Could the Luftwaffe have done a better job supplying the 6th army at Stallingrad

DonL said:

I don't disagree,

but the direct order from Hitler to Rommel was, he should hold the frontline till his army gets a victory or dies!
That was the order, nothing else!

Rommel ignored this and ordered break out and escape. After he has dictated this order he dictated a letter to his wife with last regards and the explanation that he is convinced that he will die for this order! That's documented from primary sources.

He had the nuts to make a decision!

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No disagreement here. But any other general would have suffered the penalty. Eventually so did he.

DonL said:

The 29. ID mot. was equipped with Panzer IV and Panzer III.
Then the soviet books can also explain why the IV. mech Korps of Major General Wolskis was stopping at Sety after he heard the catastrophe of the 57th at radio? And he only moved forward late of 22 November after the direct and personal order from Jeremenko?

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Yes, I know, I have wrote that already twice! In late 42 fully equipped Inf.Div (Mot) usually had a PzAbt.
Simply saying that it was mostly because of lost of nerves by CGs, German armoured units had put fear into minds of many Soviet commanders who then were overcautious in late 42. According to them Germans greatly overestimated the damage done by 29th.

I'd not say that 29th was 100% fresh but it was rested and 100% equipped, with 16th Inf. Div (Mot.), which also had a PzAbt, for the attack to SE.

Juha

I have no soviet sources to this issue!
But the 57th army retreated and my point is, that Paulus, after the order (change of the 29th and IV. Armeekorps from 4th Panzerarmee to the 6th Army at 21 November)from Heeregruppe B (General Weichs), had a full equipped and fresh offensive division at the south!
So if he would/will decide to break out (southwest) he had a very good strike unit at the right point!

DonL said:

Stalingrad was a child of Hitler, at october it had absolutely no strategical or tatical impact, nor an economy impact, Stalingrad was dead!

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that is the sad part as i understand it. all those troops and equipment wasted for basically a vendetta. it was stalin's name sake so hitler must have it.

when did paulus take over? wasnt he given command of the 6th with the understanding that something ( basically taking stalingrad ) needed to be done...hence his reluctance in retreating?

Paulus took over from General von Reichenau at December 1941 or January 1942, as General von Reichenau (died at January 1942), took over Heeresgruppe Süd, after General von Rundstedt had his issue with Hitler about Rostow!

I have no problem with it, whether you believe me or not!

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I know that you have no problem believing your own propaganda, same as Hitler i guess

I challenge you, if I think you give unsubstantiated claimes or quotes and bring forward my arguments!

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Challenge not accepted.

After that, every member or reader can decide to himself, which arguments are better or which researched opinion is more substantiated!

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According to Hayward, at Page 243, and quoting directly from Manstein an OKH/Op Abt vom 24/11/1942, betr Beurteilungder Lage Der 6 Armee FS (Abschrift OB Kdo der HGr Don/Ia Nr 4580/42 g Kdo Chefs vom 24.11.1942 ca 1300 Uhr published doc 14 Kehrig 564 "Unfortunately for all those opposed to Hitlers "Stand Fast" orders and airlift decision, Manstein made his own assessment of the situation and sent the High Command a more optimistic appraisal. His position was similar to Jodls; while he agreed that a breakout was the safest option, .....he was not convinced by Army Group B's insistence on an immediate breakout. If a relief operation could start in early December, he argued , and if promised reinforcements arrived in time, it was still possible to save the army . Of course he cautioned, if it proved impossible to launch or meet the army's supply needs by airthen it should break out.

Hitlers decision was vindicated (he felt). He (Hitler) highly valued Manteins opinion, and eagerly informed Zetzler (who was the most senior officer to advocate a breakout) and his other advisers that the field marshalls assessments (was aligned to his own). The debate was over, he had won".

So, from a good source, quoting primary material, it seems that Manastein in November supported Hitler in making 6 AQrmy stand fast until relieved. That situation changed, and Manstein fundamental position was not quite the same as hitlers, but to try and argue that Manstein wantefd an immediate breakout in mid November, is manifestly untrue.

It is intersting to note that Manstein, often toted as the best Army Commander in the German Army supported Hitlers stand fast order at Stalingrad. He understood that any breakout from the pocket would only come at ruinous losses to 6th Army.

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, Manstein made his own assessment of the situation and sent the High Command a more optimistic appraisal. His position was similar to Jodls; while he agreed that a breakout was the safest option, .....he was not convinced by Army Group B's insistence on an immediate breakout. If a relief operation could start in early December, he argued , and if promised reinforcements arrived in time, it was still possible to save the army . Of course he cautioned, if it proved impossible to launch or meet the army's supply needs by airthen it should break out.

