Consequences for Japan plans if Britain hits Kido Butai at Ceylon?

[Admiral Beez]

Blenheims attack the Japanese carriers - 8 April 1942
Around 10:25, nine unescorted Blenheims from 11 Squadron RAF attacked Nagumo's force. They were not detected inbound by the combat air patrol (CAP). Hiryū spotted the aircraft but failed to relay a warning to the other ships. As a result, the attack achieved total surprise. The bombers unloaded at 11,000 feet (3,353 m) on Akagi; the bombs fell close to the target with no hits. Four bombers were shot down over the carriers by CAP A6M2 Zeroes, and another by Japanese aircraft returning from the strike on Hermes. In return, a Zero was shot down near the carriers and another in the returning strike. This was the first time a Japanese carrier force had faced a concerted air attack.

Let's give the RAF some luck this day, with Akagi being hit by two or three 500 lb. bombs, setting the aircraft in the hangar on fire. That's but one carrier damaged, but do the Japanese gain any insight on better CAP as they prepare for Coral Sea? And how does Akagi get home?

 

[SaparotRob]

It might serve as an impetus to get the radios to work.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Blenheims attack the Japanese carriers - 8 April 1942
Around 10:25, nine unescorted Blenheims from 11 Squadron RAF attacked Nagumo's force. They were not detected inbound by the combat air patrol (CAP). Hiryū spotted the aircraft but failed to relay a warning to the other ships. As a result, the attack achieved total surprise. The bombers unloaded at 11,000 feet (3,353 m) on Akagi; the bombs fell close to the target with no hits. Four bombers were shot down over the carriers by CAP A6M2 Zeroes, and another by Japanese aircraft returning from the strike on Hermes. In return, a Zero was shot down near the carriers and another in the returning strike. This was the first time a Japanese carrier force had faced a concerted air attack.

Let's give the RAF some luck this day, with Akagi being hit by two or three 500 lb. bombs, setting the aircraft in the hangar on fire. That's but one carrier damaged, but do the Japanese gain any insight on better CAP as they prepare for Coral Sea? And how does Akagi get home?

I doubt it. They got caught with their pants down and made little if any changes OTL. I don't see the bombs actually hitting changing their doctrine much. Their search failures weren't corrected either.

 

[RCAFson]

Blenheims attack the Japanese carriers - 8 April 1942
Around 10:25, nine unescorted Blenheims from 11 Squadron RAF attacked Nagumo's force. They were not detected inbound by the combat air patrol (CAP). Hiryū spotted the aircraft but failed to relay a warning to the other ships. As a result, the attack achieved total surprise. The bombers unloaded at 11,000 feet (3,353 m) on Akagi; the bombs fell close to the target with no hits. Four bombers were shot down over the carriers by CAP A6M2 Zeroes, and another by Japanese aircraft returning from the strike on Hermes. In return, a Zero was shot down near the carriers and another in the returning strike. This was the first time a Japanese carrier force had faced a concerted air attack.

Let's give the RAF some luck this day, with Akagi being hit by two or three 500 lb. bombs, setting the aircraft in the hangar on fire. That's but one carrier damaged, but do the Japanese gain any insight on better CAP as they prepare for Coral Sea? And how does Akagi get home?

Somerville's carriers actually had a pretty good shot at sinking/crippling Hiryu and Soryu (Cardiv 2) on the late afternoon, evening of 5 April 1942. Cardiv 2 became detached from the main body of the KB and had Somerville flown off a strike towards their last reported position, then ~40 Albacores would have encountered Cardiv 2 just after sunset.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I doubt it. They got caught with their pants down and made little if any changes OTL.

I'd like to think that Nagumo would be replaced, but the IJN kept him in charge of the surviving CVs even after Midway.

Somerville's carriers actually had a pretty good shot at sinking/crippling Hiryu and Soryu

If Hiryu and Soryu are destroyed on April 5th I don't expect Akagi would be hit by the Blenheims on April 9th, but imagine three IJN CVs sunk. That makes Coral Sea a different campaign for the IJN.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

If Hiryu and Soryu are destroyed on April 5th I don't expect Akagi would be hit by the Blenheims on April 9th, but imagine three IJN CVs sunk. That makes Coral Sea a different campaign for the IJN.

In those circumstances I don't think Coral Sea happens in 1942.

