Dawn Luftwaffe raids on Allied airfields May 10th 1940, RAF escapes damage but how?

[AnynameIwish]

I'm reading some histories of the air campaign in France & the following is detailed;

- The Luftwaffe attempts to establish air superiority on Day 1 of the campaign by striking allied airfields.
- Dutch, French & Belgian Airfields are hit hard. British airfields in France nearly completely escape effective damage.
- French Air Force HQ warned late on May 9th that air attacks were likely the next day.
- The three Hurricane squadrons of the AASF at least were tasked with base defence.
- The British have more access to AAA than the French in the campaign.
- The timing of some of the attacks at least is at first light (one is at 4.45AM, 5 minutes before Nautical Twilight).
- Radar coverage & fighter squadron co-ordination isn't established like in the later BoB.

What I'm trying to understand is the causative factor for the failure of the German attacks on British airfields. I can think of a few possibilities, i.e;

- Better British force maintenance due to pre war planning & where they were in the deployment cycle of their fighters permitting a greater sortie rate & thus standing fighter patrols over their airbases.
- Failure of German air recon to enable planning the strikes.
- If they were practicing dispersing their aircraft, had slit trenches available for crew on the ground to take cover in, or better employed camoflage.
- Simple anti-aircraft fire volume pushing German Bombers to release sub-optimally.
- Not being priority targets in the first place.
- French communication issues not getting warnings out to their own airfields on time (they really had issues).
- Blind luck.

I just can't find accounts that are willing to even suggest why it happened the way it did.

 

[GreenKnight121]

Chain Home.

The first five stations, covering the approaches to London, were installed by 1937 and began full-time operation in 1938. Operational tests that year, using early units, demonstrated the difficulties in relaying useful information to the pilots in fighter aircraft. This led to the formation of the first integrated ground-controlled interception network, the Dowding system, which collected and filtered this information into a single view of the airspace.

Dozens of CH stations covering the majority of the eastern and southern coasts of the UK, along with a complete ground network with thousands of miles of private telephone lines, were ready by the time the war began in 1939.

Early warning radar, with a good communication system, really helps getting your aircraft off the ground before the enemy gets there.

 

[SaparotRob]

Yet Sir Neville Chamberlain never seems to get any credit at all for this government project.

 

[pbehn]

Yet Sir Neville Chamberlain never seems to get any credit at all for this government project.

History has been very unkind to Chamberlain, who was a very ill man. He died just after the Battle of Britain ended 9 Nov 1940. Chain Home and the later GCI coupled with Dowdings CaC system changed air warfare. The Royal Observer Corps dont get so much coverage, Chain Home only looked outwards to sea. Raids that had crossed the coast were plotted by the ROC which involved a huge number of people and a lot of training and equipment. From August 1940 the UK was out producing Germany in most types of aircraft. People can debate which was best, but frequently quantity has a quality all of its own. Much of this had Chamberlains hand on it either as Chancellor or Prime Minister.

 

[pbehn]

I'm reading some histories of the air campaign in France & the following is detailed;

- The Luftwaffe attempts to establish air superiority on Day 1 of the campaign by striking allied airfields.
- Dutch, French & Belgian Airfields are hit hard. British airfields in France nearly completely escape effective damage.
- French Air Force HQ warned late on May 9th that air attacks were likely the next day.
- The three Hurricane squadrons of the AASF at least were tasked with base defence.
- The British have more access to AAA than the French in the campaign.
- The timing of some of the attacks at least is at first light (one is at 4.45AM, 5 minutes before Nautical Twilight).
- Radar coverage & fighter squadron co-ordination isn't established like in the later BoB.

What I'm trying to understand is the causative factor for the failure of the German attacks on British airfields. I can think of a few possibilities, i.e;

- Better British force maintenance due to pre war planning & where they were in the deployment cycle of their fighters permitting a greater sortie rate & thus standing fighter patrols over their airbases.
- Failure of German air recon to enable planning the strikes.
- If they were practicing dispersing their aircraft, had slit trenches available for crew on the ground to take cover in, or better employed camoflage.
- Simple anti-aircraft fire volume pushing German Bombers to release sub-optimally.
- Not being priority targets in the first place.
- French communication issues not getting warnings out to their own airfields on time (they really had issues).
- Blind luck.

I just can't find accounts that are willing to even suggest why it happened the way it did.

