Consequences for Japan plans if Britain hits Kido Butai at Ceylon?

[Admiral Beez]

No matter what you might like to see, you need a reality check.

In the entire history of this forum, you've never posted a thread idea of your own. Why is that? Instead, you seem to focus on critiquing others' ideas, often presenting well-reasoned and strongly-backed arguments—credit where it's due, your points are thorough. But doesn't it get exhausting to constantly wait in the wings for an opportunity to point out why someone else's concept wouldn't work? How about shifting gears and contributing a "What If" thread of your own? Let's see what kind of ideas you have to offer.

 

[EwenS]

In the entire history of this What If forum you have never posted a thread idea. Why not? Instead you seem to focus on telling us all why others' ideas would not work. Like in the above, you make good, well-documented, strongly-backed arguments, granted; but does it not get tiring to lurk the What If forum, waiting for your gotcha! moment? Why not contribute a What If thread idea yourself? Let's see what you've got.

I left my days of creating "what if" situations in WW2 way back in my younger years, largely before use of the internet became widespread (showing my age now!). I find the historical side much more interesting. Particularly not just what happened but why it happened, and more importantly why it happened the way it did. I'm not looking for a "gotcha moment". I'm seeking to inform you and others who lack knowledge, especially those in the USA who generally are less well informed of the British position.

You seem to dislike my contributions because I regularly point out the historical inaccuracies in your starting points and the practical impossibilities of your suggestions. So they, in my eyes, become not "what ifs" but pure fantasies. Perhaps the site requires a "fantasy page"? And for me any "what if" has to have an historical jumping off point, and whatever is being proposed has to take account of the historical limitations.

As in this case, the assumption that the RAF was doing nothing in early 1942 (your requested 2 bomber squadrons plus 2 TB squadrons already earmarked) as well as the idea that formations can somehow be transported from one side of the world to the other in no time flat (this is the 1940s we are discussing not more modern times with the likes of C-17 & C-5 transport aircraft able to transport everything up to and including main battletanks or helicopters).

Even more frustrating from my perspective is how we seem to end up discussing the same problems over & over again. I keep promising myself that I won't comment on your fantasies in future, but then somehow manage to forget myself.

So as you are so upset, I'll bow out of this one and let you continue.

 

[Admiral Beez]

So as you are so upset, I'll bow out of this one and let you continue.

Not upset at all, but often disappointed as I'd enjoy seeing a what-if that meets your measure. As for sticking only to replies - your level of research and knowledge keeps amateurs like myself somewhat grounded to reality. Nothing wrong with that, but what I think you're missing is the opportunity to build up rather than kicks the legs out of potentially interesting topics. A Alan Stevens suggested the RAF send a larger strike to hit Nagumo, to which you rightfully replied there were no other aircraft available on Ceylon to do it. My immediate thinking is, well that idea's DOA, but if given sufficient notice what aircraft could have been available? That's your opportunity, I would argue to tell us/me what we must do to get them, rather than just telling us the whole idea is impossible. Someone shipped a dozen Blenheims to Ceylon, is it truly impossible that some other level bombers could have been sent - perhaps months earlier?

 

[EwenS]

Someone shipped a dozen Blenheims to Ceylon, is it truly impossible that some other level bombers could have been sent - perhaps months earlier?

OK, against my better judgement, I'll bite.

The Blenheims of 11 squadron were flown from the Canal Zone in Egypt to Ceylon in March 1942. 803 & 806 Fulmar squadrons also flew from Egypt to Ceylon, with ground crews travelling by sea. Those deployments involved a number of stops along the route across the ME and down through India to Ceylon.

Two Hurricane squadrons were also sent from ME, 30 Sqn from Egypt and 261 from Palestine, to Ceylon. They were flown to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, partially disassembled, put aboard the carrier Indomitable to be reassembled in batches and flown off to Ceylon 6/7 March. The ground crews travelled separately by merchant transport.

Rob Stuart sets out details of all the reinforcements to Ceylon in this article.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/ColomboRaid.31.1.2022.pdf

Note the comment that for the first two months of the war in the Far East, the emphasis was on sending what reinforcements were available in the FE theatre to Malaya and then Java. That included diversion of 4 Hurricane sqns originally destined for the ME to the FE while in transit (they left the UK in Nov 1941)

Meanwhile in the Middle East, you will recall it had been decided back around Aug 1941 that it should have priority over the Far East. On the back of that Operation Crusader was launched on 18 Nov 1941. While initially successful in pushing Rommel back to El Agheila by the end of the year, he counter attacked and by mid-Feb 8th Army was back at the Gazala line. So the RAF was fully engaged there.

You can find details of ME squadrons in the RAF narratives

https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/our-history/air-historical-branch/second-world-war-campaign-narratives/middle-east-campaigns-vol-iii-operations-in-libya-and-the-western-desert-including-malta-21-jan-1942-30-june1942/

But what was sent to Ceylon from ME was what was felt could be spared from that fight. The ME position in early 1942 is best summed up in the Narrative.

"AIR OPERATIONS - 25th FEBRUARY, 19A2 TO 25th MAY^ 1942^
The Situation at the, beginning of the Period
AHB/Ilja/12

The' stabilisation of the front at Gazala introduced
a new period of reduced activity on both sides, and from
25th February the scale of fighter and light bomber
operations fell away noticeably. The. long strain and
exhaustion of the previous months operations were being
felt both by our. own air force and by the enemy, and now
the opportimity 'for rest, reorganisation and reinforcement
was welcomed.'
- The role of the R.A.F. during these months under review
was therefore governed by. the need of the opposing forces
to:-
(a) Recover from four months arduous activity*
(b) Hold their present, position's.
(c) Build up for further, offensive action at the earliest-moment. . .

