Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?

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This topic begs for computer simulation....x1000

My gut tells me that had the Japanese taken Midway, decisively ( one or less carriers sunk plus 2 or more US carriers sunk), Yamamoto would have next taken Hawaii, regardless of how ratchet an operation it would have appeared to be, then, not forgetting the Aleutians, used the impending two-pronged threat to the West Coast, in a power move to sue for peace.
The occupation of Hawaii would have been justified by the large Japanese population and Americans would have made excellent hostages to persuade Roosevelt to accept the terms.

Remember, Yamamoto advocated for the return to peace as soon as feasible, while, the military leaders of Japan wanted as large a cushion as possible around the home islands and the resources captured earlier in the conflict.
 
"Well the Japanese managed to move 130,000 troops and 90 tanks at least 200 miles to invade the Philippines with so I'm not sure I buy the lack of sealift capacity."

The Japanese did not have the sea lift capacity. They landed 2,500 men at Legazpi on 12 Dec. Then they landed another 43,000 and those 90 tanks 10 days later at Lingayan Gulf (22 Dec.), then another 7,000 men on 23 Dec. at Lamon bay. The other 77,000 Japanese troops were sent to the Philippines between Dec. 1941 & May 1942 (over 5 Months). 129,435 is the total Japanese troops sent to the Philippines throughout the entire campaign, they were not all landed at once.

The Japanese, even at the zenith of their military power, never had anywhere near the logistical capability or the amphibious expertise to transport 60,000 troops to a remote landing site, land them under enemy fire, provide them with sustained gunfire and air support, and keep them supported throughout what could easily be a month-long campaign. The invasion of Malaya, which was the single largest Japanese amphibious operation of the war, had involved a scant three divisions, and they hadn't been landed all at once, nor had they been landed into the teeth of concerted enemy fire. Furthermore, the Japanese invasion convoys in that campaign had been operating from bases in French Indochina (Vietnam), which were a few hundred miles from the Malayan beaches. British airpower was dispersed, and unable to concentrate against the Japanese landings. By contrast, Hawaii is some 3,900 miles from Japan, and almost 2,300 miles from Truk, which were the only staging areas developed enough for such an undertaking.
Furthermore, the Japanese would unquestionably have been landing directly in the face of heavy resistance at Oahu. The few experiences the Japanese had had with direct amphibious assaults to that point in the war could hardly have proved reassuring to the planners of a Hawaiian operation. In fact, they had been disastrous. An example of this was the initial assault on Wake. This operation clearly demonstrated that the Japanese had nothing in the way of a credible amphibious doctrine a la the U.S. Marine Corps. Instead, when presented with a situation requiring an amphibious assualt, the Japanese usually selected deserted coastlines manned by thinly-spread garrisons. In Oahu, the Japanese would land in the face of a concentrated enemy with substantial forces in reserve. In the face of a large, entrenched garrison possessed of superior automatic weapons and artillery firepower, Japanese forces might well have faced a sneak preview, on a very large scale, of the disaster that befell them on the Tenaru River on Guadalcanal.
In fact, it would not be until early 1944, when the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy began perfecting their respective arts, that a naval force could reliably transport divisional sized units across thousands of miles of ocean, park offshore an island bastion, crush its airpower, land assault troops in the face of heavy fire, and then support the troops ashore for weeks at a time. The Japanese never possessed any of these essentials characteristics of amphibious power projection.
Finally, of course, is the issue of keeping Hawaii in supply once it is taken. Even before the Battle of Midway, Combined Fleet Staff as much as admitted that Japan couldn't keep Midway in supply even if they captured it! Keeping Hawaii supplied, with its much larger civilian population and garrison, would have been even more difficult. In short, the Japanese simply did not possess the amphibious and logistical wherewithal to assault, capture, and hold the Hawaiian Islands. H.P. Willmott, "The Barrier and the Javelin" and The Hawaiian Invasion, and other Nonsense
 
Hey michael rauls and buffnut453,

re post#66: "From what I've read anyway I agree but isn't the next layer to this that the reason that the western nations cut off the oil is the invasion of China and the abuses there."

and post#69: "But without the embargo, Japan would have far greater freedom to operate in China, which would make any nation supplying oil to Japan complicit in the atrocities committed."

