Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?

Good posts parsival, I have read similar before as I see it the LW were accustomed to fighting Bi Planes in the main while against the UK they had an opposing force equal in quality and numbers to their own(or almost) when they attacked an airfield there wasn't a mechanised division rumbling over the horizon. Having crossed the channel a good few times I cant get my head around someone mistaking it for a river, especially a senior military commander. There have been times when the weather has been so bad IN THE HARBOUR that boarding a car on a ferry in the port wasnt possible and at other times I was stuck in the channel for 4 hours with fog, all around Calais.

Iwouldnt describe the LWs opposition before the BoB as "mainly Biplanes" or inneffective. During the Polish campaign, the LW did enjoy a clear technical and numerical advantage, but still managed to lose more than 500 aircraft during the campaign. I would put that down to the exceptionally well trained Polish aircrew. Even during the phoney war, LW losses were running almost at the replacement rate.....

The battles in norway were pretty small scale, but losses to the Dutch, Belgian and french Air Arms were actually very heavy. Its a common misunderstanding that the Germans won these air campaigns cheaply and easily. In fact its far more accurate to describe these campaigns as the Germans winning them, despite having sustained heavy losses, not that they won cheap and easy victories. Losses over France, for example, in 6 weeks were approaching 1500 a/c to all causes. Thats a savage loss rate by any standard. French pilots were again well trained and effective, and had fought well, but the FAF was heavily outnumbered, and (like the whole French Army really) quite unable to cope with the fast changing front lines and fluid nature of the campaign. French command structures were poor, dividing air strength up in penny packets along the front such that there was no decisive point at which they could bring decisive strength to bear (the Russians made the same mistake a year later). This was probably the stand out for the British effort over Britain. Radar, and a centralised and highly organised command structure allowed them to distribute their fighters as they thought most appropriate. the British chose to string out their fighters in penny packets, much as the french had, why, because they wanted every bomber strike parried. i think that had its reasons....good ones, but it also meant British losses were heavier than they needed to be as every fight for FC was a fight they were fighting at long odds. they might have been better to concentrate on a few of the strikes and let a few through that were less damaging. Maybe.

Milosh said:

I can't find it now, but an experienced Luftwaffe pilot stated that pilot replacements were not ready for combat.

Click to expand...

Exactly the same problem the RAF had.

Steve

if you are attacked and at the end of the battle have kept the status quo ( the way things were prior to the battle )....it is a victory.

parsifal said:

Iwouldnt describe the LWs opposition before the BoB as "mainly Biplanes" or inneffective. During the Polish campaign, the LW did enjoy a clear technical and numerical advantage, but still managed to lose more than 500 aircraft during the campaign. I would put that down to the exceptionally well trained Polish aircrew. Even during the phoney war, LW losses were running almost at the replacement rate.....

The battles in norway were pretty small scale, but losses to the Dutch, Belgian and french Air Arms were actually very heavy. Its a common misunderstanding that the Germans won these air campaigns cheaply and easily. In fact its far more accurate to describe these campaigns as the Germans winning them, despite having sustained heavy losses, not that they won cheap and easy victories. Losses over France, for example, in 6 weeks were approaching 1500 a/c to all causes. Thats a savage loss rate by any standard. French pilots were again well trained and effective, and had fought well, but the FAF was heavily outnumbered, and (like the whole French Army really) quite unable to cope with the fast changing front lines and fluid nature of the campaign. French command structures were poor, dividing air strength up in penny packets along the front such that there was no decisive point at which they could bring decisive strength to bear (the Russians made the same mistake a year later). This was probably the stand out for the British effort over Britain. Radar, and a centralised and highly organised command structure allowed them to distribute their fighters as they thought most appropriate. the British chose to string out their fighters in penny packets, much as the french had, why, because they wanted every bomber strike parried. i think that had its reasons....good ones, but it also meant British losses were heavier than they needed to be as every fight for FC was a fight they were fighting at long odds. they might have been better to concentrate on a few of the strikes and let a few through that were less damaging. Maybe.

Click to expand...

