Could Axis aircraft catch the Mosquito in Dec 1941?

[wuzak]

Only for the first wave. There were Zeros based in the same part of French Indo-China so any thwarting would probably have been short-lived.



But Phillips knew he was being shadowed by an aircraft several hours before the attack actually commenced. As soon as his lookouts spotted the aircraft, he would naturally assume that his position was known and so radio silence was immaterial. Had he done so, there's every likelihood that 453 Sqn at Sembawang, which was designated with the fleet protection role, could have seriously handicapped the initial attack, although my comments about the possibility of subsequent IJNAF attacks with A6M escort also apply.

Shouldn't you guys discuss this topic in its own thread?

 

[Njaco]

I agree...unless you know something about the Axis flying Zeros in the ETO!

 

[buffnut453]

I've seen Zeros engaging F-14 Tomcats...saw it on TV so it MUST be true.

 

[parsifal]

Dont know about tomcats, but Zeroes (or at least japanese a/c) did engage or attempt to engage Mossies

Its an excellent idea to start a separate new thread. Us far east nutters have probably done enough damage here i think

 

[Freebird]

Shouldn't you guys discuss this topic in its own thread?

I originally started the thread, and it's evolved into 2 separate topics - the Mossie topic the Australian/Malaya strategy topic. I've requested that the Mods split the thread to separate the two topics, but they havn't done so yet. Remember the mod thread about patience?


Njaco, could you do this perhaps?

I agree...unless you know something about the Axis flying Zeros in the ETO!

it was actually about the Mossie in both the ETO PTO

 

[buffnut453]

All we need now is for someone to bring up a link to the Queen (Her Majesty, of course!) and we really will be going round in circles!!!

 

[Freebird]

Only for the first wave. There were Zeros based in the same part of French Indo-China so any thwarting would probably have been short-lived.

Agreed, although due to the distances involved it would take several hours to set up, with all the difficulties involved with assembly, tracking the target over that time etc.
The ship would probably survive the day, but if it wasn't withdrawn that night it would be pushing it.

But Phillips knew he was being shadowed by an aircraft several hours before the attack actually commenced. As soon as his lookouts spotted the aircraft, he would naturally assume that his position was known and so radio silence was immaterial. Had he done so, there's every likelihood that 453 Sqn at Sembawang, which was designated with the fleet protection role, could have seriously handicapped the initial attack, although my comments about the possibility of subsequent IJNAF attacks with A6M escort also apply.

True, but the danger would be to call them out too early as they didn't have too much time on station over the ships.
I don't really disagree with your points here, Phillips was indeed to slow to call out air support.
An accompanying carrier would have been a much better option, however truthfully the whole mission was a mistake to begin with IMO

 

[Rogi]

I read somewhere that the He-162s substitute glue wasn't a problem.

Workers (Balctic,Mediteranian, Jewish etc who they used as slave labor) sabotaged the glue during production, and I do know of a couple of the He-162s during renovations that had anti nazi slogans painted on the innner workings of the aircraft. I'll try to find the site where they did a whole reno. of the He-162 and they showed it on there in a couple pics.

This was somewhere wayyyyyy back in this thread

 

[Freebird]

Apart from the fact that Rommel's Afrika Korps was barely getting spun up in North Africa. Rommel's forces started arriving in Feb 41 and the deployment finished that May. North Africa was the main theatre at that stage of the war. If it had fallen, it would have resulted in the loss of Egypt, probably the neutralization of Malta, and undoubtedly a second attempt on Iraq. I hardly think that's a stabilized situation.

The Desert campaign was not stabilized, more like stalemated.
The British couldn't defeat DAK while the Germans were hampered by lack of supplies and couldn't exploit.
Other than operation Skorpion to recapture Halfaya, the German actions between April November were aimed at Tobruk, which failed.
Despite the Axis success in defeating Brevity Battleaxe, it was the British that took the initiative and launched the Crusader offensive.
But the most important factor in my mind, that despite the need to defeat Rommel and push back the Axis, neither of the veteran Australian 6th or 7th divisions were deployed in Crusader, so I don't see that swapping an inexperienced Indian division for an AIF division on garrison duty would make much difference in the Middle East.

The australian government and the australian high Command submitted repeated assessments to the effect that the defences for malaya, particularly the land defences were inadequate. According to DM Horner (Australia Allied Strategic Decision making 1939-45), referring to yet another situation report submitted by the Australians in April 1941 and (as usuall) ignored that stated all the deficiencies in the defensive arrangements, Horner states in his book "....the australian government was now placed in an invidious position. It was now faced with a british government that refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate, and that as a result australias defences were now at risk (the deployment of the AIF was conditional to adequate defences being deployed forward into malaya). The australian government now knew that the British refused to provide adequate defences in the far east, that australia had been duped into sending the bulk of its trained forces to the middle east, against the advice of its own military (the Australian GHQ had recommended just one division be sent whilst Japans position remained unclear), and a refusal by the British to either provide arms, or allow Australia to raise the capital to build its own arms. The last refusal led to the deployment of 27th Bde, the only trained reseve left in australia, and forced menzies to seek alternatives for aircraft supply and manufacturing capability.

