Generally pilots who flew both types flew the Halifax first, as Stona said many liked the Halifax because it had more room and was easier to escape from, since they survived the war they were at the time unaware how much more likely crews needed to escape.
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Generally pilots who flew both types flew the Halifax first, as Stona said many liked the Halifax because it had more room and was easier to escape from, since they survived the war they were at the time unaware how much more likely crews needed to escape.
This is very true. I would have to look up the details, but one of the early ORS reports which showed the adverse statistics for Stirling and Halifax losses had its circulation severely restricted (it certainly did not go to the Groups as would have been normal practice) for almost exactly that reason.
Cheers
Steve
Not really, because it's not true. 6 (Canadian) Group did fly largely Halifaxes (28,126 sorties in the type), but then so did 4 Group, and far more (45,337 sorties in the type). Many of the Canadian squadrons which would transfer to 6 Group on its formation did serve first in 4 Group.
1,3 and 5 Groups largely avoided the Halifax (2 Group is not relevant here) but then 3 Group suffered some bad losses flying the Stirling, a type which the Canadians avoided altogether.
The phrase 'swings and roundabouts' comes to mind.
Even 8 (PFF) Group flew the Halifax and suffered a 3.7% loss rate with it, considerably worse than its loss rate on Lancasters at 2.3%.
In Groups other than 6 Group, Commonwealth nationalities were usually mixed up with British crew members anyway, even in, for example, a nominally 'Australian' squadron. At least one 'Australian' squadron had a majority of British air crew (No. 467) and the same may well apply to other Commonwealth squadrons if anyone can be bothered to look them up.
The reason that 6 Group was so Canadian is, essentially, that the Canadian government paid for it and enough Canadians volunteered to staff it, something along with their losses we should never forget.
Cheers
Steve
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I read in a post here a long time ago that regardless of the nationality of a squadron almost all flight engineers were British because there was no training scheme set up in Canada.
some more info here.
RAF - Bomber Command No.6 (Royal Canadian Air Force) Group
As the squadrons converted from Wellingtons through Halifax IIs and V's and Lancaster IIs to Halifax IIIs and VIIs and Lancaster Is, IIIs and Xs, many transfers occurred from station to station. Of all the RCAF squadrons of No. 6 Group, No. 419 alone remained at the one station, Middleton St. George, from the formation of the Group until the end of the war. It was to this squadron, incidentally, that the first Canadian-built Lancaster (Mark X), KB700, the famous Ruhr Express, was delivered, after flying three operational sorties with No. 405 Squadron in No. 8 (PFF) Group as "LQ-Q". With the Moose Squadron it became "VR-Z" and flew a further 46 operational sorties before being destroyed in a crash at Middleton St. George on returning from Nuremberg - its 49th op - on the night of 2nd/3rd January 1945.
some more info here.
RAF - Bomber Command No.6 (Royal Canadian Air Force) Group
As the squadrons converted from Wellingtons through Halifax IIs and V's and Lancaster IIs to Halifax IIIs and VIIs and Lancaster Is, IIIs and Xs, many transfers occurred from station to station. Of all the RCAF squadrons of No. 6 Group, No. 419 alone remained at the one station, Middleton St. George, from the formation of the Group until the end of the war. It was to this squadron, incidentally, that the first Canadian-built Lancaster (Mark X), KB700, the famous Ruhr Express, was delivered, after flying three operational sorties with No. 405 Squadron in No. 8 (PFF) Group as "LQ-Q". With the Moose Squadron it became "VR-Z" and flew a further 46 operational sorties before being destroyed in a crash at Middleton St. George on returning from Nuremberg - its 49th op - on the night of 2nd/3rd January 1945.
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buffnut453
Captain
Thanks for the detailed response, Steve. Admittedly, I don't know much about Harris but he does come across as being vitally interested in "his boys" irrespective of their country of origin. If there were a nationality bias, one would expect it to show in Commonwealth squadrons routinely receiving the latest equipment last but that simply isn't borne out by the facts. Some RCAF and RAAF units received the Lancaster in 1943 while others soldiered on with the Halifax until 1945. The same could be said of mainline RAF squadrons.
