Curtiss-Wright: Loss of Don Berlin and downfall

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Whitcomb's area rule formula became well known by 1958 when proposed for solution to F-102 & F11F (AKA F9F-9) problems.

Yes, but the principle was well known from '30 engineers such as Marcel Riffard.

See
Loi des aires (aérodynamique) — Wikipédia

and note : "Une astuce bien meilleure, puisqu'elle corrigeait la cause et non l'effet, fut imaginée par Marcel Riffard dès 1932. Il suffit de déplacer le maître-couple du fuselage jusqu'à l'arrière du bord de fuite de l'aile..." - Article de Jacques Lecarme sur les interactions, in Aviation Magazine International, n°719 du 01/12/1977.
 
The translation of the quote above does not point to area rule. In fact, it doesn't point to much at all. Perhaps it is the translation. I'll assume so.

The link makes sense.

I see there was German patent during the war (between 1943 and 1945). However, I'd have to read a translation to find out if it is the same as Whitcomb's findings. Might be the same and might be just broadly similar. Can't say. Neither would be a surprise. The world was full of innovative aeronautical designers at that time, and most were pretty sharp.
 
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My point. Race over safe water. When shit happens glide to a safe spot on a beach away from crowd. When crashes occur its in the water where no one of the crowd can be injured.

Racing is dangerous and exiting to watch. Bet you one can sell out a ocean liner in the middle of the racing ring with big fat tickets and Barry Manilow for night entertainment. The rest is safe watching from said beach.

Tow in a ww2 carrier for the very rich and spent the money maintaning these ships.

Make a show but as safe as can so it may coninue.
 
One of the 'alleged' connections included Oliver Echols.
 

I made the trip knowing it was the last ever Reno Air Races, having media creds helped with costs, but it was worth it, certainly for a newb with no ties to the joint, unlike yourself. While it might have been disappointing that the last races were canned - I missed a whole lot of photo opportunities as I was out at Pylon Two on Sunday, the overall experience was well worth it for me. The two T-6s that collided were getting on approach to landing and after their collision, the tower was bringing the rest of the T-6s into land while the emergency service vehicles were racing to the scene. I was with a group of photographers and while we didn't see the collision - a group of media peeps back at the airport on the media photography stand did, we saw where they impacted the ground from where we were. To be fair, the cancellation saw only five races canned as the collision took place at 2:15 pm on Sunday. Out of interest's sake, the FAA, NTSB and pilot's who were lost's families and crew believed that the races should continue and it was RARA who insisted on the cancellation of the races, that is, according to the RARA press releases.


_ADP9008
 
Thanks Greg, I appreciate the explanation. I always wanted to get to Reno but never fit it into my schedule, guess I never will now. Damn.

In case you're interested, I've got a couple of threads going following my experiences at the air races. Pictures only:


Expanded story:


Sorry for the thread drift, back to Curtiss...
 
If they'd given the V-1710's to the P-40's and put the V-1650-1 in the Mustang MkI, then they'd have really had something.
Why would the US give the British US engines to put in British Aircraft?
The British paid for the first 620 Mustang I's cash (including the Allison engines), If the British wanted to put Merlin V-1650-1 engines in them then use engines from the British 2/3rds of the first 9000 engines.
I felt there were never enough PT boats.
Different engines.
Packard V-2500 engine was just that, a 2500 cubic inch engine.
Trying to use 1650 cubic inch engines was not going end well. (more break downs)
 
If they'd given the V-1710's to the P-40's and put the V-1650-1 in the Mustang MkI, then they'd have really had something. And, by the way, told GM to forget that ridiculous P-75 and have them build P-82's.

Instead of the P-82, which may not have existed at the start of the P-75 project, they could have continued their work on the XB-39.
 
Close enough.
Do you disagree with there not being enough PT boats? I don't have one.
I don't disagree with the number of PT boats.
Problem is you can not substitute Merlins for the Packard Marine engines on a one for one basis.
You have 3 choices.
Make smaller boats for 3 Merlins.
Use 4 Merlins per boat.
Supply a bunch of extra Merlins as spares for more frequent engine changes ( and if you are swapping out engines you aren't doing war patrols)

The Marine Merlins were rated at 1100hp (?) each. The Packards started at 1200hp and went through several stages to get to 1350hp.
The thing with the US Marine engines is that was the 1 hour rating, not the 5 minute rating.
5 minutes at 40kts does not get you out of range.
 