I am an American, born and raised, and I truly wish that the reason the US objected to Japan's invasion of China was due to the atrocities committed there and to the acts of imperialism. As far as I have been able to determine, however, the primary objection was based on the fact that Japan had upset the economic dreams of the US business owners.

As Schweik in his post#71 points out, many of the european nations along with the US had been busy trying to split-up China into their own economic fiefdoms. Because of the ranges involved, outright invasion was not an option - so the foreign powers resorted to supporting various local powers with arms and money, with the intent of upsetting any nationalist organizations and removing threats to the foreign powers interests.

The Opium Wars are a great example of this warfare. In the US, the popular myth/story paints the UK as the primary evildoer in the Opium Wars. In reality the US was at lest as involved as the UK, and possibly/probably more involved (it kind of depends on when, what local powers were subverted/supported, what specific combination of methods were employed, etc.).

For the most part, the excesses/abuses/atrocities of the Japanese invasion forces were simply used by the foreign governments in order to fan public outrage and hopefully gain support for actions against Japan.

While I in no way support the behavior of the Japanese in China, I feel it necessary to point out the hypocrisy and subterfuge of the US political and economic behavior of the time.

Hey Schweik, re your post#70. I think you hit the nail on the head with that one, and I would like to add the link below:

"The PEARL HARBOR ATTACK HEARINGS"

It is mainly concerned with the lead up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, but also provides a lot of information on the politics of the time as viewed from the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Ambassador to the US, as well as some of the related US views. This is shown by intercepted and decoded communications under the auspices of Magic et al. It is somewhat tedious reading and it helps if you make notes in order to build a timeline. It provides some insight into the diplomatic negotiations relative to China. It also, I think, answers the question of whether the US knew if and/or when an attack was coming against Pearl Harbor.
 
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Mexico can invade USA every day of the week.
Won't go well but worth a participant medal at least.

Japan was an ally in ww1 and we had a alliance with them until 1922. The alliance was against Russia but since alliance in 1922 would have been against USA then it was decided to drop it.

Kongo and the battle cruisers were British made or designed in Britain. So Britain didn't just give the IJN the clown but the whole circus.

The flagship at Tsushima was the Mikasa which again UK built. So when the point was made that by selling oil to Japan the West was condoning or accepting of Japanese military expansion...that ship had sailed A long time ago...
 

I still maintain that Germany didn't need to invade Britain. Had the BoB gone badly with, say, 11 Group being forced to retreat, it would leave London exposed. Such a situation after the loss of France would provide justification to those voices at senior levels in British Government who wanted to sue for peace. The critical period was May-June 1940. Had the Luftwaffe truly focused on neutralizing 11 Group in that period, I think it distinctly possible that Churchill would be ousted and a replaced by someone like Halifax who was interested in finding peace terms. Thus Germany's strategic aims would be achieved (ie knocking Britain out of the war) without the need for an opposed landing.
 

I wasn't implying that the US imposed the oil ban for humanitarian reasons, simply that history would treat harshly any companies that were seen as contributing to Japanese abuses.

It absolutely is the case that major powers want to remain major powers and they do that by seeking to prevent other nations from obtaining great power status. Great powers also like to feel they can control situations and keep smaller nations in their box. This was precisely the sort of thinking that led to the perceived unequal naval limitations treaties and the oil embargo. Alas, the theory of controlling other nations only works as long as the smaller nation isn't faced with what it perceives as an existential threat to its survival. In such situations, like any cornered animal, they tend to attack.
 

You're really compressing timescales here and demanding an amazing degree of prescience on the part of those who made the ship deals in the Great War and just afterwards. Alas, what is seen as a strategic coup in one generation is often perceived as a strategic disaster by the next. One only has to look at arming of the Taliban for a more recent example.