My point was that the problem wasn't the Malaya barrier strategy, only that the defences in Malaya (by Dec 1941) were certainly inadequate.
And again, it wasn't the British government that "refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate", as the commanders in the Far East, the Chiefs of Staff the Cabinet had all agreed that there was a need to strengthen the defence of Malaya, and that it would be vulnerable to seaborne attack.

They had agreed that the original 3 brigades in Malaya would need to be increased by 36 battlaions (ie - 4 more divisions) and the air assets boosted by a minimum of 336 modern aircraft.

Truthfully, the Australian govenment should have been more pro-active in this regard.
By late August or early Sept 1941, when it became clear that the British leadership (ie - Churchill) didn't intend to follow through with the agreements on force levels made earlier, they should have demanded an immediate withdrawl of AIF forces to Malaya to cover the difference, rather than wait until Jan 1942 to get this moving.

 

[buffnut453]

But withdraw AIF forces from where? The Western Desert? Rather than being "stalemated" which infers an inability to act, North Africa was a pendulum with the front line making huge moves during major offensives. The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps. Moving them to Malaya in 1941 just doesn't make sense and anyone who suggests otherwise has clearly donned the hindsight goggles - it was not clear the Japanese would attack Malaya in 1941 until very late in the year, and British leaders didn't expect the sort of "blitzkrieg" tactics that were so successfully implemented by the IJA. Moving troops from Africa to Malaya when there wasn't a direct threat to the latter was a non-starter during 1941 and everyone expected the Japanese to take their time attacking through Thailand and hence affording opportunities to reinforce Singapore and Malaya. Sadly such optimism was misplaced.

And for the Mods...apologies for going OT again - just wanted to make some additional points. Looking forward to this being split off as a separate thread.

Thanks,
B-N

 

[Siegfried]

wrong thread

 

[parsifal]

Im holding back until we do split the thread....

 

[Njaco]

If someone wants to start a seperate thread, please do. The Mods discussed the request and while we feel that it is reasonable, we're not able at the moment to go through pages of posts to pick and choose and transfer relevant posts. Anyone is welcome to start a new thread and post the link here.

As for the He 162 and the glue...

Here is a series of shots of the He 162 falling apart during trial flights.

 

[fastmongrel]

Were not supposed to swear but Sh*t that makes me shiver.

 

[Freebird]

But withdraw AIF forces from where? The Western Desert?

No, I don't propose removing any air or ground forces from the Western Desert.

With the withdrawl of the bulk of the 9th Australian from Tobruk, there are NO Australian ground troops in the Western desert, other than a battalion or so left in Tobruk

Rather than being "stalemated" which infers an inability to act, North Africa was a pendulum with the front line making huge moves during major offensives. The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps.

But again, no AIF forces were in the Western Desert in the second half of 1941, except for Morshead the 9th division, which were removed in Sept 1941 from Tobruk after serving 6 months.
There were 3 AIF divisions on garrison duty in the Middle East.
By removing 1 division, it still leaves a 2 division AIF corps in the MidEast in the fall of 1941, in addition to the Indian troops. (That would otherwise have been sent to Malaya)

Moving them to Malaya in 1941 just doesn't make sense and anyone who suggests otherwise has clearly donned the hindsight goggles - it was not clear the Japanese would attack Malaya in 1941 until very late in the year,

It was however pretty obvious that Japan would be going to war to seize the oil reserves somewhere, (Borneo or Sumatra) and to do that they needed to eliminate Singapore as a major threat against their lines of supply.
We were reading their naval diplomatic cables, so by Sept 1941 it became clear that they wouldn't back down, the US wouldn't agree to a political solution, so they would either run out of oil or else go to war.

 

[Freebird]

If someone wants to start a seperate thread, please do. The Mods discussed the request and while we feel that it is reasonable, we're not able at the moment to go through pages of posts to pick and choose and transfer relevant posts. Anyone is welcome to start a new thread and post the link here.

Could you perhaps just make a quick split of the thread at post # 53, as the first 52 posts are about the Mossie, and as most of the last 50 or 60 posts are about Malaya/Australia?

The original question was about whether Japan or Germany could shoot down a Mossie, and has mostly been answered.
(Japan probably couldn't except in exceptional circumstances, Germany could but only in daylight in the right conditions)
The topic about He 162 Mossie glue failure could probably have it's own topic too...

