The RAF also developed a very good system for cannibalising damaged aircraft and getting some of them back in service not really possible for the LW
Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?
- Thread starter Ascent
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
The RAF also developed a very good system for cannibalising damaged aircraft and getting some of them back in service not really possible for the LW
Yes, the RAF repair system was efficient. There were initial problems with the Spitfire, facilities for which only existed at certain airfields, but these were overcome. The more traditionally constructed Hurricane could often be patched up even at satellite stations.
Due to the speed of the German advance and movement of the Luftwaffe to airfields a long way from home (it deserves much credit for the almost 'frictionless' way it managed this) a situation where aircraft with any significant damage had to leave the Luftwaffe and be sent back to Germany, typically by rail, to enter the industrial repair system developed. Once repaired they would be re-accepted into the Luftwaffe. You may notice some Luftwaffe aircraft during this period with the letter 'F' after the werknummer. This is for 'Flugklar' and indicates an aircraft which has returned to service and is cleared for flight again. The CEAR on Werner Bartels E-1 notes the werknummer as 6296F. This marking seems to have been abandoned by 1941.
As you say it can hardly have helped serviceability rates, particularly combined with a small reserve and relatively low levels of new/replacement aircraft production.
Cheers
Steve
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
and yet the very next weekend is remembered as "The Bad Weekend" when Kesselring and the Luftwaffe concentrated on those very same airfields and almost - ALMOST - collapsed FC. I don't know about "...things seemed to be going very well,". Biggin Hill was almost totally destroyed as were numerous other stations. You must remember that it wasn't a case of throwing peas at a wall - it was picking the right and proper wall. Luftwaffe attacks very often concentrated on the wrong airfields but when they did get it right, it was disastrous.
.
The diagram seems to show to me that in this war of attrition where the LW had to sweep the RAF out of the skies as a prelude to invasion. Not only were the RAF not on their knees the LW was relatively worse of compared to the start. The diagram is interesting but the real problem for both sides was pilots and aircrew which were much harder to replace.
What happened on the 31 August cannot have influenced the decision to bomb Berlin on the 25. The fighting up to the 25th, when the decision to bomb Berlin was taken, was favourable for the RAF, as the figures and reports above show.
As to FC "almost collapsing" the following week, from the next war cabinet summary, 29 August - 5 September:
On the 2 September Churchill reported to the war cabinet on his visit to FC on 31 August:
On the 5 September Air Vice-Marshal Park commander of 11 Group spoke to his Chief Controller Lord Willoughby de Brooke " I know you and the other controllers must be getting worried about our losses" Park said "Well I've been looking at these casualty figures, and I've come to the conclusion that at our present rate of losses we can just afford it. And I'm damned certain the Boche can't. If we can hang on as we're going, I'm sure we shall win in the end"
I'm not particularly familiar with The RAF organisation but I wonder whether there is a confusion between PSU and Aircraft Storage Unit (ASU) most of which became known simply as Maintenance Units (MUs)
I would expect the sort of repairs described to be carried out by an MU.
Cheers
Steve
And once again Park was not referring to aircraft losses but losses (he said 'casualties') of trained personnel. Aircraft were never a problem. On 4th June 1940 Fighter Command had 331 operational Hurricanes and Spitfires, on 11th August it had 620 operational Hurricanes and Spitfires. What Dowding and Park didn't have was the combat ready pilots to fly them.
Cheers
Steve
The attack on Rotterdam was indeed a 'morale' bombing attack, the attack was intended to demoralise the troops defending the city. the German's planned a similar attack on London on the first day of Operation Sealion, in order to disrupt the British response to the landing.
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
i am going to guess the PSU is the "heavy repair shop". on a lot of bases light work was done out in the revetments and heavier work went to different hangars. even those had limitations and if the damage or problem was significant i imagine they would ship it to another location where they had the facilities to deal with it.
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
wasnt rotterdam bombed after the neitherlands already surrendered or was close to doing so....or am i thinking of another place?
Last edited:
The city was bombed after the city's defenders had agreed to surrender, the German ground forces were unable to recall the bombers in time.
