Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?

[The Basket]

You heard of the Battle of Midway? Now we talking Battle of Medway. That's the plan here.

We sail into harbour and we blow stuff up.

But instead of wearing clogs and smoking in one of them Cafes, we doing it Japanese style.

My only problem is we blowing up oil. If we plan to occupy Hawaii then dont blow up oil or any other fuel supply. May come in handy.

 

[TheMadPenguin]

"throwing everything they have" is not related to anything I postulated.
"no resources that they can use" is not related to the purpose stated: deny possession of this forward base to the enemy for 6 months, deny use of it for a year.
"get that oil they totally need" and they need time to get it ... this plan giving them another year.
"no impact on their now enraged enemy" except that enemy is denied any ability to interfere for a year after the shooting starts.

and the nukes were not an object of fear, nor a threat greater than the firebombings; that award goes to Uncle Joe who stood in position to become the communist dictator of Japan.

(you have more stirred up muck than stirred up thought, by your post, Tkdog).

"invade Hawaii and then use it as a forward base. Then we invade west coast of USA. " That's your thought not mine.

I did not posit expending any resources Japan did not have. I did not embrace any purposes (strategic objectives) Japan did not already embrace. I posited how a change in the tactic could have made their lives longer (but they would still have lost) and our pain greater.

At the Strategic level, this "take and deny" might have dissuaded the USA from extending help to the USSR (until we had Hawaii back and IJN neutered), knocked back operation Torch and operation Overlord a year or two, and changed (significantly) the post-war map.

edit: "If spotted the surprise is gone and the whole Pearl Harbor attack becomes a fiasco"
They WERE spotted. the "Naw couldn't be" factor had a large impact on what happened next.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

They WERE spotted. the "Naw couldn't be" factor had a large impact on what happened next.

There never was a "Naw, couldn't be" factor; it was a "Them's our bomber guys" factor. Did anyone else actually wade through the transcripts of the Pearl Harbor investigations that were linked from the previous thread about the attack?
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Shortround6]

Big difference between around 30 minutes warning and 1-2 days warning. The Japanese approached from the North after staying in a storm front for several days to shield them air recon. The strike was launched as soon as possible in the morning after running to south all night. For any fast surface combat ships to be just off Pearl Harbor they would have had to be about where the carriers were when the planes launched only the night before. Any transports would have had to have been at the same distance either 24 hours before the carriers got there or perhaps 36 hours depending on speed.
It is this Idea that Japanese warships or troop ships could be within 200 miles (or 100 miles) of Oahu 10-12 hours before the planes show up with next to no chance of being discovered by an air search that needs a serious rethink.

 

[Shortround6]

T expand on the last post here is a map of the route the Japanese used.

Please note dates and times are Toyko time.

There is no reason that the "blockships"/gun support cannot follow a different route but the Japanese chose the route above to stay away from the main shipping lanes and to hide in the heavy weather.
The same for the troop transports/assault ships, different route with higher chance of discovery? The freighters,tankers, and troops ships might be lucky to average 10kts? (speed of allied fast convoy?) and would need days more transit time.

A ten knot ship or convoy can cover about 130 N Miles during the "night" (Hawaii having about a 13 hour night in Dec).

The Japanese launched their aircraft at about 220 miles.

Any surface units trying to coordinate their attacks with the aircraft (attack within a few hours) are spending an awful lot of time within 300-400 miles of Hawaii before the carriers reach the launch point.

 

[The Basket]

A B-17 is much faster than a invasion fleet.

So if any recon unit sees a huge number of ships, its not rocket science to think the obvious.

The old saying know your line of retreat as well as your line of advance. Just imagine a powerful USN gets itself within a mile of any invasion force. It would be chaos.

I am going to have to send anything that floats with a gun to Hawaii because the worst case scenario would be truly disastrous. And if I lose all my fleet then I have lost the war.

If I lose then I have lost all my navy. If I win I occupy Hawaii. The risk or reward balance is crazy because I am risking all for little gain. And the USN are in a position to replace all losses and then come after me.

I am not winning the war in a afternoon but I can lose it.

If you say the Yamato in 1945 and its end then yeah it was a desperate move but then again Yamato was for the chop very soon. The loss of Yamato was on the cards so I have nothing to lose but I may gain.

 

[TheMadPenguin]

ISTR the attack fleet traveled at tanker speed (<15 kt?), not flank.
This makes sense as they had refuling tankers in the fleet.

