Could Axis aircraft catch the Mosquito in Dec 1941?

[pbfoot]

I think a better question might be how long do you think the Mosquito can outrun the foe, its seems some of us have the impression the pilot took off set pitch and mixture and pushed the throttle to the ident .....

 

[Glider]

I think a better question might be how long do you think the Mosquito can outrun the foe, its seems some of us have the impression the pilot took off set pitch and mixture and pushed the throttle to the ident .....

Probably as long as he needed too. With a bunch of 109's behind I would keep going and worry about engine wear later.

 

[Milosh]

I think a better question might be how long do you think the Mosquito can outrun the foe, its seems some of us have the impression the pilot took off set pitch and mixture and pushed the throttle to the ident .....

How long could the foe try to catch up for?

 

[parsifal]

How long could the foe try to catch up for?

It varied of course but a good median value would be about 20 minutes. If sufficient warning was obtained by the intruder of the intercept, its going to be tough to catch.

The complication (or one of them) is that the interceptor will not always be vectoring in as a stern chase. Sometimes they will be coming in beam on, sometimes from ahead, or ahead of the beam. If the intruder is able to turn away from the interceptor, he can largely solve this issue....if not, his speed advantage isnt as important as a variable for the interceptor when attempting to achieve a successful intercept.

 

[pbfoot]

You guys using the jet stream at all in this fantasy . the jet stream is always blowing out of the west . BTW the Jetstream was an unknown in the 40's so any eastbound aircraft at altitude will be doing at least 60mph up to 130 mph faster then any westbound aircraft . Certainly helps with this fantasy and makes interception a bitch > A T6 heading east would be a problem for the intercepters depending on the skill of the GCI or slang Fighter Cops skill. The following ink shows the current euro jetstream
http://www.wunderground.com/global/EU_2xJT_Index.html

 

[wuzak]

You guys using the jet stream at all in this fantasy . the jet stream is always blowing out of the west . BTW the Jetstream was an unknown in the 40's so any eastbound aircraft at altitude will be doing at least 60mph up to 130 mph faster then any westbound aircraft . Certainly helps with this fantasy and makes interception a bitch > A T6 heading east would be a problem for the intercepters depending on the skill of the GCI or slang Fighter Cops skill. The following ink shows the current euro jetstream
Weather Forecast - Europe - Local Long Range | Wunderground | Weather Underground

Was the jetstream encountered in the ETO at all?

What altitude is the jetstream in Europe?

 

[Freebird]

When the only nation under attack was the Chinese.

Huh?
ABDA command was in the early months of 1942, when the British, Australians Dutch were all being attacked

For what purpose? How could the government justify withdrawing troops from the U.K., which was still anticipating a German invasion when there was nobody to fight? (Easy to say, now, that the incursion into Russia made that impossible, but the advance didn't stall for quite a long time, and there was always fear that Hitler still had enough resources to come here again.)

There is no need to withdraw British troops from the UK, or lower available forces, there was more than enough to work with.

As for the war in the east eliminating the threat of a UK invasion, by the end September it was clear that the Soviets wouldn't be defeated before winter, when weather conditions made a cross channel invasion unworkable.
There was still enough time to improve the defences in the Far East

 

[Freebird]

It is a well documented fact that military appraisals handed to the british high command by the Australians (at least, ther were many many others that did the same) clearly showed the Malayan barrier (and Singas) to be indefensible, and that it was at risk from a landward assault.

Who had judged the Maylay barrier to be indefensible?
I've havn't seen that assertion anywhere?

The commanders in the Far East did know that the forces in Malaya (especially air) were not sufficient, but had the forces that had been recommended by the senior leaders (and agreed by the British Cabinet) actually been sent to Malaya, there is good reason to believe that the Maylay barrier defence could have worked.

The british and CW response was a calculated risk that went horribly wrong. With two major powers to fight largely alone in the ETO, and having suffered a series of costly defeats, Britiain had no choice but to cut force levels in the Far east to dangerously low levels.

I think the high point of bad decisions, however was the decision to deploy the PoW and Repulse so far forward and so badly protected. By late '41, it was very clear that Captital ships should not and could not operate in a hostile air environment where the enemy was effective in the aeronaval role.

No, in my mind the high point of bad decisions was agreeing to back the US embargo (knowing that it would likely lead to war) and then not heeding the advice of the commanders in theater of what forces were needed, or otherwise properly preparing for war.

If they didn't think they could send the forces required they never should have pulled the pin on the grenade, and agreed to support an embargo that would most certainly lead to war.

