Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?

GrauGeist said:

I recall reading where several did make it to Britain after the Netherlands fell to Germany in May.

In addition to those pilots joining the RAF in time for the BoB, there were Dutch Navy Fokkers and crew that made it over to Britain, which became the core of 320 and 321 Squadron.

Eventually, the RAF formed 322 Squadron, an all Dutch fighter unit, but that was in 1943.

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Well, afaik apart from the MLD personel, only the pupils from Haamstede were able to immediately leave to the UK. These were by no means active pilots, but trainees. They were not ready in time to fight in the bob. According to my info, no operational pilot could escape immediately, stuck as they were in Holland (Haamstede is in Zeeland) without aircraft. Some of them got there eventually, but too late to participate. They certainly did not have the chance to withdraw with the allieds like some Belgians could.

It's been a while since I read about that, it means I'll have to dig around and find the book.

When I do, I'll see about posting the info

Stona:
"Park at Bomber Command and Harris at Fighter Command. It very nearly happened. There's a 'What If' for you!"

Personal leadership as a factor: how important was it?

Park visited his units frequently. He saw the picture through his own eyes: the machines, crew (ground and air), command, facilities, replacements - the whole picture. Is it the case that when Park committed a squadron to an action he not only knew what he was sendng but who? Could he, did he, form some impression of the consequences in materiel, in men and women, and in morale. Did he ever considerr matters in terms of people who he knew personally? In human terms - how close is too close, how distant is too distant?

Reports in person or in writing would give Group commanders one story - the eagle eye of senior airman wuld sometimes tell a different one?

Take it either way -
aid to technical decision makng, or
morale, confidence, trust and positive regard
or personal leadership.

What did the human element count for in the BoB? Park specificaly or in general? Crucial points in the battle if any? How would one assess this historically, objectively? If the factor is important and subjective - what does numerical analysis (kill/loss ratios, for example) count for?

If you please? That is -if the question is interesting.

I think personal leadership was a very important factor. Park wasn't leading armies of men and women he was leading 11 Group. He certainly did know some of the leaders at squadron level personally but one shouldn't make too much of this.
He was an experienced airman and accomplished combat pilot himself. In November 1918 he was credited in an official report with nine enemy aircraft destroyed and eleven 'sent down out of control'. Earlier, whilst still an artillery officer at Gallipoli he had been much impressed with the leadership style of Sir William Birdwood. Park later commented that he showed how a leader could relax without cheapening his authority, though he did not adopt 'the soul of ANZAC's' habit of taking naked swims

Park was acutely aware of the strain the Battle was placing not just on his pilots but all the others who kept the operation running. In November 1940 he was fighting for more facilities, equipment and transport for his men. He wanted pilots released for 'exercise and recreation' whenever bad weather ruled out flying. He wanted regular hot meals and more comfortable accommodation at dispersal points. He asked that pilots in the London area be billeted off aerodrome in order to get undisturbed sleep. 'Guest' nights should be reintroduced and the provision of 'string bands, in order to remove some of the drabness of the present war' would be worth the effort.

His leadership style is nicely summed up by an apparent contradiction in two orders/signals he gave on 19th and 20th August 1940. In instructions to his controllers he pointed out that too many pilots were being lost over the sea whilst setting off in hot pursuit of retreating German aircraft. Retreating Germans were beaten Germans, at least for that day, and it mattered little to Park that their lives and machines were spared. These losses grieved him more than any others. He did not want his pilots setting off across the Channel in pursuit of retreating German aircraft.
The very next day (20th) he signalled Hornchurch to commend 'the fine offensive spirit of the single pilot of No. 54 squadron who chased nine He 113s [actually Bf 109s] across to France this afternoon.' He went on to ask all at Hornchurch and other stations to be aware of the German practice of putting up strong patrols over the Straits of Dover to protect aircraft returning from raids.
He didn't want his pilots chasing retreating aircraft but when they did so he praised their courage whilst drawing their attention to the danger of doing so and, crucially, avoiding a heavy rebuke. He understood and had learnt, probably way back at Gallipoli, that the young men who fought for him had to be led rather than driven.

His leadership of 11 Group in 1940 was crucial to the fighting of the campaign. There may have been other officers who could have waged a successful campaign too, some of the other senior group commanders certainly understood how the system worked and could have replaced him.