Interesting question. Kindelberger wanted the 1650-1 for the Mustang IA. He obtained 18 pages of data and specs for the 'merlined' P-40F and Beaufighter II (IIRC) from R-R US in April, 1941. The GM board at Allison request, shut him down. Allison tried again in November 1942 when the orders for NA-102/103 and NA-99 contract AC-30749 converted from P-51A to NA-104 P-51B-5.

Allison also appealed to Materiel Command for more orders to fill the Production Plan for 1944. I sometimes have speculated that is one of the reasons to keep both the P-40 and P-63 going - not the only reason, but one important reason.

Question - as I am old and getting senile - my foggy memory recalled 50/50 split for 1650-1? Where can I find the correct answer?
 
I can think of only one reason.

If the Mustang lived up to potential, they could dramatically improve supply chain fo UK for spares parts and replacement engines. But how to balance against importance of Lancaster and Mosquitos built in Canada?

Additionally RAF/R-R were well aware of development potential for Merlin 61. In late 1942 the Brits did solicit from NAA a proposal to ship P-51 airframes to Great Britain for assembly of engine to airframe. NAA response was 'too complicated, too long to get there from here (build plant, train workers)', not to mention War Production Board unlikely approval - given backlog of NAA orders for P-51B/C.

That said, the US did put US Packard engines in a 'British aircraft' - approximately 14500. But that mindset not in play in 1941 or 1942
 
Ministry of Aircraft Production.
Date%USUS 1 stageM28M29M31US 2 stage
Aug-41​
50.0​
2​
2​
Sep-41​
25.0​
1​
3​
Oct-41​
40.0​
2​
3​
Nov-41​
30.0​
3​
7​
Dec-41​
34.6​
9​
17​
Jan-42​
32.1​
35​
74​
Feb-42​
32.2​
48​
22​
79​
Mar-42​
34.5​
115​
57​
160​
1​
Apr-42​
33.3​
168​
334​
1​
2​
May-42​
32.2​
194​
406​
0​
2​
Jun-42​
34.5​
242​
458​
0​
2​
Jul-42​
28.0​
224​
528​
36​
13​
Aug-42​
23.8​
190​
505​
82​
23​
Sep-42​
23.8​
190​
476​
71​
63​
Oct-42​
29.4​
235​
502​
20​
43​
Nov-42​
31.1​
245​
418​
28​
105​
4​
Dec-42​
33.2​
281​
430​
3​
135​
1​
Jan-43​
33.3​
283​
439​
0​
128​
Feb-43​
35.0​
302​
519​
0​
43​
Total
30.8​
2769​
5200​
480​
560​
5​

9,014 US Merlins to end February 1943, which saw the last production of the Merlin 28 and 31, in March the final 44 single stage Merlins for the US and the start of Merlin 38 production.

3,016 Lancaster III times 4 engines, plus 1,054 Spitfire XVI and spares Throw in another 430 Lancaster X, 1,133 Canadian built Mosquitoes and the Australian ones (and Mustangs)

UK aircraft engine imports (all types), 2,704 in 1941, 3,145 in 1942, 9,441 in 1943, 11,327 in 1944, 4,528 January to June 1945.

The fundamental reason why production shifts took so much time was the cost and complexity of changing over, costs in money but also opportunity, what else could be done with the resources. Add retraining for the new type and stocking the spare parts system. Something that worked now was often preferred to something better tomorrow. For the western allies they also needed to have the aircraft they promised the USSR, which had its own preferences.

The "sudden overnight" decision by the Luftwaffe in the west to largely stop contesting front line area airspace in mid 1943, the appearance of Kamikazes, were way faster than any production system could react. So USMC fighter squadrons became carrier based.

In 1943/44 Bomber Command had Lancaster Finishing Schools, until then all training was on other types, in 1944 the 9th AF converted one of its P-51 groups to P-47 for a time. Those obsolete fighters could do as advanced trainers and operate in secondary theatres, like the F4F did.

