Defence of the Reich

[Jenisch]

It raises big challenges for the Allies...imnsurmountable ones in fact.

The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze, page 424:

With hindsight it is hard to avoid the conclusion that after the defeat of France Germany would have done better to adopt a defensive posture, consolidating its position in Western Europe, attacking British positions in the Mediterranean and forcing the British and the Americans to bomb their way onto the Continent. Given that the Red Army ultimately proved to be the nemesis of the Wehrmacht, this is hard to deny. But what is too often ignored in such counterfactual arguments is the growing awareness in Berlin that, even after the occupation of Western Europe, Germany did not have the upper hand in a long war against Britain and America. The chronic shortage of oil, the debility of the European coal mines and the fragility of the food chain, made it seem unlikely that Germany would in fact be able to 'consolidate' its conquests of 1940 without falling into excessive dependence on the Soviet Union. Even if this were possible, the combined manufacturing capacity of Britain and America vastly exceeded the industrial capacity currently under German control and this, in turn, spelled disaster in a protracted air war. The German army, on the other hand, had proved its ability to achieve decisive victory against what were thought to be the strongest armies in Europe. When we bear this range of factors in mind it is easier to appreciate why a defensive strategy seemed like a second-best in the autumn of 1940. After the defeat of France, the dream of a gigantic land empire seemed within reach, and, given the industrial strength looming on the other side of the Atlantic, there was no time to waste.

The same book, page 410:

The territories that Germany had conquered in 1940, though they pro-vided substantial booty and a crucial source of labour did not bear comparison with the abundance provided to Britain by America. The aerial arms race was the distinctive Anglo-American contribution to thewar and it played directly to America's dominance in manufacturing. But though the disparity in aircraft deliveries was extreme it was not untypical. A similarly vast gulf was also evident in relation to energy supplies, the most basic driver of modern urban and industrial society.Whereas the Anglo-American alliance was energy rich, Germany and its Western European Grossraum were starved of food, coal and oil.The disparity with respect to oil was most serious. Between 1940 and 1943 the mobility of Germany's army, navy and air force, not to mention its domestic economy, depended on annual imports of 1.5 million tonsof oil, mainly from Romania. In addition, German synthetic fuel fac-tories, at huge expense, produced a flow of petrol that rose from 4 milliontons in 1940 to a maximum of 6.5 million tons in 1943. Seizing thefuel stocks of France as booty in no way resolved this fundamentaldependency. In fact, the victories of 1940 had the reverse effect. Theyadded a number of heavy oil consumers to Germany's own fuel deficit.From its annual fuel flow of at most 8 million tons, Germany now had to supply not only its own needs, but those of the rest of Western Europeas well. Before the war, the French economy had consumed at leas t5.4 million tons per annum, at a per capita rate 60 per cent higher than Germany's. The effect of the German occupation was to throw France back into an era before motorization. From the summer of 1940 France was reduced to a mere 8 per cent of its pre-war supply of petrol. In an economy adjusted to a high level of oil consumption the effects were dramatic. To give just one example, thousands of litres of milk went towaste in the French countryside every day, because no petrol was available to ensure regular collections. Of more immediate concern to the military planners in Berlin were the Italian armed forces, which dependedentirely on fuel diverted from Germany and Romania. By February1941, the Italian navy was threatening to halt its operations in theMediterranean altogether unless Germany supplied at least 250,000tons of fuel. And the problems were by no means confined to the Reich's satellites. Germany itself coped only by dint of extreme economy. In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for the motor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chronic shortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotorization' of the Wehrmacht. It is commonly remarked that the Luftwaffe suffered later in the war because of the inadequate training of its pilots, due in large part to the shortage of air fuel. But in 1941 the petrol shortage was already so severe that the Wehrmacht was licensing its soldiers to drive heavy trucks with less than 15 kilometres of on-roadexperience, a measure which was blamed for the appalling attrition of motor vehicles during the Russian campaign. Shortages made themselves felt across the German economy. So tight were fuel rations thatin November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at its Brandenburg plant, Germany's largest truck factory, because it lacked the petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off theassembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to bearranged by the Wehrmacht's economic office so as to ensure that therewere no further interruptions.