Long after Park was removed from 11 Group the second version of the BoB pamphlet, which included Park and Dowding was released. Wing Commander Lang, the officer who had sent Park the results of Leigh-Mallory's disastrous paper exercise earlier, summed up his congratulatory message thus. 'I think you will always be referred to as A.O.C. 11 Group.' He was indeed.

Cheers

Steve

bbear said:

Stona:
"Park at Bomber Command and Harris at Fighter Command. It very nearly happened. There's a 'What If' for you!"

Personal leadership as a factor: how important was it?

Park visited his units frequently. He saw the picture through his own eyes: the machines, crew (ground and air), command, facilities, replacements - the whole picture. Is it the case that when Park committed a squadron to an action he not only knew what he was sendng but who? Could he, did he, form some impression of the consequences in materiel, in men and women, and in morale. Did he ever considerr matters in terms of people who he knew personally? In human terms - how close is too close, how distant is too distant?

Reports in person or in writing would give Group commanders one story - the eagle eye of senior airman wuld sometimes tell a different one?

Take it either way -
aid to technical decision makng, or
morale, confidence, trust and positive regard
or personal leadership.

What did the human element count for in the BoB? Park specificaly or in general? Crucial points in the battle if any? How would one assess this historically, objectively? If the factor is important and subjective - what does numerical analysis (kill/loss ratios, for example) count for?

If you please? That is -if the question is interesting.

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In warfare, as in all human endeavours, morale is a critical element. Both Park (and later Monty) put tremendous effort into that personal touch, to create a bond of trust.
Plus it is an important check on an all to human failure of just ordering 'pieces on the board' around. When you meet and see the people you are sending out to kill and die it is a good way of making sure you don't think about them as purely machines and never waste them.

That bond is that the people on the 'pointy end' know that they are not being sent out for no reason, that their superiors wont risk them for something meaningless and that they will try and give them everything possible to win with the minimum loss of life. This is nothing to do with 'softness' as both of them were two of toughest 'hard asses' (using the US term) around.

Note that both Park and Monty served in WW1 and saw the terrible and so often useless waste of people and learned from that. Park served in Gallipoli and the Somme. Monty through the entire Ww1 (except for convalescence). Both were injured severely, interesting to speculate how that affected them both personally. Park, after recovering became a fighter/recon pilot and was shot down twice with 5 kills and 14 (using the later term) probables.
Both had fought and nearly died at the 'pointy end' and both were thinkers and leaders.

There is a great strategic theoretician, John Boyd, who said that there are 3 elements to warfare, moral, mental and physical, and of those the moral one is the most important, mental is the second and the physical the lowest.

Time after time we have seen people with greater motivation and skills outperform those with vastly better resources, but that lack those other elements.
Even more so in warfare, which is an extreme human behaviour. We've seen that in so many wars, such as Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan (against all comers) and Lebanon. Vastly inferior (in terms of resources), but superior in terms of skills and motivation, forces beating those with the huge resources but who were inferior in the other areas.

Two phrases with which Park would have agreed.

"The moral is to the physical as three to one"

"The secret of war lies in the communications"

Both attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte.

As for the numbers game. It only becomes important for what we now call the BoB in retrospect. Even the ever cautious Park consistently estimated that the RAF was destroying 3 or 4 Luftwaffe aircraft (at various times) for every one it lost. It wasn't the point, at the time. The RAF didn't have to shoot down vast or even superior numbers of German aircraft and pilots, it had to avoid losing too many itself.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

Two phrases with which Park would have agreed.

"The moral is to the physical as three to one"

"The secret of war lies in the communications"

Both attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte.

As for the numbers game. It only becomes important for what we now call the BoB in retrospect. Even the ever cautious Park consistently estimated that the RAF was destroying 3 or 4 Luftwaffe aircraft (at various times) for every one it lost. It wasn't the point, at the time. The RAF didn't have to shoot down vast or even superior numbers of German aircraft and pilots, it had to avoid losing too many itself.

Cheers

Steve

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First rule (so often forgotten especially these days by Americans) rule of strategy .. never do what your enemy wants you to do.

