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This is a bit of a myth. The first significant attack on London came on the 15th August when the Luftwaffe mounted a planned attack on an airfield in Croydon (they hit Croydon airport rather than Kenley, but both were in Croydon). 60 civilians were killed when bombs hit civilian buildings outside the airfield.
The next day the Luftwaffe attacked more targets in London, killing 15 civilians in Wimbledon.
If the Luftwaffe were having a significant impact on RAF operations I'd have expected to see them inflicting increasing damage on RAF bases, as the RAF became unable to defend them properly. The statistics don't show that.
The other area I'd expect to see an effect is in serviceability rates. If the airfields were being heavily damaged, it should have made it harder to repair planes after combat, and decrease the serviceability rate. Air Commodore Peter Dye, from the RAF Historical Branch, gave 3 figures for Fighter Command serviceability rates:
Certainly the Luftwaffe did some damage to the RAF. But the statistics do not suggest it was particularly significant.
Indeed, but Evill told him at the same conference that even if the casualty rate remained at the level of the last few weeks Fighter Command would still have 725 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes ready to take to the sky's in the third week of September, the last week judged suitable for any German invasionOn 7th September, just before the stabilisation system was introduced, Dowding told Evill that Fighter Command was 'going downhill' due to the losses being inflicted upon it.
It was already a problem at the beginning of September 1940, the establishment of a Gruppe was supposed to be around 35-40 but the average had fallen to 20 in bomber units and 18 in Bf 109 units.Pilots on the other hand, and particularly combat ready leaders, could not be so easily replaced. This was the crucial shortage in September 1940 for the RAF just as it would be for the Luftwaffe a few years later.
Indeed, but Evill told him at the same conference that even if the casualty rate remained at the level of the last few weeks Fighter Command would still have 725 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes ready to take to the sky's in the third week of September, the last week judged suitable for any German invasionIt was already a problem at the beginning of September 1940, the establishment of a Gruppe was supposed to be around 35-40 but the average had fallen to 20 in bomber units and 18 in Bf 109 units.
Aircraft availability/serviceability was never a problem.
I am not so sure of that, I remember reading about Churchill visiting an airbase during an attack and he inquired about the reserve aircraft and being told there were none.
I believe you are correct on that.
I will admit, that was the finest military speech I have ever heard.
Churchill was asking about operational units being held in reserve, not aircraft held in reserve, and when Park said "none" he was only referring to units within 11 Group, not the whole of Fighter Command. In other groups a number of Squadrons saw no action at all on this day.I am not so sure of that, I remember reading about Churchill visiting an airbase during an attack and he inquired about the reserve aircraft and being told there were none.
During the war radio broadcasters were not allowed to record within the House Of Commons.I will admit, that was the finest military speech I have ever heard.
During the war radio broadcasters were not allowed to record within the House Of Commons.
Churchill's speech's "Blood, Sweat and Tears" and "The Few", or any of Churchill speeches from the House Of Commons were never heard during the war, snippets were read out by BBC staff on the radio, and reported in the press, but the recordings we hear were made post war.
Churchill was asking about operational units being held in reserve, not aircraft held in reserve, and when Park said "none" he was only referring to units within 11 Group, not the whole of Fighter Command. In other groups a number of Squadrons saw no action at all on this day.
This was at the underground bunker at RAF Uxbridge on 15th September 1940. Park was present for this (and other VIP visits) as the visitors were officially his guests. Dowding was not there, Park was the AOC 11 Group, Dowding commanded Fighter Command.
You are quite correct to say that during this visit 11 Group committed all of its squadrons to the fray and had no reserves. This was not the only time this happened but was the only time Churchill saw it happen for himself.
Knowing when and where to make a maximum commitment of your forces is something that only the best commanders get correct. In this case, and others, Park got it absolutely right.
Cheers
Steve
I have read that it was that visit that inspired the "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few" speech, in any case the situation was dire, but at least the British (my) political leader could see it first hand. Maybe the first time in modern history that a leader in politics was there looking at a battle of international importance in real time.
I believe that the "Never So Few" speech occurred on Aug 20 while the aircraft in reserve comment was made on Sept 15 or thereabouts.