The fighter bomber was making many multi crew light bombers obsolete. Hurricane or Blenheim, P-47 or A-20? The USN did publish performance tests for the F6F-3, -5 and F7F-1, -2 carrying a torpedo. The Fairey Firefly was not a good fighter compared with the F6F, but how about as a 2,000 pound bomber compared to the TBF/M?

Given the 1942 results it is unsurprising the USN made the dive bomber a required type but had trouble with replacement designs, so SBD production continued until August 1944 as the SB2A went nowhere, the SB2C had problems while the TBY was a 1945 aircraft, as was the BTD in a limited run. The Canadian SB2C lines: SBW started production in September 1943, the SBF (ignoring the prototype) in March 1944. In mid 1945 TBM production was about twice SB2C/SBW/SBF.

War Production Board, 778 PT boats November 1940 to August 1945, by year 10, 35, 127, 278, 204, 124.
 
That said, the US did put US Packard engines in a 'British aircraft' - approximately 14500. But that mindset not in play in 1941 or 1942
We also have to remember what the mindset was in the summer and fall of 1940 when the deal with Packard was signed.
Allison Production in 1940
Jan................3
Feb...............7
March.........7
April............7
May..........14
June.........30
July...........73
Aug..........65
Sept......223
Oct........286
Nov.......175
Dec........299

Allison production increased by leaps and bounds in 1941 however the initial P-40s in the summer of 1940 where having a lot of troubles with backfiring, intake manifolds blown off and a few other troubles. There was also a problem with the acceptance test/s. Army wanted 150 hours (British standard was 100hrs), Army also wanted to rate the engines at 1090hp a bit lower down than the preliminary 1030hp rating. All of this was complicated by a faulty test stand that did not provide enough vibration dampening. Several engines failed (cracks) in the last 50 hours of the tests. I believe it took the 4th engine to pass?
Allison in the Fall/Winter of 1940 and into the Spring (?) rebuilt around 277 already delivered US Army engines with new crankcases and crankshafts. The Service Allisons were down rated to 2770rpm and under 1000hp until the work was done.
Having a 2nd source of V-12 engine coming online in late 1941 could only be considered prudent in those circumstances. Allison did straighten everything out and finished 1941 by build 1,100 engines in Dec 1941 alone but that was not a sure thing in winter of 1940.
But allocations of of raw materials and tooling had to take place months before the actual product showed up.
And the Contracts were signed with Packard just about 7 months before lend-lease was signed.

So there was a lot of stuff going on in late 1940/early 1941. Now figure out if Hitler was going to continue to Attack England in the Spring of 1941 or not? And once Hitler Attacked Russia how much "stuff" was allocated to Russia? Some of which took months to actually show up. Like P-40Gs. Take used US P-40 (no letter), give them self sealing tanks and bit of armor and sometimes (?) P-40C wings to hold 4 guns and a few other changes.
There was a lot of scrambling to get stuff to Russia in the Fall of 1941 while planning what the US actually wanted in 1942 in New Production and a lot of that hit the Fan on Dec 7th 1941. Good or in production took precedence over "nice to have" in late 1942 (6 months away).
 
that 1650-1 was suggested to relieve Allison pressure
I believe that assertion is in the massive book "Vees for Victory" about the history of the V-1710.

As you point out, simply having a two speed single stage supercharger like the V-1650-1 in the V-1710 would have improved altitude performance for both the Mustang and P-40. The graphs in "America's Hundred Thousand." show that. And at about this time typically someone starts yelling that the two speed V-1710 still would have not been as good as the two stage Merlin, and while that is true a Mustang MkI or even a P-51A with a V-1650-1 would still have been a better fighter than anything else we had at the time. Even with the single stage single speed V-1710, a P-51A could hit 410 mph at 20,000 ft, which was faster than a Spitfire IX at that altitude.

Was a V-1710 equipped Mustang MkI, A-36, or P-51A a better low altitude fighter than a V-1650-1 version would have been? Maybe so, fact was that the Mustang MkI was used for TAC-R by the RAF because it was so much better than Spitfire for that role. Attempts to escort TAC-R Mustangs with Spitfires resulting in the finding that the Spit could not hack it.

I have not heard anyone praising the superior performance of the P-40F over the E, so maybe it was not enough to matter, even though we had P-40F on Guadalcanal.


 

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