Dead true. The Luftwaffe 'strategy' (if you can call it that) was to get the RAF up and their 'superior' planes and pilots would kill them, or they would kill them on the ground. And for a while there was bit of truth in that, at that time the Luftwaffe was at its peak of power and, overall its pilots, bomber crews, doctrine and tactics were greatly superior.

Park's job was to avoid the 'big loss' as much as 'killing the enemy'. Dowding, correctly left the tactical battle to Park while he managed the logistic and sadly political battle, I mean Douglas was so out of touch that Dowding, in a sense had to ambush him to get what was a logical operational decision, which Douglas never ever forgave him for. Leigh Mallory, which Park finally picked up on (and documented) sabotaged Dowding's replenishment system (he sent his crap in while keeping his 'best' in 12 group).

Hard not not come to the conclusion that LM was worth at least 10 squadrons to the the Germans.

The key logistics were pilots, not planes for the RAF. Correctly the RAF over estimated the Luftwaffe in planes, crews and production (always the sensible thing to do, then your surprises are always good ones).

Douglas never accepted or understood the difference between simple flying experience and vital combat experience. He didn't perceive a difference between operational and non operational fighter pilots. Some on this forum suffer the same problem
For example on 31st October 1940 Douglas wrote that the pilot position had undergone a "kaleidoscopic change" and that in the case of Fighter Command "we are actually faced with a surplus." Evill made a more realistic assessment. At the end of July there had been sixty two squadrons and 1,046 operational pilots. At the end of October there were sixty six and a half squadrons and 1,042 operational pilots. Total wastage in those three months was 1,151 pilots, twenty five every two days. Fighter Command, Evill concluded, was "at about the lowest ebb in operational pilots" at which it could function.

This is after the 'stabilisation' system was introduced on 8th September.
All 11 Group squadrons were 'Class A' with a minimum strength of 16 operational pilots. Some 10 and 12 Group squadrons were also designated Class A, but there minimum strength of 16 pilots need not all be operational (a distinction lost on both Douglas and Leigh Mallory). This was because Dowding insisted to Park that they must retain some operational squadrons outside 11 Group to exchange for the most exhausted squadrons in that Group.
Class B squadrons were to retain 6 operational pilots in their quota of 16.
Class C squadrons were to retain only 3 operational pilots and these squadrons themselves were not really operational squadrons.

Fighter Command Head Quarters would inform 10, 12 and 13 Groups daily of the number of pilots required from them for allotment to 11 Group. These men were supposed to be fully trained. Men from OTUs were sent to squadrons outside 11 Group to finish their operational training as 11 Groups commitments left its own squadrons unable to do this.

Richard Saul of 13 Group had previously always sent experienced units south to 11 Group and now he sent his best trained men as part of the stabilisation system. Leigh-Mallory had always retained his better squadrons in 12 Group and now he did the same with individual pilots.

In July and August 1940 squadrons sent to 11 Group from 13 Group were credited with 43 aircraft destroyed for the loss of two pilots. Those from 12 Group with seventeen aircraft destroyed for the loss of thirteen pilots. Even allowing for the inaccuracy of the credits this is hard evidence that Leigh-Mallory was sending less capable and experienced squadrons down to 11 Group and that this practice was being paid for in the lives of young pilots. That is about the most damning indictment of Leigh-Mallory that can be made.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

Douglas never accepted or understood the difference between simple flying experience and vital combat experience. He didn't perceive a difference between operational and non operational fighter pilots. Some on this forum suffer the same problem
For example on 31st October 1940 Douglas wrote that the pilot position had undergone a "kaleidoscopic change" and that in the case of Fighter Command "we are actually faced with a surplus." Evill made a more realistic assessment. At the end of July there had been sixty two squadrons and 1,046 operational pilots. At the end of October there were sixty six and a half squadrons and 1,042 operational pilots. Total wastage in those three months was 1,151 pilots, twenty five every two days. Fighter Command, Evill concluded, was "at about the lowest ebb in operational pilots" at which it could function.

This is after the 'stabilisation' system was introduced on 8th September.
All 11 Group squadrons were 'Class A' with a minimum strength of 16 operational pilots. Some 10 and 12 Group squadrons were also designated Class A, but there minimum strength of 16 pilots need not all be operational (a distinction lost on both Douglas and Leigh Mallory). This was because Dowding insisted to Park that they must retain some operational squadrons outside 11 Group to exchange for the most exhausted squadrons in that Group.
Class B squadrons were to retain 6 operational pilots in their quota of 16.
Class C squadrons were to retain only 3 operational pilots and these squadrons themselves were not really operational squadrons.