I'm not convinced that the Alllied situation would be factually impossible to sustain. Authors like Tooze belive just in the opposite, therefore this is not a concensus among historians. However, you did provided arguments that I found interesting.

 

[J-dog]

Well I would definitely increase production of the Me-262 and in 1943 not all the materials for the jet engine were gone so you could in a sense make the full jet engine easier that in 1944 and 1945. I would also definitely let the Horton Bros. create the Horton 229 and 18which is the bigger version of the 229 and was designed to Cary a nuclear bomb to the US. Don't think this is me hating the US I'm just thinking from their perspective! These two aircraft from the Horton bros were stealth planes and could have made a difference in the war even in 1943. What was interesting was that it could go 620 mph when it was powered by two Jumo 003 jet engines the same as the Me-262 bet without a tail it created less drag. I would also increase training of pilots and also promote the Arado 234. The Volksjager and the Ta-183.

 

[stona]

I would also definitely let the Horton Bros. create the Horton 229 and 18which is the bigger version of the 229 and was designed to Cary a nuclear bomb to the US.

The flaw in that plan is that Germany didn't have,nor was it anywhere near producing,a nuclear weapon for any aircraft to carry.

Steve

 

[J dog]

actually if these planes were to hold the allied planes out and successfully hold out the war until 1946 Germany was building a nuclear bomb and was already getting all of the equipment for it. Goering actually said to the Horton Bros and he was very clear that Germany would have a nuclear weapon by 1946.

 

[stona]

Goering actually said to the Horton Bros and he was very clear that Germany would have a nuclear weapon by 1946.

Not a snowball's chance in hell I'm afraid. This topic has been covered in other threads,so with all due respect I don't want to hijack this one.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tyrodtom]

The Third Reich's history is full of promises from Goering that turned out to be just hot air.

 

[J dog]

ok fair enough. Have a nice day! But you have to admit having enough speed and distance to come to the United States to bomb it would have made a difference with the Horton 18 and with the stealth make it virtually undetectable to radar..they could have bombed New York or Washington. There was a interesting idea by a brilliant German to have bombers fly to the US bomb it and then ditch the planes in the ocean to then be picked up by either a boat or possibly a submarine. Although that would have been more costly to keep spending more money on more planes and then the defenses would adapt and shoot down the planes rendering it useless.

 

[Jenisch]

About the Me 262, another quote from Tooze's book, page 620:

The Me 262, the world's first operational jet fighter, was a truly extraordinary technological achievement. The fact that in 1945, in the most difficult of circumstances, Germany was capable of producing hundreds of these aircraft should give the lie to any claims about the inherent weaknesses in the German 'technological system'. In the list of dei ex machina with which Hitler might have changed the course of the war, it is amongst the most commonly cited. But it is also one of the weapons most surrounded by self-serving post-war mythology. After the war, Ernst Heinkel, Willy Messerschmitt and the chief of Germany's fighter forces Adolf Galland colluded in the construction of a highly one-sided account of theMe 262's history, designed to celebrate the genius of German technology, whilst at the same time demonstrating the incompetence of the Nazi leadership. In their account, popularized in best-selling biographies and television interviews, it was the meddling of Hitler, Goering andMilch that robbed Galland and his valiant fighter pilots of a weapon with which they might have protected Germany against the merciless onslaught of the bombers. This was a myth that appealed to numerous themes in post-war German political culture: regret at the chance of a victory wasted, the consolation provided by the supposed superiority of 'German technology', the self-righteous commemoration of the horror of Allied bombing. But contrary to legend, all the evidence, in fact, suggests that the Reich Air Ministry seized the opportunity of jet power with every possible speed. What prevented the Me 262 from exercising a decisive influence on the air war was not incompetence and conservatism, but the debilitating material limitations of the German war economy

I don't have time to right about the Elektroboat right not, but will antecipate something to Parfisal: it's in good part another "Nazi-war-winning-weapon". It's introduction could not have been earlier, while the Allies have conditions to counter the new submarine.

 

[stona]

ok fair enough. Have a nice day! But you have to admit having enough speed and distance to come to the United States to bomb it would have made a difference with the Horton 18 and with the stealth make it virtually undetectable to radar..they could have bombed New York or Washington.