As per my previous post, a Canadian squadron received the first Canadian built Lancasters, this may have meant them having to stay on Halifaxes longer than neccessary.
Most engineers were trained in the United Kingdom, but about 1,900 engineers eventually graduated from the Flight Engineers School in Aylmer, Ontario, once it opened in July 1944.
The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan - The Second World War - History - Remembrance - Veterans Affairs Canada
No. 419 (Moose) Squadron converted to the Lancaster in April 1944. I very much doubt that the Canadians were holding out for a Canadian Lancaster, though there was obviously a propaganda opportunity there.
I did read somewhere that there was an intention to create a Canadian Group flying Canadian built Lancaster Xs, discussed back in May 1942 . How relevant this was to eventual equipment schedules I can't say.
Cheers
Steve
Edit. See my later post. I think Pbehn was quite correct in suggesting that the delay in conversion of the Canadians to the Lancaster was related to the delays in the production of Canadian built aircraft.
I did read somewhere that there was an intention to create a Canadian Group flying Canadian built Lancaster Xs, discussed back in May 1942 . How relevant this was to eventual equipment schedules I can't say.
Cheers
Steve
Edit. See my later post. I think Pbehn was quite correct in suggesting that the delay in conversion of the Canadians to the Lancaster was related to the delays in the production of Canadian built aircraft.
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Good info, but the 49,808 pilots trained for RCAF RAAF RNZF and RAF puts it into perspective.
I've just had a flick through some notes about the establishment of The Canadian Group.
Harris seems to have decided to equip the Canadian Group with Halifaxes in late June 1942, about a month after the original decision to equip it with Lancasters. It seems that it was the government in Ottawa, not the British who wanted to create an entirely new Canadian Group, with all the infrastructure to be built, despite an acknowledgement that this might delay the training and equipment of the new Group on four engine machines. It was certainly Ottawa's intention that the Group should be equipped with Canadian built Lancasters. many senior RCAF officers disagreed, but the Canadian government was convinced that 'Canadianization' would proceed more quickly in a new formation.
Harris' decision to equip this new Group with the Halifax was based on his suspicion that
"The Canadians will not produce enough Lancasters to equip a Group, or for that matter even to provide OTU backing and equipment for one Squadron."
He was correct. In September 1941 the Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply (C.D.Howe) had agreed that the Canadians would produce just 250 Lancasters at a rate of 15 per month, starting "as soon as possible in 1943". This schedule could not possibly equip a Group and with no British built Lancasters to spare, except at the expense of existing RAF squadrons, Harris made an easy decision.
I will try to dig out more on this later. I know that the Canadians objected to the Wellington, assigned as an interim measure, and were unhappy about the Halifax, though the reason seems to have been that they thought it only reasonable that the Canadians should operate Canadian built aircraft. The problem was that these were simply not available in 1942, or even 1943 for that matter.
I do know that on 26th September 1942 Freeman ruled that the
"Canadians were not to get more Lancasters than they were producing in their own country."
In a way the Ottawa government was hoist by its own petard. It wanted to operate Canadian built Lancasters, but in the absence of any they got the Halifax. To the government in Ottawa it was a question of supply.Once the Canadian Lancaster Xs started to roll off the production lines at Victory Aircraft in Toronto there would be a greater security of supply to the Canadian Group than if it had to depend on an allocation of British built machines.
Cheers
Steve
Harris seems to have decided to equip the Canadian Group with Halifaxes in late June 1942, about a month after the original decision to equip it with Lancasters. It seems that it was the government in Ottawa, not the British who wanted to create an entirely new Canadian Group, with all the infrastructure to be built, despite an acknowledgement that this might delay the training and equipment of the new Group on four engine machines. It was certainly Ottawa's intention that the Group should be equipped with Canadian built Lancasters. many senior RCAF officers disagreed, but the Canadian government was convinced that 'Canadianization' would proceed more quickly in a new formation.
Harris' decision to equip this new Group with the Halifax was based on his suspicion that
"The Canadians will not produce enough Lancasters to equip a Group, or for that matter even to provide OTU backing and equipment for one Squadron."