Thanks very much for your patience Njaco ( Mods), I'm well aware of what a pain in the @ss it is to split long threads, as I've done it too many times (on another forum).

 

[Freebird]

and British leaders didn't expect the sort of "blitzkrieg" tactics that were so successfully implemented by the IJA. Moving troops from Africa to Malaya when there wasn't a direct threat to the latter was a non-starter during 1941 and everyone expected the Japanese to take their time attacking through Thailand and hence affording opportunities to reinforce Singapore and Malaya. Sadly such optimism was misplaced.

The danger of a direct seaborne assault had been warned by Dobbie Percival himself, and with the availability of bases in Indochina, it became more of a danger.
By the fall of 1941 there was a direct threat to the Far East, and they had recognised that by authorizing 4 divisions sent to Malaya, vs about 3 brigades a ordinary garrision

In any event, the Cabinet DID approve sending additional troops - a second Indian division to Malaya - in the summer of '41, so it isn't a question of whether troops will be sent - it's a question of which troops.

The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps.

No theater commander would ever want to lose troops.
Frankly, Australia should have taken the choice away from the British, by insisiting in Sept or Oct '41 that at least 1 AIF division be withdrawn from the Middle east and sent to the Far East.

IMO, Churchill unreasonably wanted to keep all 3 AIF divisions regardless of the cost to Australia, and let the Americans clean up the mess later.
The Western Desert campaign would just have to make to with Australia contributing a single division. (Which is exactly what they ended up doing)

Parsifal,
Finally, where do you get the idea that I ever suggested the Japanese only faced inferior troops? I was referring specifically to the Indian troops in Malaya...and that's not because the troops themselves were poor but because of incredible dilution of experience due to massive and rapid force expansion. Those aren't just excuses - it was the reality in 1941.
There was no single issue that resulted in the rout that occurred in Malaya and Singapore - the causes were several and intertwined, many dating back years.

Further to what Buffnut posted, the quality of the Indian troops in Malaya was a significant factor in the collapse of the defence, as it created a cascade failure.
The fact that the battalions of the 28th (Indian) brigade shattered on the first day of combat, and the inexperienced 6th brigade lost most of it's artillery vehicles due to premature bridge demolition.
The rapid collapse prevented the proper evacuation reduction of the Penang airbase ships

If you look at the battles where the Britsh/CW were able to form a defensive line, the artillery advantage was something that the Japanese couldn't overcome, and were forced to outflank the position using the naval assets captured at Penang

 

[parsifal]

But withdraw AIF forces from where?

This goes to the very heart of the argument raging over this issue. Freebird in a couple of posts has said Malaya was defensible, if adequate resources had been put into the defences. With regard to both air and ground resources, they could have been available, but werent. why, because they were in the Middle East. why were they in the Middle East when logically, from an Australian perspective, they should have been concentrated in either Australia, and /or our near north or both....

That was precisely the plan advocated by Australia on the outbreak of the war in 1939. Our plans in 1939 were to raise 4 Divs for overseas service (what became the 6, 7 8 and 9th Divs , 2nd AIF), and an indepoendant air force largely equipped from domestic sources so as to expand the 1939 12 squadron force out to a 40 squadron force. In 1939-40, we had plans to produce the beafort and the CA4. We also planned to mass produce the Wirraway. we had no plans to build fighters but were relying on a vaguely promised undertaking by Hawker. History shows however that wacket already had all that he needed to build a competitive fighter in 1939 (the boomerang) except engines. and we didnt have engines because of the British....Getting back to the AIF and Australian war plans for 1939. we had originally planned to send just one of the AIF divisions to the Middle East, and one squadron. By various requests and promises made by the british, we ended up sending 3 divisions, plus a corp HQ, and 5 RAAF squadrons. We basically scrapped our plans to raise an expansion for the RAAF, and submitted to the EATS scheme instead. Whilst EATS had huge benefits for the RAF, it had very little benefit for the RAAF until after 1942. And the behaviour of the british with regard to setting up a local aircraft industry in Australia is not a good look for the British Government. It looks very litle like a sound defence planning decision, and very much like protecting what thyey perceived as their turf war.

If Australia had dug its heels in and only sent one div, and initially only one air force squadron, instead of the indian III Corps on Malaya (so badly trained as to be a liability) you would have had 3 Australian Divs fully trained and ready for battle. instead of the two RAAF squadrons (ill stand corrected on that number), you would have had 10 or 12, and equipped far better to boot. And this reinforcement would have occurred at very litle cost in the capability in the WEestern Desert, as the following reply will show....

The Western Desert?

