Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?

[Schweik]

True, though they had pre-positioned oil reserves in New Guinea and the Bismarck islands.

One other thing against the Japanese, is while they seemed to be able to handle the US Army in the Philippines, USMC at Wake and later in Guadalcanal gave the IJA and IJN marines a lot of trouble. There were some differences in kit and Tactics which were standardized in early 1942 which may have made the difference. IJA may have had trouble in ground fighting in Hawaii that wasn't evident in earlier campaigns.

 

[Schweik]

As for the subs - they don't aim at warships. They hit the supply ships that are all heading to the small number of available docks on Oahu.

Of course they would. I'm just saying there is no guarantee this will work. U-boat successes notwithstanding, WW2 era submarines were fairly limited as tools of war.

 

[Shortround6]

That is just factually incorrect. As I already stated uptrhead not very far, the Japanese landed 5,000 troops on a defended beach at Kota Bharu facing sighted in artillery, barbed wire, mines, and concrete pillboxes, and they captured the beachhead while only suffering about 70 Kia and 500 casualties in total. It's a much smaller scale than what is contemplated here, but it does demonstrate their ability to take a well defended and prepared position (and bode well for their success therein).

how about reading the next sentence in my post.

The Japanese did attack a few defended beaches but the defences were nothing like what existed on Oahu (let alone what might have been put there if Midway was lost).

which should cover Kota Bharu, which by the way had one regiment covering 10 miles of coastline, even with barbed wire, mines and pill boxes that is a bit thin. The artillery consisted of one battery of field artillery (25pdrs?) and perhaps one battery of 3.7in mountain howitzers?

Some sources say the Japanese lost over 300 dead and 500 wounded but that may include crewmen lost on the transports due to air attack.

 

[Shortround6]

I would suggest that resupplying Hawaii would be a challenge during those 3 months if the Japanese had 5 or 6 fleet aircraft carriers and the US had none left (or just 1 or 2). How do you send supply ships, troops, fuel, guns even airplanes to Hawaii with those carriers roaming around wherever they please?

I know in WW2 attrition generally favored the Americans but with no way to get fuel, spares, ammunition etc. to Hawaii, how long would they be able to endure an intermittent campaign of air strikes (even night-time bombing raids), shore bombardments, and (also probably night time) naval engagements around the islands? How long would those radar sets last under repeated attacks?

Let's see, 2395 miles from San Francisco to Oahu. 2611 miles from San Diego to Oahu
3846 miles from Tokyo to Oahu, 3800 miles from Rabaul to Oahu.

Who has the greater logistics problem?

the Japanese do not have the logistics train to keep carriers or other major warships in place and refueled/supplied on station in Hawaiian waters. (the US didn't either in 1942 which meant even with Hawaii the troops on Guadalcanal were sometimes on their own).

Japanese submarine anti shipping success is not the greatest, Japanese anti sub warfare ability in 1942 was pretty dismal.

Using warships to transport troops is an expedient that works to greater or less extents depending on the distances involved and the number of troops per ship. Japanese used Destroyers in the Solomons campaign on trips that were several days and demanded a high speed "dash" at night for the final approach to minimize air attacks. Quite a bit different than putting the same number of troops on a destroyer for several weeks.

The US used destroyer transports but used destroyers modified for the job. 36 flush deck WW I destroyers had their 2 forward boilers taken out (reducing speed to 25kts) to provide accommodations for 200 troops. Original guns were removed and increases AA fitted, torpedoes were removed, four landing craft and davits were fitted and increased anti sub armament.
later a number of DE's were converted.
Carrying troops as deck cargo may have worked for the Japanese in the Solomons. It wasn't going to work in voyage lasting thousands of miles.


The US has lost it's carriers in this scenario, it has not lost it's cruisers or destroyers which can operate out of Pearl Harbor under an umbrella of land based air on the unsinkable Islands.
Granted the radius of operations is reduced to the area teh land based air can cover ( a few hundred miles) but that may be all that is needed to ensure resupply and to repel the Japanese invasion attempt.