 

[EwenS]

The Japanese were not stupid. Like Britain and the US they were perfectly capable of learning from their experiences in their early War operations and did so. But there was a time factor, which, given the tempo of their carrier operations meant that lessons could not always be implemented as quickly as they might have liked. Operation C to Midway was two months with Coral Sea sandwiched in between. But the changes they made did not go far enough.

Reconnaissance. Pre-war Japanese doctrine left it largely in the hands of floatplanes on the cruisers and Battleships. But the weaknesses being shown up in early operations like Operation C in the IO were very quickly being acted on. In early 1942 some pre-production D4Y1 dive bombers were modified as D4Y1-C recce aircraft with 2 being on Sōryū at Midway but not used. And at Midway they did use a couple of Kate TB to augment the floatplanes, but it still left gaps in the coverage. Unfortunately the mistakes were repeated in that battle.

But spring 1942 also saw the issue of a requirement for a new recce aircraft which led to the Nakajima C6N Saiun (Myrt) for Operation from the new generation of carriers. But it was 1944 before it became operational and then from shore bases and by then the Japanese carrier fleet was an ever diminishing asset.

Japanese Carrier operations were biased towards offence rather than defence. Right to the end the objective was to use the greater range of their strike aircraft to hit the USN first. But the lack of emphasis on defence was, at least in part due to their lack of radar, and then having got it, how to use it defensively to greatest effect. In 1942 they were about where the RN and USN had been in 1938, before radar and decent voice radio (and VHF radio) became available to them.

When it came to CAP, immediately following Midway the Japanese sought to regroup their carrier forces. Instead of 2 carrier divisions they were to be 3 carrier divisions. So Shōkaku & Zuikaku were joined by Zuiho for Santa Cruz in Oct 1942 with the latter being responsible for fleet air defence. And the number of fighters carried was increased. The objective of this was to increase the mass of air power in the carrier group and the number of fighters available for task force protection (like the USN was able to do from mid 1943). But it was 1944 before this restructuring could really be put to the test.

The Japanese got their first ship borne radar onto the Battleship Hyuga in time for Midway and expanded from there. But they failed to integrate it with their plotting facilities, even though the latter were better than other navies. And they failed to attempt radar directed shipboard fighter direction (this was done ashore late in the war). Nor did they develop an effective form of IFF.

Despite all that they were radar savvy when it came to the offence. They developed the equivalent of ASV. Allied radar characteristics were catalogued and they exploited weaknesses in those radars. And although not so advanced as the Allies, they did use countermeasures such as Window/chaff.

Friedman "Fighters over the Fleet - Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War" is a good read on how each of the powers developed their air defences.

 

[Admiral Beez]

In those circumstances I don't think Coral Sea happens in 1942.

Meaning USS Lexington and Yorktown remain intact into June 1942. Also, with the IJN down on CVs, Sommerville's armoured fleet carriers HMS Formidable and Indomitable (does Hermes survive?) can now present an increased threat to Japan's flank. I'd love to see Sommerville meet with Nimitz and/or Fletcher in Australia or elsewhere to fight as one.

If Hermes does survive she's of little use in the PTO and should remain at Ceylon for a few months to watch how things develop, and then go the MTO to replace HMS Eagle (sunk in August 1942) or home waters for convoy work.

 

[RCAFson]

Meaning USS Lexington and Yorktown remain intact into June 1942. Also, with the IJN down on CVs, Sommerville's armoured fleet carriers HMS Formidable and Indomitable (does Hermes survive?) can now present an increased threat to Japan's flank. I'd love to see Sommerville meet with Nimitz and/or Fletcher in Australia or elsewhere to fight as one.

If Hermes does survive she's of little use in the PTO and should go the MTO or home waters for convoy work.

The RN still needs to undertake IRONCLAD and escort convoys through to Malta, so no longer term deployment of RN carriers in the IO.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The RN still needs to undertake IRONCLAD and escort convoys through to Malta, so no longer term deployment of RN carriers in the IO.

Good point. And the RN can keep possession of HMS Victorious (USS Robin) for a stronger ATO and MTO presence.

It can't be fun sitting at IJN HQ in May 1942 having just lost two or three fleet carriers and the USN/RN having lost none (to the IJN), with three Essex class, six Independence class and two Implacable class CVs under construction, and a flood of Essex, more Independence and Colossus CVs about to be ordered or begun.

 

[EwenS]

The RN, having sent 3 modern carriers to the IO by the end of April 1942, they were then gradually withdrawn after Operation Ironclad.

