Especially when you consider that while they were attacking (or looking towards) England at Mussolinis insistence Taranto was attacked and the Italian fleet severely mauled.
Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?
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Has anyone done an economic analysis of this?
I know this group has had some quite detailed discussions of the Strategic Bombing Campaign, with Parsifal being a big contributer, but don't remember seeing this done for the V-1's.
Post war US estimates put the estimated development costs of the V-1 and V-2 weapons at three billion dollars. 1 US dollar was equivalent to 2.5 RM during the war years, give or take a few cents. The V-1 program comprised a mere two hundred million dollars of this.
About 30,000 V-1s were built at a cost of 5,000 RM each. A V-2 cost 121,000RM and 6,600 were built. This is a lot of money, but also a lot of bang. Many missiles (estimates go as high as a quarter) launched never made it across the Channel. A loss the Germans could ill afford. It has been estimated that the production of both missiles used up materiel equivalent to 24,000 single engine fighters. Could the Germans afford this?
36,000 tons of explosives were used in these weapons which might have been better used elsewhere. To defend the V-1 launch sites in France the Germans employed as many flak units as they used to defend the entire city of Hamburg.
It is important to be aware of indirect costs, not just the 5,000RM price tag for a V-1
Against this the weapons did cost the allies vast sums to defend against them. There was a huge redeployment of anti aircraft artillery to SE England. As many as ten fighter squadrons were largely tied up in anti 'Diver' operations. 2,000 barrage balloons and associated infra structure were deployed to little effect. Even the most optimistic estimates credit balloons with 300 V-1s.
Between August 1943 and August 1944 Operation Crossbow sorties against the launch sites comprised 14% of all bomber sorties flown and 16% of tonnage dropped. This is a significant cost and it never stopped the launches. The diversion of bombers from other targets is what historians call an 'opportunity cost' (like the cost to the Germans of defending the launch sites) and they are significant.
For all the money spent by both sides what did the V-1 (or V-2) really achieve. The answer is not a fat lot. They were the result of a lack of strategic vision, something that the Germans in particular displayed throughout the war. The weapons might have been cheap, particularly the V-1, but they were also unreliable and very inaccurate. They were never able to threaten specific military targets, but only area targets like London or later Antwerp. They couldn't for example threaten the invasion fleet assembling in ports along the south coast of England, they were too small a target. The V-1 could 'repetitively strike' (usually this means at least 50% of missiles but it is unclear in my reference) within a circle with a diameter of 12 miles, for the V-2 this was 9 miles. They did deliver a tonnage on vague targets like this much more cheaply than for example a strategic bombing force could have, if those billions had been spent there instead, but the effect on the outcome of the war was negligible.
Cheers
Steve
About 30,000 V-1s were built at a cost of 5,000 RM each. A V-2 cost 121,000RM and 6,600 were built. This is a lot of money, but also a lot of bang. Many missiles (estimates go as high as a quarter) launched never made it across the Channel. A loss the Germans could ill afford. It has been estimated that the production of both missiles used up materiel equivalent to 24,000 single engine fighters. Could the Germans afford this?
36,000 tons of explosives were used in these weapons which might have been better used elsewhere. To defend the V-1 launch sites in France the Germans employed as many flak units as they used to defend the entire city of Hamburg.
It is important to be aware of indirect costs, not just the 5,000RM price tag for a V-1
Against this the weapons did cost the allies vast sums to defend against them. There was a huge redeployment of anti aircraft artillery to SE England. As many as ten fighter squadrons were largely tied up in anti 'Diver' operations. 2,000 barrage balloons and associated infra structure were deployed to little effect. Even the most optimistic estimates credit balloons with 300 V-1s.
Between August 1943 and August 1944 Operation Crossbow sorties against the launch sites comprised 14% of all bomber sorties flown and 16% of tonnage dropped. This is a significant cost and it never stopped the launches. The diversion of bombers from other targets is what historians call an 'opportunity cost' (like the cost to the Germans of defending the launch sites) and they are significant.