 

[Tkdog]

The Japanese would have no problems at all fighting on the ground of Oahu. Because they would never get soldiers on the ground of Oahu.

We should move on to more plausible topics like the what-if the Buffalo fighter got the same development follow ons as the Wildcat? What do the Hellcat and Bearcat follow on equivalents look like if Brewster designs them? Something like that which might have happened.

 

[swampyankee]

The Japanese would have no problems at all fighting on the ground of Oahu. Because they would never get soldiers on the ground of Oahu.

We should move on to more plausible topics like the what-if the Buffalo fighter got the same development follow ons as the Wildcat? What do the Hellcat and Bearcat follow on equivalents look like if Brewster designs them? Something like that which might have happened.

Considering how appallingly bad Brewster's management was, any Brewster-designed follow-on designs to the Buffalo would have helped the Axis more than the Allies.

 

[Tkdog]

That's the joke.

 

[michael rauls]

Considering how appallingly bad Brewster's management was, any Brewster-designed follow-on designs to the Buffalo would have helped the Axis more than the Allies.

Its occurred to me more than once that Brewsters management must have been secretly working for the Axis.

 

[Schweik]

It's not just Brewster - plenty of much larger US firms had major problems with corruption, mismanagement, chronic blind spots / groupthink etc. Look at the Curtiss scandals, Lockheeds problems with the P-38 (and then postwar, with the F-104 etc.). Also government agencies like the Navy's bureau of ordinance / Naval Torpedo Station and their debacles with the Mk 13 and Mk 14 torpedoes. Brewster probably wasn't even the worst, I think they were just a small company that grew too fast and took on too much all at once.

I've always found that kind of corporate malfeasance and institutional dysfunction fascinating. I think for the US it was one of the biggest problems they had during the War and subsequently.

 

[pinsog]

The US would still have Saratoga, Wasp, Ranger and I think a couple of small transport type carriers. I would use Saratoga, Wasp and Ranger to transport massive amounts of fighters to Hawaii while the Japanese were preparing. Saratoga arrived at Pearl with about 100 aircraft the day Midway ended. She could probably transport 150 if used strictly as a transport, launching them from 300-500 miles away from Hawaii to avoid submarines and shortening her turnaround time.

As far as defenses at Pearl, damaged battleships like Nevada could be made water tight, fuel oil pumped out, beached, and used as stationary armored shore batteries. There was an airfield a couple of hundred yards away that could have been filled with fast climbing P36's and F4F-3 Wildcats. Put 100 or more fighters flying directly over the Harbor while another 300-400 intercept raids before they even make landfall and your stationary battleships are going to be safe from air attack. Not sure how many other battleships could have been used like that. One was in dry dock, that would be a good spot to fire from.

Toss in several dozen or even a hundred light and medium tanks and quad 50 half tracks so if the Japanese do make landfall you just run up and down the beach firing canister and 30 caliber machine guns against guys that have nothing but rifles, grenades, light machine guns and maybe some mountain type pack howitzers. Probably be safer for the Americans than deer hunting.

 

[Schweik]

Good point about the Battleships!

 

[syscom3]

It would probably take a while to bring in troops, supplies and gather all the ships and planes necessary. 2- 3 months is reasonable. But keep in mind those Atolls and Islands I mentioned were because they already had airstrips and other facilities on them.



I would suggest that resupplying Hawaii would be a challenge during those 3 months if the Japanese had 5 or 6 fleet aircraft carriers and the US had none left (or just 1 or 2). How do you send supply ships, troops, fuel, guns even airplanes to Hawaii with those carriers roaming around wherever they please?

I know in WW2 attrition generally favored the Americans but with no way to get fuel, spares, ammunition etc. to Hawaii, how long would they be able to endure an intermittent campaign of air strikes (even night-time bombing raids), shore bombardments, and (also probably night time) naval engagements around the islands? How long would those radar sets last under repeated attacks?