Indomitable - engine repairs at Mombasa until mid-July then off to rendezvous with other carriers off Gibraltar ahead of Operation Pedestal, when she suffered enough damage to send her home for repairs.

Formidable - 30 Aug 1942 left Colombo for home and a short refit before working up for Operation Torch before spending most of 1943 in the Med.

Illustrious - 13 Jan 1943 left Mombasa for refit in Britain, and subsequent operations with the Home Fleet before going to the Med in mid-Aug as a replacement for the again damaged Indomitable. She had been offered to the USN along with Vic at the end of 1942, and accepted by them, before the RN decided to send Vic instead.

The next carrier to serve in the IO was the escort carrier Battler which arrived in Oct 1943, fresh from Operation Avalanche, to begin ASW and searches for German supply ships.

 

[AZRailwhale]

Somerville's carriers actually had a pretty good shot at sinking/crippling Hiryu and Soryu (Cardiv 2) on the late afternoon, evening of 5 April 1942. Cardiv 2 became detached from the main body of the KB and had Somerville flown off a strike towards their last reported position, then ~40 Albacores would have encountered Cardiv 2 just after sunset.

Somerville wasn't willing to risk launching a search/strike mission. He was under orders to not risk his forces against even a comparable force,

 

[RCAFson]

Somerville wasn't willing to risk launching a search/strike mission. He was under orders to not risk his forces against even a comparable force,

Sources for that?

Somerville's Report of Proceeding for 5 April 1942:

..."37. A destroyer was detached to search but was recalled when at 1655 a reconnaissance aircraft from Force A reported an enemy force of 5 "unknowns" in position 3-38N, 78-18E at 1600. There was then no indication of the course of speed of this unknown force, but it could be either;
(a). a new force previously unreported, or
(b). the force previously and last reported at 1004.
38. It is unfortunately necessary that no relief shadowers were sent off by the Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers as soon as this report was received and that I omitted to obtain confirmation from Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers that relief shadowers had been sent. (n.b. in text "shadows" pen and ink corrected to "shadowers" in both cases.) At 1700 I received a report from Colombo that there were indications of enemy aircraft carriers steering 230 degrees at 24 knots from an unknown position at 1400.
39. This was thought to be subsequent to the attack on the cruisers and my deductions from this enemy move was as follows.
40. If he held on this course he would be at 0400 in a position to deliver a night air attack on Addu Atoll. This seemed quite a possible course of action. In any case it was necessary for Force A to keep clear to the southward and for Force B (estimated to be 135 miles astern in position 0-12N, 75-15E at 1700) to steer southward so that Forces A and B could close for supporting action at daylight the following morning (6th April). It as also necessary for Force B to steer to southward to keep clear of the enemy carrier force should it be proceeding to attack Addu.
41. At 1726, therefore Force A altered course to 210 degrees at 18 knots and a signal was made to Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command and to DORSETSHIRE to steer south, though by this time I entertained grave fears concerning the fate of the two 8" cruisers. As I had received no signal from them that they were being attacked I felt it was possible they had escaped and were maintaining W/T silence.
42. At 1800 I received a signal from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, stating that reconnaissance aircraft reported the estimated enemy's position 20 degrees 120 miles at 1710. This position was very close to the previously reported 1600 signal. The enemy's course had not been given in either of these reports, but the positions fitted in well with the course received in paragraph 38.
43. At 1817 a further signal was received from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, adjusting the 1600 position of the enemy force, amplifying it to include 2 carriers and 3 unknown vessels and giving the course as northwest. This was the first indication I had of an enemy course to the northwest.
44. I immediately ordered Force A to alter course to 315 degrees and instructed Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command to conform. These movements had the object of keeping Force A within night air striking distance of the enemy force, trusting to an A.S.V. search to locate the enemy, and to being Force B within supporting distance should it be necessary to retire in that direction. A dawn rendezvous was arranged with Force B in approximate position 3N, 75E.
45. As no news had been received of DORSETSHIRE and CORNWALL, the presumption was that they had been sunk.
46. At 1930 a night search with A.S.V. aircraft commenced to cover the section 345 degrees to 030 degrees to a depth of 180 miles. Nothing was located by this search."...

 

[AZRailwhale]

Sources for that?