He was correct. In September 1941 the Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply (C.D.Howe) had agreed that the Canadians would produce just 250 Lancasters at a rate of 15 per month, starting "as soon as possible in 1943". This schedule could not possibly equip a Group and with no British built Lancasters to spare, except at the expense of existing RAF squadrons, Harris made an easy decision.
I will try to dig out more on this later. I know that the Canadians objected to the Wellington, assigned as an interim measure, and were unhappy about the Halifax, though the reason seems to have been that they thought it only reasonable that the Canadians should operate Canadian built aircraft. The problem was that these were simply not available in 1942, or even 1943 for that matter.
I do know that on 26th September 1942 Freeman ruled that the
"Canadians were not to get more Lancasters than they were producing in their own country."
In a way the Ottawa government was hoist by its own petard. It wanted to operate Canadian built Lancasters, but in the absence of any they got the Halifax. To the government in Ottawa it was a question of supply.Once the Canadian Lancaster Xs started to roll off the production lines at Victory Aircraft in Toronto there would be a greater security of supply to the Canadian Group than if it had to depend on an allocation of British built machines.
Cheers
Steve
The first RCAF squadron to convert to Lancasters was No. 426 which traded in its Wellingtons for Lancaster IIs in June 1943. Harris noted that the Canadians
"have been promised and deserve one Lancaster squadron."
No. 426 was joined at Linton on Ouse by No. 408 later that summer when it converted to the same type. Harris believed it right to divide the Lancaster II squadrons between 3 and 6 Groups, while taking advantage of the Canadian's experience with the Hercules engines with which the Lancaster II was fitted.
The Canadians did not, in the end, have to wait for the Canadian built aircraft to arrive.
No. 405 Squadron, in 8 (PFF) Group began converting to Lancaster Is and IIIs in August 1943. This was obviously on British built aircraft as Victory Aircraft produce its first Lancaster X the same month. 'Spirit of the Ruhr' was delivered with much fanfare to No. 405 Squadron in October. The problem for the Canadians, and particularly the government in Ottawa, so keen to equip its Group with Canadian built machines, was that this was little more than a publicity stunt. The aircraft itself was not operationally ready and only 13 more Lancasters were built in Canada during the rest of 1943. It was not until March/April 1944, when No. 419 Squadron received its Canadian built aircraft that even one Canadian squadron was so equipped.
Even the nationalistic Air Marshall Harold 'Gus' Edwards responded to the charge that the Canadians
"did not get good aircraft...[and] found themselves last in line for new aircraft and improved technology..."
In a fairly straightforward, Canadian way (or maybe Lancastrian, though he emigrated as a very young man). It was, he said
"an absolute lie."
He probably got on well with Harris
Cheers
Steve
"have been promised and deserve one Lancaster squadron."
No. 426 was joined at Linton on Ouse by No. 408 later that summer when it converted to the same type. Harris believed it right to divide the Lancaster II squadrons between 3 and 6 Groups, while taking advantage of the Canadian's experience with the Hercules engines with which the Lancaster II was fitted.
The Canadians did not, in the end, have to wait for the Canadian built aircraft to arrive.
No. 405 Squadron, in 8 (PFF) Group began converting to Lancaster Is and IIIs in August 1943. This was obviously on British built aircraft as Victory Aircraft produce its first Lancaster X the same month. 'Spirit of the Ruhr' was delivered with much fanfare to No. 405 Squadron in October. The problem for the Canadians, and particularly the government in Ottawa, so keen to equip its Group with Canadian built machines, was that this was little more than a publicity stunt. The aircraft itself was not operationally ready and only 13 more Lancasters were built in Canada during the rest of 1943. It was not until March/April 1944, when No. 419 Squadron received its Canadian built aircraft that even one Canadian squadron was so equipped.
Even the nationalistic Air Marshall Harold 'Gus' Edwards responded to the charge that the Canadians
"did not get good aircraft...[and] found themselves last in line for new aircraft and improved technology..."
