Defence of the Reich

[parsifal]

Again: who is saying that Germany could not win an attrition warfare with Russia? Not Jenisch, but the Germans themselfs

.

Actually the germans did entertain such thinking. The professional military believed prior to Kursk that given proper strategic military leadership, without the contant interference by Hitler and his cronies, that they could win a war of attrition. What was needed was a war of movement, whilst the germans still had the ability to do so. By giving and taking ground, the professionals in the heer knew they could extract the maximum of casualties out of the red army. By the end of 1941, most of the generals had realized that territorial expansion only added to the logistics nightmare for Germany. By using russia itself as a battleground, the Russians would be forced into a war tyhey would have a hard time winning. What was needed to make this strategy work was relaistic leadership at the top, and unfortunately for Germany that never happened.

Evidence of how the professional soldiers thought Germany's defensive war should be fought is there if you look for it. Suggest you look at AGS operations February to April 1943, and Rommels retrreats from Cyrenaica.

It would not be 2500 planes (of which only a part where fighters) that would stop the USAAF and the RAF. As for the 4 million men, the Allies had conditions to overcome them.

In fact by the end of 1942, it was only about 400 fighters, but the force structure was at least 2500 planes in the east. It was not the airframes the germans needed, it was the personnel

Yeah, but there are many things that defy common sense in what you wrote. First, there's the "Aryan" German Army, which only because it entered in the defensive, has a qualitative improvement beyond imagination of us Untermenschens

.

Stop talking rubbish. I'm the last person in this place to start mouthing the superiority of german arms on the basis of their politics. the German army WAS superior, and substantially so, but it had nothing to do with their race. it had everything to do with their methods and training. And the germans proved time and again that they were capable of amazing things, even in the teeth of utter defeat. The best example I can think of is Manteins defensive operations after Stalingrad....a masterpiece of improvisation, and an outstanding defensive success. the very thing they needed a year earlier .....

Second, the idea that Germany would be able to invade the Soviet Union, kill millions of it's population, inflict severe material damage in the country, and then force the Soviets to sign a peace with Germany that would include they would supply it with a huge quantity of oil (Adios Red Army, Red Air Force and much of the Soviet economy).

Getting access to Soviet Oil is a long shot. the rest is entirely possible. The Soviets didnt suffer such high attrition, because back in 1941, the germans made the mistake of continuing its push toward Moscow long after it was no longer feasible to do so. The German Generals, particualalry the front commanders were universally opposed to it. They knew that the capture of Moscow was largely a symbolic gesture by November. They also knew that they needed desperately to to pull up the advance, consolidate, and recover. Some did not anticipate the effeects of the Soviet winter, but many of th generals did.

If the generals had gotten their way and Hitler had backed down (a big ask, and the weak point of the whole argument) the germans would have defeated the Soviet counteroffensive of 1941. From there the Soviets, militarily would have been forced to make renewed attacks against the German lines. The Germans demonstrated at izyum and Kharkov what happens to the Soviets when they attack unprepared. And that was with german forces badly depleted and worn out from misuse.

To go further in show how this is a castle of cards: even if the Soviet government was treated, while still having power they could have sabotated the Caucasus oil industry if they felt it was a blackmail from a desesperated Germany (the system was actually producing much less than normally, hence the Soviets received substantial Lend-Lease petroleum products

Its not a house of cards, its the very plan that Manstein envisaged would get germany out of the war. i think he was right. as for oil from overseas, the Soviets were still self reliant to the tune of about 60% capacity on the caucaasus. The Soviets themselves knew that the Caucasus was critical to their war effort. thats why they fought so hard to defend it.
As forthe Soviets destroying the place rather than giving oil to the germans...again, rubbish. In 1939, despite having misgivings about the germans, the russians were willing to give oil to Germany, they would do it again if it was part of a peace deal. Only if the Russians were going to lose these oil firelds to direct military action would they destroy them (as they did)

and put the blamme in some "radical group". The NKVD could have "created" this group, or simply pick up actual prisioners in the Gulag and put the blamme on them.

This is totally illogical. And there is no basis to support it whatsoever. The Russians would not destroy these oilfields if after having been defeated, it was their means of salvation. It would be viewwed as their means of salvation not something to be thrown away.