Agreed very much with the post, but the bolded part.
How exactly were the numbers stacked? In the time LW heavily engaged FAF, they were in the same time against part of the RAF FC, and what ever the Belgians and Dutch managed to get airborne. IIRC, the thing was that LW was managing about three sorties per plane per day, while for the French it was less then one sortie. RAF managed a bit better.

tomo pauk said:

Agreed very much with the post, but the bolded part.
How exactly were the numbers stacked? In the time LW heavily engaged FAF, they were in the same time against part of the RAF FC, and what ever the Belgians and Dutch managed to get airborne. IIRC, the thing was that LW was managing about three sorties per plane per day, while for the French it was less then one sortie. RAF managed a bit better.

Click to expand...

I read a document on here I think it was an American evaluation of the conflict. Basically the French Air Force was in the most part posted well away from the areas of conflict further more in the later days of the Battle of France the French were effectively forbidden to engage the LW. I think that was in "The most dangerous enemy" it certainly pissed off the RAF pilots stationed on the same fields.

Parsival, how many SE monoplanes did the LW encounter prior to the BoB that wernt RAF hurricanes?

Milosh said:

I can't find it now, but an experienced Luftwaffe pilot stated that pilot replacements were not ready for combat.

Click to expand...

Ulrich Steinhilper.

High also on the list of losses as the battle wore on were the replacement pilots. They simply didn't have the experience that we pre-war regulars had acquired. In our Gruppe at the beginning of the French Campaign we had thirty-six experienced pilots, none of whom had less than three years flying experience. Now we were getting replacements for the experienced pilots we had lost straight from Jagdfliegerschule (fighter school]. At that time we still tried our best to take care of these fledglings until they could accrue some experience.

Typical of these youngsters was a young Gefreiter who arrived in late September. His flying time was minimal - he had only fired a few shots at a ground target, had never flown on oxygen and still had no idea how to use his radio. We tried to increase their experience before they actually came along on combat missions by taking them up on patrols between missions. Then we would talk on the radio, climb to altitudes in excess of 8,000 metres (25,000 ft) and make them use oxygen. Of special importance was teaching them how to change the pitch of their propeller to get maxmum pull from the engine at high altitude. A flat pitch would allow the engine to rev up to its maximum so that the super-charger would deliver the maximum volume of air to the cylinders and produce optimum power; changing to a coarser pitch would have that engine power converted into more pull and consequently speed our rate of climb. It was vital they mastered this technique if they were to keep up in a battle-climb or at high altitude.

After about ten hours of 'tuition' we would take them out over the Channel to shoot at shadows on the water or cross to Dungeness and shoot at a black medieval tower which stood there (the old Dungeness Lighthouse). Finally when we could not excuse them combat duty any more we would have to take them along with us. This became the case with the Gefreiter and so I took him as my Rottenhund [wingman]. We began our climb almost immediately after take-off and he was constantly using the radio to ask us to slow down so that he could keep up. It was obvious that he wasn't manipulating the pitch control with the skill of the more seasoned pilots to produce the same power as our machines. We tried to tell him what to do on the radio but to no avail. Eventually, about half-way across the Channel and at 4,000 metres (13,000 ft) Kiihle told him to leave the formation and return to base. He broke away but in his confusion he turned not for home but towards Dover. Kiihle realised what was happening and ordered me to give chase and take him home. I rolled out and soon overhauled him, just before we reached the balloon barrage at Dover. I had tried to raise him on the radio but he was in such a state of anxiety that he wouldn't or couldn't respond. Positioning myself in front of him I rocked my wings, using the signal for him to follow me. He dutifully hung onto my tail and we were soon back at Coquelles. This was one of only two missions I missed during the whole of our time in the Battle of Britain.

As a result we decided that we would not take any more replacements on high altitude missions until we could give them more, much more, training. They were supposed to be replacements but in the event they were more of a problem for us than reinforcement for the squadron.

Click to expand...

Milch also noted in August that pilots were being sent as replacements to the units in France with 10 landings on Bf109s, and who had never fired a cannon in training.

parsifal said:

Radar, and a centralised and highly organised command structure allowed them to distribute their fighters as they thought most appropriate. the British chose to string out their fighters in penny packets, much as the french had, why, because they wanted every bomber strike parried. i think that had its reasons....good ones, but it also meant British losses were heavier than they needed to be as every fight for FC was a fight they were fighting at long odds. they might have been better to concentrate on a few of the strikes and let a few through that were less damaging. Maybe.