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Please enlighten me, what the first quote have to do with the second?

So, from a good source, quoting primary material, it seems that Manastein in November supported Hitler in making 6 AQrmy stand fast until relieved.

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This is your interpretation!
First Manstein wasn't exactly informed about all issues, because he wasn't on location (arriving on location at 26 November), there is absolutley no word about any estimation about the LW possibilities about air supply, so I think he was getting his information not from the local commander's, different to the Army Group B and he makes very clear that the possible supply by air is a fundemental issue to his considerations!

To interpret that is the same opinion as Hitler is adventurous!
Even more if we assume he would get the possibility to talk to General Richthofen before this assessment of the situation!

I know that you have no problem believing your own propaganda, same as Hitler i guess

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Thank you for your compliment and this very nice analogy

Challenge not accepted.

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I don't care about this...................

Apparently your concept of an all weather airfield is entirely different from mine.

I served 12 years in U.S. Army engineer units of various types. They have a lot of heavy equipment (bulldozers, scrapers, dumptrucks, graders, vibratory rollers, compacters etc.) and people trained to operate that equipment. That's what you need to create a runway with a smooth surface and proper drainage. You also need gravel or crushed stone for the runway base plus concrete or pierced metal planking for the runway surface. You will probably also need some culverts for the drainage system. Airfield lighting would be nice too. And perhaps some heated hangers for servicing aircraft when the temperature is below zero. This all adds up to a lot of stuff.

Please enlighten me, what the first quote have to do with the second?

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In relation to this quote,

It is intersting to note that Manstein, often toted as the best Army Commander in the German Army supported Hitlers stand fast order at Stalingrad. He understood that any breakout from the pocket would only come at ruinous losses to 6th Army. By the time of the encirclement, 6th Army had a fraction of its required transport. It was understrength in both MT and horsedrawn transport. Most of its units were carrying casualty rates of above 40%, which would have been abandoned in an emergency breakout. If a breakout had been attempted, and had been successful (neither assumption can be assumed as possible), perhaps 30-60000 of the original strength of 250000 might have gotten out. None of the heavy artillery or supporting equipment could have been saved. This was a major consideration for both Hitler and Manstein.

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you stated

To which timeline you refering here?
At the timeline between 21 November and 25 November the whole quote is absolutely wrong, every sentence

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!

Now i have produced some evidence, which you asked for, that supports the position that manstein supported the stand fast Order in November. You have not refuted that, so should we now assume that your claim " at the time 21-25 November the whole quote is absolutely wrong, every sentence". Are we now to believe that not everyword is incorect. Or are you still claiming that Manstein 21-25 november did not support a stand fast order?

The first quote are my words, but if you read the whole quote, you will see that hitler used Mansteins assessment as support for his stand fast orders, which Manstein did not object to.

This is your interpretation!

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Yes it is, and based solidly on primary sources. Yours remain unsubstantiated claims and opinion

First Manstein wasn't exactly informed about all issues, because he wasn't on location (arriving on location at 26 November), there is absolutley no word about any estimation about the LW possibilities about air supply, so I think he was getting his information not from the local commander's, different to the Army Group B and he makes very clear that the possible supply by air is a fundemental issue to his considerations!

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Again this is your unsubstantiated opinion. Hayward is at pains to point out that manstein had made his report on the basis of painstaking and thorough investigation. That suggest that he underestimated the gravity of the situation, not that he was badly informaed, as you are climing in your opinion /propaganda piece.

To interpret that is the same opinion as Hitler is adventurous!

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Ah no, its interpreting facts and primary sources. Whats adventurous is to believe your uncorroborated statements and fantasies such as "100%" combat ready, or that manstein did not support the Stand fast order.

Even more if we assume he would get the possibility to talk to General Richthofen before this assessment of the situation!

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Its adventurous to dream up apologies for commancders, even for one as good as Manstein, when all of the available information presented thus far in this thread, suggests he simply made a mistake, not that he was lacking information. in any event, as an AG commande, it was still his responsibility to get the information he needed. Why didnt he talk to Richthofen?????. Moreover he stuck to that opinion for some time after the 26th

LOL!

This is your interpretation!

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Yes it is, and based solidly on primary sources. Yours remain unsubstantiated claims and opinion

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A assessment of the situation from a just in time designated commanding general (at 24 November), who is thousands of kilometers away from the location, getting only informations about radio/tele typewriter , or do you realy think there was a telephone link, between the 11th Army and the Heeresgruppe B, and from this you think you can derive a established opinion of this commander and then you will claim this as proved from primary sources...........
How on earth do you think he should get informations from the local comanders? There weren't Handy's at this time.........

