Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?

[The Basket]

I ain't no expert but if my target is American carriers it helps if I know where they are.

Maybe someone was out taking a whizz when that was taught at IJN strategy school.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I ain't no expert but if my target is American carriers it helps if I know where they are.

Intelligence is nice to have, but with it or without it Samurai spirit will prevail! Tennoheika banzai!

 

[pinsog]

The Zeroes did a good job against most of the attacking aircraft sent against it at Midway. Not all but most air defences are not foolproof.

At Coral Sea again not foolproof but American carriers also got hit so not exactly one way traffic.

At Ceylon did shoot down the Blenheims so end of day better than a Fulmar.

Would be interesting to know Japanese tactics in relationship to CAP over the carrier.

Oddly Shokaku was badly damaged at Coral but survived and was able to get home. Why Shokaku survived and the 4 carriers at Midway didn't are interesting.

The Royal Navy did tests in the 1930s with their carriers where the carrier was in bad shape if it came under air attack because there was no early warning and so no time to launch interception and if the interceptors had no radios then no fighter control either. Pure eyeball stuff and if you can see the bomber then it's probably too late. This was before radar which the Americans had but still lost carriers.

The concept was very simple. First strike first kill. Attack the carrier first.

So the real failure was Japanese reconnaissance and intelligence which doomed the fleet. The moment the Japanese realised the game was up it was too late.

The Zeroes are good but they not supernatural. If you swapped Zeroes for 109s or Spitfires, I doubt the outcome would have changed.

Shokaku survived because she had launched most or all of her planes, her flight deck was wrecked but no major fires. Hiryu, Soryu, Kaga and Akagi had the hangers full of fueled and armed or partially fueled and partially armed aircraft. Even a single bomb in the hanger area was enough to start fires that couldn't be put out.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I ain't no expert but if my target is American carriers it helps if I know where they are.

Maybe someone was out taking a whizz when that was taught at IJN strategy school.

Their entire military was run on a shoestring. The only way they got a half dozen good carriers into service for end 1941 was to allocate a massive portion of peacetime GDP to military spending. They probably just didn't have the dosh for radar, sufficiently powerful aero engines to allow for robust aircraft, an effective pilot training scheme and replenishment pipeline, nor funds for having effective damage control designed into their ships.

Japan attacking PH was akin to someone with a single, yet good gun trying to rob a well staffed gunstore. If you don't kill everyone in the shop in your opening volley, you're dead in the counter fire. I sometimes wonder how Japan would have planned their 1941 moves had they fully understood not just the industrial capacity but also the fighting will of the US. Where did the Japanese get the idea that USA would collapse? These are the same people who settled the Americas, defeated the global British superpower in 1783 and beat it again to standstill in 1815, and then fought a massive civil war in the 1860s, defeated the Spanish superpower in 1898 and fought the German superpower in 1917-1918. Throughout its history the US has demonstrated an audacity and willingness to fight, taking huge losses and fighting almost always to victory. Where in this history did Japan not pay attention? If Japan scores a victory at Midway and lands on Hawaii, it'll be bloodbath for the Japanese.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

They probably just didn't have the dosh for radar, sufficiently powerful aero engines to allow for robust aircraft, an effective pilot training scheme and replenishment pipeline, nor funds for having effective damage control designed into their ships.

In addition to a "dosh" deficit it seems they had a lack of appreciation for the importance of these things in the rapidly accelerating pace of war making technology. A Samurai-like cultural affinity for the devastating decisive strike, combined with the heady string of victories leading to delusions of invincibility tended to downplay the importance of defensive measures at all levels from radar to damage control. Their entire philosophy was built on a "blitzkrieg" model rather than a "seige" model.
Prior to Coral Sea, their carriers had never encountered any creditable opposition, so the whole damage control scene was a new thing for them. What limited damage control they had was geared more towards flying accidents than battle damage. Read "Shattered Sword".
The Lex and the Yorktown taught USN a lot about damage control; lessons which were quickly learned and incorporated into doctrine and hardware. (Lessons which were unfortunately forgotten by the time Vietnam rolled around, and had to be learned again the hard way.)
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Admiral Beez]

Prior to Coral Sea, their carriers had never encountered any creditable opposition, so the whole damage control scene was a new thing for them. What limited damage control they had was geared more towards flying accidents than battle damage. Read "Shattered Sword".