Fighter Command Head Quarters would inform 10, 12 and 13 Groups daily of the number of pilots required from them for allotment to 11 Group. These men were supposed to be fully trained. Men from OTUs were sent to squadrons outside 11 Group to finish their operational training as 11 Groups commitments left its own squadrons unable to do this.

Richard Saul of 13 Group had previously always sent experienced units south to 11 Group and now he sent his best trained men as part of the stabilisation system. Leigh-Mallory had always retained his better squadrons in 12 Group and now he did the same with individual pilots.

In July and August 1940 squadrons sent to 11 Group from 13 Group were credited with 43 aircraft destroyed for the loss of two pilots. Those from 12 Group with seventeen aircraft destroyed for the loss of thirteen pilots. Even allowing for the inaccuracy of the credits this is hard evidence that Leigh-Mallory was sending less capable and experienced squadrons down to 11 Group and that this practice was being paid for in the lives of young pilots. That is about the most damning indictment of Leigh-Mallory that can be made.

Cheers

Steve

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Thanks Steve, I think we are 'double teaming' this to educate people here, totally correct. Oh yes, for political reasons LM sent in his 'crap'. To be fair I blame Dowding for this to an extent, he should have ordered LM to send Bader' squadron into 11 Group where Bader would have learned .. or died (probably died, he really wasn't that good a fighter pilot). But again to be fair Dowding was acting as the 'Chairman of the Board' and he was not, as Bader, LM and Douglas were ... politicians, who were much more interested in winning their internal political battles than actually wining the war.

Bader to his credit asked to go down to 11 Group on several occasions. There are many things I will criticise Bader for, but a lack of courage is certainly not one of them. How he could have fitted in with 11 Group's tightly controlled operations will forever remain a moot point because Leigh-Mallory refused to release him.

I do enjoy a story to illustrate a point.

Late in September 1940 the fantastically named Squadron Leader Raymond Myles Beecham Duke-Woolley was leading his Hurricane squadron, having taken off from Kenley, in a patrol over Canterbury. He had got up to 31,000ft when, looking north he saw a black mass coming from the direction of London. Despite Leigh-Mallory's contention that having a base at Duxford would give his wings adequate time to gain height before entering 11 Group's area this black mass, which was indeed 12 Group's 'Big Wing', was much lower than Duke-Woolley and his Hurricanes.
Duke-Woolley reckoned that the wing 'looked determined' and therefore decided to turn in behind it as voluntary top cover. His squadron was using a loose German style formation in accordance with Park's instructions, and as they were also flying somewhat higher than Hurricanes were supposed to they may have looked a lot like the Luftwaffe. This is certainly what the Duxford Wing thought, failing to identify the friendly Hurricanes it thought it was about to be attacked and started to orbit. Duke-Woolley, thinking that it was preparing to intercept a raid followed suit. For some minutes there was a ridiculous stalemate until the 'Big Wing' started to run short of fuel, having taken so long to assemble, and retired, in good order to the north.
A couple of weeks later Duke-Woolley learned that his patrol report had got around, been leaked in modern parlance, and had been received with 'huge delight' by ground crews and pilots throughout 11 Group.

Cheers

Steve

Thanks Steve, I think we are 'double teaming' this to educate people here, totally correct.

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I wouldnt be too sure about that. more like watching a first class comedy act in full swing.

Thanks to OldSkeptic and stona, thanks all.

You have gven me answers about the human element some of which I asked for - and a generous surplus.

As I understand it: The human element is important and was crucial in the BoB. Crucial if not in outcome then in the speed and comparative cost of the strategic outcome. Records showing combat developed skill in, intimate operational knowledge of and high prioity oerational attention to that factor are objective measures of leadershp in that sense.

I notice that my question set off a quantity of subjective assessment of leaders and decisons. So maybe the human element is important but possibly best acknowledged then avoided in explanations of events?

As a a result I am slightly more minded to regard neat 'numbers analysis' with suspicion. Thank you.