In that enters the irrealism of this scenario, Parsifal. The only way that Germany had to really control the Soviet oil would be by actually trying to capture it (again, the things usually happen in the way they happened because there were no alternatives).

No, they happen because of human frailties. Hitler wa incapable of backing down, that led to his country's defeat. if he could have accepted a compromise peace, the russian sure would, and from their all this stuff you are saying falls away. The Germans were never going to capture the oilfields intact, but Russian previous actions showed them to be prgamatic, and quite prepred to "sell their soulds" if circumstsances demanded it.

And there was also the danger of leave the Red Army (which was being supported by the US and Britain) able to pose a treat to Germany in the future. The mere possibility of a revolt is unlikely, not only because the opposition was practically eliminated in the Great Purge, but also because the situation. The Soviet people understood well that they had to fight, there was no alternative.

There is no basis for sying this. in fact the history of Russia just 20 years before suggests completely the opposite to what you are saying. A defeated Russia is an unstable Russia. Russia with 20-30 million casualties is going to sue for peace, despite Stalin or anybody else for that matter.

In a scenario where by somehow Germany is stronger than historically, the Soviets woud have retrated, but give up, no.

Thats a matter hotly debated,and by no means a certainty, especially if the Soviets had suffered heavy one sided defeathttp

 

[stona]

As for the mobilization of the German economy, Stona, it's a myth that it was not mobilized at the start of the war.

Really? Take a look at some figures. When did something as fundamental as the German aircraft industry move to 24 hour working. British manufacturers were doing it in 1940.What percentage of German women were working in 1940/41?
The German economy didn't start to take up the slack until 1942/3,by which time it was too late. It was not geared for a long haul.There are endless references for this in just about every history of the period.
Speer wasn't a magician. He didn't have more to start with. The increases in production that he managed,despite the allied bombing,were achieved by removing the slack from the production economy.

Let's concentrate on aircraft production,this is an aircraft based forum after all. It was not until Germany was embroiled in the conflict with the Soviet Union,more than two years into the war,that Goering finally authorised to bring some order to the aircraft industry. By this time it was already to late. The attrition of the previous years had been ignored and the British aircraft industry had a more than two year head start. Even the US,as relative new comers,were at least a year ahead. How is this "mobilised at the start of the war"?

More anecdotally why did Speer complain that he was confronted by whining Gauleiters in 1943 when he wanted to divert materials away from cosmetic production to armaments. German women,apparently,neede their make up.

Steve

 

[parsifal]

It would have made no substantial difference to the air war in the West and I see no reason why the allies would have reduced or abandoned the bombing campaign of 1942onwards.

Hi steve

Perhaps not immedialtely, but the return of manpower, the redeployment of 30% more flak, with the best crews, and the arrival if vast numbers of aircrew and service personnel is going to deliver a massive boost of resources foir the germans, that the allies will find hard to match. If the Peace treaty with the Soviets occurs say in September 1942, by mid to late 1943, instead of having around 500 fighters and 250 Night Fighters defending the reich, the Germans may well have around 1500 and 700. if the loss are a linear relationship to fighters available, that immediately pushes BC loss rates through to the unsustainable level. Same for the US

The military,industrial and economic weight of the Western Alliance would eventually have prevailed.

You do realize that you are basically saying the Soviet contribution to victory was irrelvant. i cannot accept that. Moreover, if the allies had been forced to fight the Germans without the Soviets, the great US economic advantage would have been a lot less. A lot more effort would have been meeded to keep the convoys rolling, much manpower would need to be diverted.......I just cannot see the Allies winning an unconditional surrender in that scenario. I dont see the germans winning, per se, but their ability to fight more or less indefinately is a possibility

As a minor detail,how many resources would the Germans have required to hang on to their newly acquired territories in the East? It's a big place! I don't see any way that a system like that employed by the British in India would have worked.

Stalins terms reportedly were that the frontiers return to the 1939 border. The Nazis wanted to retain the whole of Poland. But the Soviets would have had all their own territory returned...


Michael

 

[Jenisch]

You do realize that you are basically saying the Soviet contribution to victory was irrelvant.

Nobody is saying that. For "relevant" however, you want to say that the Americans and British would be unable to defeat Germany alone. I will not lose my time anymore with you, Parfisal. I already provided plenty of evidence that the Germans could not sustain an attrition war with the US and Britain. You are not being much different from Richard Overy, that uses similar "noble" arguments but does not support them.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Jenisch, Parsifal...