Even allowing an unlikely scenario where this happened what possible difference would it make. We're talking a few tons of bombs on the USA. The Anglo/American air forces dropped 2.8 million tons on Germany. It didn't defeat them in itself anymore than the London blitz (a mere 12-13,000 tonnes) forced Britain out of the war. If the Germans and British could "take it" I'm sure the Americans could too.

Steve

 

[Jenisch]

If the British and American people wanted to see Hitler defeated and difficulties arised, they would not need to considerate peace with Germany, but with Japan. Late in the war the Japanese were not a treat anymore, and would certainly accept a peace proposal from the Allies. That would trow all the Anglo-American industrial and military potential against Germany. Just the American aircraft deployed in the Pacific were equivalent to the total contingent of the LW by a few times. Germany would resist to that? No, it would not. Just B-29s would be 2000 by 1945.

 

[J dog]

Yes but attacking the most populated city in the US and possibly Washington dc it could have done a lot of damage not to the city but the psychological damage would have been greater. This could have made the US pull back forces of their own to protect themselves and then give the Germans more freedom because a good amount of Americans were protecting bomber groups, attacking ships, and attacking tanks which if you eliminate even a few it could help to gain more territory and lose less men and planes. Thus giving more people, planes, tanks, and planes to give greater numbers in later battles. Although it may be not much all Germany needed was those few decisive victories which could be obtained with a little more help.

 

[stona]

It's not going to happen. The design wasn't on paper until 1944 and every design took from 2-4 (sometimes much longer) years to become a useable aircraft. Something as radical as the Horten designs,which were by no means even regarded as viable by many other German engineers and designers,would certainly have taken longer.
It was too late for offensive operations,German aircraft production was concentrated on defensive fighter and fighter bombers.
Already,as early as the last quarter of 1942, Anglo-American production exceeded Germany's by 250% for single engined fighters,196% for twin engined types and a massive 20,077% for four engined bombers. These figures take no account of increasing Soviet production. It's statistics like these that win wars not acts of bravado like dropping a few bombs on New York. Germany had neither the means,nor more importantly the will to embark on the production of unproven multi engined aircraft. Goering's 1944 "Amerika Bomber" was nothing more than hot air.

Another minor point,if as recent research has suggested,the Horten designs incorporated a level of radar stealthiness this was completely accidental. It was not a concept that existed in the 1940s and was never mentioned at the time. One of the Horten brothers (I think Reimar) jumped on the stealth bandwagon many years post war.
Another myth is that the types built received a special surface finish which they did not. The surviving examples are finished in a standard Ikarol lacquer.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Jenisch]

Already,as early as the last quarter of 1942, Anglo-American production exceeded Germany's by 250% for single engined fighters,196% for twin engined types and a massive 20,077% for four engined bombers.

And don't forget about you British. Until 1944, Britain actually produced more acft than Germany.

 

[Jenisch]

Double post.

 

[stona]

And don't forget about you British. Until 1944, Britain actually produced more acft than Germany.

Indeed they did.Even as early as 1940 we had our arses in gear. Throughout the BoB There were only 3 weeks when the RAF suffered a net loss of Hurricanes and in the same 3 weeks a net loss of Spitfires (plus one other later).
The Luftwaffe was not so fortunate,infact at the start of the BoB it hadn't replaced the losses incurred in the earlier campaigns. Even over Dunkirk between May 26th and June 3rd the Luftwaffe lost 240 aircraft to the RAFs 177. Noone in Germany saw the pattern forming.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Jenisch]

Indeed they did.Even as early as 1940 we had our arses in gear. Throughout the BoB There were only 3 weeks when the RAF suffered a net loss of Hurricanes and in the same 3 weeks a net loss of Spitfires (plus one other later).
The Luftwaffe was not so fortunate,infact at the start of the BoB it hadn't replaced the losses incurred in the earlier campaigns. Even over Dunkirk between May 26th and June 3rd the Luftwaffe lost 240 aircraft to the RAFs 177. Noone in Germany saw the pattern forming.

Cheers

Steve

In terms of the air war, the situation wasn't so bad. Mainly because Germany started to give industrial priority to the air war with the West in parallel with the start of the Barbarossa. And that was because the Germans were considerating victory against the USSR as a foregone conclusion, and they were aware of the big gap between them, Britain and the US in acft production.