Going back to Japan, the oil issue was the issue of the day in the period 1937-1941. To equate actions then with actions 20 years previously when, as you recognize, Japan was an ally, is a stretch, to say the least. As noted in my previous post, Great Powers want to remain Great Powers and they want the smaller nations to do their bidding (and often their dirty work). That was the case when Britain helped arm Japan. A generation later, the strategic calculus had changed drastically, due in no small part to Britain and the US palpably treating Japan as a second-rate nation when Japan perceived itself as a Great Power. Great Powers that keep trying to keep other nations in a box when the those nations don't want to be kept there are asking for trouble....and sometimes that trouble bites.
 

The Americans had broken the Japanese diplomatic codes and knew they would settle for a one Ocean navy. The British couldn't afford a 3 ocean navy and so the deal was sealed, the Washington Naval Treaty.
 
Japan was not a first rate power.
It was able to punch well above its weight because it spent all the money it had on the military.
Just imagine kamikaze Italians and pretty much that was the score.
Weak economy and weak industry. But big battleships.

The military expansion of Japan started 1894 with the first war with China. Tsushima was against Russia over Korea and Manchuria. That was in 1905. The writing was well on the wall before 1941.

Going to war with the West maybe not obvious but at one point as with Russia, The West and Japan will be wanting the same slice of the pie.
 

To emphasize this point, it's enlightening to read the synopsis of atrocities in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion circa 1902, (from the Wiki)

Boxer Rebellion - Wikipedia

"
From contemporary Western observers, German, Russian, and Japanese troops received the greatest criticism for their ruthlessness and willingness to wantonly execute Chinese of all ages and backgrounds, sometimes burning and killing entire village populations.[119] The German force arrived too late to take part in the fighting, but undertook punitive expeditions to villages in the countryside. Kaiser Wilhelm II on July 27 during departure ceremonies for the German relief force included an impromptu, but intemperate reference to the Hun invaders of continental Europe which would later be resurrected by British propaganda to mock Germany during the First World War and Second World War:

" Should you encounter the enemy, he will be defeated! No quarter will be given! Prisoners will not be taken! Whoever falls into your hands is forfeited. Just as a thousand years ago the Huns under their King Attila made a name for themselves, one that even today makes them seem mighty in history and legend, may the name German be affirmed by you in such a way in China that no Chinese will ever again dare to look cross-eyed at a German.[120] "

One newspaper called the aftermath of the siege a "carnival of ancient loot", and others called it "an orgy of looting" by soldiers, civilians and missionaries. These characterisations called to mind the sacking of the Summer Palace in 1860.[121] Each nationality accused the others of being the worst looters. An American diplomat, Herbert G. Squiers, filled several railroad cars with loot and artifacts. The British Legation held loot auctions every afternoon and proclaimed, "Looting on the part of British troops was carried out in the most orderly manner." However, one British officer noted, "It is one of the unwritten laws of war that a city which does not surrender at the last and is taken by storm is looted." For the rest of 1900–1901, the British held loot auctions everyday except Sunday in front of the main-gate to the British Legation. Many foreigners, including Sir Claude Maxwell MacDonald and Lady Ethel MacDonald and George Ernest Morrison of The Times, were active bidders among the crowd. Many of these looted items ended up in Europe.[122] The Catholic Beitang or North Cathedral was a "salesroom for stolen property."[123] The American commander General Adna Chaffee banned looting by American soldiers, but the ban was ineffectual.[124]
Some but by no means all Western missionaries took an active part in calling for retribution. To provide restitution to missionaries and Chinese Christian families whose property had been destroyed, William Ament, a missionary of American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, guided American troops through villages to punish those he suspected of being Boxers and confiscate their property. When Mark Twain read of this expedition, he wrote a scathing essay, "To the Person Sitting in Darkness", that attacked the "Reverend bandits of the American Board," especially targeting Ament, one of the most respected missionaries in China.[125] The controversy was front-page news during much of 1901. Ament's counterpart on the distaff side was doughty British missionary Georgina Smith who presided over a neighborhood in Beijing as judge and jury.[126]
While one historical account reported that Japanese troops were astonished by other Alliance troops raping civilians,[127] others noted that Japanese troops were 'looting and burning without mercy', and that Chinese 'women and girls by hundreds have committed suicide to escape a worse fate at the hands of Russian and Japanese brutes.'[128] Roger Keyes, who commanded the British destroyer Fame and accompanied the Gaselee Expedition, noted that the Japanese had brought their own "regimental wives" (prostitutes) to the front to keep their soldiers from raping Chinese civilians.[129]
The Daily Telegraph journalist E. J. Dillon stated that he witnessed the mutilated corpses of Chinese women who were raped and killed by the Alliance troops. The French commander dismissed the rapes, attributing them to "gallantry of the French soldier." A foreign journalist, George Lynch, said "there are things that I must not write, and that may not be printed in England, which would seem to show that this Western civilization of ours is merely a veneer over savagery."[122]
"