Is this discussion why the Luftwaffe didnt eliminate the RAF and establish air superiority in France in a single day? I know those black crosses had special powers but surely there is a limit?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

What clocks are being used for the times? Friday 10 May 1940 UK clocks on +1 hours GMT (had been since 25 February). At London GMT times Sunrise 04:15, Sunset 19:39, new moon on 7 May, moon rise 06:36, moon set 22:27. South East England weather is reported as light winds, more cloud later, some local showers. Visibility mostly around 6 miles. Bad weather resulted in 8./KG51 being 125 miles off course and bombing Freiburg. The Swiss shot up a He111 in their airspace. The second wave strikes were against non airfield targets.

Apart from the factors mentioned, a number of the RAF airfields were new and were on average at a further distance from Germany enabling more warning, the size of the different attacking forces, the number bombs dropped. There were the problems in repairing damaged aircraft compounded by the German Army advances. RAF 53 squadron had a Blenheim damaged by bombing at Poix later abandoned, 88 squadron had 2 Battles damaged in the morning and 2 in the afternoon raids, all 4 later abandoned, but not officially destroyed on 10 May. While some allied airfields were hit hard, most were only lightly damaged and the allies were losing aircraft in the air.

The British were doing dawn patrols. According to John Foreman's list of RAF fighter claims 1 Squadron made 4 claims by 7am, 73 squadron 4 plus 2 "AM", 85 squadron 5, 87 squadron 7, 607 squadron 8, 615 squadron 1.

12 Days in May by Cull Landers and Weiss says the RAF in France was alerted by the Air Ministry about the German ultimatum to the Netherlands 0215 on 9 May, probably meant to be 10 May. One "Airborne" operation that morning was 400 troops in 98 Fi156 to Witty in the Ardennes, another was 200 dummies to distract Belgian defences. French losses from ground attack put at 35 including Potez 63 and Vought 156. The RAF fighters claimed 60 destroyed, 16 probable and 22 damaged for the day the book thinks actually 35 destroyed and 14 damaged. The RAF reports it lost 21 Battles, 4 Blenheims and 5 Hurricanes from its forces in France that day.

Williamson Murray says the Luftwaffe lost 47 bombers and 25 fighters on 10 May, all up 83 aircraft including transports, for May and June 1940 1,428 lost all types to all causes including 213 transports.

The Battle of France Then and Now has over 20 pages (including photographs) listing the lost/damaged of all sides on 10 May. It says aircraft losses, all types, all causes for 10 May were 54 British, 63 French, 149 Dutch, 144 Belgian and 353 German. Personnel killed, missing or PoW as 67 British, 15 French, 28 Dutch, 5 Belgian and 904 German which indicate the ground losses. The 10 May Luftwaffe losses look high but it gives May and June aircraft losses of 1,470, close to Murray's. If you believe the totals the day's fighting cost 410 allied aircraft. The official RAF loss figures quoted in the Narrow Margin by Wood and Dempster have 928 RAF aircraft losses, Battle of France has 934 for 10 May to 20 June 1940, both excluding Norway.

Phoenix Triumphant by E R Hooton mentions attacks on 47 French, 15 Belgian and 10 Dutch airfields claiming 379 to 829 destroyed on the ground, actual around 210 most in Netherlands and Belgium. Netherlands losses included 31 trainers. Luftwaffe fighters claimed 41 kills and actually shot down 25 Netherlands aircraft, Luftwaffe lost at least 11 bombers. The Belgian air force lost 83 front line aircraft including some in the air. France lost 65 (+25?) aircraft, of the 91 first line unit airfields in use in that part of France 31 were attacked.

My reading is a combination of factors kept the RAF ground losses low on 10 May, starting with a limited number of attacks, that most strikes in France caused few aircraft casualties, the still at peace Holland and Belgium took the majority of the losses on 10 May. A major problem for the French was spare parts supply for its newer types compounded by the inevitable teething problems they had, which would slow down the return on any damaged aircraft.

 

[AnynameIwish]

What clocks are being used for the times?

I was using Paris from 'timeanddate.com' as a proxy for the specific airbase locations. Thanks for the rest of your response, I've been trying to find local copies of those books, it fills in a lot of the gaps.

Chain Home.

The first five stations, covering the approaches to London, were installed by 1937 and began full-time operation in 1938. Operational tests that year, using early units, demonstrated the difficulties in relaying useful information to the pilots in fighter aircraft. This led to the formation of the first integrated ground-controlled interception network, the Dowding system, which collected and filtered this information into a single view of the airspace.

Dozens of CH stations covering the majority of the eastern and southern coasts of the UK, along with a complete ground network with thousands of miles of private telephone lines, were ready by the time the war began in 1939.

Early warning radar, with a good communication system, really helps getting your aircraft off the ground before the enemy gets there.

That'd be great except this was in France, not the U.K & as I'd mentioned Radar coverage ... isn't established like in the later BoB.