Bbear, numbers are useful in that they can help you work out where you are, but you have to be aware of the 'fuzz factor'.. and the 'map' is not the 'terrain'.

For internal management good numbers are essential in knowing your resources so you can make the right decisions in allocating/increasing/etc them.

The 'fog of war' means you can never be sure about the other side, hence the need for good intelligence and analysis, but at best you will only have a limited picture of where they are at.

Hence the role of human talent in being able to work out, with limited and often 'noisy' data what the other side thinks, wants to do and is planning to do. So you can counteract it. A classic example of that was R. V. Jones the great master of scientific intelligence (get his book, a must read) with a tiny staff out performed most of the other 'intelligence' organisations by light years. Even Kim Philby admired him.

Fighter command was full of scientists and used them (unlike bomber command) to the full in all areas, not just the technical things but in things like operations research.

Dowding and Park largely discounted the 'claims' numbers of their own people, though even they at that time didn't know just how inaccurate they were. They, correctly, overestimated the Luftwaffe's capability and resources, since it is always best to plan for the worst so all your surprises are nice ones.
They also strived to avoid the 'big mistake', that high risk/maybe high payoff so enamoured by the 'romantic' commentators of war and fiction writers (and the incompetent), that occasionally comes off, though you never hear about the many, many times it doesn't.

That 'big mistake' was what the Luftwaffe was really counting on.

At the same time, both Dowding and Park endlessly tried to make things better for their pilots under such incredible danger and stress.
Park wrote endless memos about thing like getting better accommodation for the pilots so they could get rest. Dowding ensured, as best he could with the resources, rotations of pilots and units to give them rest and time to regroup.

Both of them, though rather standoffish people in a personal sense, showed deep understanding and caring about their people ... again that morale element, that 'bargain' that is so important between the leaders and the led.

Park later showed that he was as good on the offense as he was on the defence in Malta, because he had thought about it and worked how to do it properly. Rather than the LM 'leaning towards the enemy' nonsense that got more pilots killed than in the BoB.

The Luftwaffe was another thing entirely, though tactically, technically and in quality at the peak of its powers at that time and led by some very competent people (especially Kesselring who never gets the credit he is due for being both an excellent air and ground general .. I'd put him way above Rommel for example). But, as opposed to the Heer (the German Army) and as it is was a purely Nazi created organisation it was wedded to that 'warrior/hero' mythos (which I will argue was the real reason it finally collapsed).

Pilots got no rest, they were expected to fight endlessly for years until death or injury, totally inhumane. There is no surprise that the highest scoring pilots of the war were German, they were simply an example of the 'tail' of what so called a 'survival curve'. Statistically some will will survive long enough to build up immense scores (just like some lightbulbs will last for 20 years, but the average is a fraction of that).
Plus, tactically and strategically it became totally distorted. The ultimate example of that was Marseille in North Africa, where his squadron was a life support system for him while he shot down endless, obsolete P-40s and Hurricanes, while never shooting down any bombers....the same ones that were hammering the German troops all the time.

Funny how the 'standoffish', not 'jolly' and (using the British term at that time) 'not clubable' had far more care for their people than the other, apparently 'more human and nice', ones did (and I include the 'nice' Eisenhower in that observation). That observation fits a long standing theory of mine, but that, as they say, is another thing entirely.

Douglas never accepted or understood the difference between simple flying experience and vital combat experience. He didn't perceive a difference between operational and non operational fighter pilots. Some on this forum suffer the same problem
For example on 31st October 1940 Douglas wrote that the pilot position had undergone a "kaleidoscopic change" and that in the case of Fighter Command "we are actually faced with a surplus." Evill made a more realistic assessment. At the end of July there had been sixty two squadrons and 1,046 operational pilots. At the end of October there were sixty six and a half squadrons and 1,042 operational pilots. Total wastage in those three months was 1,151 pilots, twenty five every two days. Fighter Command, Evill concluded, was "at about the lowest ebb in operational pilots" at which it could function.

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Jagdwaffe pilots fit for duty:

29 June - 906
1 August - 869
1 September - 735
28 September - 676
1 November - 673

To those figures you have to add the number of Bf 110 pilots, around 100 - 150, and night fighter pilots (around 50 - 100)

Just to illustrate the difference in thinking between Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe, at the end of July Fighter Command had 675 serviceable aircraft for their 1,046 operational pilots. On 31 October they had 684 serviceable aircraft, 1042 operational pilots.