Don't know but at the end of Sept 40 they had more serviceable 109s than combat-ready pilots to fly them.
Juha
parsifal
Colonel
Short answer...absolutely. Average strengths of the the fighter groups going into the battle was 35 aircraft, 6-8 weeks later they were down to about 20 a/c per group. Serviceability rates also plummetted . at the start the germans were able to field about 600 109s on a daily basis, by the beginning of october this figure had slumped to under 300.
I dont agree that the LW came close to defeating the RAF. The RAF came close to breeaking, but in order for the LW to claim outright victory, they needed air supremacy, and that meant they had to emerge from the battler with significant strength still available. That meant not only that they had to remove the RAF from the equation, they also had to remain standing themselves as a potent and dominating force. Whilst the RAF was taking a bit of a beating, the LW was doing it tough as well. And that was enough for the RAF to claim victory, even in the difficult parts of the battle. The RAF merely had to reatin southern England as disputed airspace to achieve victory, the LW needed air supremacy. They never came close to that, whilst the RAF never relinquished their dispute of the skies being fought for.
Moreover, the RAF insisted on fighting well forward, which i dont accept and donet understand. Fighting well forward does have its reasons, but it also gives back certain advantages to the LW, which i think were more important in that opening stage of the battle.
Even before the BoB started Goering was shocked at how much it had lost in strength "Is that all that is left of my Luftwaffe" he said. As others have said it was a tool for short campaigns and after Poland Holland Belgium France and Norway it was depleted in numbers
Fighting forward had its tactical advantages, using up fuel of escorting fighters being one of the main ones.
Last edited:
parsifal
Colonel
German command structures
Part I of II
On the basis of map exercises conducted by Felmy's staff at Luftflotte Two-the only such exercises (against Britain) held prior to the war-General Felmy concluded "neither the strength nor the training or equipment of Second Air Fleet forces were adequate to insure a quick victory over Britain in 1939."
The "target date" established for these map exercises had been set at 1942. Based on these staff estimates, it would appear that both Goering and his chief of staff were fully cognizant of the dangers in entering into a war against England before the Luftwaffe was adequately prepared. After an official visit to England in 1938, Milch warned Hitler against Ribbentropp (the German ambassador in London) whom he believed "was damaging relations between the two countries."
Milch also conveyed an additional warning; England was prepared to go to war over the Danzig and Polish corridor question. Goering would express his foreboding when, upon receiving final confirmation of the attack upon Poland, he called Herr Ribbentropp (then the foreign secretary) and shouted at him, "Now you have your war. You alone are to blame." Two days later (3 September 1939), when England declared war on Germany, he is quoted as saying, "May Heaven have mercy on us if we should lose this war."
A study prepared by Oberst (Colonel) "Beppo" Schmid, chief of intelligence of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, further determined that the RAF could reach strengths equal to those of the Luftwaffe by 1940. Therefore, the priorities established for the forced submission of England were the " firstly defeat of the Royal Air Force, secondly incapacitation of the British air armament industry, and thirdly elimination of the British Navy."
Subsequent actions could then be directed against port, shipping, and other industries, but strong air forces would still be required to accomplish this. no mention in these professional staff studies was ever made of the impportance of the CH network, even at this stage German appreciation of its importance was limited. Schmid stated after the war that he briefed the commanders that because of the "high morale of the British people and the improvising skill of British leaders, Great Britain could not be forced to capitulate through air attack alone, but only through actual occupation of the island." At other time he testified that the LW did not appreciate the importance of the CH network, or the infrastructure that was using it.
These studies were thoroughly professional and sound in judgement, but as always, there was significant political inteference from the highest levels. Hitler's opinion, was that Britain could be defeated through a combination of air and sea blockades. Hitler insisted that, "the moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate." If this could be achieved, there would be no need for invasion. Hitler then outlined his strategy in Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of War. The directive called for the invasion of Poland and a strategic defensive in the west against England and France. This was the basis of Hitlers terror bombing campaigns. it wasnt there yet, but the war experiences put the finishing touches on terror bombing as an instrument of war. The British were still some way behind, but catching. in 1939, their air staffs were still very muchbesotted by the notion of precision bombing...taking out specific targets by point attacks.
