parsifal
Colonel
Keeping the shipping lanes open was esstial to the overall allied effort. Shutting down the US MS effort in the pacific Theatre and Indian ocean would have had catastrophic effects on the war
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If the IJN began a systematic slaughter of shipping off the west coast, then no doubt, the ships crews would decide not to sail and remain in port "untill something was done".
Losses go down but the war effort is impacted to some degree.
So, why would the US on the west coast react differently to that on the east coast. On the east coast the convoys were more vital, because they were carrying oil from the carribbeam (and other strategic materials) vital to the whole war effert, but the slaughter was about two to three times as large as that which might occur in the Pacific/Indian Ocean.
Also, US Shipping in the entire theatre was a significant proportion of the whole theatres Merchant fleet. i dont know the numbers, but it has to be at least 40% in 1941-42.
Lets assume that your strategy involves US controlled shipping only, and that only emergency convoys are authorised to PH, and nowhere else. lets say that that begins in January, and does not finish until about August. These are very rough figures, and Im only suggesting them to point out the flaws in your suggestion, and why it would lead to catastrophe in the theatre.
There is likely, to be disruption of the local economies on the western seaboard. Rail could undertake to compensate to a degree, but re-routing cargoes from and to the Ports, over to railheads is going to cause a lot of local disruption. I dont know how much, but a lot. In England, the british found it necessary to maintain their coastal convoys, even through the height of the BOB, because a cessation of these convoys would have hurt the british economy very badly. And this was in England, where railways are everywhere!!!!
But the disruption in the US, whilst bad, is not fatal. I agree with that. Based on the reports for the british, you are probably looking at an economic ruin for the Northwest (including the Canadian west caost i would think, as well as Alaska), and say about a 5-10% reduction in manpower and production outputs for the whole country
In the pacific, because the shipping lanes are not working, or working to emergency standards only, the operations of the US fleet will need to be curtailed severely, and operate from the west coast only. This is well beyond the reach of the Japanese fleet. But it means now that the conquest of SE Asia occurs in record time, no later than the end of february, as the collapse is rapid, and catastrophic. Military convoys to Australia and India are attacked by air, surface and submarine, and massacred. All of the economies of Australia and New Zealand are completely wrecked, as the wool and wheat crops are left on the docks to rot. there is no supply of military material. Faced with such a catastrophe, with the Pacific bases like Fiji and Noumea gone, because the US has undertaken such a catastrophic retreat from the theatre, and apparently abandoned by England as well, the two dominions have no choice but to sue for peace with the enemy, If they dont they face the very real prospect of invasion (see below as to where the men and shipping for such an invasion will come from).
In the Indian ocean, the blockade becomes more or less complete, and India is reduced to to a starving hotbed of discontent. If you dont believe me, have you ever wondered why Chandra Bose was used by the japanese. In 1943 the worst famine in history to date took place in Bengal, with millions dying. Partly there was a breakdown in the rail net, as too much rail capacity was used up on military purposes. There were riots and mutinies everywhere, and large numbers of troops had to be diverted from the front, just to maintain control. It was a major factor in why so little activity occurred in 1943 on the Burma front. Eventually order was restored, by restoring the food supply chain (with wheat from Australia), but in this case, the food shortage is for the entire country, and for a much longer period. moreover because no foodstuffs have gotten out of Australia (and America is too far away, and no exports are getting out anyway) the revolt is nationwide, and uncontrollable. India is lost to a nationwide mutiny, a revolt, and the promise by the japanese to provide rice and wheat, from the now surrendering Australians (which they probably dont honour).
In China, the collapse occurs somewhat earlier, because the allies have had to suspend shipments of supplies there before they even start properly. For similar reasons, the Nationalist are forced to either retreat to the outer provinces (and reduced to insignificance), or surrender outright. The communists I believe would continue to fight, because they alone have learnt to fight as a guerilla force. However, the Japanese, by achieving victory, have been able to release something like up to 50 divisions, able now to face the american counteroffensive, but before that, to bully the dominions and the Indians into surrender.
In addition to this middle eastern supplies of oil are now under severe threat, and in effect no longer available. The southern Lend lease route to Russia is blocked, oil exports to england blocked, and the middle eastern campaign under severe threat, because all foodstuffs, many of its troops pulled out (australians, new zealanders, and Indians at least), so now your withdrawal is affecting the european theatre as well
One other thing, because of the early fall of the far east, the japanese have managed to capture perhaps another 250000 tons of shipping from the far eastern ports. They do not lose the 800000 that they did in 1942, because American subs have been pushed outside the range of the major Japanese shipping arteries (they are forced to operate from the west coast, which limits them to the outer limits of the the empire...Kwaj, Eniwetok etc). With the extra shipping, Japan is able to import raw material to Japan at an elevated rate, and output of material for war is thereby increased. By how much I am not sure, but given there was roughly a 30% decrease in military output because of shortages, it could anything up to that figure (ie 30%)
I wont say that the events I have portrayed will happen exactly as I suggest, but i do know that the allied defences were interlocking, and interdependant. Removing one part like that has massive flow on effects in other areas. I have outlined just one possible scenario. One thing i can assure you of, a pull out like what you have suggested would have catastrophic effects on the outcome and conduct of the war, far moreso than if the convoys soldiered on, and kept up the fight against the japanese, regardless of losses.