Click to expand...

There was research done on this to work out the effectiveness between the "Big Wing" and squadron size attacks, and it was found that the smaller size attacks were more effective in both terms of enemy losses caused and casualties suffered.

tomo pauk said:

Agreed very much with the post, but the bolded part.
How exactly were the numbers stacked? In the time LW heavily engaged FAF, they were in the same time against part of the RAF FC, and what ever the Belgians and Dutch managed to get airborne. IIRC, the thing was that LW was managing about three sorties per plane per day, while for the French it was less then one sortie. RAF managed a bit better.

Click to expand...

I read a document on here I think it was an American evaluation of the conflict. Basically the French Air Force was in the most part posted well away from the areas of conflict further more in the later days of the Battle of France the French were effectively forbidden to engage the LW. I think that was in "The most dangerous enemy" it certainly pissed off the RAF pilots stationed on the same fields.

Parsival, how many SE monoplanes did the LW encounter prior to the BoB that wernt RAF hurricanes?

Of LW's opponents in 39-40 only Norwegians and Belgians had biplane fighters, all others, incl. Poland, had only SE fighters

PAF had appr. 161 SE fighters (P.11 and P.7)
RNeAF 28 Fokker D.XXI plus 23 TE Fokker G.IA
FrAF had 631 SE and 58 TE fighters in first-line units on 10 May 40

Juha said:

Of LW's opponents in 39-40 only Norwegians and Belgians had biplane fighters, all others, incl. Poland, had only SE fighters

PAF had appr. 161 SE fighters (P.11 and P.7)
RNeAF 28 Fokker D.XXI plus 23 TE Fokker G.IA
FrAF had 631 SE and 58 TE fighters on 10 May 40

Click to expand...

Thanks....getting confused between Bi plane and non retractable undercarriage

All French and all Dutch TE had retractable u/c, all Polish and all Dutch SE had fixed u/c

Juha said:

All French and all Dutch TE had retractable u/c, all Polish and all Dutch SE had fixed u/c

Click to expand...

Why were the French so completely out classed, I thought their only competetive fighter was the Dewotine 530?

Agreed very much with the post, but the bolded part.
How exactly were the numbers stacked? In the time LW heavily engaged FAF, they were in the same time against part of the RAF FC, and what ever the Belgians and Dutch managed to get airborne. IIRC, the thing was that LW was managing about three sorties per plane per day, while for the French it was less then one sortie. RAF managed a bit better.

Click to expand...

The FAF was outnumbered pretty badly. At the start of the campaign, the available forces to each side were as follows

Belgian AF:

1st Regiment (army co-operation): based at bierset, Deurne and Gossoncourt, with 40 Fairey Fox and 10 Renard 31
2nd Regiment (fighters): based at Schafen and Nijvel with 30 Fairey Fox and 25 CR 42, 15 Gloster Gladiator and 11 Hurricane I
3rd Regiment (recon and bomber): based at Evers with 27 Fairey Fox and 13 Fairey Battle

Total Belgian Strength at beginning
151 a/c

Dutch AF

In 1940, the Dutch AF had 29 Fokker DXXis and 41 GIs (which they commandeered). The Fokker CX bombers were destroyed in the opening day of the assault. most of the medium bombers; Fokker T4, T5 and T8W were in the NEI, but there were 12T5s and at least 8 T8W seaplanes used,

Total Dutch strength at beginning
90 a/c (not including the CX)

French Air Force
In May 1940, before the battle the FAF could deploy
26 Groupes De Chase (19 with MS406) and a total strength of 700 fighter. In the vital North west sector however, there were less than 300 fighters, and in the whole of metropolitan France no more than 550 fighters were deployed

21 Groupes De Bombardment (mostly obsolete aircraft) total air strength 320 planes

5 Groupes de bomadment d'Assault: 80 planes

11 Groupes de Reconnaisance 170 planes

38 Groupes Aerians d'Observation ; 420 planes

Total strength was 1690, of which about 1100 were in the metropolitan area, and of these about 700 in the Northwest department. 190 French aircraft were destroyed on the ground on the opening day of the4 assault, and similar proportions of losses were suffered by both the Belgians and Dutch. During the campaign, the French did not redeploy any of their overseas air assets to France, and preferred for the fight to come to their intererior departments rather than move them forward to join the fight at the front.