Therefore, a shift by ise/hyuga/whichever to flank at sundown 6 Dec would get them twice as far as the carriers got that same night (300 miles instead of 150, assuming10 hours of dusk/night travel).

The ships traveling at 27-30 kts would be able to gun Pearl about the end of the raid, and enter the channel before dark.

Also, freighters acting as troopships could (if careful) travel openly towards Pearl, as we were at peace and freighter traffic is un-alarming.
Even if the troopships stayed with the fleet until launch, they'd be able to hit the North shore of Oahu 20 hours later (0500 Monday) while the harbor is still aflame.

Thankfully, it didn't happen, and nobody could convince the IJN of this plan if they tried. End of Alternate History Fantasy.

 

[The Basket]

Ise couldn't do 27 knots unless it had a rocket strapped to it.

I ain't knowledge but I gots enough knowledge to be dangerous.

Which is the issue with this forum. If you say stuff which don't fly then you gonna be held accountable.

 

[TheMadPenguin]

ISTR the attack fleet traveled at tanker speed (15 kt?), not flank.

But you're right on this: I misread something that put 27 in my head, Ise & Hyuga were rated to 23 knots. After rebuild (1934-36), 24.6 knots, but still not 27.

As to stuff "not flying" I'd put both Ise & Hyuga in that category.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Is a Japanese total victory at Midway even possible? The USN has radar and seemingly tougher ships, better aircraft handling/rotation and much better damage control. I would think the only possible victory for the Japanese is one where both sides are beaten up, the USN more so and both withdraw to their home ports.

Even if we get a one sided victory for Japan at Midway, with the IJA seizing Midway Island, they're not prepared or equipped to invade Hawaii, so they still have to go back to their bases to repair and replenish and now to prepare for the Hawaii invasion. My guess it will be at least six to eight weeks before the invasion force is ready. It's now been six months since Pearl Harbour, so Hawaii will have already been reinforced by USAAF, USMC and Army units. And the USN's other carriers will be arriving, likely with decks stuffed with USAAF P-40s.

 

[Conslaw]

The Japanese were expecting to encounter at best minor naval resistance prior to the landing and occupation of Midway. They were expecting that the USN would come out and meet them - not that three carriers would be lying in wait in as perfect position as they could manage. I think the Japanese were expecting two US carriers maximum, based on their expectation that the Yorktown would need substantial yard time. (Actually I don't know what the IJN knew about the Yorktown or American carrier deployment in general.)

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Japanese were expecting to encounter at best minor naval resistance prior to the landing and occupation of Midway. They were expecting that the USN would come out and meet them - not that three carriers would be lying in wait in as perfect position as they could manage.

I agree. This vid does a great job of explaining the challenges and failures on the Japanese side.



In the video we see how the lack of radar, poor reconnaissance and inefficient aircraft handling procedures caused much of their downfall. Also indiscipline and incoordination of the defending fighter pilots leading to them all going to LA to attack torpedo bombers, leaving the HA empty as the dive bombers approached didn't help. The small magazine capacity on the Zero was also an issue, meaning frequent returns to the carriers for ammunition, resulting in the inability to launch a counter strike of bombers.

Honestly, the IJN should have got radar from the Germans, practiced damage control and sorted out how to quickly rotate aircraft.

 

[taly01]

The small magazine capacity on the Zero was also an issue, meaning frequent returns to the carriers for ammunition, resulting in the inability to launch a counter strike of bombers.

But this is a good aircraft design problem the Zero until late 1942 only had a 60 round canon load per 20mm short Oerlikon (MGFF) gun, at 500r/m this is only 7 seconds firing time. This is only 2-3 bursts and assuming you hit. While the 7.7mm guns had some 680 rounds per gun at 900r/m (probably much less as syncronised through prop) for some 45-60 seconds probably.

So most pilots would have been left with 7.7mm only after attacking 1-2 enemy bombers. If the 100rd drum had been available by Midway it would have given 12 seconds firing for 20mm, its beginning to look better. To offset the increased weight of 20mm the 7.7mm load could have been halved to 340 rpg for still some 24-30 sec firing time.

The IJN did learn and after Midway sometimes dedicated one of the smaller carriers to CAP. But this also assumes the discipline to keep a high and low CAP as you see TB flying towards your carriers can be kept!

 

[Admiral Beez]

But this also assumes the discipline to keep a high and low CAP as you see TB flying towards your carriers can be kept!

I get the feeling that IJN fighter pilots saw themselves as solo warriors, akin to samurais, rather than team players like those USN pilots conducting a Thatch Weave.