 

[Freebird]

The other thing that stands out for me is that having accepted the risk of undermanning their forward defences, why did the British continue to make assurances they could not keep, and knew they could not keep throughout 1940-41. If they had been honest about the situation, the nations affected, like Australia, could have made more realistic preprations for war.

Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.

I don't see that they couldn't have kept their promises, or have known that there was a significant risk of war until July of 1941. They were reading the Japanese messages and so they knew that Japan was too engaged in China to pose a significant threat, until the embargo forced the Japanese to take desperate measures.

Who are the senior leaders that you think failed to grasp the danger?
Every one of the senior leaders in the Far East that are on record (Babington, Bond, Dobbie, Brooke-Popham Percival himself) pointed out the need for stronger defences (especially air), nor have I seen any racist angle either, as none them ever expressed the opinion that the meagre assortment of obsolete aircraft would be adequate against the Japanese.

Let's not beat around the bush, the lion's share of the blame can be attributed to the Minister of Defence, (Winston Churchill) who disregarded the advice of the senior leaders in the Far East as regards to Japan.
From what I've read, it seems that he
A.) Believed that Japan would naver dare to attack the US, and
B.) That even if they did, the mighty US military would make quick work of Japan

Therefore the UK needn't worry or prepare for a long conflict, as the US would take care of the Pacific
He also believed that sending the Prince of Wales Repulse would intimidate Japan.

I The one point I will make is that no sensible person would countenance building up forces in an area where there was no fighting when other theatres were under attack. Perhaps the hindsight goggles are clouding our view of the difficult decisions that had to be made, without foreknowledge, at the time?

On the other hand, Chuchhill the War Cabinet recognised the danger in other territories under their control, and beefed up the defences in areas that the Nazis could possibly attack - like Gibraltar, Iceland, Cyprus etc, but that were not fighting at the time (other than a few air raids)

Now, I would agree that there was no justification for expanding forces in the Far East from mid-1940 to mid-1941,
at which time there was a critical shortage of troops, air forces guns during the French collapse, BoB, Sonnenblume, the expedition to Greece, Battle for Crete, revolt in Messopotamia, campaign in Levant the East Africa campaign.

However by the end of July 1941, things have more or less stabilized in the ETO. (in a relative sense )
With dispatch of the bulk of Axis forces to Barbarossa the danger of an immediate invasion of the UK has passed, and the defence of the UK is far stronger than the year before. The Italians have been defeated in East Africa, the Vichy ejected from the Levant, and the revolt in Messopotamia put down.

At this point, the US asks the British to support the embargo, which will most likely lead to war.
IMO They have 2 options:
1.) if the don't think that they have enough forces to go to war with Japan, they shouldn't agree.
2.) If they do agree, they should be fully prepared to beef up the air ground forces (at least) to what the 1940 conference recommended would be needed to resist a Japanese attack.

 

[parsifal]

Who had judged the Maylay barrier to be indefensible?
I've havn't seen that assertion anywhere?

The australian government and the australian high Command submitted repeated assessments to the effect that the defences for malaya, particularly the land defences were inadequate. According to DM Horner (Australia Allied Strategic Decision making 1939-45), referring to yet another situation report submitted by the Australians in April 1941 and (as usuall) ignored that stated all the deficiencies in the defensive arrangements, Horner states in his book "....the australian government was now placed in an invidious position. It was now faced with a british government that refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate, and that as a result australias defences were now at risk (the deployment of the AIF was conditional to adequate defences being deployed forward into malaya). The australian government now knew that the British refused to provide adequate defences in the far east, that australia had been duped into sending the bulk of its trained forces to the middle east, against the advice of its own military (the Australian GHQ had recommended just one division be sent whilst Japans position remained unclear), and a refusal by the British to either provide arms, or allow Australia to raise the capital to build its own arms. The last refusal led to the deployment of 27th Bde, the only trained reseve left in australia, and forced menzies to seek alternatives for aircraft supply and manufacturing capability.

The commanders in the Far East did know that the forces in Malaya (especially air) were not sufficient, but had the forces that had been recommended by the senior leaders (and agreed by the British Cabinet) actually been sent to Malaya, there is good reason to believe that the Maylay barrier defence could have worked.

Possibly, but the "ifs" are so remote from reality as to make the statement menaingless. the british were never going to defend the far east adequately whilst also at war with the European Axis, even though they knew the defences were completely inadequate Whatever resources they did commit were largely the result of repeated criticisms by countries like australia. If they had had their way, i am certain malaya in 1941 would have been defended by no more than the pace guard and the national goat.....

If they didn't think they could send the forces required they never should have pulled the pin on the grenade, and agreed to support an embargo that would most certainly lead to war.

