Daylight V Night bombing....

[fastmongrel]

The Lancaster, B-17, and B-24 all seem to be similar in weight and power and wing area. The B-24 has the better wing and the B-17 had the better altitude performance. The biggest problem I perceive for the Lancaster in the daytime role is its limited service ceiling, around 10,000 ft lower than the other two. The lower the altitude, the better the flak coverage. Otherwise the basic airframes seem equally adaptable.

The main marks of Lancaster only had single stage Merlins or in a few single stage Hercules engines. The RAF didnt bomb much above 20,000 so didnt need to fly higher if there had been the need the service ceiling of 22 to 24,000 feet could have been raised by fitting 2 stage Merlins and the extended wing which was designed for but never fitted to Lancasters. Basically AVRO could build the Lincoln earlier for use in europe. Its not a big leap to get the Lincoln into service earlier it was just a developed Lancaster. Still not going to fly as high as the US bombers but the increase in cruising altitude would be useful.

 

[davebender]

With respect to the comments being bandied about about the RAF not escorting their Night bombers, this is, with respect, bunkum. The RAF in fact employed over 140 Mosquitoes alon, on average, as Direct escort

The below information is from "The Other Battle" by Peter Hinchliffe
30 March 1944. Nuremberg.
Maximum effort bombing attack. Just under 800 bombers.
20 Mosquitos flew Serrate (i.e. Direct Escort) missions.
35 Mosquitos flew intruder and spoof missions.
95 RAF bombers destroyed in the air and another 9 so badly damaged that they crash landed in England.

 

[Colin1]

The below information is from "The Other Battle" by Peter Hinchliffe
30 March 1944. Nuremberg.
Maximum effort bombing attack. Just under 800 bombers.
20 Mosquitos flew Serrate (i.e. Direct Escort) missions.
35 Mosquitos flew intruder and spoof missions.
95 RAF bombers destroyed in the air and another 9 so badly damaged that they crash landed in England.

This is how I understood it
as the conflict progressed into late-war, RAF losses at night began to mirror USAAF losses by day prior to effective long-range escort. Mosquito nightfighters didn't seem to be that good at picking out the Luftwaffe machines, relying more on the plume provided by a destroyed RAF bomber to illuminate the aircraft that killed it than the onboard AI.

 

[davebender]

From September 1944 onward life gets drastically easier for RAF Bomber Command.
- The Luftwaffe now has crippling shortages of aviation gasoline due to destruction of the hydrogenation plants.
- The Luftwaffe lose their most important night fighter bases in places like Venlo.
- American and British fighter-bombers can now maintain standing air patrols over many German airfields using newly captured airfields in France.

No airforce can operate effectively with these disadvantages.

 

[Colin1]

No airforce can operate effectively with these disadvantages.

No, you're quite right
let's face it, Germany did lose the war
but notwithstanding the increasingly short supply of fuel and the territorial gains being made by the Allies, the Nachtjagd had become extremely efficient at destroying bombers at night.

 

[Nikademus]

Life got harder for Bomber Command as it turned out because technological improvements continued to enhance the deadliness of the NF's in the air. By the tail end of the campaign their losses were increasing while those of the Eighth dropped.

 

[Colin1]

Life got harder for Bomber Command as it turned out because technological improvements continued to improve the deadliness of the NF's in the air. By the tail end of the campaign their losses were increasing while those of the Eighth dropped.

Yes
I'm by no means the expert on night ops but that's largely how I understood it

 

[davebender]

Life got harder for Bomber Command as it turned out because technological improvements continued to enhance the deadliness of the NF's in the air.

That holds true until the summer of 1944. When Germany lost France and their aviation gasoline hydrogenation plants at the same time the bottom fell out.

Look what happened to Helmut Lent, one of the greatest night fighter pilots in history. His high tech Ju-88G didn't save him from hitting a power line while landing at an emergency airfield because the primary airfield had just been bombed.