Knock it off you two! If I see one more personal attack, both parties are spending time at the beach. I don't care who started it.

 

[bobbysocks]

The military,industrial and economic weight of the Western Alliance would eventually have prevailed.

that is the way i see it. and i am not discounting the soviet contribution to the war but you also cant dismiss the importance of lend lease material as a stop gap measure in their war with germany. the raw materials ( steel, etc), trucks, food medicine, machinery, along with airplanes, tanks, guns, ammo all supplemented the soviet war machine until it could be brought up to speed. without the eastern war those items would have went to the west. yes, the supply lines were long but the uboat fleet would not have gained much from no eastern war. by mid 43 the convoys were better defended and the losses to uboats were diminishing. so the LW now has 1500 fighters and 700 night fighters. one of the major problems the lw ( and german army ) had in the east was the size of the front. in essense wouldnt the same hold true here? they have the whole of europe to defend with 1500 fighters where as the allies could consentrate their escorts were needed. my contention is that the western allies would still be able to distrupt germany's production where as they would not be able to recipocate. the factories in the us, canada, and other CW would not have missed a beat. the weak link were the convoys and the alles were winning at keeping them going.

i

 

[Jenisch]

HyperWar: An Unknown Future and A Doubtful Present [Chapter 5]

By August 1943, the Army [US Army] reached its peak combat strength for World War II, fielding a total of only 90 divisions, one of which was later dismantled. Subsequent enlistments made the Army larger, but never increased its combat edge. Marshall and Wedemeyer appreciated the impact that increased military technology would have on the nature of war and planned to take advantage of firepower and air power to field a smaller army. Wedemeyer failed, however, to carry the problem through to its logical conclusion. Modern military technology had a stupendous impact on the battlefield; it had an equally significant influence on Army organization.
Limitations of the Plan--Type Divisions

Incorrect about the number of divisions the Army could field, Wedemeyer was necessarily also incorrect about the numbers of division by type:

Type Division 1941 Estimate Actual
Armored 61 16
Mechanized 61 0
Infantry 54 66
Mountain 10 1
Cavalry 4 2
Airborne 7 5

The dramatic differences between the Victory Plan troop basis and the final shape of the Army in May of 1945 cannot properly be ascribed to errors of judgment, however.12 The most important changes in divisional organization, division slice factor aside, came about because of logistical and tactical lessons that were unavailable to Wedemeyer in 1941.13

The Army did not create as many armored divisions as Wedemeyer's plan called for chiefly because General George Marshall's greatest fears about Lend Lease were realized: the needs of the British and the Russians consumed a large part of American tank production. In 1955, the Army staff calculated that Lend Lease to the USSR, France, Italy, China, Brazil, the Netherlands, Norway, and the British Empire had equipped around 101 U.S.-type divisions.14 The United States, for example, shipped a total of 5,374 medium tanks and 1,682 light tanks to the USSR alone between June of 1941 and September 1945. While only about 20 percent of all war production eventually flowed into Lend Lease channels, that matériel was overwhelmingly heavy equipment such as tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft.15 American industry simply could not satisfy the demands of both Army and Lend Lease for new production and for production of replacement armored vehicles. Therefore it proved impossible for the War Department to equip as many American armored divisions as the Victory Plan called for.