A fair assessment. The Brits became experts at damage control, but that didn't stop them after three years of combat experience from losing Ark Royal to a single torpedo hit, with the captain ordering the damage control teams to abandon ship.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

A fair assessment. The Brits became experts at damage control, but that didn't stop them after three years of combat experience from losing Ark Royal to a single torpedo hit, with the captain ordering the damage control teams to abandon ship.

Damage control, like Air Combat Maneuvering or carrier landing, is a perishable skill which must be practiced constantly and kept abreast of the latest changes in weaponry, technology, and configuration.
In boot camp we used to get rousted out of the rack at 3AM: "AHOOGAH, AHOOGAH, General Quarters, General Quarters! Fire on the 01 level quarter deck! All hands don pea coats, dungarees, and work boots. Starboard side down and forward, port side up and aft. Deploy all compartment fire hoses. Attack teams man your nozzles!"
Yawn....just another day in paradise.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[ThomasP]

Hey Admiral Beez,

re your post#224 (the second paragraph)

I refer you to my post#63, in particular:

"Contrary to popular myth (at least in the US) the Japanese government had no interest in going to war with the US, and their war planners never thought it likely (possible? yes, but not likely) that they would win a short war with the US. The Japanese war planners considered it a certainty that they would not win a sustained war with the US (barring devine intervention, pure luck, extreme US incompetence, etc.). The reason for Japan's willingness to start a war with the US, UK, and Dutch (at least at that point in time) rested solely on the fact that these countries had all ceased to supply oil to Japan. Even if the US alone had continued to supply oil to Japan, the Japanese high command would not have started a war at that point in time. The Japanese government knew that without oil the Japanese nation would have returned to its late-1800s to early-1900s status. They would most likely have lost Manchukuo, Korea, and have had to stop their invasion of China. This would have destroyed their economy and their ability to defend themselves, putting them at the mercy (once again) of the European nations and the US, and possibly the Soviet Union."

I feel I should add that this is not simply my opinion. The above Japanese view was substantiated by post-war intelligence gathered from the debriefing of various Japanese civil and military higher-ups, and is generally accepted as accurate by serious historians, including those in the US military services. Why it is not emphasized in US history classes/books more is open to debate and speculation, the Japanese assessment of their situation (right or wrong) is not. They were quite aware of the US military/industrial capabilities and did not think it likely that the US would not fight. They simply felt that there was no other acceptable choice.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Throughout its history the US has demonstrated an audacity and willingness to fight, taking huge losses and fighting almost always to victory. Where in this history did Japan not pay attention? I

What the Japanese saw through that loonngg telescope stretched across the big pond was a nation beaten down by the depression, full of "America Firsters", isolationists, and pseudo fascist sympathizers, as well as a significant Japanese population. A little optimistic thinking on their part could easily lead to the conclusion the US had very little stomach for war. Heck, they'd sat quietly on their hands while Hitler rolled through Europe, hadn't they? The images projected by newspapers, radio, and newsreels can easily give foreigners a distorted view of any country.
If the Japanese had gone quietly about their agenda in South East Asia and ignored the US, their assessment of our resolve might have proven correct. We would have tried (unpopularly at home) to intervene with forces ill equipped and ill prepared to deal with Kido Butai and got our head handed to us on a platter. Under the circumstances, the isolationists would have had a field day, and FDR might have been forced to negotiate.
BUT...Yamamoto saved our bacon. Not only did he awaken the "sleeping tiger"; he kicked him in the nuts! Presto change-o! Game over.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Shortround6]

the dosh for radar, sufficiently powerful aero engines to allow for robust aircraft, an effective pilot training scheme and replenishment pipeline, nor funds for having effective damage control designed into their ships.

This what happens when a relatively small country gets into a war with a big one.
The Japanese electronics industry was small, but so was most other countries compared to the United States. It doesn't matter if you have a few smart scientists if you can't build the parts they need and/or build them in quantity. The US may have had the worlds highest per capita ownership of radios and phonographs. Most made in American factories.

