Comparison of the Gloster F.5/34 and the Mitsubishi A6M2. (1 Viewer)

[Shortround6]

If the A-M had been watching events in SEA with a critical eye, from the time Germany launched Unternehmen Barbarossa, & effectively quashed the likelihood of an invasion of the UK, it may not have been too late to reinforce Singapore.

It was around 2-3 months sailing time to get anything from Britain to Singapore. Crating, uncrating, loading/unloading not included.
With the Soviets collapsing like a punctured balloon in the summer of 1941 the likelihood of German-British invasion was rather real for the spring of 1942.

The British were stretched too thin in 1941 and the political decision to aid Greece squandered whatever extra margin of resources existed in the "Mid-East"
Mid-East covering Egypt-Greece-Cypress-Iraq-Palestine-East Africa.
Over 1200 miles east to west and over 2200 miles North to South.

Unloading troops/material in Oct/Nov of 1941 just adds to Japanese booty.

He who defends everything defends nothing.

 

[EwenS]

Kind of what I meant by

Not sure where but I have definitely read that L-M refused to release fighters for overseas deployment but it could have been referring more to Spitfires than fighters in general. If the A-M had been watching events in SEA with a critical eye, from the time Germany launched Unternehmen Barbarossa, & effectively quashed the likelihood of an invasion of the UK, it may not have been too late to reinforce Singapore. History shows us that there was a significant lack of agility in the way this was handled, as was much of the conduct of the war in the early years. Plus, they did not have any suitable aircraft to use in an effective attack role, though maybe even Hurribombers would have been better than the poor old Blenheim.

You might find the following thesis on Fighter Comand strength in terms of the numbers of squadrons and trained pilots in 1940/41 interesting. Note how FC never reached the 80 squadrons of single engined day fighters seen as necessary in Dec 1940. That was at least in part due to units being siphoned off for the ME.

https://journals.gold.ac.uk/index.php/bjmh/article/download/1558/1671/1892

 

[yulzari]

Kind of what I meant by

Not sure where but I have definitely read that L-M refused to release fighters for overseas deployment but it could have been referring more to Spitfires than fighters in general. If the A-M had been watching events in SEA with a critical eye, from the time Germany launched Unternehmen Barbarossa, & effectively quashed the likelihood of an invasion of the UK, it may not have been too late to reinforce Singapore. History shows us that there was a significant lack of agility in the way this was handled, as was much of the conduct of the war in the early years. Plus, they did not have any suitable aircraft to use in an effective attack role, though maybe even Hurribombers would have been better than the poor old Blenheim.

Assuming that the decision were made the RAF has six months from the launch of Barbarossa to choose what to send, with all the maintenance support etc. Assemble the staff, find shipping and escorts which has to be drawn from existing purposes for an extended period, for a trip around the world and then send them by sea around Cape Horn, deliver them, assemble them and set up the bases and be ready in position. Can it be done? Yes but it would be close, very close. The only source would be from UK squadrons as the Middle East is actively using all it has. Hence the OTL dribble of old or unfit for UK service types that actually happened and we note that offers of Middle East cast offs were turned down. A comparison might be Operation Torch where an army was created and transported from scratch and launched across the Atlantic but that was with resources not being used in battle otherwise and itself took 11 months to arrive not 6 months and across one ocean not three. The US contribution to Torch was impressive under the circumstances but not a real model I feel.

It all comes back to scarce resources and necessary gross over commitment which led to the necessity to gamble on where could be neglected. In terms of industry etc. the Commonwealth was fighting in 1941 with 1/3 of what the Wallies had in 1944. Even allowing for the Pacific war draw upon those 1944 resources there was simply not enough to go around at the point when the decisions on the air defence of Malaya and Burma were made which is realistically March 1941 when the UK was considered under threat and the Middle East barely able to defend itself and one only has to look at the Commonwealth list of ancient and weird types used in battle in clearing Italy from East Africa and North Africa. To to mention preparing to invade Syria and Lebanon, put down revolt in Iraq and will have to invade Iran with the Soviets shortly.

However, we stray away from the OP into how to make a better Malayan and Burmese air defence.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If the A-M had been watching events in SEA with a critical eye, from the time Germany launched Unternehmen Barbarossa, & effectively quashed the likelihood of an invasion of the UK, it may not have been too late to reinforce Singapore.

I like the idea, but I wonder at the time from July to Jan 1942 if it looked like the USSR might be quickly defeated, with the now entirely-UK focused Wehrmacht coming back to finish Sealion. By the time (Jan 1942) the Red Army had demonstrably stomped the Germans at the Battle of Moscow, Singapore was about to fall. We can't blame Churchill for thinking he'd better keep his best forces at home. I wonder if this thinking also led to the failures in the MTO. Now, if we want forces for Malaya it is through earlier success in North Africa that we will get them - so defeat the Italians and prevent the Afrika Corp from crossing the Med. That will give us the forces for Malaya (including my Canadian-made Gloster F5s) - and if large enough we might just force Japan to revise its southern strategy.