What Parfisal says that I'm in doubt, Stona, is the Alllied manpower problem for the ground forces. The US Army was probably able to raise some 200 divisions if there's no Lend-Lease to the USSR. Anyone has info of how much divisions the British Empire could have provided?

 

[tyrodtom]

In terms of the air war, the situation wasn't so bad. Mainly because Germany started to give industrial priority to the air war with the West in parallel with the start of the Barbarossa. And that was because the Germans were considerating victory against the USSR as a foregone conclusion, and they were aware of the big gap between them, Britain and the US in acft production.

What Parfisal says that I'm in doubt, Stona, is the Alllied manpower problem for the ground forces. The US Army was probably able to raise some 200 divisions if there's no Lend-Lease to the USSR. Anyone has info of how much divisions the British Empire could have provided?

Of the about $50 billion of Lend Lease the USA sent out , $11 billion went to the USSR, less than 25%. So I think you're overstating the effect that Lend-Lease to Russia may have had on the USA's ability to molbilize.
It takes training facilities that have to be built, and training cadre, that have to be trained themselves, when you want to greatly increase your number of infantry or armored divisions.

 

[stona]

Anyone has info of how much divisions the British Empire could have provided?

I don't know but it's difficult to see how the UK and "Old Commonwealth" could have produced more than they did.
India gave up nearly three million volunteers who fought in every theatre. There would be political problems involved in any kind of conscription there.
Men also came from Africa and the Carribean but I suspect that the prevailing attitudes of the time influenced their use (and numbers).
Steve

 

[Jenisch]

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-Victory/USA-Victory-5.html

By August 1943, the Army [US Army] reached its peak combat strength for World War II, fielding a total of only 90 divisions, one of which was later dismantled. Subsequent enlistments made the Army larger, but never increased its combat edge. Marshall and Wedemeyer appreciated the impact that increased military technology would have on the nature of war and planned to take advantage of firepower and air power to field a smaller army. Wedemeyer failed, however, to carry the problem through to its logical conclusion. Modern military technology had a stupendous impact on the battlefield; it had an equally significant influence on Army organization.
Limitations of the Plan--Type Divisions

Incorrect about the number of divisions the Army could field, Wedemeyer was necessarily also incorrect about the numbers of division by type:

Type Division 1941 Estimate Actual
Armored 61 16
Mechanized 61 0
Infantry 54 66
Mountain 10 1
Cavalry 4 2
Airborne 7 5

The dramatic differences between the Victory Plan troop basis and the final shape of the Army in May of 1945 cannot properly be ascribed to errors of judgment, however.12 The most important changes in divisional organization, division slice factor aside, came about because of logistical and tactical lessons that were unavailable to Wedemeyer in 1941.13

The Army did not create as many armored divisions as Wedemeyer's plan called for chiefly because General George Marshall's greatest fears about Lend Lease were realized: the needs of the British and the Russians consumed a large part of American tank production. In 1955, the Army staff calculated that Lend Lease to the USSR, France, Italy, China, Brazil, the Netherlands, Norway, and the British Empire had equipped around 101 U.S.-type divisions.14 The United States, for example, shipped a total of 5,374 medium tanks and 1,682 light tanks to the USSR alone between June of 1941 and September 1945. While only about 20 percent of all war production eventually flowed into Lend Lease channels, that matériel was overwhelmingly heavy equipment such as tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft.15 American industry simply could not satisfy the demands of both Army and Lend Lease for new production and for production of replacement armored vehicles. Therefore it proved impossible for the War Department to equip as many American armored divisions as the Victory Plan called for.

Wedemeyer's emphasis on armored divisions arose from his reading of Fuller and from the dramatic use the Germans had made of armor in the opening battles of the war.16 Some Americans, however, wondered whether so many armored divisions would be tactically desirable, suggesting that they would be awkward to maneuver and very hard to support. General Marshall eventually favored a compact and powerful force maintained at full strength as the better course of action, writing in 1945 that the more divisions an Army commander has under his control, the more supporting troops he must maintain and the greater are his traffic and supply problems. If his divisions are fewer in number but maintained at full strength, the power for attack continues while the logistical problems are greatly simplified.

