 x Ju 88 A-4 torpedo bombers
He 115s (number not listed)
FW 200
Bv 138

It doesn't say how many He 115, FW 200 and Bv 138 but probably just a few of each.
 
The BV138 and HE115 were commonly encountered over PQ18 and both aircraft would duck into the ever present cloud cover to escape interception and a Martlet would do worse than the Sea Hurricane in the same conditions. The sole SH loss was to a HE115, and by 1942 these had their defensive armament increased with extra armour added. Condemning an aircraft on the basis of a single combat, is more than a bit weird, to say the least. 33 verified HSHIB kills from June to Sept 1942 versus 9 losses, speaks for itself and several of those losses were from Axis fighters over Pedestal.

Sorry, but that's a lot of nonsense. The HSHIB weighed ~7000lb and had 1440HP. The Martlet II/IV weighed 7750lb and had 1200hp. The Martlets were completely outperformed by the Sea Hurricane. The numbers don't lie and power to weight and wing loading heavily favoured the Sea Hurricane.

The IIC carried 91RPG of 20mm.

Then why did the FAA go with Grummans, Corsairs, and Fulmars as the war went along?

Perhaps Schweik's point about endurance is on point.
 
Perhaps. But the discussion is about armament and not performance.



Yet the FAA saw fit to procure Grummans all the same, both Martlets and Hellcats. Apparently they didn't have a problem with .50s, but as your own statements lay out, the .303 had issues dealing with those German bombers. Perhaps the FAA considered the .50 a suitable compromise between weight (hence performance), trigger-time, and hitting power? By 1942, I'd reckon a .303 to really only be suitable against fighters, or unarmored bombers.

Do you happen to know which model Ju-88s were involved in this battle, and what was their armor layout? I'm having trouble finding it, but I'm curious. Was it the A-17 torp bomber variant? My understanding is that the armor was centered around the crew-space, but I could well be wrong.

I appreciate your patience with what might seem dumb questions.

Fighters armed with 8 x .303s had shot down several thousand Axis aircraft by Mid 1942, but it was becoming ineffective by then as Lufwaffe aircraft had increased performance and extra armour.

The FAA procured what it could get, as they didn't have the luxury to pick and choose. The FAA initially got Martlets because took over French and Greek contracts.

What does a Hellcat, which appeared in mid/late 1943 have to do with a HSH1B which first showed up in early 1941? Maybe absolutely nothing? Even if the Hellcat had poorer performance, like the Martlet, the fact that it had folding wings would make it preferable to a HSH, but of course the Hellcat was far superior to the Martlet and Sea Hurricane. The FAA had no opinion on the .5in and they got them because that's what the Martlet came with. The early .5in were actually pretty miserable with a slow RoF and frequent gun jams, but by mid 1942 these kinks were being worked out.
 
The BV138 and HE115 were commonly encountered over PQ18 and both aircraft would duck into the ever present cloud cover to escape interception and a Martlet would do worse than the Sea Hurricane in the same conditions.

If you read the accounts, this was not the only means by which they survived. Admitteldy the BV 138 was fairly heavily armed. The He 115 certainly wasn't.

The sole SH loss was to a HE115, and by 1942 these had their defensive armament increased with extra armour added. Condemning an aircraft on the basis of a single combat, is more than a bit weird, to say the least. 33 verified HSHIB kills from June to Sept 1942 versus 9 losses, speaks for itself and several of those losses were from Axis fighters over Pedestal.

I'm not 'condemning an aircraft over a single combat" - it's just an example. The failure at Pedestal overall is the basis worthy of condemnation. Certainly many RN offiicers felt that way. And unlike with the Wildcat they were not able to find a way to adapt the Sea Hurricane to the conditions.

Sorry, but that's a lot of nonsense. The HSHIB weighed ~7000lb and had 1440HP. The Martlet II/IV weighed 7750lb and had 1200hp. The Martlets were completely outperformed by the Sea Hurricane. The numbers don't lie and power to weight and wing loading heavily favoured the Sea Hurricane.

In real life, in terms of top speed and dive, roll and acceleration, the Martlets were better. The extra weight in the Martlet was largely fuel! The minor edge held by the Sea Hurricane at takeoff rapidly diminished as the Wildcat used up fuel, and the Sea Hurricane had to go back down and land. Also, under Tropical conditions Hurricanes did not achieve spec performance.

Assessments from a race conducted by the Royal Navy found that even the Seafire was at best 9 knots faster than the Wildcat:

Erik Brown noted: "The Wildcat [was] faster and more maneuverable than the Sea Hurricane, "
 
The FAA had no opinion on the .5in and they got them because that's what the Martlet came with. The early .5in were actually pretty miserable with a slow RoF and frequent gun jams, but by mid 1942 these kinks were being worked out.

FAA pilots didn't necessarily feel that way, for example Henry Adlam noted, after a mock combat with a Seafire:

"Adlam came out of the experience with renewed confidence in his Martlet, largely because he felt the "0.5 calibre shells from six Browning machine guns" (Thus narrowing the Martlet down to a Mk II, III or IV) would present him with a key advantage over the Seafire IIC "

And of course, Spitfires were made with .50 cals in the wings to replace the .303s so I think they did recognize it's merits.
 
Then why did the FAA go with Grummans, Corsairs, and Fulmars as the war went along?

Perhaps Schweik's point about endurance is on point.

Fulmars? Only 600 built. Sea Hurricanes, about 500 as we've discussed. F4F series about 7900, IIRC including the FM2 which finally achieved HSH1B performance figures in 1944. The Sea Hurricane had fixed wings and the the folding wing was the real big advantage of the Martlet II/IV over the Sea Hurricane, just as the F4F-4 replaced the fixed wing F4F-3, despite the poorer performance of the -4. Right? The Seafire III was only retained because it had folding wings.

Schweiks point about endurance is no point at all. In combat the air cooled P&W or Curtis engine used a lot more fuel than the Merlin and it used more for climb as well. The difference in endurance in actual combat conditions was small.
 
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FAA pilots didn't necessarily feel that way, for example Henry Adlam noted, after a mock combat with a Seafire:

"Adlam came out of the experience with renewed confidence in his Martlet, largely because he felt the "0.5 calibre shells from six Browning machine guns" (Thus narrowing the Martlet down to a Mk II, III or IV) would present him with a key advantage over the Seafire IIC "

And of course, Spitfires were made with .50 cals in the wings to replace the .303s so I think they did recognize it's merits.

The Seafire IIC had 2 x 20mm cannon and 4 x. 303mgs.

Seafire IIC had ~1500hp and weighed less than 7000lb, Any Martlet would be completely outperformed by a Seafire IIC and you have to be completely ignorant of basic arithmetic to believe otherwise. Again, power to weight and wing loading tell the story.
 

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