Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules


You may be interested in how the island was fortified. Although the earliest gun emplacements date to the early 1900s, many guns remained in serviceable condition until newer replacements were constructed. Two complete turrets from Arizona were salvaged and rebuilt for use as coast artillery batteries. At the beginning of the war the US Army placed a very large number of 155mm field guns around the island. These were capable of hitting a ship as far away as 20 miles offshore.

For a complete list of the coast defense artillery on Oahu, check out the Coast Defense Study Group website here:

LIST OF AMERICAN MILITARY RESERVATIONS AND CONCRETE GUN BATTERIES Hawaii
 
Going back to near the beginning, I share buffnut's observation about resupply. that's a hewge factor especially in phib ops, frequently overlooked. It arose again recently when I started looking at the German plans & capability (lots more of the former than the latter) for invading the UK. Sealion planning and then British 1970s wargaming at Sandhurst identified resupply as a crucial concern. OTOH, long ago I did a study of WW II phib ops and concluded that over 90% succeeded--but nearly all were allied.

IMO if Japan seized Midway with intent to take Hawaii, the US would've reinforced Oahu etc til hell wouldn't have it. Torch might not have occurred but that's a separate issue.
 
If tactics and strategy were important then the Luxembourg army is set to conquer the world.
The bigger the economy, the bigger the industrial base and the bigger number of tanks I can build.

Well tiny Finland defeated Russia in the war that happened in that period of the late 30's you were talking about. Their tactics were famous as being among the best developed by anybody during the war
Hey guys, why does everything have to reduced to a binary either/or? This begins to sound like the eternal argument over airplane performance and armament vs pilot training and skill in a dogfight. In a war of rapid action between roughly equivalent technologies, tactics and strategy become dominant, as was pointed out in the Battle of France and the first Finnish war. Once the rapid action stops and a war of attrition settles in, the stronger industrial base and the economy behind it is likely dominant.
I probably don't have to remind anyone here of Yamamoto's famous prophecy upon hearing of the success of the Pearl harbor raid (but I will anyway) "I fear we have only managed to awaken a sleeping tiger and fill him with a terrible resolve."
Cheers,
Wes
 
All well and good, but I still think there is a persistent tendency to underestimate the capabilities of the Japanese in WW2 even as we tend to exaggerate the capabilities of the Germans. And I think that may be in part down to who had the most effective propaganda.

I just listened to Part III of Dan Carlins "Supernova in the East" which just came out last week, and I was struck by the audacity and lethality of the Japanese war machine in late 1941 / early 42. Not only the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the seaborne invasion and conquest of Malaysia, Java, and the Philippines, were carried out all more or less simultaneously (or in rapid and overlapping succession to be more precise), and for the most part flawlessly.

Malaysia included a fairly significant contested landing on a pretty well defended beach. The campaign in Malaya was conducted with a lot of improvisation (using fishing boats and bicycles to facilitate flanking and infiltration for example) skillful use of tanks, air support and naval assets, and was won against 2-1 odds - the Japanese had 70,000 troops and the British, Dutch etc. had 140,000. Philippines as I'd mentioned earlier was on a larger scale and also against a numerically stronger opponent (wikipedia says 129,000 Japanese troops vs. 151,000 Filipino and American)

All of this was also carried out at a time when successful amphibious assaults across such distances were fairly rare, and in which nobody had ever really even used aircraft carriers.

The amphibious assault at Kota Baru - against a fortified landing site with barbed wire, mines, sighted in artillery and concrete pillboxes, was at a much smaller scale than say, D-Day or Galliopoli, but it was certainly hairy enough that it could have gone badly wrong and in it's successful execution, a pretty good training run for a larger scale operation in the future.

To ground this back into aircraft, I think the Japanese military aircraft in 1941 and early 1942 were extraordinarily capable. They may not have been as fast or high flying as the best German fighters but they proved superbly capable of shooting down Allied aircraft and sinking Allied ships, and quite effective at CAS as well. In my opinion the A6M was definitely not inferior to any other fighter in the world at that time. I'd put it in the top 3 fighters - the Spitfire, the 109 and the Zero.