Britain was never going to go the path of appeasement, however inadequate the forces. they also needed to stand firm, to ensure US entry

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Huh?
ABDA command was in the early months of 1942, when the British, Australians Dutch were all being attacked
There was still enough time to improve the defences in the Far East

Sorry about that; I'd forgotten how quickly the Japanese launched their invasion forces.
There was no chance to improve the Far East defences, once the decision had been taken to send hundreds of Hurricanes to Russia.
The big mistake with regard to Prince of Wales Repulse, was to continue with their sortie, without the aircraft carrier that was supposed to travel with them, but had run aground during an exercise. The force commander didn't help, when he decided that he could manage without informing the RAF, and getting air cover.

It was now faced with a british government that refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate, and that as a result australias defences were now at risk (the deployment of the AIF was conditional to adequate defences being deployed forward into malaya). The australian government now knew that the British refused to provide adequate defences in the far east, that australia had been duped into sending the bulk of its trained forces to the middle east, against the advice of its own military (the Australian GHQ had recommended just one division be sent whilst Japans position remained unclear), and a refusal by the British to either provide arms, or allow Australia to raise the capital to build its own arms. The last refusal led to the deployment of 27th Bde, the only trained reseve left in australia, and forced menzies to seek alternatives for aircraft supply and manufacturing capability.
The commanders in the Far East did know that the forces in Malaya (especially air) were not sufficient, but had the forces that had been recommended by the senior leaders (and agreed by the British Cabinet) actually been sent to Malaya, there is good reason to believe that the Maylay barrier defence could have worked.

Possibly, but the "ifs" are so remote from reality as to make the statement menaingless. the british were never going to defend the far east adequately whilst also at war with the European Axis, even though they knew the defences were completely inadequate Whatever resources they did commit were largely the result of repeated criticisms by countries like australia. If they had had their way, i am certain malaya in 1941 would have been defended by no more than the pace guard and the national goat.....

Emotive stuff, but not true; the British government (not just Churchill) had written to the Australians, pledging that, if the Japanese were so foolish as to attempt an invasion of Australia, they (we) would have cut their losses, abandoned the Mediterranean, and sent the lot to defend Australia (I found a copy of the message in our National Archives.) You can choose to disbelieve it, if you wish, of course, but that was the government's position.

 

[pbfoot]

Was the jetstream encountered in the ETO at all?

What altitude is the jetstream in Europe?

It is around the world and a reasom east bound flights take less then west bound

 

[wuzak]

It is around the world and a reasom east bound flights take less then west bound

Yes, but were they flying hgh enough to encounter/use it?

 

[wuzak]

It is around the world and a reasom east bound flights take less then west bound

Yes, but were they flying hgh enough to encounter/use it?

 

[pbfoot]

you were talking about 30000 feet , well it starts at 23000 feet

 

[Edgar Brooks]

I've just read a biography of a Norwegian pilot, who said they occasionally got caught in it, but never knew (then) what it was. There was also a Lancastrian, just after the war, which was due to cross the Andes, but just disappeared; years later a glacier brought parts of the aircraft (and bodies) out into the open, and it was surmised that they'd flown into the (head wind) jetstream, and let down straight into the mountain peaks, thinking they'd got over the top. The stream isn't constant in its position, which is why the U.K. has such variable weather; sometimes it holds warm weather over us, at others it allows Arctic weather to get here.

 

[buffnut453]

Who are the senior leaders that you think failed to grasp the danger?
Every one of the senior leaders in the Far East that are on record (Babington, Bond, Dobbie, Brooke-Popham Percival himself) pointed out the need for stronger defences (especially air), nor have I seen any racist angle either, as none them ever expressed the opinion that the meagre assortment of obsolete aircraft would be adequate against the Japanese.

Yes, commanders on the spot did ask for more assets (I don't know of any commander who says he can complete his mission without fewer forces, the exception being Gideon of Old Testament fame). Irrespective, they were all were banking on Japan making a staged assault from French Indo-China through Thailand and not a full-blown seaborne invasion from modern Formosa. Major George Wards, Assistant Military Attaché in Tokyo, provided a briefing to senior British officers in April 1941 where the GOC, then General Bond, deliberately contradicted Wards' evaluation that the Japanese Army maintained a high standard of efficiency (Source: Wards Papers at IWM). This would seem to contradict your assertion that all Far East commanders accepted the Japanese threat.