The Luftwaffe operated with much smaller margins. On 29 June the Jagdwaffe had 856 serviceable aircraft, 906 pilots. On 28 September they had 712 serviceable fighters, only 676 pilots fit for duty. Again you have to add the Bf 110s and night fighters to get the total German fighter force, so the numbers of pilots and aircraft are higher, but the difference with Fighter Command is clear. FC wanted spare pilots to reduce the load. The Luftwaffe simply threw everything into the battle at once.

Well now, I must say there are some great comments and use of factual information to get across the strategic situation in 1940 up to and including the BoB. Great stuff well done all.
I would like to add a few short comments, firstly well done 'Parsifal' for pointing out the losses sustained by the Luftwaffe during their campaign in a Poland sept 39. Here is an extract from my website dedicated to my father, a Polish fighter pilot:
Here are the statistics on the comparative numbers and losses in the campaign.
Polish Air Strength:
Total Aircraft: 435
First Line Combat Aircraft: 313
Total Losses: 327 (75%)
Combat Losses: 187
Air-to-air combat: 70
Enemy ground fire: 30
Friendly Ground Fire: 33
Destroyed on ground: 54
Damaged and written off: 140
Evacuated to Romania: 98 (mostly fighters) Unaccounted for: 10
German Air Strength:
Total Aircraft: 2085
First Line Combat Aircraft: 1323
Total Losses: 564 (27%)
Combat Losses: 285 (from German records) (Polish claimed kills: 220) (Polish claimed air-to-air kills: 133) (Polish claimed ground-to-air kills: 87) Damaged and written off: 279
As you can see, the German losses were higher – 172% - of the Polish losses for this period, hardly a walkover!!

I know I am biased but one thing my father and some of his flying compatriots were always disgusted with was the fact that it took so long and such heavy losses to be sustained by the RAF before Dowding actually 'took his thumb out of his backside' to utilise the foreign fighter pilots he had available to him who were being wasted by sitting around doing nothing but learning outdated and tactically useless methods of flying currently practised by the RAF at the time. To have these highly skilled, combat trained pilots sitting around was a major mistake made by Dowding. The Poles were masters at close flying, combat against the ME109, very high gunnery skills as the records show between RAF and Polish sq during gunnery competitions when the top places were always held by the Polish pilots and the records of kills by 303,303,308,315 and 317 sq speak for themselves.
The poles would not use the vic formation or line abreast or line astern as they were classed by the more experienced poles as dangerous formations, hence finger 4 being adopted by the RAF later from these foreign sq use.
My father was always critical of the .303 'pop gun' as he called it and the poles cut down the convergence range of their guns down to 75 - 100 yes to ensure damage was done ( one of the reasons, the other was a hatred of Germans for several reasons!).
As I said, I am slightly biased as I was, and still am influenced by the views of a WW2 Polish fighter pilot, but don't forget the Czechs and Free French pilots also available to Dowding.
There was a few comments about Churchill and his famous saying which I won't repeat again! My father who was often stationed at Northolt which was primarily a Polish fighter station with several Polish sq's rotating in and out, said that Churchill often came to spend time with the poles as he liked their fighting spirit and attitude and would chat to the poles and always left inspired. His personal plane was at Northolt.
Personally I don't think you can pin it down to a 'specific' day that the conflict over England actually turned against the LW, there are too many factors involved all playing their part. There have been many valid comments above, including the English radar, bombing of London and German civilian targets etc etc.
Lately I have been reading the German histories including JG26, JG2 and others and it has been interesting to note the losses the Germans ACTUALLY suffered, not the losses claimed by the RAF which was later said to have been kept both false and high to 'keep up morale'. There is a lot of factual information out there if you look.

OldSkeptic. Thank you.. I have read you on such topics before with interest. But here you have put the point quite powerfully and precisely.

My puzzle with any theory or hypothesis of that kind is - how could we test it? Does any historian count, classify and grade the memos Park sent? or Kesselring? Is there a weighing of personnel files or another quantitative effort that as ever beenn proposed? Or even a text analysis of auto-biographies? Can one calibrate callousness or measure a mythos?