Aircraft engines are tricky things, The high powered ones used in fighter planes and fast bombers often beat racing car engines in regards to power per pound of engine weight. They needed first class alloys and metallurgy. They also had only little margin of extra strength for the intended use. which was dependent on the available fuel. No sense making an engine that will stand up to 250pounds per square inch BMEP levels if the available fuel detonates at 160-170 sin BMEP. It will be much heavier than an engine designed for the expected pressures the fuel will allow (with a small extra margin).

Many nations had less than needed training programs, the US had, due to it's interest in aviation (and higher standard of living than many other countries) a more robust private aircraft industry and consumer base, even if a large part of it was Taylor/Piper cubs and Aeroncas (And Ercoupes
It meant there were a lot more semi trained pilots and low level instructors to draw from to form a widespread training program.
For one view point See: Civilian Pilot Training Program - Wikipedia

Also consider that from march of 1927 till Aug 1930 the US certified 716 different civilian aircraft. Many of these were just engine changes but it is a vast number compared to any other country or even group of countries. That number does not include experimentals or record breaking aircraft or race planes but only planes intended for sale to the public or for commercial use carrying passengers/cargo.

Effective damage control also means recognizing the different threats, which is not always easy to do without experience. It has been said that every US fire code is the result of a fire in which one or more people lost their lives. This may not be strictly true but the vast majority of regulations can be traced to one or more fatal fires. Likewise with warships, better flash containment, magazine flooding arrangements and safety interlocks only came into being on battleships after they lost some in combat or by blowing themselves up in harbor with their own ammunition. (one writer claims more battleships from 1890 blew themselves up than were lost to enemy gun fire (losses to torpedoes and bombs not counted)


Lack of "dosh" may be due to a significantly smaller economy/manufacturing base.

 

[The Basket]

You got to see the big picture.

If you look at the American carriers and their losses which in 1942 were quite a few.

I am of the opinion that the loss of 4 carriers was not decisive or war winning. A giant pain in the rear, certainly but not war losing.

The Japanese fought the Battle of the Eastern Solomans and Santa Cruz as carrier battles mainly featuring Zuikaku and Shokaku to good effect. Plus a few of the less well know IJN carriers.

And with it all the Americans after the Battle of Santa Cruz had one operational carrier left in the Pacific which was the damaged Enterprise.

So by this metric the IJN had won and lost in equal measure.

One could say the Japan won the carrier battles of 1942.

Maybe.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Hey Admiral Beez,

re your post#224 (the second paragraph)

I refer you to my post#63, in particular:

"Contrary to popular myth (at least in the US) the Japanese government had no interest in going to war with the US, and their war planners never thought it likely (possible? yes, but not likely) that they would win a short war with the US. The Japanese war planners considered it a certainty that they would not win a sustained war with the US (barring devine intervention, pure luck, extreme US incompetence, etc.). The reason for Japan's willingness to start a war with the US, UK, and Dutch (at least at that point in time) rested solely on the fact that these countries had all ceased to supply oil to Japan. Even if the US alone had continued to supply oil to Japan, the Japanese high command would not have started a war at that point in time. The Japanese government knew that without oil the Japanese nation would have returned to its late-1800s to early-1900s status. They would most likely have lost Manchukuo, Korea, and have had to stop their invasion of China. This would have destroyed their economy and their ability to defend themselves, putting them at the mercy (once again) of the European nations and the US, and possibly the Soviet Union."

I feel I should add that this is not simply my opinion. The above Japanese view was substantiated by post-war intelligence gathered from the debriefing of various Japanese civil and military higher-ups, and is generally accepted as accurate by serious historians, including those in the US military services. Why it is not emphasized in US history classes/books more is open to debate and speculation, the Japanese assessment of their situation (right or wrong) is not. They were quite aware of the US military/industrial capabilities and did not think it likely that the US would not fight. They simply felt that there was no other acceptable choice.

The US did paint Japan into a corner for certain. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN 1938-1940

 

[The Basket]

I ain't no fan of that reasoning.

If you blame America for Japan's actions then Japan did nuffin wrong.

And that's bad mojo.

Japan painted Japan into a corner and must be held accountable for its actions.

If Japan spent its time knitting or playing monopoly with a close chum then all this would have not happened.

Just because you love war and love more war and then finding out there was plenty more war than you can handle out there doesn't mean you are absolved of blame.