The Royal Air Force In France

There were a number of bomber formations engaged almost from the beginning, and based in England, and during the Dunkirk operations there were about 10 squadrons or equivalent used to cover the evacuation. but these were not available at the beginning of the campaign

British Air Forces in France (or BAFF) was an RAF Command set up on 15 January 1940 under the command of Air Marshal Arthur Barratt to provide unified control of all RAF units based in France. It had two immediately subordinate formations, with differing tasks.
the "Air Component" (Royal Air Force Component of the British Expeditionary Force) underAir Vice-Marshal C H B Blount to provide reconnaissance and fighter cover for the BEF.

the AASF (Advanced Air Striking Force) under Air Vice-Marshal P H L Playfair. The AASF consisted of RAF light bomber squadrons based within France (around Rheims) to allow them to bomb Germany should the political decision to do so be taken. No such decision had been taken before the German offensive in the West began on 10 May 1940, and thereafter the AASF bomber force was used against the advancing German Army and its lines of communications.

As well as the forces under its command, BAFF could also request RAF Bomber Command to provide support from UK-based medium bombers. The headquarters of BAFF were at Chauny alongside those of the French air commander, to maximise co-operation between the BAFF and the Armée de l'Air

There were about 600 aircraft in total, of which 4 squadrons amounting to 36 aircraft were Hurricanes and 135 were bombers. It had been agreed that this rather meagre force structure would be reinforced immediately by 4 squadrons of Hurricanes, but in fact this was expanded to 6 squadrons. the RAF also during the campaign used up about 600 of its reserve aircraft and of courcse committed a big part of FC when the evacuation started. but at the start of the campaign the British deployed about 600 aircraft

Total allied committment at the start of the battle was 1570 aircraft

German comittment to the battle was in excess of 2500 aircraft

starting advantages were ther3efore about 5:3, however the Germans were able to gain some advantage from having the initiative. As outlined above, about 190 French aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and about 40-50% of the Belgian and Dutch Air forces similalry destroyed. I have no information on the RAFs losses to these pre-emptive strikes, but assuming it was at lerast 100 aircraft, that places the immediate match up of forces at 2500+ LW aircraft to about 1000 allied machines. This proportions never really changed much during the campaign, despite the British efforts to reinforce the front. Put simply Allied loss rates were too high for a sustainable ramping up of strength to ever be claimed. By Day 5 of the campaign the minor allies were basically gone, and both the RAF and FAF left reeeling in the face of repeated hammer blows by the LW, plus unsustainable losses as the bombers tried to stem the flooding advances of the Germans ground forces.

Another source i found gives the following strength figures for the BOF, westerrtn front 10 May 1940

Type
French; [British/Belgian/Dutch] [Allied Combined] German
Fighters 583 197 780 1264
Bombers 84 192 276 1504
Recon/Obs'n 458 96 554 502
Totals 1125 485 1610 3270

This does not alter the fact that the allies were pretty badly outnumbered

FAF fighter units did pretty well however. The best formations were the Curiss Hawk escadrilles, that really did write a glorious chapter for the FAF.

The American-made Curtiss 75A fighter joined French squadrons beginning in March 1939 and being delivered across four subtypes, each progressively improving on the last . It was the most effective type in its class in combat over France (on both sides), for the French, until the Dewoitine D520 became operational in mid-May 1940. Eight squadrons equipped with the Curtiss 75A shot down 220 German aircraft (confirmed kills), losing only thirty-three pilots. In the seven major aerial battles in which the Curtiss fighters were engaged with Messerschmitts, the total score was twenty-seven Bf 109Es and six Bf 110Cs destroyed for three of the French flown Curtiss aircraft.