Wedemeyer's emphasis on armored divisions arose from his reading of Fuller and from the dramatic use the Germans had made of armor in the opening battles of the war.16 Some Americans, however, wondered whether so many armored divisions would be tactically desirable, suggesting that they would be awkward to maneuver and very hard to support. General Marshall eventually favored a compact and powerful force maintained at full strength as the better course of action, writing in 1945 that the more divisions an Army commander has under his control, the more supporting troops he must maintain and the greater are his traffic and supply problems. If his divisions are fewer in number but maintained at full strength, the power for attack continues while the logistical problems are greatly simplified.
Other unforeseen developments prevented the Army from forming mechanized divisions, foremost among them the shipping problem. Despite enormous strides in merchant ship construction, there remained a serious competition for space. Mechanized divisions required more shipping space, and the staff realized that ports of embarkation could ship these divisions to Europe only very gradually. Dismounted infantry divisions, on the other hand, required far less shipping space, enabling the United States to build up combat forces in the theater much faster. As with tanks, the vehicles the mechanized divisions would have used were also in great demand by other nations, and Lend Lease quickly consumed much of the available production. Finally, as part of his drive to decrease the division slice, and recognizing production and shipping problems, General McNair decided to remove many vehicles from the divisions and pool them in the field armies, which could presumably manage a smaller number of vehicles more efficiently to accomplish the same tasks. Years later, Wedemeyer remarked that the battlefield would have become a hopeless traffic jam if the Army had carried out his original scheme for mechanized divisions.
Despite the fact that Lend Lease proved a factor limiting the number of armored divisions that the Army could create, it too had hidden benefits for American mobilization. While the constant demands of Britain and Russia for equipment continued to vex the War department, contracts for manufacture of matériel for Lend Lease served the purpose of establishing major military production lines well before America went to war. Industry was in general unwilling to convert to war production unless there was some sort of guarantee of sustained production. Lend Lease provided such a guarantee, and the War Department therefore found that an important segment of industry was already mobilized by 7 December 1941.

Changes in the activation programs for other type divisions were influenced by factors other than Lend Lease. Specific plans for the liberation of Europe eliminated the need for more than one mountain division, although use might have been found for them if the Allies had pursued Churchill's idea of an attack through the Balkans into central Europe. The progress of the fighting in Italy, the one theater that offered scope for employment of mountain divisions, demonstrated that standard infantry divisions fought as well as specialist troops in rough terrain.19 After the Normandy invasion, General Dwight D. Eisenhower's SHAEF staff could find little use for airborne divisions. Neither organized nor intended to conduct sustained battle, airborne divisions had little utility after the invasion. Eisenhower retained them in the general reserve, finally using them in MARKET-GARDEN operation in the Netherlands in September 1944. Thereafter, ground forces advanced so briskly that they captured projected airborne objectives before the airborne operation could be launched, although airborne divisions were used in the crossing of the Rhine in 1945. No one could find a role for horse-mounted cavalry divisions that justified the shipping problems involved, particularly the supply of fodder and feed. Accordingly, the War Department simply scrapped one of the cavalry divisions and converted the other to an infantry division is all but name.
The progress of the war also eliminated the need for the massive antiaircraft artillery organization Wedemeyer planned for the theaters and field armies. He could not know that the strategic bombing campaign the Royal Air Force and the American numbered air forces conducted in Europe would have literally devoured the German Luftwaffe by mid-1944. The Army Air Forces very proficiently accomplished Wedemeyer's second condition for operations on the continent of Europe: they gained "overwhelming air superiority" by July of 1944. The consequence was that the enemy air threat did not exist to justify such a large antiaircraft artillery service in the European theater.20

Likewise, there was little need for the large tank destroyer force planned in 1941. In part, that was because the United States Army found other ways to deal with tanks than by fighting them with a specialized force. Tactical aviation emerged as an efficient way to kill tanks, particularly after air leaders realized that .50-caliber projectiles could penetrate the thin armor of tank's engine compartments.21 There was also a growing consensus in the Army that the best antitank weapon was the tank itself. Early tank destroyers were relatively lightly armored and could not exchange fire with a tank. More heavily armored tank destroyers resembled tanks so closely that the distinction between the two blurred. Eventually, the Army field more powerfully armed tanks than the medium M4 Sherman. Rearmed with a 76-mm. high velocity weapon, the Sherman could at least compete with modern German tanks. The General Pershing tank, introduced at the end of the war, had a 90-mm. gun and, despite maintenance problems, was the equal of the best that the Germans could offer. As a result, tank destroyers became technically and doctrinally obsolescent by the end of World War II.22 Well before the end of the war, the Army began to reduce the number of tank destroyer battalions forming and in training.