As for the notion that US submarines would automatically shut down any Japanese efforts to prep for an invasion. Aside from the fact that US Submarines did not have a decisive effect during the Guadalcanal or New Guinea campaigns, in part due to problems with torpedoes etc., WW2 submarines in general had a somewhat random element in how well they did in combat, and for the USN this lasted right until the end of the war. Sometimes they could be pretty deadly, sometimes rather shockingly ineffective.

For example, the fate of the Japanese hybrid Carrier-Battleship Ise is instructional. After participating in the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Cape Engaño, the Ise was relocated for a while to Cam Ranh bay in what is now Vietnam, as the flagship of the IJN 5th fleet. They decided to send Ise to Singapore to pick up a load of critical supplies (rubber, aviaton fuel, tin, and strategic metals) which it was to bring back to Japan. The US codebreakers got wind of the plan so they positioned 15 submarines along the route back to Japan, which were then joined by another 11 submarines during the Ise's voyage for 26 submarines in total. All to get one ship. Only three managed to attack Ise along the way, and none of the attacks hit anything. Ise reached Kure after a 14 day trip, unscathed.

Ise at this time was an obsolete ship with very little ASW capability no more than a couple of seaplanes as an air contingent.

Logistics were never the strong part of the Japanese. Just because they had carriers, it didn't mean they could stay at sea indefinitely. The US could easily supply Hawaii without worrying to much about IJN interference.

Also note that the French Frigate Schoals didnt have a landing strip until 1943. At one time I posted a bunch of info on that island. Same with Johnston Atoll. It pretty much was a small atoll of small size prior to the navy increasing the size of the islands.

 

[Tkdog]

Yeah the atolls are unlikely to be much help. Not only do they increase the logistical load they would require a dispersal of resources to hold them. If they can be shelled to pieces any night of the week by a single submarine then some effort must be made to prevent that. What would that be? Destroyers? More fuel, less escort for the proposed invasion fleet.

Is that cost worth a few minutes of fighter coverage over Oahu once or maybe twice a day? For a week or so at best before damage mounts up and you need more planes. Or some sort of tender or something - more fuel.

They were useful to the US as forward posts for scouts and as a refueling point. That doesn't turn them into attack carriers without a significant investment.

 

[Schweik]

Logistics were never the strong part of the Japanese. Just because they had carriers, it didn't mean they could stay at sea indefinitely. The US could easily supply Hawaii without worrying to much about IJN interference.

What makes you say that? On the one hand people keep saying that the Japanese couldn't get supplies and weapons in place to attack let alone occupy Hawaii because they would be too exposed to US submarines etc., but on the other hand everyone seems to think the US would have no problem supplying Hawaii. Distance may be a bit less to the US but it's still enormous, way beyond range of most aircraft. Slow moving transport ships heading to Hawaii would be vulnerable to submarine, carrier aircraft and surface attacks. And unlike B-17s, long range Japanese bombers like G3Ms could sink ships pretty efficiently via torpedoes. So could IJN destroyers armed with long lance torpedoes.

Also note that the French Frigate Schoals didnt have a landing strip until 1943. At one time I posted a bunch of info on that island. Same with Johnston Atoll. It pretty much was a small atoll of small size prior to the navy increasing the size of the islands.

Ah well that is news to me, and if true that does complicate things a bit for the Japanese. For FFS, wiki just said that they built a 1,000 meter landing strip "after the Battle of Midway", but the wiki about the airfield states that the first airfield was built in 1942 by Seabees.

According to the Wiki at Johnston Atoll the first (1,200 meter) airfield was built on Johnston Atoll in 1941, "along with two 400 men barracks, two messhalls, a cold storage building,, a fresh water plant, shop buildings and fuel storage." It says this was complete by Dec 7, 1941. The Wiki also states that in July 1942 500 Seebees were landed there to expand fuel storage and water production "and build additional facilities".