I have to admit, cynical as I am, I was a little shocked to read that missionaries were deeply involved in looting, reprisals, and rapes. I guess I'm naive. But it does put the rape of Nanking in some context. It's not just Japanese troops who went nuts in China, China suffered a great deal at the hands of foreigners, and while we may have forgotten most of these stories, or filtered them to point up the sins of our enemies, the Chinese have not. They remember it all too well.
 

I actually agree with most of this but that attitude, about smothering or sacrificing 'lesser' powers (like Japan as an example of the former and Czechoslovakia as an example of the latter) was itself dangerous and in no small part what led to WW II. The British armed Japan partly as a bulwark against Communist Russia. Then lost their Pacific fleet and some of the jewels of the Colonial Empire to them 15 years later. The British and French threw small but highly comptent Czechoslovakia under the buss and then faced a German armored spearhead pouring into France, 1/3 comprised of Czech tanks, which were quite good by the standards of the day.



As you said, British arming Japan is somewhat analogous to the US arming the Mujahadeen in the 1980s, in both cases to throw a barrier in front of Russia. However arms to the Muj / Taliban didn't rise to the equivalent height of the pagoda on the Kongo...
 

I don't agree, in 1940-42 Japan was definitely a 1st rate power. Italy was a bit worn out by 10 years of Fascism before WW2 even started, but they never achieved the stunning victories the Japanese did... and Kamikazes came with the defeat not with the expansion.

One of the interesting things I learned listening to Dan Carlins "Supernova in the East" was that Japan was one of the most ardently and intransigently anti-Communist States on Earth, maybe even more than Nazi Germany. They really, really, really hated communists. So it's a bit ironic that during most of the war they had a peaceful border with the Soviets. No doubt something to do with their defeat by General Zhukov early in the war.
 
Schweik said:
What battles / regions does First Team cover exactly?
Click to expand...
You need to buy First Team vol 1 and 2. You will LOVE it.

Even though I completely disagree with you on the chances of success, I'm thoroughly enjoying the debate. Sometimes the best threads can be one that seemed so obvious to one side, but the discussion fleshes out the 'why'.
 
RCAFson said:
According to Lundstrom's First Team and Shattered Sword IJN losses to fighters against Midway were minimal, (~4 aircraft) with the majority of losses being from Midway AA:
Click to expand...
Actually you are helping make my point. AA took down most of the enemy aircraft in the first Midway raid, imagine if they had also had 50-75 F4F-3's with Navy pilots to help out as well.

AA at the imagined invasion of Hawaii would have been much more intense than at Midway, plus 350-500 fighters as well that this time around would be alert, in the air and ready to fight instead of caught on the ground.
 
Economics in attritional warfare is the whole game. Its the whole sport.

That's why Japan is going lose all the time, every time.

The actual value of wealth or GDP is all over the place but Italy and Japan is roughly par with each other. Japan is richer but Italy has a smaller population so swings and roundabouts.

So Japan in 1938 has 4% of the world economy against 25% or so of the combined economy of the British Empire and USA. The difference between the economy of USA and Japan is similar to the Difference of Germany and Poland in 1938.

By 1945, Japan is a smoking ruin while USA is getting started.

The two most important material in war is oil and iron. And Japan is going to start a war against its major supplier. Utter dumb assery.

Did America care about China? Japan was seen as a stop against Soviet incursion and the growth of communism in China was a weak point. Also trade was good with Imperial Japan so the war with China was not a deal breaker and even would have been in American interests.
 