Now, if we can improve the aircraft sufficiently to enter service; the Gloster F5 needs a name. Were there any proposed names? Previous Glosters include the Gamecock, Gambet, Gannet, Gauntlet, Gladiator, Goldfinch, Goral, Goring, Grebe, Gorcock, Gnatsnapper, Grouse, Guan, Javelin, Meteor, Nighthawk, Nightjar, and Sparrowhawk. I assume, much to Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring's disappointment that the Goring is out contention. With exceptions, traditionally Glosters are named after birds starting with G: Bird Gallery - Bird Gallery - Entries with Name starting with 'G'

 

[Shortround6]

I rather like the Gloster Gadwall
Anything with 2-3 words in the name is not snappy enough once you hang Gloster in front of it. I mean who is going to write out Gloster Great Crested Flycatcher in a report?
Or even be able to say it after a few pints in the Squadron bar?

 

[Shortround6]

Now, if we want forces for Malaya it is through earlier success in North Africa that we will get them - so defeat the Italians and prevent the Afrika Corp from crossing the Med.

The Best opportunity for that, militarily speaking, was to send a lot less "stuff" (men) to Greece. Politically speaking is more questionable.

The British don't need to stop Rommel from landing in NA, they have to stop him from landing in time to do much of anything. This gives a little more breathing room.
By the time Rommel gets most of the 2nd German division into NA the British Commonwealth has got 62,000 troops in Greece (24th of April). But this was way to late to save Greece.
Another division to the East African campaign and other division in Egypt/Libya and the 1st Armored Brigade added to whichever division was in Egypt/Libya would certainly have made Rommel's job a lot harder.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

Göring's disappointment that the Goring is out contention.

They could have kept the same Gloster naming convention, and called it the GoringCock.
Then deliberately make it undersized, and a poor performer at max altitude

 

[Admiral Beez]

...British Commonwealth has got 62,000 troops in Greece (24th of April). But this was way to late to save Greece.

The British Army was the seaborne escape artist of 1940-41. 330k British (and allied) troops evacuated from Dunkirk (Operation Dynamo), 25k from Norway (Op. Alphabet), and 50k from Greece (Op. Demon). The following year, Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival must have wondered why after so many successful evacuations, Churchill was now demanding that he and his 85,000 Allied troops at Singapore fight to the last man instead of trying to prepare an evacuation.

Was a Dunkirk-like evacuation of Singapore possible?

If unescorted troop ships can arrive and depart from Singapore up to the end, I see no reason that empty ships couldn't have the same success. On Jan 27th Wavell granted Percival permission to abandon Malaya and to retreat to Singapore. Once Malaya had fallen, the campaign was lost, and...

ww2aircraft.net

 

[Admiral Beez]

Anything with 2-3 words in the name is not snappy enough once you hang Gloster in front of it. I mean who is going to write out Gloster Great Crested Flycatcher in a report?

True. One bird of prey not used by Gloster is the Goshawk. It's two syllables. There is the failed Rolls-Royce Goshawk evaporative engine and the Curtiss BF2C Goshawk. Otherwise the name is free to use until the postwar T-45. And just look at this beautiful bird of prey - Folland had better clean up his design before it's thus worthy.

 

[yulzari]

The Best opportunity for that, militarily speaking, was to send a lot less "stuff" (men) to Greece. Politically speaking is more questionable.

The British don't need to stop Rommel from landing in NA, they have to stop him from landing in time to do much of anything. This gives a little more breathing room.
By the time Rommel gets most of the 2nd German division into NA the British Commonwealth has got 62,000 troops in Greece (24th of April). But this was way to late to save Greece.
Another division to the East African campaign and other division in Egypt/Libya and the 1st Armored Brigade added to whichever division was in Egypt/Libya would certainly have made Rommel's job a lot harder.

However they had already got the troops into Greece well before Barbarossa occurred so, at the time the decision (whether wise or no) was made, it was either to keep them in North Africa or send them to Greece. In no way were they going to be sent to the Far East with all their equipment. By the autumn of 1941 efforts were being made to scrape together some sort of force to defend Syria and Iraq against any German incursion from the Caucasus. It included some of the last British operational cavalry. Nothing significant was going to be sent from the Middle East to the Far East. The Indian army had committed its regular forces to the war in the Middle East. There were no reserves uncommitted to be sent. The RAF and RIAF had negligible units and squadrons in India itself and those obsolete policing types and impressed civilian aeroplanes. I really cannot emphasise that the only place with a reserve of operational types was the UK itself.

 

[EwenS]

Minor point. The Indian Air Force was established in Oct 1932 and the first aircraft flights on 1 April 1933. It didn't become the Royal Indian Air Force until 12 March 1945.