Somerville's Report of Proceeding for 5 April 1942:

..."37. A destroyer was detached to search but was recalled when at 1655 a reconnaissance aircraft from Force A reported an enemy force of 5 "unknowns" in position 3-38N, 78-18E at 1600. There was then no indication of the course of speed of this unknown force, but it could be either;
(a). a new force previously unreported, or
(b). the force previously and last reported at 1004.
38. It is unfortunately necessary that no relief shadowers were sent off by the Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers as soon as this report was received and that I omitted to obtain confirmation from Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers that relief shadowers had been sent. (n.b. in text "shadows" pen and ink corrected to "shadowers" in both cases.) At 1700 I received a report from Colombo that there were indications of enemy aircraft carriers steering 230 degrees at 24 knots from an unknown position at 1400.
39. This was thought to be subsequent to the attack on the cruisers and my deductions from this enemy move was as follows.
40. If he held on this course he would be at 0400 in a position to deliver a night air attack on Addu Atoll. This seemed quite a possible course of action. In any case it was necessary for Force A to keep clear to the southward and for Force B (estimated to be 135 miles astern in position 0-12N, 75-15E at 1700) to steer southward so that Forces A and B could close for supporting action at daylight the following morning (6th April). It as also necessary for Force B to steer to southward to keep clear of the enemy carrier force should it be proceeding to attack Addu.
41. At 1726, therefore Force A altered course to 210 degrees at 18 knots and a signal was made to Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command and to DORSETSHIRE to steer south, though by this time I entertained grave fears concerning the fate of the two 8" cruisers. As I had received no signal from them that they were being attacked I felt it was possible they had escaped and were maintaining W/T silence.
42. At 1800 I received a signal from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, stating that reconnaissance aircraft reported the estimated enemy's position 20 degrees 120 miles at 1710. This position was very close to the previously reported 1600 signal. The enemy's course had not been given in either of these reports, but the positions fitted in well with the course received in paragraph 38.
43. At 1817 a further signal was received from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, adjusting the 1600 position of the enemy force, amplifying it to include 2 carriers and 3 unknown vessels and giving the course as northwest. This was the first indication I had of an enemy course to the northwest.
44. I immediately ordered Force A to alter course to 315 degrees and instructed Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command to conform. These movements had the object of keeping Force A within night air striking distance of the enemy force, trusting to an A.S.V. search to locate the enemy, and to being Force B within supporting distance should it be necessary to retire in that direction. A dawn rendezvous was arranged with Force B in approximate position 3N, 75E.
45. As no news had been received of DORSETSHIRE and CORNWALL, the presumption was that they had been sunk.
46. At 1930 a night search with A.S.V. aircraft commenced to cover the section 345 degrees to 030 degrees to a depth of 180 miles. Nothing was located by this search."...

He had enough radar equipped aircraft that he could have launched a search/strike mission. The only risk would have been operational losses from bad landings. At best he could find the IJN, at worst he could write off a couple of Albacores or Swordfish and burn some a gas. American commanders launched strikes on less data than Somerville had.

 

[RCAFson]

First you say:

"Somerville wasn't willing to risk launching a search/strike mission. He was under orders to not risk his forces against even a comparable force,"

Then when confronted with the truth you come up with this:

He had enough radar equipped aircraft that he could have launched a search/strike mission. The only risk would have been operational losses from bad landings. At best he could find the IJN, at worst he could write off a couple of Albacores or Swordfish and burn some a gas. American commanders launched strikes on less data than Somerville had.

geez...

 

[Admiral Beez]

Somerville's carriers actually had a pretty good shot at sinking/crippling Hiryu and Soryu (Cardiv 2) on the late afternoon, evening of 5 April 1942. Cardiv 2 became detached from the main body of the KB and had Somerville flown off a strike towards their last reported position, then ~40 Albacores would have encountered Cardiv 2 just after sunset.

I was thinking back to this thread and your post. ~40 Albacores with night-experienced pilots would have torn the KB to pieces. How does that impact the Coral Sea campaign, and is there a Midway?

But it must be tricky to find your target in the approaching darkness. It's one thing to hit ships at anchor at Taranto, and yet another to find and target warships on the move in the great expanse of ocean. I ran quick check on ChatGPT, which advised: "On the night of April 5–6, 1942, over Sri Lanka, the Moon was in its waning gibbous phase, approximately 80% illuminated." Furthermore, weather conditions were clear enough for air operations, so it was likely fair with good visibility. So, moonlight can make it through, target acquisition and servicing might be easier. I also wonder if the Japanese were cocky with their lack of emissions control (EMCON) and light discipline.