Oh and Hitler used anything and everything that comes along with his agenda!

Are we now to believe that not everyword is incorect. Or are you still claiming that Manstein 21-25 november did not support a stand fast order?

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Yes I do, because he hadn't every information he needed to make a realy substained assessment of the situation at 24 November.
Other then the Armygroup B and as he gets all informations he didn't stick to his opinion!

And Mr. Parsifal you shouldn't interpret my statements, because to me it is totaly equal, if he had done a failure, or underestimate the situation, or had hit his head at the time of the assessment! I realy don't care about this, because it is totaly unimportant.
For Hitler it was a assessment of the situation he craved just as the assessment of Jeschonnek and Göring!
And it is more then eye-catching, that this assessments, are all from General Commanders who are not at the location and not close to the facts!
Armygroup B and Luftflotte 4 as the units at location have made fundamental other assessments!
If you want, you can blaime General Manstein but i think the circumstances are important.
And to say my argumentations are unsubstantiated claims and opinions, I realy don't care, because you are the one who claimed that Manstein had had the same opinion as Hitler.
I repeat it again, this is more then adventurous, if you look at all circumstances!

As he was at the location and gets all the informations he needed, he was far away from Hitler's opinion! That's documented by General Schulz Ia of the Heeresgruppe Don at the first meeting of the General Stuff at the location.

This will be everyone's ONLY warning. Keep it civil or vacations will be given.

Sorry i haven't done anything. This time I haven't said any personal wrong word,or have done a provokation.

I'm talking about anyone who can't be civil, not just one person. Its a good discussion but I can see tempers starting to cloud judgement.

DonL

Your initial position was to dismiss my comments as bunkum. You challenged me to produce some evidence, which I have done. Your interpretation of that information is, to say the least novel, but you are no longer dismissing my claims as bunkum, but are now making excuses for mansteins failure, whilst trying to throw up the biggest smokescreen we have seen around herein a while.

The buck stops at the Army Group Commander. army Group Commanders dont have the luxury of making excuses....they make decisions. thats what they are there for. Manstein accepted the assignment, and if he wasnt ready to make a statement, should not have donte so, because his opinion carried great weight and it was used to silence Hitlers critics. It affected the decision to attempt an airlift to a very significant extent, far more so than poor old Paulus.

I agree, Richthofens and Fiebigs assessments were far more accurate, and should have been listened to. Thats not the issue. The issue (well one of them) was whether Manstein supported Hitlers Stand Fast Order. You initially refuted that, now you are busy making excuses for the man, whilst still trying to cast doubt on the ultimate source of information for this material....the Lage Ost reports. You can laugh all you want, make rude and destabiluizing comments all you want, misinterpret all the plain facts all you want, but the proof is ther for everyone to see. You claimed, initially that Manstein wanted an immediate breakout attempt. clearly that claim is now in tatters, but that does not seem to have any effect on your rose coloured view of the German Army. Now you arent saying that. The goal posts have moved I see. Rather than continually attacking me, how about you put your money where your mouth is and post some supporting information for people to look at. Specifically where is your proof that Manstein supported an immediate Breakout attempt from mid November......good lucki with finding that....

Now I have produced evidence as you have requested. People can judge that as they see fit. Time for you to produce your much vaunted evidence and skill to refute the claim, rather than simply producing a lot of opinion, which as you know I see as just so much froth and bubble.

Or, are we in for yet another tirade and insult session....you claim your behaviour is acceptable. I beg to differ on that one as well, though that is opinion.

And by the way Mr DonL, I am Parsifal to you, not Mr Parsifal. Parsifal incidentally is the slayer of evil, the defender of the truth, purity and the righteous. He is a figure of german folklore, deliberately selected for purposes such as this. Read up on your Wagner.....hope you are enjoying the pointy end of the spear.

Njaco said:

This will be everyone's ONLY warning. Keep it civil or vacations will be given.

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I sense there will be "selective reading" by several members in this thread...

i am listening, and I hear you guys. I am also trying at keeping the debate focussed. if i am unable to control my temper i will take the hands off the wheel and step back for while.

There is no love lost between me an DonL. There is latent dislike between the both of us. For my part, i say i have previously been the target by internet beatings from this person. nothing to do with the content, a lot to do with the language. Has virtually no effect on me, I will continue to debate the issue as objectively as i can, for as long as I can. But neither am i going to mekly conceede the point in a debate.