The Morane-Saulnier MS 406 equipped eighteen squadrons in France on 10 May 1940. The kill-loss ratio for units flying the MS 406 was 191 to 89, however, many Morane units were lost on the ground. The shortcomings of the Morane fighter compared to the Bf 109E have been the topic of many memoirs, but in the reported battles in which Messerschmitts faced Moranes alone, the French posted a record of thirty-one kills and five losses. During the Battle of France, the air staff converted twelve squadrons equipped with Moranes to other types as rapidly as training facilities permitted. This policy marginally increased the efficiency of the individual units, but it acted to decrease the effectiveness of the fighter force as a whole by taking combat-experienced squadrons out of the line at a critical time. Further, it failed to capitalize on new production to increase the size of the fighter force.

Another fighter designed to meet the same specification as the MS 406 was the Bloch MB 152. Though it lost out in the procurement competition to the Morane, the Bloch firm developed the basic design around a more powerful engine. The resulting Bloch MB 152 was faster and more powerfully armed than the MS 406. Twelve squadrons had Bloch fighters on 10 May 1940, and six more became operational with them during the battle, but they were not deployed forward like the Moranes. Units while equipped with Blochs shot down 156 German planes and lost 59 pilots.

The first two squadrons equipped with the fast and agile Dewoitine 520 entered the battle on 13 May; eight others completed conversion training and became operational before the armistice. Between them, they shot down 175 enemy aircraft for a loss of 44 aviators. Polish pilots manned two squadrons of Caudron C 714 fighters. The ultralight Caudron (3086 pounds, empty) was capable of 302 mph with a 450-horsepower engine. Becoming operational on 2 June, the Poles shot down seventeen German aircraft and lost five pilots before their unit was disbanded on 17 June.

the fighter force accounted for between 800 and 1000 of the 1439 German aircraft destroyed during the battle.

On 10 May 1940, the operational units of the French Air Force committed to the Western Front were heavily outnumbered. The FAF did not enage in a particulalry high rate of operations, and this effectively increased German superiority to about 4:1, when the sortie rate is used inplace of raw numbers. but the french were still fairly effective in the air denial role they chose to employ, such that by mid-June, the Luftwaffe was exhausted. It had lost 40 percent of its aircraft.

On the 17 June the french Air Staff ordered that the FAF begin evacuation to French North Africa. An examination of which units were ordered to North Africa and which were left behind reveals much about the motivation behind the evacuation. The units flown to North Africa were those regular air force squadrons with the most modern and effective aircraft all of the squadrons equipped with the Curtiss 75A (10), Dewoitine 520 (10), Amiot 354 (, Bloch 174 (1, Farman 222 (4), Douglas DB-7 (, and Martin 167 (10), plus most of those with the Lioré et Olivier 451 (12 of 1. Those left behind included all of the air force reserve units-47 observation squadrons and 12 fighter squadrons-and all of the units closely connected with the army (the observation squadrons, the 10 assault bomber squadrons, and 7 night fighter squadrons converted to the ground assault role).

The behavior of the leaders of the French Air Force before and during the Battle of France suggests that their primary purposes were to protect the regular air force against its domestic adversaries and to ensure its survival after the battle and the expected defeat. Refusing to expand the regular air force, spinning off the dangerous and unglamorous observation mission to the reserves, maintaining a low operational rate, and selecting only regular air force units and those unconnected with direct support of the army to send to North Africa constitute a coherent pattern. The senior aviators kept their service small, protected the cadres from severe danger, and kept most of the regular air force together out of the Germans' reach. Such decisions suggest a misordering of priorities in a nation at war but do make psychological and institutional sense when one reflects on both the frustration the aviators had suffered in their struggle to achieve operational independence from the army and the cavalier and callous way in which parliamentary officials had played with their lives, careers, and values.

duplicate post

Many thanks for the effort to dig out and type the data. The data from the last post seem to be emanating from Lieutenant Colonel Faris R. Kirkland, USA (Ret). Kirkland says also:

The French faced the German invasion with 4360 modern combat aircraft and with 790 new machines arriving from French and American factories each month. However, the air force was not organized for battle. The regular air force had only half again as many units as during its peacetime nadir in 1932. As the battle opened, 119 of 210 squadrons were ready for action on the decisive northeastern front. The others were reequipping or stationed in the colonies. The 119 squadrons could bring into action only one-fourth of the aircraft available. These circumstances put the Allied air forces in a position of severe numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe.