The Western Desert was a critical fron for Britiain, but the Western Desert is not the entire ME command. australian troops were used like the plaything of the british Government, with only a minority used in the western desert.

6th Division was the first to arrive, in Septemeber 1940, whereupon it trained in the Delta until December. it then relieved the 4th Indian (which was sent to abysynnia) and played crucial roles in the conquest of Bardia and Tobruk. It was then withdrawn back to the Delta for rest and recovery before being sent to crete, where most of it was either captured or lost its equipment. It then returned to the Delta, to be painstakingly rebuilt for the next six month before being shipped back to Australia. Of the 17 months or so that it was in the ME, it spent 3 months on the main front.

7th division arrived in December 1940. it remained in the Delta, until March or April 1941. Some it was sent to Greece, where it escaped, less its equipment to crete, and then finally back to the Delta, where those element remained until shipping home in 1942. The majority of the division however, went to the Levant to fight the Vichy. On completion of that campaign, those elements of the Division returned to the delta, where they stayed, for the most part until their return to Australia. One Brigade of the 7th was used to relieve elements of the 9th in Tobruk some time in the latter part of 1941. but really, this division spent zero time in the western desert. thats 0 out 15 months deployment in the western desert.

9th Division arrived March 1941 and was immediately used to relieve 6th div. they deployed into Tobruk and played a pivotal role in saving the whole of the ME from German conquest, by delivering repeated stinging reverses on Rommel from the fortress. Rommel could neither take Tobruk nor could he ignore it. It finished up costing him the 1941 camapign. This was not a stalemate...Australians were winning these battles hands down, and, it was the main front of the theatre at that time. What was rupturing, was at the Egyptian frontier, where the british were making an absolute hash of it.

9 Div shipped out of Tobruk in November, only after voracious calls for the withdrawal of these heroic tropps by their owners. The british high command resisted for as long as they could, and then made yet another cardinal mistake. instead of replacing the 9th with battle experienced troops, they repolaced them with an untried formation, which folded and surrendered fairly quickly. the 9th had been in the Western Desert for 9 of its 12 months in the TO. It was right to send this div to the ME.

So, of the 3 divs sent to the TO, only 1 was really ever used at any given moment in the crucial front. The others, for most of the time were frittered away on unimpoprtant but very dangerous sideshows....

Rather than being "stalemated" which infers an inability to act, North Africa was a pendulum with the front line making huge moves during major offensives.

This is no more an accurate summation than FBs was. The main front was actually tobruk and not the Egyptian frontier. It was the linchpin that prevented the Delta from falling, and it remained fairly static, but not stalemated. in front of tobruk Rommel was dealt repeated defeats.

Even what you may see as the main front was reletively static after June. There had of course been an offensive against the italians, then a counteroffensive by the Germans, then a stalemate as both sides moved virtually nowhere on that part of the front. Crusader and rommels reteat did not start until November, and then his counterattack not until April- June 1942.

The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps.

I agree completely, but where this falls down is that the majority of Australian troops were not in that TO....they were being frittered away on pointless Churchillian adventurres in various sideshows of the command. There were long term benefits to these sideshows, but these troops should not have been there. it would have made far more sense to send III Indian Corps to the ME, and I aus corps (6, 7 and * Divs) to Malaya

Moving them to Malaya in 1941 just doesn't make sense and anyone who suggests otherwise has clearly donned the hindsight goggles - it was not clear the Japanese would attack Malaya in 1941 until very late in the year, and British leaders didn't expect the sort of "blitzkrieg" tactics that were so successfully implemented by the IJA.

well, thats precisely what the Australian High command wanted from the beginning, and they stuck to that position from 1939 until 1942. What swayed them away from the position were the empty british promises....that Malaya would be addequately defended, that in the event of a japanese attack they would drop everything and deploy a balanced fleet to Singapore, and that they would allow investment to occur for the setting up of a local Australian aero industry. none of these promises were kept. And britiain knew that an attack was imminent....not in a specific sense, but definately in a strategic sense

Moving troops from Africa to Malaya when there wasn't a direct threat to the latter was a non-starter during 1941 and everyone expected the Japanese to take their time attacking through Thailand and hence affording opportunities to reinforce Singapore and Malaya. Sadly such optimism was misplaced

.

The same can be said about the middle east. moving troops raised for the purpose of defending malaya, to a theatre under no direct threat (in 1940 there were no germans in the ME. moreover, for most of their deployments most of these troops were never in the main TO - the western desert). It wasnt sad, it was criminal to be honest and there is virtually no mitigation for the gigantic errors made by the british in this whole affair

 

[buffnut453]

Hi Parsifal,

The new thread's up on why Singapore was lost. Perhaps you could copy this post and insert it into that thread?

Cheers,
B-N