 

[bobbysocks]

Alright here's my uneducated point of view ( aka rant...some ( ok a lot of ) alcohol involved ). we give the soviets all this sympathy for enduring the nazi onslaught. they did so much on the ground...way more than the western allies. we should be ashamed of ourselves like stailn complained to the us and uk/cw. we simply didnt participate in the war the way russia did. i guess we slacked a bit and just werent motivated because we had other frivolous things going on...LIKE THE FREAKIN PACIFIC WAR! america was attacked by who?? germany? ummmm....ok there were uboat attacks on shipping...but WHAT ...or shall i dare say WHO...drove the US ( think of dec 7...the infamy day speech) to declare war with one act? Japan/Pearl harbour. america could have simply decided to fight its war there ( in the pacific where it was threatened and attacked ) making a pact with the uk/cw to do what is necessary to bring down the japanese threat to both of out interests. but we didnt. we entered "THE WAR". the us and the uk/cw fought a 2 front war..in 2 different arenas with all the logistic problems you can imagine. how far is burma from london?? Or washington DC from manila? my point is the us/uk/cw alliance fought ALL the ALLIED enemies...2 separate fronts and all the problems that was involved in that. the russians? when did they wage war on japan?? not until AFTER germany surrendered AND it became a land grab for them. tell me i am wrong in the fact that they fought weeks after japan surrendered!!!!!!! i dont want to hear any crying and whining.! they FLAT didnt take the fight to japan when needed but only when it was BENEFICIAL to them so they could share in the spoils as the victor. the russians endured alot, but only fought on one front AND WHERE AIDED AND SUPPLIED by their other allies. they contributed ZILCH to the us/uk/cw pacific war. ( please correct me if i am wrong )

LET'S ask another question here....had the US/UK/CW not have to divide their resources between the 2 theaters and be able to concentrate solely on the reich would that big soviet contribution been that a big difference???? Honestly, russia was a one man player in the war. if you believe different you are a stark raving fool. there were numerous opportunities for them to accept us/uk troops...air bases ( with long range bombers and escorts )....i would bet everything i have in the bank that if stalin would have asked/demanded troops,,,the us/uk/cw would have happily obliged. THEY DIDNT!! stalin was paranoid of the west and wanted to do it on their own.....and doing so screwed over their allies by not declaring war on japan. so, what ever they endured was by their own hand and decision. i dont want to hear about how badly their loses were....that was THEIR decision...plain and simple...not the allies...nor do i want to hear how their contribution was paramount to the end of the war. how many russians were taken as POWS in burma or the philippines??? how many russian soldiers fell along side the road on the death march??? novel idea......what if the soviets had been more of a team player and let the allies set up bomber and naval bases near Vladivostok....where 17s, lancs, the us/rn could have pounded toyko and japan years earlier...how would that have impacted the entire outcome of the war???

 

[vinnye]

Stalin did not like the idea of foreign troops on Russian soil - even if they were allies in the fight against the Germans. An example of this is the very limited help given to the Free Polish troops that were dispersed around Russia and given little in the way of equipment and aid in transport to organise into an effective fighting unit. Stalin only allowed these troops to be sent to the Med and on into Italy etc rather than to fight the Germans on Russian / Polish ground.
He did not want a strong independent Polish armed force to potnetially be a problem post war.

 

[parsifal]

Stalin did not like the idea of foreign troops on Russian soil - even if they were allies in the fight against the Germans. An example of this is the very limited help given to the Free Polish troops that were dispersed around Russia and given little in the way of equipment and aid in transport to organise into an effective fighting unit. Stalin only allowed these troops to be sent to the Med and on into Italy etc rather than to fight the Germans on Russian / Polish ground.
He did not want a strong independent Polish armed force to potnetially be a problem post war.

There was a Polish Army in the Soviet Army (an Army in the Red Army was roughly the equivalent of a large Corps, less the support echelons). More Poles fought under the Soviet banner than fought for the west. I dont now much about the units formation, though I expect many "volunteered" to get better food and conditions more than anything. Dont know what they did for officers either......