 

[Jenisch]

ther unforeseen developments prevented the Army from forming mechanized divisions, foremost among them the shipping problem. Despite enormous strides in merchant ship construction, there remained a serious competition for space. Mechanized divisions required more shipping space, and the staff realized that ports of embarkation could ship these divisions to Europe only very gradually. Dismounted infantry divisions, on the other hand, required far less shipping space, enabling the United States to build up combat forces in the theater much faster. As with tanks, the vehicles the mechanized divisions would have used were also in great demand by other nations, and Lend Lease quickly consumed much of the available production. Finally, as part of his drive to decrease the division slice, and recognizing production and shipping problems, General McNair decided to remove many vehicles from the divisions and pool them in the field armies, which could presumably manage a smaller number of vehicles more efficiently to accomplish the same tasks. Years later, Wedemeyer remarked that the battlefield would have become a hopeless traffic jam if the Army had carried out his original scheme for mechanized divisions.
Despite the fact that Lend Lease proved a factor limiting the number of armored divisions that the Army could create, it too had hidden benefits for American mobilization. While the constant demands of Britain and Russia for equipment continued to vex the War department, contracts for manufacture of matériel for Lend Lease served the purpose of establishing major military production lines well before America went to war. Industry was in general unwilling to convert to war production unless there was some sort of guarantee of sustained production. Lend Lease provided such a guarantee, and the War Department therefore found that an important segment of industry was already mobilized by 7 December 1941.

Changes in the activation programs for other type divisions were influenced by factors other than Lend Lease. Specific plans for the liberation of Europe eliminated the need for more than one mountain division, although use might have been found for them if the Allies had pursued Churchill's idea of an attack through the Balkans into central Europe. The progress of the fighting in Italy, the one theater that offered scope for employment of mountain divisions, demonstrated that standard infantry divisions fought as well as specialist troops in rough terrain.19 After the Normandy invasion, General Dwight D. Eisenhower's SHAEF staff could find little use for airborne divisions. Neither organized nor intended to conduct sustained battle, airborne divisions had little utility after the invasion. Eisenhower retained them in the general reserve, finally using them in MARKET-GARDEN operation in the Netherlands in September 1944. Thereafter, ground forces advanced so briskly that they captured projected airborne objectives before the airborne operation could be launched, although airborne divisions were used in the crossing of the Rhine in 1945. No one could find a role for horse-mounted cavalry divisions that justified the shipping problems involved, particularly the supply of fodder and feed. Accordingly, the War Department simply scrapped one of the cavalry divisions and converted the other to an infantry division is all but name.
The progress of the war also eliminated the need for the massive antiaircraft artillery organization Wedemeyer planned for the theaters and field armies. He could not know that the strategic bombing campaign the Royal Air Force and the American numbered air forces conducted in Europe would have literally devoured the German Luftwaffe by mid-1944. The Army Air Forces very proficiently accomplished Wedemeyer's second condition for operations on the continent of Europe: they gained "overwhelming air superiority" by July of 1944. The consequence was that the enemy air threat did not exist to justify such a large antiaircraft artillery service in the European theater.20

Likewise, there was little need for the large tank destroyer force planned in 1941. In part, that was because the United States Army found other ways to deal with tanks than by fighting them with a specialized force. Tactical aviation emerged as an efficient way to kill tanks, particularly after air leaders realized that .50-caliber projectiles could penetrate the thin armor of tank's engine compartments.21 There was also a growing consensus in the Army that the best antitank weapon was the tank itself. Early tank destroyers were relatively lightly armored and could not exchange fire with a tank. More heavily armored tank destroyers resembled tanks so closely that the distinction between the two blurred. Eventually, the Army field more powerfully armed tanks than the medium M4 Sherman. Rearmed with a 76-mm. high velocity weapon, the Sherman could at least compete with modern German tanks. The General Pershing tank, introduced at the end of the war, had a 90-mm. gun and, despite maintenance problems, was the equal of the best that the Germans could offer. As a result, tank destroyers became technically and doctrinally obsolescent by the end of World War II.22 Well before the end of the war, the Army began to reduce the number of tank destroyer battalions forming and in training.