So it sounds like that was ready to be a useful base for the Japanese.[/quote][/QUOTE]

 

[pinsog]

Any land base within range of Hawaii becomes immediate target practice for B17's. Again, I would probably send them at night so Zero's can't intercept and probably at relatively low level because Japanese AA is ineffective. No need to send an expensive submarine or destroyer to lob a few shells at a runway when B17's could go everyday. Even in daylight Zero's weren't very effective against B17's.

Japanese carrier's were understrength at Midway because they couldn't replace the attrition in pilots or planes from December 1941 to June 1942. Put 400+ fighters on Hawaii and in 1 or 2 raids the carriers won't have any aircraft or pilots left to fight with. US pilots can bail out over their own territory so even with 1 to 1 exchange, many/most US pilots survive, replacement fighters pour i from US on Saratoga, Wasp and Ranger. Saratoga, Wasp and Ranger could probably operate close to 300 fighters alone, although I would not commit them to battle, only use as ferries. As ferries they could probably deliver 350-400 fighters in a single trip.

 

[Tkdog]

So...they just get to capture all that intact? I would suspect someone would blow up the water plant. Even if they use teleporters and beam in... how do they keep it functional if it is shelled nightly from subs? Bombed nightly by Cats? Do you divert forces from the invasion force (tick, tock you're running out of oil!!!) to keep the atoll functioning? If so, why? They are too far away to impact the air war over Oahu.

So now they can interdict convoys between the mainland US and Hawaii? Sure they managed to operate a few subs off the west coast for short periods of time. But not long and not many. They get too close they will be sunk. Too far and then you burn fuel you don't have looking for them.

Meanwhile the US sub force is operating from Pearl and potentially reloading off Maui or..... Cause that's the other thing. During the time it takes the Japanese to get the resources together to try and invade they would have fighter strips on Kauai, Maui, etc to try and find time to bomb too. Radar stations all over the place warning of sleep deprived pilots bringing under serviced planes in for their 15 minutes of fame from the atolls.

If they try to blockade Hawaii then they have constant air, surface and submarine pressure on their blockading forces. Any damaged unit must transit 3000 miles to be repaired. How long do you suppose that blockade lasts? What are they going to blockade it with? Do they have tanker support to keep a blockade going? This isn't the channel with ships of the line against Napoleon.

 

[Schweik]

Where is all the fuel (and ammo etc.) coming from to supply the subs and B-17s and hundreds of fighters operating out of Hawaii? Doesn't Hawaii itself have to be resupplied? Don't the Hawaiian Islands have a large civilian population with it's own needs?

I don't foresee B-17s and Catalinas flying night raids being a major problem for small island airstrips. They weren't that easy for Japanese pilots to shoot down (usually) but they never hit much either in most cases.

With the capture of Atolls the Japanese could, in theory, use army planes and army pilots, who were not as rare as trained carrier capable navy pilots.

 

[Tkdog]

The difference is that Hawaii has hundreds of square miles to store all this stuff. With months to supply they have months and months of resources.

 

[Tkdog]

You need to read different books. The Black Cats destroyed plenty as did the 17s.

 

[pinsog]

The US pushed convoys to Europe through much tougher conditions as far as submarines. Hawaii provides air cover out as far as possible. As far as fuel, bombs, food, etc, that can be stockpiled while Japan is also stockpiling in preparation for invasion. The US supply line is 40% shorter allowing the US to build up faster assuming the same number of ships. Unless a Japanese carrier task force is east of Hawaii, supply convoys would have little trouble getting through.

Bombers would need to fly constantly, fighters need to train but you wouldn't need to fly all 400-500 fighters everyday. Most could sit with full fuel tanks awaiting interception missions.

Saburo Sakai in ZERO credits B17 raids on airfields as one of the great factors in their defeat as they had no counter to them and had huge difficulty in bringing them down even in daylight