For all the money spent by both sides what did the V-1 (or V-2) really achieve. The answer is not a fat lot. They were the result of a lack of strategic vision, something that the Germans in particular displayed throughout the war. The weapons might have been cheap, particularly the V-1, but they were also unreliable and very inaccurate. They were never able to threaten specific military targets, but only area targets like London or later Antwerp. They couldn't for example threaten the invasion fleet assembling in ports along the south coast of England, they were too small a target. The V-1 could 'repetitively strike' (usually this means at least 50% of missiles but it is unclear in my reference) within a circle with a diameter of 12 miles, for the V-2 this was 9 miles. They did deliver a tonnage on vague targets like this much more cheaply than for example a strategic bombing force could have, if those billions had been spent there instead, but the effect on the outcome of the war was negligible.
Cheers
Steve
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wiking85
Staff Sergeant
What's the last bit about? The vast majority of V-1s were not air launched. About 1,450 sorties were flown to air launch V-1s. Against this should be balanced a report on KG 53 of October 1944 when training for air launching the V-1 at Karlshagen. There was a 23.94% failure rate from 71 attempted launches, as near a dammit 1 in 4. Of those launched many failed to perform correctly. Of the 71 attempted launches only 40 V-1s were adjudged to have performed 'satisfactorily'. Satisfactorily was that they attained ranges between 75 Km and 85 Km, the only fly in the ointment being that they were all supposedly programmed for a flight of 60 Km !
Beware of Wikipedia! Articles often have a high content of B.S.
Total losses of aircraft on air launched V-1 missions (KG 3 and KG 53) was 65. An unsubstantiated PoW account claimed that 12 aircraft were lost to a premature explosion of their payloads. This number is not included in the 65 official losses above and may explain the odd total of 77 in that article. Most were destroyed on the ground or lost to 'other causes'. Few (best estimate is a total of 17) were destroyed by night fighters.
Cost effectiveness is a very difficult thing to assess. The V-1s certainly tied down resources in England and the campaign against the launch sites, production facilities etc did use significant resources of the allied air forces. The problem for the Germans is that the allies could afford this. The opportunistic gain for the Germans is that these resources were not doing more damage elsewhere.
The V-1s also absorbed significant resources in Germany for their production, transport and launch, all of which had to be protected. This is separate from development costs. Germany was far shorter of such resources than the allies and this begs the question whether these increasingly scarce resources might have been better used elsewhere.
Simply being 'cost effective' at dumping a tonnage of explosives inaccurately across SE England, London and Antwerp does not necessarily mean that a system is worth the investment in it.
The Air Ministry compiled statistics on the accuracy od air launched V-1s. It would make for depressing reading for the Germans.
Of course 6-10 miles either way will still hit a target the size of a city (as London and Antwerp in particular found out) but how militarily valuable is this? The allies were dropping vastly more and more concentrated explosives on German cities, totally devastating many, something V-1s never came close to doing, and people still argue about how useful that was in interfering with Germany's productivity and will to fight on!
Obliterating a greenhouse in Kent (my family were market gardeners and this is from a first hand account) might not be as good value for money as a toolmaker in Croydon.
This lot were 'aimed' at London.
Cheers
Steve
Beware of Wikipedia! Articles often have a high content of B.S.
Total losses of aircraft on air launched V-1 missions (KG 3 and KG 53) was 65. An unsubstantiated PoW account claimed that 12 aircraft were lost to a premature explosion of their payloads. This number is not included in the 65 official losses above and may explain the odd total of 77 in that article. Most were destroyed on the ground or lost to 'other causes'. Few (best estimate is a total of 17) were destroyed by night fighters.
Cost effectiveness is a very difficult thing to assess. The V-1s certainly tied down resources in England and the campaign against the launch sites, production facilities etc did use significant resources of the allied air forces. The problem for the Germans is that the allies could afford this. The opportunistic gain for the Germans is that these resources were not doing more damage elsewhere.