 

[Alan Stevens]

Blenheims attack the Japanese carriers - 8 April 1942
Around 10:25, nine unescorted Blenheims from 11 Squadron RAF attacked Nagumo's force. They were not detected inbound by the combat air patrol (CAP). Hiryū spotted the aircraft but failed to relay a warning to the other ships. As a result, the attack achieved total surprise. The bombers unloaded at 11,000 feet (3,353 m) on Akagi; the bombs fell close to the target with no hits. Four bombers were shot down over the carriers by CAP A6M2 Zeroes, and another by Japanese aircraft returning from the strike on Hermes. In return, a Zero was shot down near the carriers and another in the returning strike. This was the first time a Japanese carrier force had faced a concerted air attack.

Let's give the RAF some luck this day, with Akagi being hit by two or three 500 lb. bombs, setting the aircraft in the hangar on fire. That's but one carrier damaged, but do the Japanese gain any insight on better CAP as they prepare for Coral Sea? And how does Akagi get home?

We can do better than that!

They send a bigger strike package, and Kaga and Hiryu get several bombs thru the flight deck each as well.

 

[EwenS]

We can do better than that!

They send a bigger strike package, and Kaga and Hiryu get several bombs thru the flight deck each as well.

A bigger strike package made up of what exactly?

At the beginning of April 1942 the following strike aircraft were based on Ceylon:-

11 squadron with Blenheim IV. It arrived at the Colombo Racecourse airfield from the Middle East in mid-March with 14 aircraft. At 0820 on 9 April it despatched 11 aircraft to seek out the IJN fleet. Another aircraft was unable to take off. 2 turned back with engine trouble. That left 9 to conduct the attack.

788 squadron. This was a pool squadron assembled at China Bay, Trincomalee formed in Feb 1942 reportedly with 12 Swordfish and a few Albacores. Whether it still had all of these on 5th April is not clear as one source refers to the island's torpedo force being wiped out that day. On 5th April it despatched 6 Swordfish to Ratmalana, but they were intercepted by the IJN Colombo strike force and all were shot down, with most of their crews killed or wounded.

814 squadron with 12 Swordfish. This was the air group from Hermes. It disembarked to a satellite airfield at Kokkolei near China Bay on 5 April when Hermes was sent back to Trincomalee to prepare for Operation Ironclad (the invasion of the northern part if Madagascar, then scheduled for early May 1942).

There might also have been some spare Swordfish at China Bay, as well as some biplane Vickers Vildebeest torpedo bombers in storage there, having been given up by 273 squadron when it converted to Fulmars in March. But probably no spare pilots to fly them. Then there is the question of torpedoes to arm them. Torpedoes were in short supply in the RN generally at this point in the war for both the RAF and the RN. At least two were rescued from a hangar at China Bay that was destroyed on 9th April. How many others available is unknown. It would have been unusual for the carrier to unload its ammunition when in harbour unless it was going to be dry docked, which wasn't planned for Hermes at that time, there being no such facility at Trincomalee. Otherwise the weapon loads on the Swordfish would consist of 6x250lb bombs.

Sending Swordfish out in daylight without fighter protection would have been suicide. Witness 825 squadron during the Channel Dash in Feb 1942. On 9th April all the fighters in the Trincomalee area were fully engaged against the IJN attack.

And then you will say 'oh there has to be something else that could be sent!". Well no. Any other bomber squadrons were in eastern India recoveringbombers and reforming from their escape from Burma and the DEI. And it is about 1,200 miles from Calcutta to Ceylon, so even if they had been available they couldn't have been moved quickly.

Plans were being made to reinforce the Far East theatre with new units being formed and transfers in from other theatres starting to be made. But even the reinforcements were delayed by events in summer 1942, leading to units being hijacked in the Middle East while en route, some temporarily, some more permanently.

 

[Admiral Beez]

We can do better than that! They send a bigger strike package, and Kaga and Hiryu get several bombs thru the flight deck each as well.

Agreed. But we need a RAF decision in early January 1942 or sooner to send another two squadrons of level bombers to Ceylon, presumably by sea freight. I'd love to see Beaufighters or Mosquitos, but we're most likely to get more Blenheims, maybe Hampdens, or worse, Battles.