According to Directive No. 1, the Luftwaffe was to "take measures to dislocate English imports, the armaments industry, and the transport of troops to France." While planning for the contingency was allowed, no attacks were to be made on the mainland of Britain itself. Hitler would, however, issue a memorandum on 10 October detailing his intentions in the West if Britain failed to come to an agreement for peace. Specifically, Hitler identified "Germany's unfavorable geographic location for air warfare, which forced aircraft to fly long distances to reach their targets." In recognition of this limitation, War Directive No. 6 (dated 9 October 1939), mandated the occupation of "as large an area as possible in Holland, Belgium and northern France as a basis for conducting a promising air and sea war against England." Not all of hitlers interferences were retrograde....this was a positive step in the right direction...obvious to us now, but not so obvious at the time. Subsequently, Directive No. 9, issued on the 29th of November 1939, identified Britain as "the driving force behind the Western Powers' will to make war. The defeat of Britain . . . was the prime condition for final victory, and the most effective means to bring about this defeat was to paralyze the British economy." Again, i tend to agree with hitlers summation. The air staffs recommendation was based on the false premise of being able to gain air supremacy, and being able to carry out a cross channel attack. Neither of these presumptions by OKL were at all realistic.
The precedence established for target selection was 1) ports (either by mining approaches or bombing installations), 2) attacks on merchant shipping and associated naval escorts, 3) storage depots followed by transport conveying British troops to the continent, and 4) vital military industries including aircraft and munitions factories. Interestingly, after the main assault of 1940, this was precisely the template the LW reverted to in late 1940 and early 1941. and whilst it would gain outright victory, it was a more modest set of objectives that hurt Britain a lot.
The intention of these 1939 studies was not total war against England, or an invasion, or even an all out air war. What the Germans did desire was an economic strangulation of the British Isles to the point that a negotiated peace could be had. Political attitudes against continued German aggression had stiffened and the peace proposals Hitler presented in the Reichstag on 6 October were soundly rejected by the British.
The fact remains that neither the Luftwaffe nor the German Navy was in a position to blockade England to the extent required by Hitler's memorandums and directives. A factor that Hitler had not yet grasped but also a factor the British seemed to have been quite willing to exploit to their best advantage. Therefore, the German command had to devise new plans to conquer Great Britain.
Much of the German air planning for the Battle of Britain was based on the considerable successes of earlier campaigns in 1939 and early 1940. But, "no uniformly accepted concept existed concerning the operational conduct of air warfare against England." The prerequisite for successful land operations was recognized as security, through control of the air. The task for the Luftwaffe, however, was viewed in simplistic terms and approached rather casually; the only difference between the coming battle and others previously fought was "that the R.A.F., being the most powerful single air force yet encountered, would necessarily require for its destruction some time longer than the 12 to 48 hours previously allotted to other air forces." This was quickly exposed as the faulty assessment it was, but is indicative of the completely inadequate approach the air staff had to this most difficult of problems.
Part I of II
On the basis of map exercises conducted by Felmy's staff at Luftflotte Two-the only such exercises (against Britain) held prior to the war-General Felmy concluded "neither the strength nor the training or equipment of Second Air Fleet forces were adequate to insure a quick victory over Britain in 1939."
The "target date" established for these map exercises had been set at 1942. Based on these staff estimates, it would appear that both Goering and his chief of staff were fully cognizant of the dangers in entering into a war against England before the Luftwaffe was adequately prepared. After an official visit to England in 1938, Milch warned Hitler against Ribbentropp (the German ambassador in London) whom he believed "was damaging relations between the two countries."
Milch also conveyed an additional warning; England was prepared to go to war over the Danzig and Polish corridor question. Goering would express his foreboding when, upon receiving final confirmation of the attack upon Poland, he called Herr Ribbentropp (then the foreign secretary) and shouted at him, "Now you have your war. You alone are to blame." Two days later (3 September 1939), when England declared war on Germany, he is quoted as saying, "May Heaven have mercy on us if we should lose this war."