In a theoretical attack on Hawaii, Japanese resources would not have been divided between four major campaigns. They would have been concentrated. Arguably the strongest, best trained and most capable naval war machine ever assembled in history.

As I said upthread - the major flaw in any theoeretical Japanese attack plan, the one which I do find convincing, would have been fuel and logistics. Especially fuel oil for ships. That is a big hurdle. If the fuel didn't exist for such an operation then it just wouldn't have happened.
The other two hurdles - the vast distances and the prepared defenses, while substantial, maybe aren't insurmountable. Prepared defenses availed nothing in Malaysia. Japanese troops were ideal for a task like storming beaches under fire. They would have formidable support in the form of naval artillery. Ok sure fine Yamato can't use it's big guns for bombardment I'll take your word for it, there are several other Japanese battleships available for that and to duel with the shore guns. The Japanese have the various Atolls and small islands I already mentioned - Midway, French Frigate Shoals, Johnston Atoll, they had 4-6 fleet carriers available and 4 or more light carriers too, plus maybe a dozen slower 'escort' carriers. They had those astonishingly long ranged bombers plus float plane fighters. Most of their aircraft have much longer effective range than most Allied equivalents. Long enough to help cope with Pacific distances. I can also imagine the Japanese capturing some of the other Hawaiian Islands to use as a staging area from which to attack Oahu. Lets remember, Hawaii is far away for the Americans too and IJN Submarines would be waiting between California and Hawaii as well.

Lets also remember that the Japanese proved quite good at pressing their warships into service as temporary troop transports and even supply ships. The Yamato was at one time loaded with two battalions of infantry. Cruisers and destroyers could carry more, some destroyers as we know were modified to be fast / armed transports for use in the Solomons. So this capability should also be kept in mind.

Putting something like that together would have been a huge challenge requiring near genius level of organization, imagination, timing and resourcefulness. But the Japanese proved they were indeed capable of that between Dec 41 and April 42.



And as for the notion that their plans were too complex and inevitably fell apart upon contact with the enemy, I think that is the confidence of hindsight. Lets keep in mind that the US had partially broken the Japanese code. This allowed them to leverage their Strategic and Tactical responses to Japanese chess moves with ideal counters. Like having your carriers right where they need to be at just the right time. But the US didn't always have all the Japanese codes broken, the code breaking is in fact another semi-random element. If the Japanese codes are broken prior to a Hawaii assault, then yes once again I give it to the Americans. If not, I'm not so sure.
 
Last edited:
Torch might not have occurred but that's a separate issue.

That - and US supplies and arms going to Russia and Britain, was the genesis of the whole discussion actually. Was a threat to Hawaii plausible enough that the US would start shifting resources to the Pacific rather than doing what they did to help in other Theaters.

And thus did the SBD Dauntless, for example, qualify as one of the key aircraft that won WW2 or not.
 

I wasn't suggesting an either or, by any means. I was just saying that while yes Logistics is critical, it isn't the only thing. Strategy and Tactics, and morale and quality of kit, also matter.
 
Their hatred of communism has been cited as the real reason that IJ surrendered. The argument is that they feared a Red Army occupation more than the bomb.

i think it was more a general fear of the Russians and less ideological hatred of communism. The Soviet Army in the 1930s handled the IJA pretty roughly, and the Soviet Army of 1945 was certainly better equipped than that of 1938, especially in comparison with the IJA.
 
That is true but the Japanese regime also had a really fanatic dislike of Communism, more than most arguably.

It's also worth noting that the Soviets had just managed to wipe out most of the Manchurian army in a matter of two weeks. The IJA on 1941 was tough, but in 1945 they still had the same light tanks, the same bayonetted bolt action rifles. The Soviets came with their 1945 Army: Joseph Stalin tanks, T-34/85, ISU-152s, burp guns, Katyusha rockets, La-7s, Sturmoviks, P-63s, the whole nine yards.



Soviet invasion of Manchuria - Wikipedia

The Soviets defeated 700,000 IJA troops in 11 days.
 