 

[mhuxt]

Yes
I'm by no means the expert on night ops but that's largely how I understood it

No, loss rates between BC and 8th AF heavies tracked virtually the same from March '44.

 

[Milosh]

Bomber Command Monthly Operational Statistics,
BC Operational Stats

 

[Nikademus]

That holds true until the summer of 1944. When Germany lost France and their aviation gasoline hydrogenation plants at the same time the bottom fell out.

Look what happened to Helmut Lent, one of the greatest night fighter pilots in history. His high tech Ju-88G didn't save him from hitting a power line while landing at an emergency airfield because the primary airfield had just been bombed.

Many pilots suffered injury and death due to operational causes. The statistics on the page provided by Milosh do show a drop in losses during a four month period from sept to dec 44 (overall losses). However in 45, despite the setbacks, the Luftwaffe's ongoing deterioration and loss of teritorry in France, the losses increased again so i do not agree that things became "easier" by default for BC based on that and readings from Neillands, Hastings and Miller. Overall loss %'s remained lower than in 43 but then again, the sortie count was larger overall, diluting the loss %'s. It would be interesting to also compare the # of operational NF's in the air during late 44 and 45 as well.

 

[BombTaxi]

I think the 8th AF could have gone to the night role very easily, as they were already 'area bombing' cities in daylight on numerous occasions

To look first at the 8th in the night role, BC had H2S and the 8th had H2X, which meant both could bomb a city-size target in zero visibility conditions, with enough accuracy to provoke a firestorm. The 8th, although always depicted as making 'precision' attacks did in fact 'area bomb' on radar on a number of occasions during the war, which essentially guaranteed the same king of results BC got bombing at night, i.e widespread and intentional damage to civilian as well as military assets in the target area. Even the lesser payload of the B-17 needn't be a terminal handicap - as long as the right 'mix' of incendiary to large-capacity HE bombs is observed, reduced bombloads will still be capable of starting Hamburg-Dresden style firestorms, although the process may be somewhat slower. The real diffculties will be outside the 8th AF itself, in providing an adequate Pathfinder force, NF force and onboard ECM for the bombers - all things that the USAAF never had a pressing need to develop.

As for BC operating in daylight - this is a bit more difficult. I don't believe defensive armament is really that big an issue. The idea that the firepower of bomber machine guns alone could defend a formation from fighters was put to bed over Schwienfurt. Adding waist guns and ball turrets to Lancasters would not make a box of Lancs 'fighter-proof' any more than it did for B-17s, and the extra weight and expense in terms of equipment, ammo and crew actually reduces BC's offensive potential. What they really need is a long-range escort. But just as the USAAF never really needed to develop night bomber ECM, Fighter Command has never needed to escort bombers to the other side of Germany and back, so they have no suitable type. As the USAAF would not need the P-51, production could be diverted to BC, but if we are envisioning this 'swap' from very early in the war, BC is going to go through the same slaughter, and the same protracted period of operating only within fighter range until the Mustang becomes available in significant numbers...

 

[Nikademus]

Biggest factor as i see it would be bombload. UK 4E's could log the big exotic bombs that were well suited for Precision/Area bombing. Even if one removes armament from the US bombers I don't think they can carry these bombs which would make them overall less effective. Still....put enough over the target and eventually the job will get done.

 

[JoeB]

No, loss rates between BC and 8th AF heavies tracked virtually the same from March '44.

But RAF largely withdrew from strikes on targets deep inside Germany after the heavy losses of 'Battle of Berlin', USAAF maintained or stepped up such efforts (partly diverted to D-Day related missions, but not as early or as much or for as long). Then RAF stepped up deep Reich missions from fall '44 when the factors mentioned against the German NF's (gas shortages, lack of radar and fighter bases outside Germany's own borders) kicked in; RAF improvements in areas like ECM were also a significant factor in the lower losses from late 1944.