Anecdote and character analysis and comparison of 'leadership styles' I've read some of. And they are great for illustrating a point, it seems to me. But to prove or disprove a notion of our kind we would ned objective evidence. Otherwise as people have their own pre-existing lists of heroes and villains.. discussion might turn into one of those endless and unending irresolvabes. Your reading or any theory realated to it would be condemned to a fate worse than disproof.. That is to be put in the large bucket of issues where 'it is strongly suspected but unprovable'.

Except that there might just be agreement that 'the human element' is large - and largely imponderable - as a factor in explanation of events? Maybe?

Thanks again for the blast of fresh air.

Further to T Leigh-Mallory

1914 The King's Liverpool Regiment, 1915 The South Lancashire regiment, Jan 1916 No 1 School of Aeronautics, July 1916 No 5 No 7 Sqn (BE2 c &d ), Nov '16 Flight Commander 7 Sqn., May '17 Office Commanding 15 (Reserve) Sqn.,
Nov '17 OC No 8 (Army Op) Sqn.,
Significant dates: Feb '21 OC 2 Sqn School of Army Co-operation. April '26 Air Staff HQ 22 Group. April '27 Commandant, School of Army Co-operation. Jan '30 Instructor - Army Staff College. Dec '31 Supernumerary No 1 Air defence Group.
Jan '32 Air Staff, Directorate of Operations Intelligence, Jan '34 attended Imperial Defence College. OC No 2 Flying Training School Rigby. Nov '35 SASO RAF Iraq - to- 14 Dec 1937 AOC No 12 (Fighter) Group!

Source: extracted from -
NB - no Fighter experience in WW1, and only a month of 'Air Defence' experience!! Just how did he get the job !!?? Seems more fitting to stay in the Middle-East a bit longer perhaps via another posting then to France in 1939/40 .

merlin said:

Further to T Leigh-Mallory

1914 The King's Liverpool Regiment, 1915 The South Lancashire regiment, Jan 1916 No 1 School of Aeronautics, July 1916 No 5 No 7 Sqn (BE2 c &d ), Nov '16 Flight Commander 7 Sqn., May '17 Office Commanding 15 (Reserve) Sqn.,
Nov '17 OC No 8 (Army Op) Sqn.,
Significant dates: Feb '21 OC 2 Sqn School of Army Co-operation. April '26 Air Staff HQ 22 Group. April '27 Commandant, School of Army Co-operation. Jan '30 Instructor - Army Staff College. Dec '31 Supernumerary No 1 Air defence Group.
Jan '32 Air Staff, Directorate of Operations Intelligence, Jan '34 attended Imperial Defence College. OC No 2 Flying Training School Rigby. Nov '35 SASO RAF Iraq - to- 14 Dec 1937 AOC No 12 (Fighter) Group!

Source: extracted from -

HTML:

http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Leigh-mallory.htm

NB - no Fighter experience in WW1, and only a month of 'Air Defence' experience!! Just how did he get the job !!?? Seems more fitting to stay in the Middle-East a bit longer perhaps via another posting then to France in 1939/40 .

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How did he get the job? I would advance the theory that with a fore name of Trafford and a Double barreled family name that he was "just the right sort of chap" and "just the sort of fellow we are looking for"

So if not L-M who ??

So far undecided between two:

- AVM G B A Baker b. 1894, WW1 - 1916 Flight Commander 19 Sqn RFC - Spad SVll, Jan '35 Attended Imperial Defence College, Dec '35 Air Staff HQ Fighting Area, May '36 Air Staff, HQ 11 Fighter Group.

Well maybe better is:

- AM Sir John Baldwin WW1 - 1914 U?T Pilot, 19 Feb '15 F/O RFC, 7 Dec '15 Flight Commander RFC, 12 June '16 Sqn Commander RFC, 28 Dec '17 OC 41st Wing RFC/RAF, 1928 Attended Imperial Defence College, Jan '32 SASO HQ Fighting Area
6 Feb '33 AOC Fighting Area (Temp.), Feb '34 AOC No 1 (Air Defence) Group, 22 Aug '35 Director of Personal Services.

Park only got his job under Mountbatten because Leigh-Mallory was killed on his way to take up the post
Another what if?
Steve