Agree completely with the second para

 

[gjs238]

Alright here's my uneducated point of view ( aka rant...some ( ok a lot of ) alcohol involved ). we give the soviets all this sympathy for enduring the nazi onslaught. they did so much on the ground...way more than the western allies. we should be ashamed of ourselves like stailn complained to the us and uk/cw. we simply didnt participate in the war the way russia did. i guess we slacked a bit and just werent motivated because we had other frivolous things going on...LIKE THE FREAKIN PACIFIC WAR! america was attacked by who?? germany? ummmm....ok there were uboat attacks on shipping...but WHAT ...or shall i dare say WHO...drove the US ( think of dec 7...the infamy day speech) to declare war with one act? Japan/Pearl harbour. america could have simply decided to fight its war there ( in the pacific where it was threatened and attacked ) making a pact with the uk/cw to do what is necessary to bring down the japanese threat to both of out interests. but we didnt. we entered "THE WAR". the us and the uk/cw fought a 2 front war..in 2 different arenas with all the logistic problems you can imagine. how far is burma from london?? Or washington DC from manila? my point is the us/uk/cw alliance fought ALL the ALLIED enemies...2 separate fronts and all the problems that was involved in that. the russians? when did they wage war on japan?? not until AFTER germany surrendered AND it became a land grab for them. tell me i am wrong in the fact that they fought weeks after japan surrendered!!!!!!! i dont want to hear any crying and whining.! they FLAT didnt take the fight to japan when needed but only when it was BENEFICIAL to them so they could share in the spoils as the victor. the russians endured alot, but only fought on one front AND WHERE AIDED AND SUPPLIED by their other allies. they contributed ZILCH to the us/uk/cw pacific war. ( please correct me if i am wrong )

LET'S ask another question here....had the US/UK/CW not have to divide their resources between the 2 theaters and be able to concentrate solely on the reich would that big soviet contribution been that a big difference???? Honestly, russia was a one man player in the war. if you believe different you are a stark raving fool. there were numerous opportunities for them to accept us/uk troops...air bases ( with long range bombers and escorts )....i would bet everything i have in the bank that if stalin would have asked/demanded troops,,,the us/uk/cw would have happily obliged. THEY DIDNT!! stalin was paranoid of the west and wanted to do it on their own.....and doing so screwed over their allies by not declaring war on japan. so, what ever they endured was by their own hand and decision. i dont want to hear about how badly their loses were....that was THEIR decision...plain and simple...not the allies...nor do i want to hear how their contribution was paramount to the end of the war. how many russians were taken as POWS in burma or the philippines??? how many russian soldiers fell along side the road on the death march??? novel idea......what if the soviets had been more of a team player and let the allies set up bomber and naval bases near Vladivostok....where 17s, lancs, the us/rn could have pounded toyko and japan years earlier...how would that have impacted the entire outcome of the war???

Add to this interring B-29 crews and aircraft in the Soviet Union.
Then reverse-engineered the aircraft.

 

[stona]

I don't suggest for one moment that the Soviet contribution was irrelevant,far from it. I am saying the Western allies would have defeated Germany,eventually,without them. Not the same thing at all.

No way would the Germans have had the extra hundreds (thousands) of fighters available in the West. Take a look at German aircraft production throughout the war and it barely covered their losses. The mid/late war increases inproduction were to counter the air assault in the West which they singularly failed to do.They recalled most of their fighter units from the East to the West where the USAAF/RAF promptly shot them down.

Do you seriously believe in the possibility of a peace arrangement in which Germany and the Soviet Union returned to the 1939 border? I assume you mean the one they "arranged" in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
That I won't buy,two for one and with a massive discount

Cheers

Steve

 

[Jenisch]

Stalin did not like the idea of foreign troops on Russian soil - even if they were allies in the fight against the Germans.

Such alliance was opportunistic - they really didn't like from each other. Due to the Soviet alliance with Hitler, the Anglo-French were preparing themselfs to attack the Soviet oil production in Baku, and this was not a mere contingence plan:

In March 1940, after the end of the Winter War, the British undertook secret reconnaissance flights to photograph areas inside the Soviet Union, utilising high-altitude, high-speed stereoscopic photography pioneered by Sidney Cotton.[10]
Using specially modified and unmarked Lockheed Model 14 Super Electra aircraft painted in a special blue camouflage scheme developed by Cotton himself (who led the RAF's Photographic Development Unit or PDU), the Secret Intelligence Service launched the high-altitude reconnaissance flights from RAF Habbaniya, a Royal Air Force station in Iraq. One such mission was flown on 30 March 1940. Flying over the mountainous region of southeastern Kurdistan, across the coast of the Caspian Sea then north towards Baku, the flight entered Soviet airspace at 11:45 after a four-hour flight. Loitering for an hour whilst making six photographic runs with its 14 in (36 cm) aerial camera, the aircraft left Baku at 12:45 and returned to RAF Habbaniya.[11]
Another reconnaissance sortie was flown on 5 April from RAF Habbaniya, this time crossing Turkish airspace to reach Batumi. This flight encountered Soviet anti-aircraft fire and a Soviet fighter attempted to intercept it. However, the British had obtained everything they needed for photo-interpretation purposes and for mapping the Soviet petroleum centres.