A study prepared by Oberst (Colonel) "Beppo" Schmid, chief of intelligence of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, further determined that the RAF could reach strengths equal to those of the Luftwaffe by 1940. Therefore, the priorities established for the forced submission of England were the " firstly defeat of the Royal Air Force, secondly incapacitation of the British air armament industry, and thirdly elimination of the British Navy."
Subsequent actions could then be directed against port, shipping, and other industries, but strong air forces would still be required to accomplish this. no mention in these professional staff studies was ever made of the impportance of the CH network, even at this stage German appreciation of its importance was limited. Schmid stated after the war that he briefed the commanders that because of the "high morale of the British people and the improvising skill of British leaders, Great Britain could not be forced to capitulate through air attack alone, but only through actual occupation of the island." At other time he testified that the LW did not appreciate the importance of the CH network, or the infrastructure that was using it.
These studies were thoroughly professional and sound in judgement, but as always, there was significant political inteference from the highest levels. Hitler's opinion, was that Britain could be defeated through a combination of air and sea blockades. Hitler insisted that, "the moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate." If this could be achieved, there would be no need for invasion. Hitler then outlined his strategy in Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of War. The directive called for the invasion of Poland and a strategic defensive in the west against England and France. This was the basis of Hitlers terror bombing campaigns. it wasnt there yet, but the war experiences put the finishing touches on terror bombing as an instrument of war. The British were still some way behind, but catching. in 1939, their air staffs were still very muchbesotted by the notion of precision bombing...taking out specific targets by point attacks.
According to Directive No. 1, the Luftwaffe was to "take measures to dislocate English imports, the armaments industry, and the transport of troops to France." While planning for the contingency was allowed, no attacks were to be made on the mainland of Britain itself. Hitler would, however, issue a memorandum on 10 October detailing his intentions in the West if Britain failed to come to an agreement for peace. Specifically, Hitler identified "Germany's unfavorable geographic location for air warfare, which forced aircraft to fly long distances to reach their targets." In recognition of this limitation, War Directive No. 6 (dated 9 October 1939), mandated the occupation of "as large an area as possible in Holland, Belgium and northern France as a basis for conducting a promising air and sea war against England." Not all of hitlers interferences were retrograde....this was a positive step in the right direction...obvious to us now, but not so obvious at the time. Subsequently, Directive No. 9, issued on the 29th of November 1939, identified Britain as "the driving force behind the Western Powers' will to make war. The defeat of Britain . . . was the prime condition for final victory, and the most effective means to bring about this defeat was to paralyze the British economy." Again, i tend to agree with hitlers summation. The air staffs recommendation was based on the false premise of being able to gain air supremacy, and being able to carry out a cross channel attack. Neither of these presumptions by OKL were at all realistic.
The precedence established for target selection was 1) ports (either by mining approaches or bombing installations), 2) attacks on merchant shipping and associated naval escorts, 3) storage depots followed by transport conveying British troops to the continent, and 4) vital military industries including aircraft and munitions factories. Interestingly, after the main assault of 1940, this was precisely the template the LW reverted to in late 1940 and early 1941. and whilst it would gain outright victory, it was a more modest set of objectives that hurt Britain a lot.
The intention of these 1939 studies was not total war against England, or an invasion, or even an all out air war. What the Germans did desire was an economic strangulation of the British Isles to the point that a negotiated peace could be had. Political attitudes against continued German aggression had stiffened and the peace proposals Hitler presented in the Reichstag on 6 October were soundly rejected by the British.
The fact remains that neither the Luftwaffe nor the German Navy was in a position to blockade England to the extent required by Hitler's memorandums and directives. A factor that Hitler had not yet grasped but also a factor the British seemed to have been quite willing to exploit to their best advantage. Therefore, the German command had to devise new plans to conquer Great Britain.