 

[EwenS]

Background article on Britain's decision to assist Greece and the politics involved.

https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2013/04.pdf

 

[Shortround6]

However they had already got the troops into Greece well before Barbarossa occurred so, at the time the decision (whether wise or no) was made, it was either to keep them in North Africa or send them to Greece. In no way were they going to be sent to the Far East with all their equipment. By the autumn of 1941 efforts were being made to scrape together some sort of force to defend Syria and Iraq against any German incursion from the Caucasus. It included some of the last British operational cavalry. Nothing significant was going to be sent from the Middle East to the Far East. The Indian army had committed its regular forces to the war in the Middle East. There were no reserves uncommitted to be sent. The RAF and RIAF had negligible units and squadrons in India itself and those obsolete policing types and impressed civilian aeroplanes. I really cannot emphasise that the only place with a reserve of operational types was the UK itself.

You are quite correct.
The window of opportunity was small, very small, and it entailed pretty much letting Greece fend for itself and using the forces that were sent to Greece help clean up East Africa and push the Italians further into Libya before Rommel even gets there. With an earlier end to the fighting in East Africa it at least frees up troops, they never had much for equipment and what they had was pretty much worn out and not worth shipping anywhere else. It does give you at least some trained combat veterans instead of the poorly trained (due to time in service) troops in the Far East.
Perhaps if the "reinforced" British (and commonwealth) had been able to hold the Italians and Germans inside of Libya there would not have been the wasteful hundreds of miles back and forth in the spring/summer of 1941. That may (or may not) have freed up some more things that could have been sent east.

Or perhaps any 'surplus' is just to Russia as more lend lease and nothing goes to the Far East anyway.

 

[MikeMeech]

My What'if, as described below requires that the F5/34 is developed and produced in Canada, outside of the British Air Ministry but as a pre-war private venture, akin to the later Gregor FDB-1. Presumably we're substituting all (most?) of CC&F's Hawker Hurricane production with the Gloster, so Stalin is not getting his Canadian Hurricanes.

In 1940 when Britain is looking for non-essential aircraft to send to Malaya, the AM team sent to look at the Brewster Buffalo and others also heads to Fort William, ON has a look at the first dozen or so thin-wing, R-1830 powered F5s. Sufficiently impressed the Air Ministry orders the aircraft to be produced for the RAF for shipment by rail to Vancouver and by sea to Malaya. Given the timing, I am likely being too ambitious on the two dozen squadrons (300 aircraft) by autumn 1941 (how many Hawker Hurricanes did CC&F produce by mid 1941?) but I expect at least a couple of squadrons of F5s to arrive in time to serve alongside the Brewster Buffalos.

And that's how we get to compare a thin-wings, streamlined and Twin Wasp powered F5 to the Ki-43 and A6M.

Hi
Page 379 of 'Canadian Aircraft since 1909' by Molson & Taylor has 76 Hurricanes produced during 1940, for 1941 up to June, 336 had been produced. What would you get rid of in aircraft production in Canada during 1940-41 to make skilled/semi-skilled work forces and production capability available to work on the Gloster and sort out the problems that may arise in your modifications? I can't see it appearing until 1942 at the earliest, which would mean it is a dated design by the time it reaches service.

Mike

 

[Admiral Beez]

What would you get rid of in aircraft production in Canada during 1940-41

All the Hurricanes, but starting earlier upon Hawker-Siddeley's 1934 acquisition of Gloster, with Folland, blueprints and the first prototypes shipping out to Canada. If we follow the same timeline as CC&F's Hurricane program we'll not get any F5s into service until early 1941 at best. But if we have CC&F take on the F5 in early 1935 as an initially-private venture leading to improved P&W-powered prototypes in 1937, I think we can get production aircraft into service by 1939.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

4 days before operation Compass "5 day raid" the 4th Indian Division was promised to the commanders operating against Italian East Africa, to move there starting mid December.

13 April 1939 Britain Greece treaty where Britain will aid Greece if it is attacked.
28 October 1940 Italy attacks Greece
9 December 1940 Operation Compass, 4th Indian, 7th Armoured and Corps troops
11 December most of 4th Indian ordered withdrawn, when leaving it takes corps artillery with it, which is ordered to return
19 December first elements of 6th Australian Division arrive, final elements on 27 December, (The New Zealand Division was deemed unavailable until completed, the Australians could put 3 infantry brigades together with some heavy weapons and call it a division)
3 January 1941 Bardia attacked
10 January HMS Illustrious attacked by Luftwaffe
19 January East African offensive begins, 4th and 5th Indian divisions
21 January Tobruk attacked
2 February conference in Greece between commanders begins. 1 Greek division in reserve, 2 if returning casualties could be speeded up.
5 February road block established at Beda Fomm
6 February Benghazi falls.
7 February final trapped Italians surrender.
14 February first German troops arrive in Tripoli

During February Luftwaffe raids on Benghazi curtail to stop British supplies being offloaded, Tobruk is used. While one factor of the Western Desert deployments is available troop numbers, another is supply problems. 7th Armoured division returned to Egypt with 12 cruiser and 40 light tanks, all needing workshop overhaul. 2nd Armoured division arrived at the front with its tanks needing new tracks. Replacements rushed from Australia did not stand up well enough. 3rd Armoured brigade had 86 instead of the authorised 156 tanks including radioless Italian M13. XIII corps staff, the ones in charge of operation Compass, were dispersed to other units as needed.