The V-1s also absorbed significant resources in Germany for their production, transport and launch, all of which had to be protected. This is separate from development costs. Germany was far shorter of such resources than the allies and this begs the question whether these increasingly scarce resources might have been better used elsewhere.
Simply being 'cost effective' at dumping a tonnage of explosives inaccurately across SE England, London and Antwerp does not necessarily mean that a system is worth the investment in it.
The Air Ministry compiled statistics on the accuracy od air launched V-1s. It would make for depressing reading for the Germans.
Of course 6-10 miles either way will still hit a target the size of a city (as London and Antwerp in particular found out) but how militarily valuable is this? The allies were dropping vastly more and more concentrated explosives on German cities, totally devastating many, something V-1s never came close to doing, and people still argue about how useful that was in interfering with Germany's productivity and will to fight on!
Obliterating a greenhouse in Kent (my family were market gardeners and this is from a first hand account) might not be as good value for money as a toolmaker in Croydon.
This lot were 'aimed' at London.
Cheers
Steve
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The US built Republic-Ford JB-2 and the navalized version, KGW-1, were planned to be used for the invasion of Japan.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JB-2_Loon
So I assume there was value seen.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JB-2_Loon
So I assume there was value seen.
The US could easily afford such a weapon, even if it didn't work very well. Value for money is always relative to how much you can afford to spend. The US was also churning out B-29s and even the odd atomic bomb. Such things were beyond the resources available to Germany. The V-1 and V-2 was a last and useless throw of the dice.
The US could afford to transport no less than 492 German rocket scientists and technicians to the US after the war for its own programmes. Some of these men had 'dubious' backgrounds to say the least. Prominent among them was Werner von Braun and 126 men who had worked at Peenemunde.
Cheers
Steve
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
There was also the huge expense of building fortified V-1 storage and launch facilities like Siracourt and V-2 facilities like Watten.
Even without constant damage and reconstruction from Allied bombing, they consumed a tremendous amount of materials, logistics and manpower.
Even without constant damage and reconstruction from Allied bombing, they consumed a tremendous amount of materials, logistics and manpower.
I believe the V2 cost more lives on the German side than the allies use of slave labour poor conditions and extremely dangerous propellants.
The innaccuracy of the V1 was in part a victory for the spy network. Sensors (radio I believe) were attached to some to indicate how far they travelled, As i remember the sensors said they were long but spies told them they were short so they increased the parameters even more.
The innaccuracy of the V1 was in part a victory for the spy network. Sensors (radio I believe) were attached to some to indicate how far they travelled, As i remember the sensors said they were long but spies told them they were short so they increased the parameters even more.
Precisely so. And all this was also protected with substantial flak resources which might have been used elsewhere. Transporting the V-1s also used up scarce resources. These were all 'opportunity costs' to the Germans.
As I said before, just taking into account the price tag for each V-1, even if you include the cost of development, is an over simplified view of the overall cost, which also includes numerous factors like those in GrauGeist's post above.
Cheers
Steve
A brief return to the BoB. Some way back I said that I was unaware that Park had specifically favoured head on attacks, though certainly not denying the possibility. He did indeed favour them as seen in a document entitled 'Head-on Attacks', AIR 16/901.
Park considered that Luftwaffe bomber formations were vulnerable from the front, poorly armoured, lightly armed, in tight formation (without room to manoeuvre) and led by the best pilots. If attacked from the front he wrote that the formations 'would break up in confusion'. This fitted with his avowed aim of ruining the aim of the many, rather than shooting down a few.
Dowding refused to authorise this as a standard tactic because it allowed the least time for accurate shooting, the risk of collision was high and the fighters were exposed to the coordinated fire of rear gunners as they over shot.
There is a first hand account from Myles Duke-Woolley, who did favour the tactic.
"I will say the old Hun tried hard, but they did not like that head-on business. One could see the leader carrying on straight, but the followers wavering, drawing out sideways to the flanks, and in some cases just plain leaving the formation."