In a fairly straightforward, Canadian way (or maybe Lancastrian, though he emigrated as a very young man). It was, he said
"an absolute lie."
He probably got on well with Harris
Cheers
Steve
I started to read up and collect some data about this. I feel a close affinity to the RCAF aircrew though I never ever met one. Middleton St George was an RCAF airfield, it is now Durham Tees Valley Airport my local airport, it is so close that I walked there to see an air display in the 1970s (I took a train back). I also raced motorcycles at Middleton's satellite airfield Croft where the commentator spoke from the old control tower.
I just point out the following.
The number of Halifaxes in service reached its peak in mid 1944 so it was clearly not only Canadian and ANZAC squadrons got Halifaxes many RAF squadrons did too. Canadian airmen were in service in the RAF from 1941 No6 group was formed in October 1942. The Lancaster was preferred on long range missions like the battle of Berlin so it is a matter of debate whether you were actually better off being in a Lancaster or Halifax squadron. Here in the North East of England it is completely understandable why those in the North East of England should be used to mine sea lanes in the North Sea. Harris wanted rid of the Stirling and then the Halifax, On any particular mission your chances of survival was better in a Lancaster compared to a Halifax and even more so to a Stirling however your chances of being on the next mission to Berlin also were greater if you flew a Lancaster. If anyone can provide any proof that RCAF or RAAF and RNZF squadrons were given inferior planes and more dangerous missions then I am willing to read what they have to say. From my point of view missions were planned based on the best way to execute the mission, squadrons were formed based on the availability of aircraft and the experience of the aircrew/ground crew. Canadian squadrons were formed in the North of England and that puts a geographical aspect to mission planning. Personally I just salute each and every one of the guys who did their bit.
I just point out the following.
The number of Halifaxes in service reached its peak in mid 1944 so it was clearly not only Canadian and ANZAC squadrons got Halifaxes many RAF squadrons did too. Canadian airmen were in service in the RAF from 1941 No6 group was formed in October 1942. The Lancaster was preferred on long range missions like the battle of Berlin so it is a matter of debate whether you were actually better off being in a Lancaster or Halifax squadron. Here in the North East of England it is completely understandable why those in the North East of England should be used to mine sea lanes in the North Sea. Harris wanted rid of the Stirling and then the Halifax, On any particular mission your chances of survival was better in a Lancaster compared to a Halifax and even more so to a Stirling however your chances of being on the next mission to Berlin also were greater if you flew a Lancaster. If anyone can provide any proof that RCAF or RAAF and RNZF squadrons were given inferior planes and more dangerous missions then I am willing to read what they have to say. From my point of view missions were planned based on the best way to execute the mission, squadrons were formed based on the availability of aircraft and the experience of the aircrew/ground crew. Canadian squadrons were formed in the North of England and that puts a geographical aspect to mission planning. Personally I just salute each and every one of the guys who did their bit.
RAF bomber bases map, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/...AF-Bomber-Command-base-in-England-mapped.html
Click on the base and there is a short history and lists a/c losses by type.
Click on the base and there is a short history and lists a/c losses by type.
Airframes
Benevolens Magister
Quite a useful graphic, but note that a number of the bases shown were handed over to the USAAF, and some others were not strictly Bomber Command.
Good info Steve, a question, do you live at the National Archive?
It all started many, many years ago with an investigation into the loss of a relative who had been a navigator flying with Bomber Command. This was the first step at the top of a very slippery slope, and what's, whys, hows and wherefores of Bomber Command have become something of a passion (the boss would say obsession) over the last thirty years or so.
I'm always happy to share. The bombing offensives (we should never ignore the Americans, though I know less about the nuts and bolts of their effort, or the personalities) were the first of their kind and nothing like them will ever happen again. The more we can understand them the better, we won't ever get a chance to look at anything comparable.