To further reinforce the point, but with a different spin on the effectiveness of FECB's efficacy as an intelligence organisation, Lt Col Ashmore recalled a commanders' conference on 21st October where the FECB representative 'painted a fairly indecisive picture and seemed unable to tell the conference much about the latest Japanese moves and forces in Indo-China and elsewhere' whereas the GHQ representative delivered a clear, logical critique and 'left an impression…that the Japanese were in no position to attack Malaya at this time or in the near future'. (Source: ADM 223/494, UK National Archives). Brooke-Popham also blamed lack of adequate intelligence for the surprising performance of Japanese aircraft, although this has subsequently proven to be an inaccurate criticism - pretty accurate intel was available on all Japanese aircraft types except the Ki-43.

Reports from military observers in China consistently placed the efficiency and effectiveness of Japanese forces as below that of Italy. These reports were taken to heart by senior staffs in London. Assessments about the military forces of Japan, China and Thailand clearly display a racial hierarchy at play in the thinking of many British intelligence staff and senior military leaders - often the threat was couched in terms of comparison against the Indian Army as if one could readily make such broad, sweeping assertions without factoring in local conditions, ability to concentrate force etc.

However by the end of July 1941, things have more or less stabilized in the ETO. (in a relative sense )
With dispatch of the bulk of Axis forces to Barbarossa the danger of an immediate invasion of the UK has passed, and the defence of the UK is far stronger than the year before. The Italians have been defeated in East Africa, the Vichy ejected from the Levant, and the revolt in Messopotamia put down.

Apart from the fact that Rommel's Afrika Korps was barely getting spun up in North Africa. Rommel's forces started arriving in Feb 41 and the deployment finished that May. North Africa was the main theatre at that stage of the war. If it had fallen, it would have resulted in the loss of Egypt, probably the neutralization of Malta, and undoubtedly a second attempt on Iraq. I hardly think that's a stabilized situation.

 

[Freebird]

The big mistake with regard to Prince of Wales Repulse, was to continue with their sortie, without the aircraft carrier that was supposed to travel with them, but had run aground during an exercise.

The aircraft carrier you are referring to is the "HMS Indomitable", and it did indeed run arground in the Caribbean.
There was an alternative however, they could have easily substituted HMS Hermes to provide cover for Force Z. The Japanese had no fighter escort for the bombers, so even with the limited capacity of the Hermes, a dozen Fulmar or Sea Hurricanes could have thwarted the waves of torpedo bombers.
Ultimately though, since the intent was to use the ships as a "show of force" to intimidate Japan, they most likely should have been withdrawn after Japan attacked, rather than sent on a suicide mission.

The Cabinet had in fact discussed this very thing Dec 8, with Churchill deciding to "sleep on it", by the time he woke up the next morning they were already sunk

The force commander didn't help, when he decided that he could manage without informing the RAF, and getting air cover.

Admiral Phillips was put in a difficult position, and handicapped by several factors.
The Admiralty policy was complete radio silence, to prevent the signals being used to locate the force.
It was also most unfortunate that the first wave of bombers knocked out the radio on the PoW.
I would agree though, it was a mistake not to call for help as soon as the Japanese strike force was sighted, this would have saved the two ships.

 

[wuzak]

you were talking about 30000 feet , well it starts at 23000 feet

Sure, at some places, at different strengths.

I've not seen the jet stream mentioned much, if at all, regarding the ETO. For B-29s over Japan it is mentioned often as a complicating factor.

Here's one for thought. The US 8th AF heavy bombers flew in tight formations - the formation had 3 dimensions - width, length and height. The high squadrons could be several thousand feet above the low squadrons - and where the low squadron is theoretically out of the jet stream the high squadron would theoretically be in the jet strem. If that were the case it could present problems for maintaining formation.

 

[buffnut453]

The Japanese had no fighter escort for the bombers, so even with the limited capacity of the Hermes, a dozen Fulmar or Sea Hurricanes could have thwarted the waves of torpedo bombers.

Only for the first wave. There were Zeros based in the same part of French Indo-China so any thwarting would probably have been short-lived.

Admiral Phillips was put in a difficult position, and handicapped by several factors.
The Admiralty policy was complete radio silence, to prevent the signals being used to locate the force.
It was also most unfortunate that the first wave of bombers knocked out the radio on the PoW.
I would agree though, it was a mistake not to call for help as soon as the Japanese strike force was sighted, this would have saved the two ships.

But Phillips knew he was being shadowed by an aircraft several hours before the attack actually commenced. As soon as his lookouts spotted the aircraft, he would naturally assume that his position was known and so radio silence was immaterial. Had he done so, there's every likelihood that 453 Sqn at Sembawang, which was designated with the fleet protection role, could have seriously handicapped the initial attack, although my comments about the possibility of subsequent IJNAF attacks with A6M escort also apply.