One issue is that tiny Finland defeated Russia. No it did not.
Not by a long way. The Finnish flag is not flying over the Kremlin.

Yes the Finns were able to inflict casualties on the Soviets but it was not a win.

Unless your forces are at the gates of the Kremlin dictating terms then you won nothing.

Finland got good peace terms which are fair enough but it wasn't a victory.

Had the Soviets decided in the Spring of 1946 to go balls to the wall and invade Finland, how do you think it will go?

Tactics and plans can easily go up in smoke. Japanese tactics at Coral Sea are a fine example. The IJN had a strict timetable with strict orders. Zuikaku and Shokaku had to land 9 Zeroes on a land base. But bad weather meant they couldn't. This now meant that the 2 main fleet carriers were now delayed and out of position for the whole battle. Just because they couldn't land 9 Zeroes. Which in the great scheme of things were totally immaterial.

The Von Schlieffen plan is another example of strict timetables and totally unrealistic wish dreams and moon beams.

The Soviets in 1945 were able to defeat the Japanese because of the large industrial military complex which a large economy can bring.

War is not chess.
 
The Finns were able to prevent the Soviets from achieving their reported war aims: [re]conquest of Finland, in the Winter War.
The Soviet aims seemed different in the Continuation War, but it did leave Finland with a restrictive peace treaty and significant reparations to pay off.
 
I am not saying the Finns lost. But they certainly never won.
Shades of grey.

So bit like Jutland or Battle of Britain, no clear winners or victors but who achieved their war aims and who did not.

My view is that wars are fought on various levels.

And each level has its own layers.

I remember my favourite comment is someone claiming Germany won the Battle of Britain because they caused more damage. Shot down more planes. That's not how it works!

If you say 6 shot revolver v 17 shot semi auto who will win? Answer no idea because i need more information.

Can I win a boxing match against a world champion heavyweight boxer? Nope.
Can I win against an old granny? Yep.

So the boxing rules or my capabilities only need to be as good as my opponent.
 
Had the Soviets decided in the Spring of 1946 to go balls to the wall and invade Finland, how do you think it will go?
For the Finns, catastrophe. For the war weary Soviets, more casualties and attrition than the likely strategic gains warranted. Besides their assets were tied up in battening down eastern Europe. So it didn't happen. Besides, isn't there an ethnic/linguistic kinship between the Georgians (Stalin's people) and the Finns?
Cheers,
Wes
 
There is such a thing as a defensive victory. Not all wars are total wars, in fact historically a very small percentage of wars ever were, either due to inclination or cost/benefit analysis.

The Greeks won the Persian wars even though they never got near Persepolis.

Germany won the Battle of France, defeating both France and most of the army of England. Not because of greater economic power but because of Strategy and Tactics. North Vietnam won the Vietnam War. The Taliban looks like it's about to win the Afghanistan War. They certainly didn't match US economic power.

Georgians did not have the lingual cultural link to Finland. Their language (and alphabet) is somewhat unique, part of the Kartvelian Language group. Finnish is part of the Uralic Language group which includes Hungarians, Estonians (who have close cultural links to Finland) and some ethnic groups in Russia like the Mordvins.

IMO you don't have to look much further as to why the Soviets stopped when they did in both the Winter War and the Continuation War than cost / benefit analysis. It was costing too much and threatening to weaken the Soviet forces too much, bog down too many troops etc.
 


The prepared defences in Malaysia (and the Philippines) were not engaged until the Japanese forces were ashore and had covered considerable ground. The Japanese did attack a few defended beaches but the defences were nothing like what existed on Oahu (let alone what might have been put there if Midway was lost).

Even if the Japanese had seized Midway in the few days after the carrier battle it would have taken several months to establish a Japanese base of any size there not to mention the time needed to build up your alternatives ( French Frigate Shoals, Johnston Atoll) and transport the needed supplies to build up stock piles at two or more of these "bases".
Hawaii invasion is in Late August or Sept or later?????

What is the US doing in the meantime? crying in their beer and wringing their hands or fortifying not only Oahu but the neighboring Islands?