I also find myself more frequently defending Bomber Command, and most particularly Harris, the one man who many associate with the organisation, from increasingly serious charges founded in a profound ignorance of what actually happened and how the campaign developed. This ignorance is displayed by reasonable and well educated people who really should know better, but who are not prepared to make the effort to establish the real facts when they might get in the way of a sensational story. A headline featuring the phrase 'war crime' tends to attract attention. So called popular history and the ever decreasing quality of journalism generally do not help. I was recently given a book which purported to show that the Germans had raided the Isle of Wight to attack a radar station there. There is not one shred of evidence to support this contention and what little supposedly solid evidence the author provided was easily refuted with less than half a day at TNA, leaving nothing but some hot air and conjecture... and yet someone was happy to print it
I fear for the reputation of Bomber Command in the future. My post war generation, some of whom have really made the effort to understand what their fathers or grandfathers did will not be here in another twenty years or so. Then what?
Steve
I've attached a map of No 6 Group's bases.
Apologies to the source (which was Canadian) as I don't seem to have noted it in my file.
6 Group ended up in this area, which from the point of view of operational flying was not ideal. Smoke and industrial haze were a problem, the bases are surrounded by higher ground and are further from the targets than bases to the South or East. It was the Canadian government that over ruled plans for the Canadians to simply take over 1 Group (sandwiched between 4 and 5 Groups in Lincolnshire and South Yorkshire) which many Canadian and British officers considered the best and easiest way of creating the Canadian Group, when it decided it wanted an entirely new Group and organisation.
Much of East Anglia was already reserved for the burgeoning needs of the USAAF. The Pathfinders were based there, as was 3 Group, still flying Stirlings which needed every bit of assistance they could get. Thus it was to the Vale of York, between York and Middlesborough that the Canadians were sent, much to the dismay of many Canadian airmen who arrived at muddy camps consisting of nothing but grim Nissen huts, in the middle of nowhere, sometimes miles from the nearest town or railway station, and in a part of England that while noted for its rugged natural beauty (it is stunning) was far from cosmopolitan.
Cheers
Steve
Edit: The map is from 'The Crucible of War - The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force'. I'm not sure which volume, but credit given.
Apologies to the source (which was Canadian) as I don't seem to have noted it in my file.
6 Group ended up in this area, which from the point of view of operational flying was not ideal. Smoke and industrial haze were a problem, the bases are surrounded by higher ground and are further from the targets than bases to the South or East. It was the Canadian government that over ruled plans for the Canadians to simply take over 1 Group (sandwiched between 4 and 5 Groups in Lincolnshire and South Yorkshire) which many Canadian and British officers considered the best and easiest way of creating the Canadian Group, when it decided it wanted an entirely new Group and organisation.
Much of East Anglia was already reserved for the burgeoning needs of the USAAF. The Pathfinders were based there, as was 3 Group, still flying Stirlings which needed every bit of assistance they could get. Thus it was to the Vale of York, between York and Middlesborough that the Canadians were sent, much to the dismay of many Canadian airmen who arrived at muddy camps consisting of nothing but grim Nissen huts, in the middle of nowhere, sometimes miles from the nearest town or railway station, and in a part of England that while noted for its rugged natural beauty (it is stunning) was far from cosmopolitan.
Cheers
Steve
Edit: The map is from 'The Crucible of War - The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force'. I'm not sure which volume, but credit given.
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Airframes
Benevolens Magister
Good stuff Steve, and thanks for the warning about that book on the alleged raid on the IoW.
I saw it listed on the publisher's web-site, and considered buying it, just out of curiosity. Sounds like it might make a reasonable movie, in a similar vein to 'The Eagle Has Landed', but not much else !
Back in the early 1980's, I spent a couple of weeks touring around, visiting every BC airfield in the Vale of York, some still active at that time, but I'm dashed if I can find the photos I took at the time.
I saw it listed on the publisher's web-site, and considered buying it, just out of curiosity. Sounds like it might make a reasonable movie, in a similar vein to 'The Eagle Has Landed', but not much else !
Back in the early 1980's, I spent a couple of weeks touring around, visiting every BC airfield in the Vale of York, some still active at that time, but I'm dashed if I can find the photos I took at the time.
To clarify Stonas post, this is what a Yorkshire Nissan hut looks like, Allerton Castle used by the RCAF high command in WW2.
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