I say....let the debate continue. Let the abuse cease....

davebender said:

Apparently your concept of an all weather airfield is entirely different from mine.

I served 12 years in U.S. Army engineer units of various types. They have a lot of heavy equipment (bulldozers, scrapers, dumptrucks, graders, vibratory rollers, compacters etc.) and people trained to operate that equipment. That's what you need to create a runway with a smooth surface and proper drainage. You also need gravel or crushed stone for the runway base plus concrete or pierced metal planking for the runway surface. You will probably also need some culverts for the drainage system. Airfield lighting would be nice too. And perhaps some heated hangers for servicing aircraft when the temperature is below zero. This all adds up to a lot of stuff.

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Different Army and different time. Already during WWII US construction units had much more heavy equipment than Europeans saying nothing on Japanese, but others build a/fs anyway. And as I wrote they needed only upgrade already existing a/fs with better radios beacons and some lightning. To keep them open heavy equipment would have been nice but that was possible also without them if there were men for manual labour available. And one could make a temporary landing ground during Eastern Front winter without earth improvements, of course it would bacome unuseable when the thaw arrived.

Juha

This will be everyone's ONLY warning. Keep it civil or vacations will be given.

Gardening leave.

MM

davebender said:

I find it difficult to believe Goering didn't have that information in front of him. He had a staff to read readiness reports from the various Luftflotte and keep status boards up to date.

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I have no idea whether he did or not. I don't believe that his assurances that the encircled army could be supplied from the air were based on sound military advice. He was getting that from Richthofen and many others. He had a staff whose advice he could,and did,ignore.
Anyway there was noone from the air staff arguing against the air supply at the OKH because of Jeshonnek's equivocal stance.

You can never discount the political considerations in the decision making of the nazi leadership,and the propensity of these palladins for interfering in military matters of which they had no detailed understanding.

It's a fundamental difference in leadership that on the allied side the war was run by technocrats to whom the political leadership usually deferred on matters military. I'm not referring to policy but the nuts and bolts of the allied strategy to realise those policies.

Cheers
Steve

I mean the western allies,I don't know enough about Soviet policy and strategy or the individuals involved to have an opinion.

I will state the answer to the original question with a paradox, that IF 'the german high command' had realised that it was impossible to deliver the needed tonnage no matter what they did, extreme emergency meassures could be taken at an earlier time, fx the arrival of Milch. This could marginally have raised the supplies to 6th army, but probably also would have incurred an even greater cost on the Luftwaffe without much improvement to the germans overall strategic position.

So the answear is yes, but not enough could have been done.

Then there is the (strictly speaking off topic) question about the chances of a break-out. To me it seems important to keep the overall strategic situation in mind, and though there seem to be little doubt that an immidiate withdrawal after the collapse of the flanks of 6th army would have saved quite a lot of it, it is impossible to know what condition it would have been in, or indeed how many could escape. As time passed the cost would rise steadily.

But looking at the eatern front as a whole this withdrawal might have had grave consequenses (I basicly agree with Juha on this topic), and that is one reason why the commander on the spot should not disobey orders lightly. In a perfect world nobody would have taken orders from Hitler, but a field commander should always keep in mind that he dosn't have the overall picture in front of him. (Neither should the overall commander forget that the field commander might have a more realistic idea about the capabilities of the forces under direct command). When a generals concern for the well being of his troops becomes the first and only priority, he should probably consider changing profession. If on the other hand Paulus' reasons where only worries about being executed for treason, the morally right thing to do was of course to order a break out, at leat while there was a real possibility of getting out a lot of his men.

The German high command (esp Hitler and Göring) failed miserably (also) on this occasion, but even after a successful withdrawal of army group A and B the strategic outlook for germany would have been bleak. In grand strategical terms Germany HAD to defeat the soviet union to win the war, though a defensive stance might have prolonged it somewhat. The improved capabilities (though exactly how improved is open to debate) of the Red Army arguably also came as a shock to Germans throughout their force structure. As I remember Hitler being quoted, he said that he could never get there again (Stalingrad), and even if the city itself was whithout strategic significanse, there seem little reason to believe that the Wehrmacht could have penetrated deep into Soviet held territory to take areas of desisive strategic importance again in 43, at least not on a scale mirroring that of 42, let alone 41.

Anyway I think the discussion shows that it is very difficult to weigh the benefits of holding up considerable Soviet forces versus getting out some divisions, and it should come as no surprise that the germans (from Paulus to Hitler) didn't act fully rational in such an overall hopeless situation. Even with hindsight it seem like we have a hard time agreeing on exactly what was possible and preferrable.