Granted the west coast will be screaming for their own defenses but a lot more could have been done to beef up Defences in Hawaii.
There were 16 old 8in guns on railway carriages as part of the Hawaiian defences. Eight of them had replaced 12in mortars like these
that had been placed in storage, the 8 in guns replacing the mortars on the railway equipment. BTW the copy under the picture is WW I propaganda.
Work was being done to mount the 8in gun houses from the Saratoga and Lexington inot shore batteries, this was not completed until 1943 but then the US had won Midway and things were not as urgent (like mounting the complete triple 14in mountings salvaged from the Arizona). I don't think the 14 mountings could have been prepared in time, some mounts for the 8in gun houses though???? More railroad guns from the US mainland? they certainly existed.

Auxiliary Airfields on Kauai and Molokai? with radar sets? Given even 3 months what could the US have done to further fortify the Hawaiian Islands over and above what was done as the Midway was won and the fighting moved to the Solomons and New Guinea.

US defences certainly did not stay static after Dec 7th.
 
The prepared defences in Malaysia (and the Philippines) were not engaged until the Japanese forces were ashore and had covered considerable ground.

That is just factually incorrect. As I already stated uptrhead not very far, the Japanese landed 5,000 troops on a defended beach at Kota Bharu facing sighted in artillery, barbed wire, mines, and concrete pillboxes, and they captured the beachhead while only suffering about 70 Kia and 500 casualties in total. It's a much smaller scale than what is contemplated here, but it does demonstrate their ability to take a well defended and prepared position (and bode well for their success therein).
 
Last edited:

It would probably take a while to bring in troops, supplies and gather all the ships and planes necessary. 2- 3 months is reasonable. But keep in mind those Atolls and Islands I mentioned were because they already had airstrips and other facilities on them.


I would suggest that resupplying Hawaii would be a challenge during those 3 months if the Japanese had 5 or 6 fleet aircraft carriers and the US had none left (or just 1 or 2). How do you send supply ships, troops, fuel, guns even airplanes to Hawaii with those carriers roaming around wherever they please?

I know in WW2 attrition generally favored the Americans but with no way to get fuel, spares, ammunition etc. to Hawaii, how long would they be able to endure an intermittent campaign of air strikes (even night-time bombing raids), shore bombardments, and (also probably night time) naval engagements around the islands? How long would those radar sets last under repeated attacks?



As for the notion that US submarines would automatically shut down any Japanese efforts to prep for an invasion. Aside from the fact that US Submarines did not have a decisive effect during the Guadalcanal or New Guinea campaigns, in part due to problems with torpedoes etc., WW2 submarines in general had a somewhat random element in how well they did in combat, and for the USN this lasted right until the end of the war. Sometimes they could be pretty deadly, sometimes rather shockingly ineffective.

For example, the fate of the Japanese hybrid Carrier-Battleship Ise is instructional. After participating in the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Cape Engaño, the Ise was relocated for a while to Cam Ranh bay in what is now Vietnam, as the flagship of the IJN 5th fleet. They decided to send Ise to Singapore to pick up a load of critical supplies (rubber, aviaton fuel, tin, and strategic metals) which it was to bring back to Japan. The US codebreakers got wind of the plan so they positioned 15 submarines along the route back to Japan, which were then joined by another 11 submarines during the Ise's voyage for 26 submarines in total. All to get one ship. Only three managed to attack Ise along the way, and none of the attacks hit anything. Ise reached Kure after a 14 day trip, unscathed.

Ise at this time was an obsolete ship with very little ASW capability no more than a couple of seaplanes as an air contingent.
 
The carriers are not going around where ever they want. They are dashing in doing something maybe and then running away to get fuel. A long way away to get fuel. The atolls don't have drinking water for the most part. And also need a constant supply of fuel. The logistics tail to make all this work needs to stretch back to Japan, which is also stretched for fuel.

There are no oil wells in Hawaii. There is zero percent chance they capture the supplies intact.
 
As for the subs - they don't aim at warships. They hit the supply ships that are all heading to the small number of available docks on Oahu.
 

Users who are viewing this thread