Many times I am the guy promoting operational stats and other people pointing out the limitations But something like a fighter-fighter kill ratio is two sides of a coin. At least for the two sides involved in that particular ratio, it's a zero sum game. Relative bomber loss rates against different types of defenses are not coupled together that way. And it doesn't just depend on the relative capability of the two different types of defense (German day and night) but how hard the particular Allied bomber arm pushed. In the period where German NF's gained the biggest upper hand, the British backed off somewhat on their night campaign against the most difficult targers, which the overall Allied effort could afford and which arguably only made sense. By the same token, the smaller US effort ca. '43 backed off for awhile against its most difficult targets as result of too heavy daylight (unescorted) losses, but with newly increased escort capability, was pushing quite hard through most of 1944.

Joe

 

[davebender]

in 45, despite the setbacks, the Luftwaffe's ongoing deterioration and loss of teritorry in France, the losses increased again

Do we have a breakdown by loss type for 1945?

I suspect that German radar guided flak continued to improve even as the Luftwaffe ran out of fuel and got bombed to dust.

 

[Airframes]

One of the reasons, if no the main reason, that (RAF) Bomber Command reduced operations into Germany in 1944 was due to the requirements for the run up to D-Day, the support of the landings, and the on-going need to hit transport and supply targets. Harris objected strongly to this, and was virtually told 'do it or go'. Once the need for these ops had been virtually fulfilled, then BC returned to full operation against German targets. It had little to do with the losses incurred by the Luftwaffe night fighter arm or flak.

 

[tomo pauk]

...

I suspect that German radar guided flak continued to improve even as the Luftwaffe ran out of fuel and got bombed to dust.

Statistics posted on the another thread claim 1942 was the best in shells fired vs. planes downed ratio (4000 fired shells per plane downed), while it took 16000 (16K) for same effect in 1944. All figures for heavy guns, Western front.
Reasons:
Guns worn out, capable crews were replaced by teenagers older men, while Germans neglected development of radars (compared with UK USA) and were on receiving end of ECM.

 

[davebender]

I think your reasons are wrong.

Everyone except the German Army neglected CAS and light flak prior to WWII. Consequently early war CAS missions by Britain, France and the Soviet Union were relatively easy kills for German light flak. This is especially noticable during May 1940 when German light flak defending Meuse River bridgeheads slaughtered attacking British and French aircraft.

Eventually Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union became more proficient at CAS. Consequently German flak gunners had to work harder and fire more rounds to get kills.

 

[Njaco]

I'm not saying they should've bombed from high altitude - it's easy for lightened B-17 to cruise at 25K, then make shallow dive towards target, and then climb back to 25K and head home.

A B-17 dive bomber? I've heard somehing similar from ........Hitler?!

 

[JoeB]

One of the reasons, if no the main reason, that (RAF) Bomber Command reduced operations into Germany in 1944 was due to the requirements for the run up to D-Day... It had little to do with the losses incurred by the Luftwaffe night fighter arm or flak.

That's not what the RAF's own official history says. And anyway, for whatever reasons, the RAF didn't operate a lot against deep Reich targets between the heavy losses of March '44, until the German defense network had been partly taken apart, physically, by loss of bases in occupied Europe and right at the German border, in fall of '44. Even if that's a coincidence, you still can't compare USAAF loss stats in that period, much of which was full bore against deep Reich targets (though they were diverted to D-Day missions in some cases, but let's remember 'USAAF strategic bombing' includes 15th AF not only 8th).

It's pretty clear that with the state or art of defense and offense in spring 1944, RAF night bombers were more vulnerable than (escorted) USAAF day bombers, when operating against the toughest targets deep in the Reich, and the trends were going in opposite directions. The subjective judgement of what part that fact played in the RAF's greater shift away from Reich targets in sprin '44 isn't really that relevant. The point is that whole month loss stats can't be compared if the operational objectives were significantly different in the month in question. Again, the same would go for some earlier periods where a larger % of USAAF missions were 'milk runs'.

Joe