Nimitz had a sign above his desk. I dont remember the exact wording but it said something like "BEFORE YOU ASK OR SUGGEST ANYTHING, DO WE HAVE THE SHIPPING?" You might do well to consider the implications of that message as well.
In the long run, anything that happens to be delayed in 1942 becomes irrelevant, after 1943.
The war ends exactly as scheduled on Aug 15th 1945.
See my quotes above. I think the war could end long before August '45, but not the way you would predict
Freebird, good suggestion for the subs to sneak into the harbor and commence firing in the late morning of Dec 7th..
The Japanese subs carry 12 - 20 torpedoes and have a high endurance, so by the time they need to return to re-arm they should have sunk 6 - 10 merchants or more, a huge amount of tonnage to lose.And I would even credit the IJN (had they done that) to sink a lot of boats. But then, after firing their torpedo's, its time to sail back to Kwajelein for a reload, and the USN would have a month of respite
But then, theres always the reaction the USN would have after a few weeks, and the west coast would continually get more secure as aircraft and DD's are brought into play..
Unlike the Atlantic, the Pacific had the vastness for indivdual ships to "dissapear" from the subs. And there is a fundemental difference between the ETO and PTO ..... England needed vast numbers of ships to support its industrial and population base. The US, at a minimum, only needed enough ships to keep Hawaii supplied, and that wasnt a lot of tonnage needed.
As far as Australia is concerned, I know that Sydney did, and have to disagree with you by saying also that Melbourne did as well. the Port of Brisbane is a river, at the headwaters of Moreton Bay, a very shallow body of water that any Sub would have to traverse in a surfaced condition for more than 100 miles. The boom defences in Sydney were not completely fullproof however, as the Midget sub attack in May shows,
I still stick to th e theory that attacks into harbours by full sized subs is not practical. Putting aside the harbour defences issue for a moment, which i admit i cant answer completely, IMO subs entering the harbours would not be able to dive, and would be very easy targets in most cases. For the japanese, operating as corsairs, in my opinion, in the open reaches of the ocean, is a far more prudent option
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As far as Australia is concerned, I know that Sydney did, and have to disagree with you by saying also that Melbourne did as well. the Port of Brisbane is a river, at the headwaters of Moreton Bay, a very shallow body of water that any Sub would have to traverse in a surfaced condition for more than 100 miles. The boom defences in Sydney were not completely fullproof however, as the Midget sub attack in May shows,
Parsifal, I can agree with you about halfway. In Australia which probably had the most protected ports, the Axis subs could lurk outside the ports and on the coastal shipping routes, which probably had enough traffic to be effective. I don't see this being practical in the open areas of the Pacific ocean. after the first month of sinking some ships in the SE Pacific {Tonga, Fiji, N. Caledonia, Tahiti etc, the shipping traffic would probably dry up, the Japanese boats would probably be re-deployed. The US Canadian Pacific ports are not only mostly unprotected {and impossible to boom}, but provide ideal hunting hiding ground for subs. The large, deep bays in Juan de Fuca {Vancouver}, Puget sound {Seattle Tacoma}, San Fransisco have dozens of small, deep, uninhabited inlets that would allow the subs to hide in, surfacing at night to hunt targets of oppertunity, or ships entering/leaving the harbour.
I dont have much knowlewdge about the US west coast ports, but as Wildcat points out in his post, there is quite a bit of evidence to suggest that the ports in Australia were given some level of protection. I dont think Australia was alone in providing port defences. The commonwealth had been at war for three years, we had suffered the effcts of raiders, and had been fretting about Japan since the war in Europe boke out. Ine the acase of singapore, the port was protected by the big guns, as well as proper passive defences. There were also extensive minefieldws around the port. Singas was the main fleet base in the far east, along with Trincomallee and to a lesser extent Colombo. I am about 90% sure as well that Surabaya, the main RNN base was also protected. Protecting you harbours is a fundamental first step in wartime, and the main reason that enemy forces dont try these Guere De Course activities directly into the harbours of an opponent. For an idea of what usually happens in these circumstances, look at what happened at Dieppe.....a massacre basically
In order for the blockade scenario to work , the japanese must sustain their efforts relentlessly. This is why Sys was trying to say they (the Japanese) would abandon the policy after only a few losses. I dont agree with that summation, but neither is a blockade of just a few weeks going to achieve anything either. in the case of the Pacific, it is the interdiction of traffic, not so much the tonnages that do the damage. So, if the targets disappear, because they dare not risk the Japanese subs waiting for them, then the Japanese have won anyway. If the MS comes out unprotected, or inadequateky protected (as it must, in the beginning), then the Japanese sink a significant proportion of them, and the outcome is the same as the "no comee outee" strategy. If the the US attempts a major effort too early, to somehow break the Japanese hold over the Allies, the US will probably suffer a major defeat, and still be in deep do dos. But the key to all this, is for the Japanese to maintain th blockade (which only requires to be partially successful in order to work)..