Cheers
Steve
Park considered that Luftwaffe bomber formations were vulnerable from the front, poorly armoured, lightly armed, in tight formation (without room to manoeuvre) and led by the best pilots. If attacked from the front he wrote that the formations 'would break up in confusion'. This fitted with his avowed aim of ruining the aim of the many, rather than shooting down a few.
Dowding refused to authorise this as a standard tactic because it allowed the least time for accurate shooting, the risk of collision was high and the fighters were exposed to the coordinated fire of rear gunners as they over shot.
There is a first hand account from Myles Duke-Woolley, who did favour the tactic.
"I will say the old Hun tried hard, but they did not like that head-on business. One could see the leader carrying on straight, but the followers wavering, drawing out sideways to the flanks, and in some cases just plain leaving the formation."
Cheers
Steve
What goes around comes around...
parsifal
Colonel
Im not sure that head on attacks made all that much sense when attacking LW bomber formations. A B-17 defensive box was a formidable formation, and the weakest part of the aircraft was from front on. LW bombers were far weaker defensivand ive heard their weakest point, in terms of defensive fire was from behind
I think it made sense to Park because of his oft' repeated priorities. The bombers were the targets, he kept repeating this over and over again like a mantra. He also believed that disrupting the formations not only made the bombers more vulnerable (which it did) but that it would spoil their ability to bomb accurately. He also repeatedly said that disrupting the many was more important than downing a few. Unlike a certain Leigh - Mallory, who said the exact opposite, Park (and Dowding) believed it was important to intercept the bombers before they reached their targets whenever possible. The intention was to prevent them bombing (not likely, though it did happen) or at the very least force them to bomb inaccurately.
We all discuss today rates of attrition, who could last longer, and talk about fighting to a stalemate. Park had been involved in the development of Britain's air defences since the mid 1920s and defending Britain's air space, all of it, was all he was trying to do. He had a thorough understanding of the system and tools which he had to do the job, which was just as well for us.
Things might have been very different. In May 1938 the Air Ministry wished to send Park to Palestine. Arthur Harris was to go to Fighter Command as Senior Air Staff Officer, Dowding's number two. Harris wrote that he had a long standing agreement with Cyril Newall, Chief of the Air Staff, that he should go to Palestine. Harris later claimed that he persuaded Newall by telling him that he was recently married and that his wife's trousseau was "entirely tropical". In fact Park had in April been in hospital with acute streptococcal pharyngitis and his being declared 'unfit for service abroad' and sent on a month's sick leave suffering from 'general debility' probably had more to do with the change in appointments than Mrs Harris' wardrobe. Harris went to Palestine and Park became Dowding's right hand man in July 1938.
Park at Bomber Command and Harris at Fighter Command. It very nearly happened. There's a 'What If' for you!
Cheers
Steve
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
Didn't say it was successful, just a more rational use of their resources. The Allies threw a lot at it, I get a total of 33 squadrons (inc 13 night fighters) involved for all or a part of the V1 defence period (June-Sep '44). 15 served through the entire campaign (3 were night fighters). Then there was the bombing, tactical aircraft, medium bombers and the strategic ones.
Add in everything else and the Allies definitely spent more resources than the Germans did, but they could afford it at that point. The political resources spent by the British were also immense, standing weekly PM committee, etc, etc. It was of major importance to them, there were evacuations again, etc, etc. So directly and indirectly it tied up a lot of their resources.
There were ways the Germans could have used them more effectively if they had managed to get them into full production say even 6 months before and if they had the intelligence/PR/etc resources and info (very big 'ifs' of course). Aim all at a port for a week and launch a few thousand, repeat at other places. The actual impact would be small in terms of hits, but the disruption would have been hideous and almost certainly harmed the D-Day build up. But they were too late, by the time they had the numbers any strategic gain they could possibly have got was really gone, intertesting to speculate that if they hadn't wasted all that time on the V2 then they might have been able to get the V1 up and running sooner(?).
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
We were lucky to have Park. People underestimate the pressure he was under. The Luftwaffe, to their credit, tried about every trick in the book. At times they were sending over bombers with 5:1 fighter/bomber ratios. hence Park's brilliant tactics of 'stripping off the escort' first.