The French seem to have considerably more A/C than Germans. Question is how good they were deploying them (= bad), using (low sortie number = bad) and whether there was enough plots to fly them properly (maybe, with Poles and Chezcs arriving in 1939/40)?
The Germans will be here any minute now, and French are ready to blow mud huts in Chad?

In fact FrAF had appr. 8300a/c in France and appr 1500 in colonies, those in colonoes were mostly unsuitable for European war. And those in other parts of France could be transferred to the NE France if needed. Some were protecting central France , some were guarding the Italian front etc. and many were in depots. Much of the claim on FrAF are really BS, how much of RAF were in 11 Group area during the summer 40? Probably even less than FrAF had in NE France on 10 May 40. SU had deployed much of its AFs near its western frontiers in June 41 and was that a clever move?

It was Kirkland, but his claims about the french outnumbering the germans are bogus, hence i didnt use that bit. An aircraft half built on a factory floor, or an aircraft sitting in a faxctory awaiting delivery is not a number that should be added to the total availability, particulalry when the german numbers dont include those p[erpheral numbers. The limiting factor for the French was the number of pilots, and small size of the starting forces.

There were no missing thousdands of aircraft in the FAF, as the Germans discovered after the armistice. There were quite a few, but not a couple of thousands that were ever discovered, and the FAF did not have a giant bonfire on surrender either

So I guess the question is were the British just having afternoon tea with the Luftwaffe and swatting them down like flies with barely a sweat or was the RAF really on the verge of breaking? I keep getting the impression that not many believe that the RAF had a hard time during the BoB.

....But our own
Air Force was stronger than ever and there was every reason to be
optimistic about the 1940 Air Battle of Britain.

Click to expand...

I have to disagree with this comment, Hop. From my BoB thread with many sources....

30 August 1940 - It had been one of the worst days for the RAF, 39 aircraft were destroyed, eight of these were Spitfires from 222 Squadron Hornchurch. Over 50 RAF personnel had been killed (39 of these at Biggin Hill) with nearly 30 seriously injured. Some 200 civilians had been killed in the air raids and along with the radar stations of Pevensey, Beachy head and Foreness sustaining damage, Biggin Hill was made virtually unoperational, and the control of its sector was transferred over to Hornchurch.

31 August 1940 - The casualties this day were the highest of the Battle of Britain for RAF Fighter Command with thirty-nine aircraft destroyed in combat and fourteen pilots killed. RAF No.151 Squadron had lost six pilots in three days and was now down to twelve pilots to fly ten serviceable aircraft and was eventually withdrawn from 11 Group duties. RAF No.43 Squadron lost two of its commanders and by early September a third, S/L C.B.Hull, a South African was killed. The last couple of days had taken a toll on pilots, including many experienced commanders and now many squadrons were being led by junior officers and even in some cases by non-commisioned officer pilots. Sgt J.H (Ginger) Lacey of RAF No.501 Squadron was one of them. S/L P.W.Townsend of 85 Squadron was another experienced pilot that was a casualty, his place being taken by P/O G.Allard.

1 September 1940 - British casualties were fifteen aircraft totally destroyed and six pilots killed or missing. Since the Battle of Britain had begun, Dowding had lost some 75% of his squadron commanders and nearly 400 pilots had either been killed or seriously wounded. RAF No 111 Squadron at Croydon and RAF No 151 Squadron at Stapleford were down to just seven pilots each, available for operations while the two Hurricane squadrons at North Weald could count on only two Hurricanes as serviceable. By the evening of 1 September, RAF No 54 Squadron was removed from operations.

2 September 1940 - The total of thirty-one fighters lost by Fighter Command this day along with eight pilots killed, was double from the day before. The Germans lost thirty-five bombers and fighters. Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, Croydon, North Weald, Debden, Detling, Eastchurch and Hawkinge were all damaged, and although still operational they were not at full capacity or working with the efficiency that was hoped, only Tangmere and Kenley had escaped much of the constant bombing. Debden airfield was the only aerodrome hit with severe damage. The British had to set up an emergency operations room outside the airfield at Debden - this time in a chalk pit outside Saffron Walden.