One other thing, Japanese submarines were designed for Pacific operations. Many i-Boats were equipped with their own seaplanes, and they were backed up by a maritime SAR force which by March was being re-equipped with Search aircraft capable of long range patrols of over 24 hours duration, and ranges approaching 2000 miles (each way). The subs were exceptionally lonranged, and exceptionally fast (in a surfaced condition). Provided they adopted some of the practices of the KM, they could rapidly deploy to areas where major convoys were located, and then deal with them, or, if too heavily defended, spot for the surface fleet, which could descend on the convoy and dispatch it with a carrier strike
As the west coast ports begin to curtail sailings a losses mount alarmingly, the japanese could send more boats to East Africa/Indian ocean to help strangle the Commonwealth war effort.
The Japanese only needed to maintain a force of six boats in the Indian Ocean, in order to cause majopr disruption to the India bound convoys, in 1943. If the germans had been willing to offer help in this theatre in 1942 (perhaps by sending the LR Italian cruiser subs there, to work out of Singapore), the demise of the Allies in that theatre could have been hastened.
Out of interest, here is some info on the coastal defences of Moreton Bay/Brisbane River area in WWII.
Wildcat do you know if there were any ASW squadrons in the Brisbane area in Dec '41 - Mar '42?
No. 23 squadron (Hudson and Wirraway), which was based at Archerfield (Brisbane) was engaged in seaward patrols in this time period. In the Dec '41- Jan '42 timeframe, the unit's Hudson's were up daily carrying out these patrols. In late Jan, the Hudsons were posted out to help form 32 sqn at Port Moresby, therefore it was left up to the squadron's Wirraways to carry on with the seaward patrols. Interestingly on the 24th of March '42, a Wirraway dropped two bombs on a submarine roughly 50 miles off the coast of Brisbane, a brown substance came to the surface however what effect the bombs had on the sub was unknown.
Yeah, I doubt our Hudsons had ASV at this time aswell. Infact I don't think they were ever installed in our Hudson force at all - though I could be wrong.Interesting. In Vancouver we had Ansons at the training base at Jericho, and Hampdens were used for training at Patricia Bay on Vancouver island. However I think that none of them had airborne search radar at this time, and I suspect that the Hudsons probably did not either.
Wildcat I believe that the cargo freighters anchor in Moreton bay, near Manly, if I remember correctly? {I was there in 1988 so it's been some time}
Then when a space opens up the tugs would help the ship up the river to dock unload is this correct?
If the situation is similar to Vancouver, where we had only 3 or 4 cargo berths in the inner harbour Fraser river, so there would usually be 5 - 10 ships anchored in the large outer bay, waiting to be either loded or unloaded
I'm not sure how it all works on the Brisbane river, sorry mate. Emac might know the particulars.
1) A major reduction of Shipping for the pacific, significantly delaying the counteroffensive in the pacific.
2) Suspension or delay in the blue water navy currently under construction in favour of increase MS and small ship production.
3) A cut or abandonment of the more agressive parts of US aircraft production, such as the heavy bomber program, to free up more resources for MS and escort production.
4) Diversion of more DDs and carriers to Europe from the Pacific.
5) Reduction or abandonment of the Arctic Convoys to Russia.
6) Diversion of more RN assets to assist the USN in its coastal convoy battles. Woulds almost certainly have resulted in the loss of malta
The change in the production priorities of the shipyards can not be done over night. If the hull is mostly completed on the slip, then it would have been completed, simply because demolishing it would take more time than it was worth. And dont think that the boilers and machinery can simply be removed from the capital ships and reused in smaller ships. Theres issues of size, weight, performance, etc.
I say there would be little if any change in the output of the warships in the yards simply because there was nothing to be done in the short term, and the warships had to be built.
And I also take issue with the supposition that the KM and IJN could maintain tempo's like this scenario on an open ended basis. It couldnt be done and eventually the effectiveness drops off as subs are lost or damaged and allied countermeasures are put into place.
Andd it is extremely unlikely that the US would just abandon Hawaii. The USN could always get enough tankers to Pearl to keep its carriers operating in a low tempo pace of operations. In fact, the carriers would probably be used first in escorting convoys from the mainland to the islands. And once the IJN "smelled" warships .... then any number of their subs would be pulled from commerce raiding to warship hunting with the resultant drop in potential attacks on merchant men.