Did Zeros even have radios? I've read that some removed them to save weight. With no radio there's no way for the carrier's CIC (combat info centre) to coordinate and prioritize defence or vector fighters to threats the pilots may not see.

The USN and RN understood the need for radar and fighter direction.

The Beginnings of Naval Fighter Direction - Chapter 5 of Radar and the Fighter Directors - Engineering and Technology History Wiki

 

[Conslaw]

But this is a good aircraft design problem the Zero until late 1942 only had a 60 round canon load per 20mm short Oerlikon (MGFF) gun, at 500r/m this is only 7 seconds firing time. This is only 2-3 bursts and assuming you hit. While the 7.7mm guns had some 680 rounds per gun at 900r/m (probably much less as syncronised through prop) for some 45-60 seconds probably.

So most pilots would have been left with 7.7mm only after attacking 1-2 enemy bombers. If the 100rd drum had been available by Midway it would have given 12 seconds firing for 20mm, its beginning to look better. To offset the increased weight of 20mm the 7.7mm load could have been halved to 340 rpg for still some 24-30 sec firing time.

The IJN did learn and after Midway sometimes dedicated one of the smaller carriers to CAP. But this also assumes the discipline to keep a high and low CAP as you see TB flying towards your carriers can be kept!

The zero's weaknesses were all non-critical for the conquest stage of their war plan. Lack of armor and self-sealing tanks weren't critical when your pilots rarely let the enemy get a shot in, any losses incurred because of the vulnerability were made up for by the crucial range advantage. The small ammunition capacity for the cannon was justified because the zero needed to get in killing blows on enemy bombers before defensive gunnery could kill the zero. More ammunition would be preferred but only a small percentage of the time will you get a shot at more than two enemy planes. (The A6M-32 received more ammunition.) The J2M Raiden aka "Jack" was supposed to take the burden of defending land bases, and the A7M was supposed to come online in 1943-44 to take on the carrier-based air-superiority role. Both of these aircraft have been well covered in other threads. Suffice it to say, the J2M was never manufactured in anything close to the quantities needed for the job, and everything that could have gone wrong with the A7M problem did, and the A7M never became operational.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The zero's weaknesses were all non-critical for the conquest stage of their war plan.

As good as the Zero is reputed to be, did it ever see the IJN through to a victory at sea? Certainly they shot down some land based fighters off Ceylon and Darwin, but did the Zero ever save the carriers it was supposed to defend.

 

[The Basket]

The Zeroes did a good job against most of the attacking aircraft sent against it at Midway. Not all but most air defences are not foolproof.

At Coral Sea again not foolproof but American carriers also got hit so not exactly one way traffic.

At Ceylon did shoot down the Blenheims so end of day better than a Fulmar.

Would be interesting to know Japanese tactics in relationship to CAP over the carrier.

Oddly Shokaku was badly damaged at Coral but survived and was able to get home. Why Shokaku survived and the 4 carriers at Midway didn't are interesting.

The Royal Navy did tests in the 1930s with their carriers where the carrier was in bad shape if it came under air attack because there was no early warning and so no time to launch interception and if the interceptors had no radios then no fighter control either. Pure eyeball stuff and if you can see the bomber then it's probably too late. This was before radar which the Americans had but still lost carriers.

The concept was very simple. First strike first kill. Attack the carrier first.

So the real failure was Japanese reconnaissance and intelligence which doomed the fleet. The moment the Japanese realised the game was up it was too late.

The Zeroes are good but they not supernatural. If you swapped Zeroes for 109s or Spitfires, I doubt the outcome would have changed.

 

[PAT303]

Shattered sword is a good read on this subject. The IJN loaded and fueled planes on the lower decks leaving the flight deck clear for CAP planes to return, re-arm and re-launch which seriously hampered flight operations. It appears after reading SW that Zero pilots were very keen to re-arm once the 20mm ammunition was gone which is not much of a surprise given how effective 2 303's would be when 8 in the Spit Hurri is considered lightly armed by many.

 

[The Basket]

Against attacking aircraft you can still do much with a few guns.

Dive bombers and torpedo bombers could lose focus if a Zero is behind them.

Also IJN flak was no where near good enough. Also lack of naval escorts was poor for added flak and as extra targets.

Just could have done better.

 

[Admiral Beez]

So the real failure was Japanese reconnaissance and intelligence which doomed the fleet.

That sounds about right. In addition to intel, being able to use that intel is essential. Have the Japanese buy some radar tech and radios from the Germans and centralized fighter direction and prioritization would fix a lot.

And buy up the BMW 801.