By the way, think of the Italian force deployed against Greece in the western desert as a blocking force.

5 March first troops embark for Greece
8 March first troops disembark in Greece
24 March Admiral Cunningham is asked by the Admiralty about plans for evacuating troops from Greece.
26 March Yugoslav coup.
27 March, 1st Armoured Brigade, almost all the new Zealand Division and 1 Brigade of Australians in Greece.
2 April Rommel's forces enter Agedabia, quick end of plans for 7th Australian Division and Polish Brigade to go to Greece.
4 April 1.5 Commonwealth divisions in Greece plus supporting troops, more still arriving
6 April German attack in Balkans,

When it comes to holding Singapore maps say you need to hold Northern Malaya/Southern Thailand as well as Sumatra/Java, otherwise the supply lines are cut, Thailand was not going to fight Japan (and probably Britain as well if operation Matador had occurred), the Dutch had few defences in the East Indies. By deciding the Japanese were inferior and the IJN would be often pulled into the Pacific the defence of Singapore was assumed possible, along with continuing unchanged pre war plans.

In a Singapore siege situation you needed to hold parts of the mainland for the water supply and feed about 560,000 civilians living on 225 square miles, Malta had 240,000 civilians living on 95 (Malta) / 122 (Malta plus Gozo) square miles

Canada Hurricane I production, Sea and mark II production began in November 1941.
Feb-40 1
Mar-40 4
Apr-40 4
May-40 9
Jun-40 10
Jul-40 11
Aug-40 1
Sep-40 1
Oct-40 7
Nov-40 13
Dec-40 15
Jan-41 35
Feb-41 46
Mar-41 66
Apr-41 58
May-41 72
Jun-41 59
Jul-41 62
Aug-41 11
Sep-41
Oct-41 1

All Canadian built Hurricanes either retained in Canada or shipped to Britain to be fitted with engines and other parts.

 

[Admiral Beez]

All Canadian built Hurricanes either retained in Canada or shipped to Britain to be fitted with engines and other parts.

That's new to me, as I believed that Canadian-built Hurricanes were complete aircraft, later on using Packard-built Merlins. For example, this Sea Hurricane at CC&F below looks complete, though I expect upon delivery customer-specific items like FAA radios may be installed.

As for them all being shipped to Britain, I thought many were intended for the USSR, presumably crated and ready to use. But that's what's great about this site, I learn stuff.

There's more info and and great pics here Canadian Warplanes 3: Hawker Hurricane

 

[EwenS]

All the Hurricanes, but starting earlier upon Hawker-Siddeley's 1934 acquisition of Gloster, with Folland, blueprints and the first prototypes shipping out to Canada. If we follow the same timeline as CC&F's Hurricane program we'll not get any F5s into service until early 1941 at best. But if we have CC&F take on the F5 in early 1935 as an initially-private venture leading to improved P&W-powered prototypes in 1937, I think we can get production aircraft into service by 1939.

Where is the market for your P&W powered F5 in the 1935-37 timeframe? All very well having it created as a private venture in Canada, but companies don't take that risk completely blind, especially if it is a completely new venture, and especially with the world just exiting a worldwide recession. CC&F weren't even in the aviation business until they took on the Hurricane contract in Nov 1938. They have to have some idea of who they will sell it to. And do you really expect the RAF to buy a foreign aircraft at that time? Acquisitions from established aircraft companies in the USA didn't begin until 1938 when gaps in procurement from British companies began to become apparent.


Butterflies. If Folland goes to Canada in your timeframe, he doesn't set up Folland Aircraft Company in 1937 in the UK and Britain loses a major sub-contractor for Blenheim, Beaufort, Spitfire, Wellington & Mosquito components and subassemblies. 1937-38 Folland was supplying Spitfire tailplane and rudder assemblies, and expanded into other components like ailerons, seat assemblies, various sheet metal components etc during wartime.

While we might have survived without the 12 Fo. 108 engine testbed aircraft, I'm not so sure about the rest.

It demonstrates yet again how intertwined the British aircraft industry was in the 1930s & 1940s. Lots of smaller companies, personality clashes, egos to be soothed etc etc.