I can admire Yamato or a Type-38 rifle with the best of em but let's not get indulgent here. Japan was an unpleasant militaristic war machine with some nasty baggage.

So don't go dewy eyed over the loss of Imperial Japan. They got beat and only have themselves to blame.

 

[swampyankee]

One wonders about the intersection between people who are blaming US sanctions for Japan's aggression and simultaneously strongly advocating stronger sanctions against, say, Iran.

Japan was, quite literally, rampaging through China for at least a decade by the time Pearl Harbor was attacked. By any sensible measure their actions were at least as bad as, and, in my opinion worse than, Iran's are today*.

Japan did not need to invade China; they chose to do so. The sanctions placed by the US on Japan were a response to Japan's completely voluntary actions.


------

* At least partly because Iran is, relatively, much weaker, even regionally, than was Japan in the 1930s.

 

[The Basket]

Zuikaku is pronounced Zweekaku in English so that's good to know and seemed to live most of the war a charmed life.

Except now Zuikaku is some manga or anime character as all Japanese warships are now female characters.

Usually with oversized aircraft hangers!

Not my thing but knock yerself out.

I am writing this on my Sony mobile so the Japanese did win something in the end.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Japan was, quite literally, rampaging through China for at least a decade by the time Pearl Harbor was attacked.

Japan did not need to invade China; they chose to do so.

This is a rather simplistic analysis of how Japan got involved in China. Ever since Will Adams (the character John Blackthorne in "Shogun") had landed in 1599 around the start of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Japanese intelligentsia had been aware of the existance of Great Britain and the fact that a small resource limited island nation could rise to become a world power through prowess in trade and force of arms.
When they finally emerged from their bubble to engage with the world, they set out to emulate Britain's success. Unfortunately, the rules were changing and the methods that worked for Britain in the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries were becoming less acceptable on the world stage in the late19th and 20th centuries. Additionally, a much greater portion of the world's natural resources were already claimed by others, most of whom were more advanced technologically and industrially.
Japan's prowess in the Sino- and Russo-Japanese wars, along with her long held Samurai warrior tradition combined to give the armed forces a high level of social respect and political clout. Alongside this (and within the services) there developed cults of ultranationalism and a sense of "competitive extremism" not unlike what we see in the US today: "I can be more (conservative, liberal, racist, sexist, [insert explitive of choice],) than you can!" This led to junior and mid level officers who were well respected nationalists sometimes taking matters into their own hands when government policies were not deemed forceful enough. Any senior officer or government official rebuking or countermanding such actions risked being labeled a traitor to "the National Destiny" and possibly subject to assassination or public disgrace. The invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was just such an event. Officers in the Kwantung Army (ostensibly there to protect Japanese industrial assets from "bandit warlords") assassinated one of the warlords and proceeded to occupy his and adjoining territories, all without orders from Tokyo. When this resulted in international protests, the government could only take an internationally defiant stance, as the alternative of admitting their chain of command was breached was unpalatable. Having discovered that this ploy would work, the Kwantung Army repeated it on the border of China proper in 1937, leading to the infamous China quagmire that soaked up so much of Japan's resources and manpower.
Thus Japan's 1930s policy of aggression was to a large extent a non-policy of fait accompli that they were too proud to back down from. As an example of a society rife with extremism run amok, this is a lesson to be heeded by our current world.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Schweik]

In addition to a "dosh" deficit it seems they had a lack of appreciation for the importance of these things in the rapidly accelerating pace of war making technology. A Samurai-like cultural affinity for the devastating decisive strike, combined with the heady string of victories leading to delusions of invincibility tended to downplay the importance of defensive measures at all levels from radar to damage control. Their entire philosophy was built on a "blitzkrieg" model rather than a "seige" model.
Prior to Coral Sea, their carriers had never encountered any creditable opposition, so the whole damage control scene was a new thing for them. What limited damage control they had was geared more towards flying accidents than battle damage. Read "Shattered Sword".
The Lex and the Yorktown taught USN a lot about damage control; lessons which were quickly learned and incorporated into doctrine and hardware. (Lessons which were unfortunately forgotten by the time Vietnam rolled around, and had to be learned again the hard way.)
Cheers,
Wes

Considering carrier warfare was so brand new, and had never actually happened when they were setting all their plans in motion, it's impressive they thought of as much as they did while still in the theoretical stage. In the 1880s the last actual Samurai were staging their last rebellion with actual Samurai swords and bows. By 1905 they are defeating the Russians in surface actions. In WW2 they captured virtually the entire European colonial regime in a few weeks. How could it not go to their head? Look at the English by comparison with Fairey Fulmars and Swordfish vs Zeros and Aichi D3As.