 

[EwenS]

Agreed. But we need a RAF decision in early January 1942 or sooner to send another two squadrons of level bombers to Ceylon, presumably by sea freight. I'd love to see Beaufighters or Mosquitos, but we're most likely to get more Blenheims, maybe Hampdens, or worse, Battles.

No matter what you might like to see, you need a reality check. Then look at what was done including decisions taken in Jan 1942 about what to send to the FE.

Firstly, delivery times from Britain. Ground crews have to travel by sea around the Cape along with their heavy equipment (there was nothing to spare in India at the time). That takes 6-8 weeks travel plus time to prepare (medical checks, overseas leave, packing time etc as well as finding the shipping space for all this at a time when troop shipping space was stretched). Then on arrival in India (main port of entry Bombay) travel to operational area in Ceylon or East Bengal on the other side of India. Bombay to Calcutta is over 1,000 miles with the journey having to be made on Indian railways.

Any aircraft sent by sea also have to endure those delays. Then have to be assembled by people with the requisite skills (where are they coming from? The RAF of course at MUs that need personnel from Britain).

Beaufighters were still in high demand as night fighters at Home. In Nov 1941 there were two long range fighter Beaufighter squadrons in the ME with just 24 aircraft. These were the only ones out with Britain. CC had a few more squadrons including a couple converting. But such was the shortage and the need to supply replacements to the ME that one squadron had to revert to flying other types. The ME was a constant drain on the UK based CC Beaufighter squadrons in summer 1942.

Mosquitoes were only just becoming available. A handful of PR aircraft from July 1941, B.IV began to be delivered to the first squadron in Nov 1941. NF.II to first squadron in Jan 1942. But it was later in 1942 before these became operational. Had Mosquitos been available in numbers these early aircraft would not have fared well. See the gluing problems early Mossies in the Far East in 1943/44.

Also bear in mind the SW monsoon season from April / May to Sept / Oct when operations of any kind, land and air, more or less ceased due to weather during 1942 & 1943. That gave breathing space for units to rebuild ready for the next campaigning season.

We have been over the British priorities in late 1941 in other threads. But perhaps take time to look at what was done.

As well as the Hurricane squadrons diverted while en route from Britain (2 of which ended up in Ceylon prior to Operation C), another 2 squadrons were diverted from the ME in time for Operation C as well as 11 squadron Blenheims as previously noted and the two Fulmar squadrons plus sufficient spares to allow re-equipment of 273 squadron (from Vildebeest biplane TB)

Jan 1942 decision to send 2 squadrons of Beauforts to replace the 90 aircraft not coming from the Australian production line. 22 squadron ground crews left Britain in Feb bound for the FE. The aircraft were flown out via the ME in March. It came together in Ceylon on 28th April. 217 ground personnel left Britain on 7th May. The aircraft left a month later but were hijacked at Malta due to the crisis in the Med in mid-1942 where most were lost. It became operational with Hudsons in Ceylon in Oct, and converting to Beauforts again in April 1943 when numbers allowed (Beaufort losses in the Med in 1942 were very heavy and became the main supply requirement.

215 bomber squadron had formed in Britain for overseas service on 9 Dec 1941. Its ground crews left Britain in Feb for India with its Wellingtons being flown out at the end of March to be based in Bengal. Its initial activities included supply dropping, coastal patrols and airborne forces training before beginning bombing operations in March 1943. 99 also left in Feb 1942 to reassemble in June to begin operations in Nov.

As noted on another thread, in May 1942 ground crews for two Liberator squadrons were diverted from the ME to India. 159 became operational there at the end of Sept, with 160 following in Feb 1943. Again delays due to events in the ME in summer 1942.

62 squadron reformed on Hudsons from the remnants of a Blenheim squadron around April 1942 for GR and anti shipping work around the Bay of Bengal. 353 formed in India for GR work over the Bay of Bengal with Hudsons in June.

By Sept 1942 enough new Blenheims were on hand for 34, 60 & 113 squadrons around Calcutta and 11 squadron in Ceylon.

By Jan 1943 Beaufighters fighters were equipping 27 squadron (reformed Nov 1942) and a flight of 89 squadron Beaufighter night fighters had arrived from the ME. Then add in the USAAF contribution in the shape of the 7th BG (B-24) and 341st BG (B-25).

And during 1942 the fighter strength increased significantly with more Hurricane deliveries and the arrival of USAAF P-40 Groups.