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See, I don't agree with that historically. Economics is a big thing, but it's not the only thing - it ended up the thing that mattered most in WW2 as we can see from hindsight, and as the saying goes "quantity has a quality all it's own" but quality as in actual merit matters just as much in some cases.

Quality - of training, of machine (like fighter aircraft) designs, of production, of planning, of cohesion and morale of military units, of communication and C3I, of fighting skill - these things also matter quite a bit. We tend to attribute everything to economics and scale but if that were the case Japan never would have conquered so much of China in WW2, Genghis Khan never would have conquered China in the 13th Century, and the small City State of Rome would have never conquered 3/4 of Europe and the Mediterranean in the 1st.

You have things like rates of production and population size, and then you have things like rates of friction. If you have twice as many men as I do but I'm killing 5 times as many of yours as I lose each time we fight, I am still going to win.

To put it in more concrete terms, the rate at which Soviet army was being destroyed in the first few months of WW II was ultimately unsustainable, and had to be corrected, or else they would indeed have lost. In the 3rd Quarter of 1941, the Soviets lost 2,129,677 men dead (just counting military casualties), maimed or captured. At that rate of 8 million per year, by 1945 they would have lost more than 32 million men. They didn't have enough fighting age men to absorb that and still have sufficient left over to help the women working in the factories and running the farms*. They had 170 million before the war, half of those (roughly) were women*, half of who remained were too old or too young, or in no shape for the infantry lets say. That leaves about 40 million. 32 million dead would be cutting it too close.

But they got the numbers down, they remained horrific but the total for 1942 was 3.2, still extremely bad, for 1943 it was 2.3, for 1944 it was 0.8. Total military deaths / missing / maimed or "irrecoverable losses" to use the Soviet terminology were somewhere around 8 -11 million for the war. Astronomical, and certainly catastrophic losses, but about 1/3 what they would have been if they had not gotten the "friction rate" at least somewhat under control. If they were still using bolt action rifles / BT-7 tanks / I-153 fighters and the same tactics through to the end of the war it would not have changed. But they had worked very hard to improve the quality of their kit, their training, their tactics and their logistics too, and that made the difference.

Losses at such a fire-hose rate as the Soviets faced in WW2 have a way of eroding morale. The Soviets had a heavy duty, draconian system for keeping their men in line, but even with that much pressure (and that whole system of commissars, SMERSh assassins and gulags set up to keep the pressure on) was able to keep the army in line but there was a breaking point.


Similarly, if the United States had been content to keep fighting with M3 tanks and TBD Devastators and F2As and P-39s through WW2, if they hadn't kept up with tank and ship and aircraft designs, and updated and improved their tactics, adding things like radar, code decryption and antibiotics to the mix, they would not have won the Pacific War in my opinion. Admittedly the nuclear bomb was a game changer, but I'm not sure you could have won the war with that alone.

S

*I know there were many brave women who fought in the Soviet armed forces in WW2, including a couple of fighter aces, but most of the army was made up of men. And if they were at war the women were needed to run the farms etc.
 

The Kindle versions are nice because they are machine searchable, but you can get both volumes used for really cheap. Lundstrom's Blackshoe Carrier Admiral, is to a degree, an updated version of both volumes.
 
If you look at say France in 1940 then economics had nothing to do with the defeat of France and so you can ascribe tactics morale and other things because it was a run wot u brung and so nothing could be done long term because there was no long term.

The USSR had bad winter, huge land mass and large population so even the default setting is a winning hand.

But Russia collapsed in ww1 but didn't in ww2. And USSR should have collapsed but didn't. By 1942 the German Army had started to weaken and had to use troops from its axis allies. But point is the USSR was not fighting alone and benefitted heavily from Western equipment, the bombing raids and the 2nd fronts such as D-day and Italy. So the Soviet situation improved as the Germans grew weaker.

You can't build tank 1 without oil, iron, rubber, skilled work force and so on which are all part of a economy and even paved roads and shipping. Its all linked.

This is something Speer said to Hitler when Hitler wanted higher tank production and Speer said they didn't have the petrol to fuel them!

You can have all the best tactics and fighting spirit but pointy sticks are no match for atomic bombs.
 
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