Especially when you consider that while they were attacking (or looking towards) England at Mussolinis insistence Taranto was attacked and the Italian fleet severely mauled.
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Especially when you consider that while they were attacking (or looking towards) England at Mussolinis insistence Taranto was attacked and the Italian fleet severely mauled.Sad to say, their participation/performance was such, that it mahttp://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=1121445kes for an obscure footnote in history.
Funnily enough their V1 campaign was more rational (the V2 was a joke). The V1 was cheap to develop and build so they could throw thousands at the UK, Antwerp, etc. It cost the allies far more in resources to defend against them that it cost the Germans to use them, so it was a sort of strategic win for them.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flying_bomb#AssessmentHas anyone done an economic analysis of this?
I know this group has had some quite detailed discussions of the Strategic Bombing Campaign, with Parsifal being a big contributer, but don't remember seeing this done for the V-1's.
Unlike the V-2, the V-1 was a cost-effective weapon for the Germans as it forced the Allies to spend heavily on defensive measures and divert bombers from other targets. More than 25% of Combined Bomber Offensive's bombs in July and August 1944 were used against V-weapon sites, often ineffectively.[12] In early December 1944, American General Clayton Bissell wrote a paper which argued strongly in favour of the V-1 compared to conventional bombers.[34]
Blitz (12 months) vs V-1 flying bombs (2¾ months)
Blitz V-1
1. Cost to Germany
Sorties 90,000 8,025
Weight of bombs tons 61,149 14,600
Fuel consumed tons 71,700 4,681
Aircraft lost 3,075 0
Personnel lost 7,690 0
2. Results
Structures damaged/destroyed 1,150,000 1,127,000
Casualties 92,566 22,892
Rate casualties/bombs tons 1.6 1.6
3. Allied air effort
Sorties 86,800 44,770
Aircraft lost 1,260 351
Personnel lost 2,233 805
The statistic of this report, however, have been the subject of some dispute. The V-1 missiles were often prone to exploding prematurely, occasionally resulting in the loss of the aircraft from which they were dropped. The Luftwaffe lost 77 aircraft as a result of the launch of these sorties.[35]
The US built Republic-Ford JB-2 and the navalized version, KGW-1, were planned to be used for the invasion of Japan.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JB-2_Loon
So I assume there was value seen.
There was also the huge expense of building fortified V-1 storage and launch facilities like Siracourt and V-2 facilities like Watten.
Even without constant damage and reconstruction from Allied bombing, they consumed a tremendous amount of materials, logistics and manpower.
There is a first hand account from Myles Duke-Woolley, who did favour the tactic.
"I will say the old Hun tried hard, but they did not like that head-on business. One could see the leader carrying on straight, but the followers wavering, drawing out sideways to the flanks, and in some cases just plain leaving the formation."
Im not sure that head on attacks made all that much sense when attacking LW bomber formations. A B-17 defensive box was a formidable formation, and the weakest part of the aircraft was from front on. LW bombers were far weaker defensivand ive heard their weakest point, in terms of defensive fire was from behind
Post war US estimates put the estimated development costs of the V-1 and V-2 weapons at three billion dollars. 1 US dollar was equivalent to 2.5 RM during the war years, give or take a few cents. The V-1 program comprised a mere two hundred million dollars of this.
About 30,000 V-1s were built at a cost of 5,000 RM each. A V-2 cost 121,000RM and 6,600 were built. This is a lot of money, but also a lot of bang. Many missiles (estimates go as high as a quarter) launched never made it across the Channel. A loss the Germans could ill afford. It has been estimated that the production of both missiles used up materiel equivalent to 24,000 single engine fighters. Could the Germans afford this?
36,000 tons of explosives were used in these weapons which might have been better used elsewhere. To defend the V-1 launch sites in France the Germans employed as many flak units as they used to defend the entire city of Hamburg.
It is important to be aware of indirect costs, not just the 5,000RM price tag for a V-1
Against this the weapons did cost the allies vast sums to defend against them. There was a huge redeployment of anti aircraft artillery to SE England. As many as ten fighter squadrons were largely tied up in anti 'Diver' operations. 2,000 barrage balloons and associated infra structure were deployed to little effect. Even the most optimistic estimates credit balloons with 300 V-1s.
Between August 1943 and August 1944 Operation Crossbow sorties against the launch sites comprised 14% of all bomber sorties flown and 16% of tonnage dropped. This is a significant cost and it never stopped the launches. The diversion of bombers from other targets is what historians call an 'opportunity cost' (like the cost to the Germans of defending the launch sites) and they are significant.
For all the money spent by both sides what did the V-1 (or V-2) really achieve. The answer is not a fat lot. They were the result of a lack of strategic vision, something that the Germans in particular displayed throughout the war. The weapons might have been cheap, particularly the V-1, but they were also unreliable and very inaccurate. They were never able to threaten specific military targets, but only area targets like London or later Antwerp. They couldn't for example threaten the invasion fleet assembling in ports along the south coast of England, they were too small a target. The V-1 could 'repetitively strike' (usually this means at least 50% of missiles but it is unclear in my reference) within a circle with a diameter of 12 miles, for the V-2 this was 9 miles. They did deliver a tonnage on vague targets like this much more cheaply than for example a strategic bombing force could have, if those billions had been spent there instead, but the effect on the outcome of the war was negligible.
Cheers
Steve
Park at Bomber Command and Harris at Fighter Command. It very nearly happened. There's a 'What If' for you!
Steve
I think it made sense to Park because of his oft' repeated priorities. The bombers were the targets, he kept repeating this over and over again like a mantra. He also believed that disrupting the formations not only made the bombers more vulnerable (which it did) but that it would spoil their ability to bomb accurately. He also repeatedly said that disrupting the many was more important than downing a few. Unlike a certain Leigh - Mallory, who said the exact opposite, Park (and Dowding) believed it was important to intercept the bombers before they reached their targets whenever possible. The intention was to prevent them bombing (not likely, though it did happen) or at the very least force them to bomb inaccurately.
We all discuss today rates of attrition, who could last longer, and talk about fighting to a stalemate. Park had been involved in the development of Britain's air defences since the mid 1920s and defending Britain's air space, all of it, was all he was trying to do. He had a thorough understanding of the system and tools which he had to do the job, which was just as well for us.
Things might have been very different. In May 1938 the Air Ministry wished to send Park to Palestine. Arthur Harris was to go to Fighter Command as Senior Air Staff Officer, Dowding's number two. Harris wrote that he had a long standing agreement with Cyril Newall, Chief of the Air Staff, that he should go to Palestine. Harris later claimed that he persuaded Newall by telling him that he was recently married and that his wife's trousseau was "entirely tropical". In fact Park had in April been in hospital with acute streptococcal pharyngitis and his being declared 'unfit for service abroad' and sent on a month's sick leave suffering from 'general debility' probably had more to do with the change in appointments than Mrs Harris' wardrobe. Harris went to Palestine and Park became Dowding's right hand man in July 1938.
Park at Bomber Command and Harris at Fighter Command. It very nearly happened. There's a 'What If' for you!
Cheers
Steve
By the time the B of B started had the Germans managed to set up any of their own radar stations on the Frech coast? Did the Luftwaffe manage to get any warning of Park's intercepting squadrons beyond visual?
Over Dieppe and the French campaign they lost at about 4:1.