Much of the German air planning for the Battle of Britain was based on the considerable successes of earlier campaigns in 1939 and early 1940. But, "no uniformly accepted concept existed concerning the operational conduct of air warfare against England." The prerequisite for successful land operations was recognized as security, through control of the air. The task for the Luftwaffe, however, was viewed in simplistic terms and approached rather casually; the only difference between the coming battle and others previously fought was "that the R.A.F., being the most powerful single air force yet encountered, would necessarily require for its destruction some time longer than the 12 to 48 hours previously allotted to other air forces." This was quickly exposed as the faulty assessment it was, but is indicative of the completely inadequate approach the air staff had to this most difficult of problems.
parsifal
Colonel
Geran Command structure Part II of II
As an example of the extreme and fatal complacency that existied in the LW, Erhard Milch, in his capacity as the inspector general, reported (in June 1940) that as a result of his visits to the various captured airfields and the field headquarters, "no preparations at all were being made for air war with Britain." This is somewhat amazing considering the tremendous logistical problems associated with sustained operations from those airfields. Runways had to be improved, and depots established. Munitions, fuel, and supplies had to be transported hundreds of miles from their sources within Germany. The Germans continued to view the English Channel as little more than a large river. The air force was to support the land forces in another "river-crossing" exercise-an operation not unlike those previously conducted on the Meuse, Maas and Vistulla rivers--without regard to the strategic consequences.
The casual approach to the war with Britain was certainly a reflection of the overconfidence resulting from the highly successful campaigns recently concluded in Poland, Norway and especially in France. All, however, were campaigns where the bomber forces functioned almost exclusively as extensions of the tactical air arm. But the near exclusive use of the bomber arm for tactical support of the Army inevitably led "to confusion and misconceptions as to the employment of the bomber which lasted throughout the war." And, in addition to the task of defeating the RAF, the German Combined Staffs issued a directive in July from Field Marshal Keitel stipulating "the German lack of command of the sea could be substituted by supremacy in the air." Further burdens on an already overtaxed force structure.
Some of the Luftwaffe's airmen were more skeptical (and realistic), and Werner Baumbach, a future General of Bombers wrote, "we know that England is the hardest nut to be cracked in this war. Our experience at the front has shown us that final victory against England can only be attained by the systematic cooperation of all arms of the service and ruthless application of the elementary principle of concentrating all one's strength and effort at the vital strategic point. Even if the air arm is the most important weapon in total war, it cannot by itself ensure the decisive, final and total victory." Evidently, nobody important was listening when he stated this most obvious of onservations.
Hitler's Directive No. 16, dated 6 July 1940, identified the role of the Air Force in the invasion (code-named Seelowe or "Sea Lion") as prevention of "interference by hostile air forces." In addition, the Luftwaffe was to mount attacks against British strong points, especially those in the landing areas, against troop concentrations and reinforcements, as well as naval units operating in the area of operations. The LW never gained the necessary advantages to make any serious inroads into these directive missions. In essence then, the Luftwaffe would provide an "air umbrella" and also the necessary "force multipliers" beneath which the invasion could take place and be assisted. To that, it was also responsible for keeping the attentions of the RN at bay, something it was never entirely successful at in other TOs . There was little difference in this directive from those used to form the operational basis for the campaigns in Poland, Norway and France. But, there was one significant flaw, and that flaw was a total failure to provide a special joint command staff to control all three branches of the Wehrmacht-such as the Joint Command organized as Group XXI for the operations in Norway-to assume responsibility for the planning, preparation, and execution of Operation Sea Lion. This included an over arching control and directoion of air assets to ensure campaign, as oppsed to air force, objectives were followed and effecitiely met. 5 Instead, the responsibility for operational planning rested with the three high commands of the Wehrmacht (OKH), the Air Force Operations Staff (OKL) and the navuy (OKM, all operating more or less separate to each opther
Much of the planning for the "intensified" air operations was apparently conducted by the Air Fleets and then submitted for approval by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff and ultimately by Goering. What is unclear, however, is how this planning was coordinated. This disjoited command structure and competing objectives goes a long way to expaining the ragged and inneffective application of LW power during the campaign. Klee writes that "by 25 July 1940 the air fleets formulated their initial intentions for the conduct of air warfare against Britain, basing their work on appropriate studies submitted by their air corps. On 29 July the Luftwaffe Operations Staff provided comments on the plans submitted. On 1 August the air fleet submitted their revised plans. Again Goering disapproved certain specific points." Finally, on 2 August 1940, the Preparations and Directives for Operation Adler was released.