The vital question of supplies was still the chief
problem, and it was essential that the enemy's supply lines
should be attacked and disorganised as much as possible.
The medium bombers therefore, increased the intensity of
their attack. The Axis supply position was far stronger
than it had been owing to the fact that Malta was now being
subjected to intensive bombing* After the first fortnight
of the period, during which ,57 sorties were flown by Malta
based. bombers against enemy ports'and bases, the bomber
effort from the island had been brought almost to a stand
still, and Axis convoys were able-to keep up the flow of
supplies with far greater freedom than before."

So there was no more to spare from the ME. Any further reinforcements have to come from Britain. Which takes us back to my last post. AFAICT diversion of units based in Britain began in early Jan 1942.

Incidentally 215 Wellington sqn had been earmarked for the ME but was another diversion to the FE. As I noted it only formed on 9 Dec 1941.

Logistics of moving personnel half way around the world.
With shipping shortages generally and troop capacity in particular, this had to be carefully choreographed. Planning a troop convoy began a couple of months before departure. Units to be moved identified, potential shipping identified (being wartime nothing could be guaranteed). Troopships arriving from one journey had to be turned around, repaired where necessary or replacements found, reprovisioned and otherwise made ready.

The RAF hierarchy had to decide what reinforcements needed to be sent / could be spared from operations in Britain. Units going overseas had to undergo medical checks (often requiring personnel being drafted out and in), overseas leave given (they were told they would be overseas for up to 4 years), pack equipment, be transported, usually by road to the nearest station and then rail, to the relevant departure ports (usually Liverpool or various locations on the Clyde) and be allocated to a troopship for embarkation. And a squadron wasn't just the aircrew. We are talking of something over 500 personnel in a bomber squadron IIRC. Finding accommodation for short notice additions to already planned unit moves could prove challenging.

As noted larger aircraft like Wellingtons & Beauforts could be flown to the FE. Otherwise a squadron would turn in its old aircraft, if it had any, in Britain and pick up new aircraft from an MU on arrival. That of course meant packing at one end and reasembly at the other. But the latter was a separate supply line, but one that needed co-ordinated.

While all this may seem obvious to some, it takes time. And time was the thing that was fixed. And that is before a ship leaves shore in Britain. To get those squadrons onto WS16 would have been a bit of a challenge for everyone concerned.

Fast WS troop convoys left Britain for the ME & India roughly once a month. These convoys usually underwent various reorganisations along the route as different elements headed for different destinations. Transhipment of personnel from one vessel to another along the way was not uncommon. In the period from Aug 1941 to April 1942 there were the following:-

WS11 sailed from Britain 30 Aug 1941. Arrived at destinations from Aden to Singapore late Oct early Nov.
WS12 sailed from Britain 29 Sept 1941. Arrived Aden to Singapore at the end of Nov.
WS12X from Halifax, Canada using USN transports (unusual arrangement to maximise troop movements to/from Britain). Sailed 10 Nov. Main part arrived Colombo 27 Dec 1941. Carried British 18th Div on to Singapore.
WS12Z sailed from Britain 12 Nov. Broke into various elements arriving Suez and Singapore early to mid Jan 1942.
WS14 sailed from Britain 9 Dec 1941. Again broke into different elements arriving Aden and DEI in late Jan 1942.
WS15 sailed from Britain 10 / 11 Jan 1942. Various elements arrived Aden & Colombo in first few days of March.
WS16 sailed from Britain 16 Feb 1942. This convoy seems to have carried most of the RAF reinforcement sqns referred to in my last post. Arrived Aden & Bombay 6 & 8 April 1942.
WS17 sailed from Britain 23 March 1942. Arrived Aden, Bombay, Karachi mid- May 1942. This one proved a challenge when extra shipping had to be found to transport some of the troops to be employed in Operation Ironclad.

WS Convoys in World War 2 - the 'Winston's Specials'

The main point of entry to India for personnel was Bombay. From which via transit camps and the Indian rail system they had to find their way to the front line.

So from a transport perspective, if you want additional RAF units in Ceylon by the time of Operation C, the whole decision making process and planning has to be moved up at least a full month so they can travel on ships in WS15 leaving mid-Jan at the latest. In fact, if you are relying on Blenheims probably even earlier so they can be assembled on arrival in time to be useful. So that takes you back to decision making almost on the very day of the Japanese invasion at the very latest. No one expected on that day that the Japanese would not be stopped.

But the problem with advancing decision making any further is the pre-invasion policy of prioritising the ME, where there was an active shooting war, over the FE where there is only a threat, albeit an increased one after July 1941 when the Japanese occupied southern French Indochina and begin construction of multiple air bases from which to strike further south.

Other relevant dates.

Arcadia Conference in Washington 22 Dec 1941 to 14 Jan 1942. Churchill & Roosevelt meet for the first time in WW2. ABDACOM formation announced 1 Jan along with Wavell's appointment as CinC. He arrives in Singapore on 7th Jan. At 30 Dec the Japanese advance is only between a third and a half of the way down the Malayan peninsula.

The Japanese advance into Burma (ordered on 22 Dec 1941 to a division based in Bangkok 300 miles from the border) only began on 17 Jan 1942.

Operation C only became possible after the Japanese secured enough of a foothold in the outer DEI island chain to allow safe passage of the KB between the various islands. That didn't happen until the end of Feb 1942 when they secured a foothold on the eastern end of Java thus securing the Sunda Strait. The Bay of Bengal venture only became possible after the campaign in Sumatra and the Nicobars, thus securing passage in the Malacca Straits.

So the threat to Ceylon is not as clear cut in Dec / Jan as it became from late Feb. Which is of course the point at which reinforcements begin to arrive.