Siege mentality vs. Biltzkrieg mentality is a good way to put it. Historically wars were fought both ways - the impetuous, reckless charge could carry the day, but the siege was often a better strategy. Interestingly in Japanese feudal warfare, their siege technology was a little bit limited. Their castles looked like pagodas, and were not as fireproof or hardened against cannon like European ones. More or less by mutual agreement, back in the Feudal days the Japanese didn't use cannons much at all (even while they did widely adopt a very specific type of Portuguese matchlock arquebus).

So there could be some truth in the idea of cultural predilections. The idea of not surrendering and of defeat of your warlord being an irredeemable shame for the Samurai did probably contribute to things like not having a good Air Sea rescue program in place. Preferring the pitched battle to the siege could also be a factor.

A German from a noble family by contrast would have centuries of legacy of complex feudal wars involving captivity and ransom, raiding, pitched batles and siege warfare practiced at the highest level, but also heavily featuring diplomacy, compromise deals (the Germans had a word for this - "Rezeß" meaning something like backing off / or backing down). The chess like strategy of siege warfare was the main form of war, as well as raiding. Centuries of fighting Bohermians, Swiss, Mongols and Ottomans taught them the hard way that while bold cavalry charges could win battles, that was only if the timing was perfect and the situation was appropriate.

German burghers from towns like Nuremberg, Augsburg or Hamburg had a cultural legacy of centuries of their city-state engaging with regional nobles and joining together to fight off enemies, but also repeatedly making compromises. Those towns were the ultimate siege organism. They survived by wealth and their superiority in siege warfare. Something like 80% of the budget of a town like Danzig / Gdansk, Breslau / Wroclaw, or Cologne was spent on continuously modernizing their walls and arsenals preparing for sieges. They had a similar notion of honor or "face" as you will find in the Pacific Rim ('Ehren' to the Germans) but it was much more flexible. Compromise was not dishonorable. Captivity wasn't irredeemable. But while the influence of burghers and noble families was strong in Germany, there was a stronger one.

This is a quote by Niccoló Machiavelli on Assessing a state's strength, from Il Principe (The Prince) 1532

"German cities are completely independent, don't have much territory around them and obey
the emperor only when it suits. They are not afraid of him, nor any other powerful rulers in the
area. This is because these towns are so well fortified that everyone realizes what an arduous
wearisome business it would be to attack them. They all have properly sized moats and walls;
they have the necessary artillery; they have public warehouses with food, drink and firewood
for a year; what's more, to keep people well fed without draining the public purse, they stock
materials for a year's worth of work in whatever trades are the lifeblood of the city and
whatever jobs the common folk earn their keep with. They hold military exercises in high
regard and make all kinds of arrangements to make sure they are routinely practiced."

But the old City State culture didn't fit with the German Empire. The mentality of the Germans at the start of WWI and II was heavily influenced by the Culture of Imperial Prussia, which in turn was derived in large part from the old Teutonic Order, who created arguably the first modern type State in Europe (post Charlemagne) in their massive and well organized Crusader State in the Baltic. They were known to be incredibly tough, disciplined, ruthless warriors and had created a highly effective combined-arms force. But they also had a knack for relying too much on the impetuous charge, and on overplaying their hand. After generations of hard won and patient victories, they were knocked down repeatedly in huge setbacks when they went too far into enemy territory and were lured into ambushes and feigned retreats. They lost large percentages of their men and their leadership in catastrophic defeats against Pagan Lithuanians in 1270, in 1279, and in 1298 (where German burghers from Riga joined the uprising due to being fed up with the Teutonic Knights), and most seriously at Grunwald / Tannenburg in 1410

They also had a tendency to constantly aggravate the natives and their own burghers with their heavy handedness which caused repeated rebellions, such as the numerous (native Baltic, pagan) Prussian uprisings against them in the 1260s and 1270s, and the 13 Years War in the 15th Century when their towns, led by Danzig, successfully rebelled against them and joined Poland.