As an example of the extreme and fatal complacency that existied in the LW, Erhard Milch, in his capacity as the inspector general, reported (in June 1940) that as a result of his visits to the various captured airfields and the field headquarters, "no preparations at all were being made for air war with Britain." This is somewhat amazing considering the tremendous logistical problems associated with sustained operations from those airfields. Runways had to be improved, and depots established. Munitions, fuel, and supplies had to be transported hundreds of miles from their sources within Germany. The Germans continued to view the English Channel as little more than a large river. The air force was to support the land forces in another "river-crossing" exercise-an operation not unlike those previously conducted on the Meuse, Maas and Vistulla rivers--without regard to the strategic consequences.
The casual approach to the war with Britain was certainly a reflection of the overconfidence resulting from the highly successful campaigns recently concluded in Poland, Norway and especially in France. All, however, were campaigns where the bomber forces functioned almost exclusively as extensions of the tactical air arm. But the near exclusive use of the bomber arm for tactical support of the Army inevitably led "to confusion and misconceptions as to the employment of the bomber which lasted throughout the war." And, in addition to the task of defeating the RAF, the German Combined Staffs issued a directive in July from Field Marshal Keitel stipulating "the German lack of command of the sea could be substituted by supremacy in the air." Further burdens on an already overtaxed force structure.
Some of the Luftwaffe's airmen were more skeptical (and realistic), and Werner Baumbach, a future General of Bombers wrote, "we know that England is the hardest nut to be cracked in this war. Our experience at the front has shown us that final victory against England can only be attained by the systematic cooperation of all arms of the service and ruthless application of the elementary principle of concentrating all one's strength and effort at the vital strategic point. Even if the air arm is the most important weapon in total war, it cannot by itself ensure the decisive, final and total victory." Evidently, nobody important was listening when he stated this most obvious of onservations.
Hitler's Directive No. 16, dated 6 July 1940, identified the role of the Air Force in the invasion (code-named Seelowe or "Sea Lion") as prevention of "interference by hostile air forces." In addition, the Luftwaffe was to mount attacks against British strong points, especially those in the landing areas, against troop concentrations and reinforcements, as well as naval units operating in the area of operations. The LW never gained the necessary advantages to make any serious inroads into these directive missions. In essence then, the Luftwaffe would provide an "air umbrella" and also the necessary "force multipliers" beneath which the invasion could take place and be assisted. To that, it was also responsible for keeping the attentions of the RN at bay, something it was never entirely successful at in other TOs . There was little difference in this directive from those used to form the operational basis for the campaigns in Poland, Norway and France. But, there was one significant flaw, and that flaw was a total failure to provide a special joint command staff to control all three branches of the Wehrmacht-such as the Joint Command organized as Group XXI for the operations in Norway-to assume responsibility for the planning, preparation, and execution of Operation Sea Lion. This included an over arching control and directoion of air assets to ensure campaign, as oppsed to air force, objectives were followed and effecitiely met. 5 Instead, the responsibility for operational planning rested with the three high commands of the Wehrmacht (OKH), the Air Force Operations Staff (OKL) and the navuy (OKM, all operating more or less separate to each opther
Much of the planning for the "intensified" air operations was apparently conducted by the Air Fleets and then submitted for approval by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff and ultimately by Goering. What is unclear, however, is how this planning was coordinated. This disjoited command structure and competing objectives goes a long way to expaining the ragged and inneffective application of LW power during the campaign. Klee writes that "by 25 July 1940 the air fleets formulated their initial intentions for the conduct of air warfare against Britain, basing their work on appropriate studies submitted by their air corps. On 29 July the Luftwaffe Operations Staff provided comments on the plans submitted. On 1 August the air fleet submitted their revised plans. Again Goering disapproved certain specific points." Finally, on 2 August 1940, the Preparations and Directives for Operation Adler was released.