This is where people who didn't understand air tactics then (and quite a few even now) get all mixed up. The 'big wings' seem like a good idea, until to realise that airfare is 3 dimensional and where seeing the enemy first and surprising them is of greater importance than numbers. Park used lots of squadrons, just in separate coordinated attacks, from all directions. There never was a moment where the Luftwaffe were not being attacked, going there and coming back. Single squadrons were small, hard to spot, could form up, climb and attack very quickly, and had a target rich environment. So they could get in and out and inflict damage, which the next squadron did the same from somewhere else and so on. At no point did he risk too many forces, even if a a whole squadron was lost they could be easily replaced.
The 'big wings' were the opposite and perfect for the Luftwaffe fighter tactics, who could dive in and kill some, then repeat. Post war analysis showed that, at best they managed 1:1 kill/loss, maybe less. Over Dieppe and the French campaign they lost at about 4:1.
Trying to form up a 'big wing' in 11 Group invited a slaughter of a couple or several squadrons at one hit, which was a Luftwaffe hope. This is what the US escorts later did to the German 'big wings', the Mustangs got into them as they were forming up and murdered them. Big, clumsy, easy to see, wasted huge amounts of time and fuel just forming up, everyone looking over their shoulder to avoid running into someone else and not noticing 4, half a dozen or 12 enemy fighters in their midst wrecking havok.
So we were lucky, Leigh Mallory would have lost the BoB in a couple of weeks ...max, Harris, (shudder), probably in a couple of days. Only Park, week after week handled his forces with a skill that has never been beaten (in all the innumerable wargames since then by just about every airforce in the world). Fortunately the Luftwaffe never had a a Park, otherwise the UK/US bombing effensive would have suffered a heck of a lot more than they did.
Interceptions of raids during the BoB rarely took place out to sea, unlike he much smaller scale Channel battles that preceded the assault on Fighter Command.
This is largely due to the way the command and control system worked. Raids could be detected forming up over the French coast but this was not the time to launch interceptors. Course, height and direction of the raids were all established in order to get the right squadron or squadrons to the right place at the right time to make the interception.
From the moment that orders were given by group controllers (for 11 Group these came from Uxbridge, scene of Churchill's dramatic visit) to sector controllers they were to be executed by squadrons taking off from airfields in that sector. Once airborne they were controlled from the ground and guided to the raid by their senior sector controller. It is often not understood that when squadrons from different sectors operated together they remained under the control of their own sector controller. As soon as raiders were sighted squadron commanders took charge and no further attempts were made to contact the engaged squadrons from the ground until they reported that the action was over.
It was the group controllers who were at the centre of the action. They had to interpret the filtered information coming in from Bentley Priory. They had to distinguish between major raids and feints and still keep as many aircraft as possible ready for action. Aircraft were not to waste fuel on pointless patrol, nor were they to be caught on or close to the ground. Several balances had to be struck between likely alternatives almost every day. It was a guessing game in which the penalties for guessing wrongly could be (and were) severe.
The Germans certainly had operational radar (Freya) at the beginning of the war but it was not part of a sophisticated command and control system until later. It did not give comprehensive coverage either. I believe the Germans did have some success seeing British raids coming early in the war, but I'd have to look that up to be sure. Someone else may know better
The Luftwaffe's fighters and bombers operated free from ground control (and couldn't communicate with one another) so even had the RAF fighters been detected there is little that could have been done about it.
Cheers
Steve
Airframes
Benevolens Magister
I'd need to check specific details, but from memory, the German 'Freya' radar installations along the Channel coast were initially dedicated to shipping. It wasn't until heavier allied bomber raids commenced (I think after 1941) that serious thought was given to properly integrating these units into air defence.
I don't want to open a 'Big Wing' debate but over Dieppe Leigh-Mallory was finally convinced by some of his operational commanders that sending wings did not work and that squadrons should be sent in twos and threes, but once there operate under control of their individual commanders. Park would surely have approved
Cheers
Steve