I think in a way you can see all this as kind of a split personality of the Germans in WW2. Partly, they had this flexible, pragmatic, and creative side, which I think in large part is reflective of the towns and their old burgher culture, and maybe a bit their Imperial knights. But on the other hand you had the ruthless, inflexible and ultimately self destructive mentality of the Teutonic Order and the great princes of the apocalyptic 30 Years War.

S

 

[Schweik]

This is a rather simplistic analysis of how Japan got involved in China. Ever since Will Adams (the character John Blackthorne in "Shogun") had landed in 1599 around the start of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Japanese intelligentsia had been aware of the existance of Great Britain and the fact that a small resource limited island nation could rise to become a world power through prowess in trade and force of arms.
When they finally emerged from their bubble to engage with the world, they set out to emulate Britain's success. Unfortunately, the rules were changing and the methods that worked for Britain in the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries were becoming less acceptable on the world stage in the late19th and 20th centuries. Additionally, a much greater portion of the world's natural resources were already claimed by others, most of whom were more advanced technologically and industrially.
Japan's prowess in the Sino- and Russo-Japanese wars, along with her long held Samurai warrior tradition combined to give the armed forces a high level of social respect and political clout. Alongside this (and within the services) there developed cults of ultranationalism and a sense of "competitive extremism" not unlike what we see in the US today: "I can be more (conservative, liberal, racist, sexist, [insert explitive of choice],) than you can!" This led to junior and mid level officers who were well respected nationalists sometimes taking matters into their own hands when government policies were not deemed forceful enough. Any senior officer or government official rebuking or countermanding such actions risked being labeled a traitor to "the National Destiny" and possibly subject to assassination or public disgrace. The invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was just such an event. Officers in the Kwantung Army (ostensibly there to protect Japanese industrial assets from "bandit warlords") assassinated one of the warlords and proceeded to occupy his and adjoining territories, all without orders from Tokyo. When this resulted in international protests, the government could only take an internationally defiant stance, as the alternative of admitting their chain of command was breached was unpalatable. Having discovered that this ploy would work, the Kwantung Army repeated it on the border of China proper in 1937, leading to the infamous China quagmire that soaked up so much of Japan's resources and manpower.
Thus Japan's 1930s policy of aggression was to a large extent a non-policy of fait accompli that they were too proud to back down from. As an example of a society rife with extremism run amok, this is a lesson to be heeded by our current world.
Cheers,
Wes

It wasn't necessarily even safe to reign in the most fanatic people. Dan Carlin in his 'Supernova in the East' mentioned some historians who described the Japanese system in the late 30s as "government by assassination"

I agree there are echoes of this same "race to the bottom" today.

S

 

[Admiral Beez]

Japan was, quite literally, rampaging through China for at least a decade by the time Pearl Harbor was attacked.

We were all rampaging through China. Japan just did it later than everyone else, and with a yellow, not white face.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Dan Carlin in his 'Supernova in the East' mentioned some historians who described the Japanese system in the late 30s as "government by assassination".

Not just the late 30s. My mother's parents (Universalist missionaries) were forced to leave Japan with their three daughters in 1933 due to death threats from ultranationalists due to their gaijin "infidel" faith polluting the Shinto purity of the Japanese national essence. Local law enforcement advised that no protection could be provided and suggested they leave the country, as they wanted no "tragedies" on their doorstep.
My great Uncles, Philip and Paul (brothers of my paternal grandfather), who were born and raised in Tokyo (missionary parents again) found it expedient to leave Japan shortly thereafter, and Paul soon died of culture shock and a broken heart. Philip, who had grown up with and gone to school with boys who became high ranking politicians and military officers was "invited" to visit an underground naval intelligence bunker in DC on Dec 8, 1941, and emerged the day after VJ day. His family was told that he was safe, but on a secret overseas assignment for the State Department. His fluency in Japanese and his understanding of Japanese psychology and culture made him an intelligence asset and (he was told) a prime assassination target. Postwar, he did do a lot of work for the State Department. (All of this he didn't talk much about)
Japan in the 30s was a crazy place for western minds to comprehend.
Cheers,
Wes