Operation Pike - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The idea that the Grand Alliance was a "noble alliance" is nothing more than a myth. The Soviets would be happy that the Nazis and the democracies destroyed themselfs (this was a major reason of the M-R pact) in the same way that the West would be happy if the Nazis and Soviets destroyed themselfs.

 

[Jenisch]

Do you seriously believe in the possibility of a peace arrangement in which Germany and the Soviet Union returned to the 1939 border? I assume you mean the one they "arranged" in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
That I won't buy,two for one and with a massive discount

With all respect to Parfisal, I think he is giving too much credit to the popular myth that Hitler was blamed for everything bad that happened to the WM, while the officiers have credit for everything good. Parfisal also belives that the German "technological advantage" would be relevant in this scenario. This is another myth. Germany would not develop an atomic bomb first or close than the US one. Stona can explain this better than me. If the war goes into 1945, and Germany starts to deploy jets in increasingly numbers, there would be an answer from the Allies, and their jets were comparable to the German ones.

As for the tanks, there would be the Centurion and the Super Pershing (I attached an image of the latter), both of which could compete with the latest German tanks. So, in general the Germans did not enjoy a decisive technological advantage over the Allies. Both sides had some areas which were superior to each other however.

As for the Luftwaffe, The Wages of Destruction, page 626:

In early 1944, the US Army Air Force dramatically turned the tables in the daytime battle by introducing a new generationof long-range escort fighters with performance substantially greater than Milch's outdated Messerschmitts. Literally thousands of Mustang P51S equipped with disposable fuel tanks now accompanied the bombers deep into Germany and picked off the Luftwaffe's interceptors before they even got close to the bomber streams. 'Big Week' - 20-25 February 1944 - is commonly regarded as the critical turning point in the airwar. On six consecutive days, thousands of American bombers were hurled against all the major aircraft factories in Germany. The Luftwaffe was not destroyed in a single week. However, the US Army Air Force gave notice that the Germans would now face an utterly unsustainable rate of attrition. In February the Luftwaffe lost one-third of its fighters and a fifth of its crews. In March, it lost more than half its fighter aircraft. In April 43 per cent were shot down and in May and June the loss rate hovered around 50 per cent. Over the first five months of 1944 the Luftwaffe's entire complement of fighter pilots was either killed or disabled. A few German aces survived long enough to notch up extraordinary tallies but the working life of the average Luftwaffe pilot was now measured in weeks.

Tooze exaggerates in the criticism of the Bf 109, which despite the outdated design was still competitive if flown by a properly trained pilot. Anyway, as we can see, the attrition with the West consumed the LW very quickly. The attrition in the East was not much different, with the difference that the Soviets paid a high price due to initially not having sufficient numbers of modern aircraft, properly trained pilots and tactics.

Luftwaffe Orders of Battle 24 June 1941, 27 July 1942, and 17 May 1943

According to this link, in May 1943 42% of the LW combat force was in the East.

http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

While according to this other:

4.06 times as many aircraft were lost in combat in the West than were lost in the East, a ratio reasonably close to Groehler's 3.41 for all "losses". The most chilling statistic for the JG 26 pilots appears in the sortie data. An airplane flying a combat mission in the West was 7.66 times more likely to be destroyed than one on a similar mission in the East. It is clear that the burden of sacrifice was borne by the Luftwaffe aircrew on the Western Front and over the Reich, not on the Eastern Front.

And as I already wrote: the German aero industry was preparing itself to the confrontation with the West before the Barbarossa started, so there would not be major changes in German production figures.

By late 1941, the LW had lost nearly all it's complement of modern aircraft. If some peace treaty was reached with Russia in 1942, it would not give the Germans the hability to close the gap that had already been open before between them and the Allies. One of the most overlooked things of the war is that Britain was able to match the Germans in terms of having a comparable air force and aircraft production. Only late in the war Germany surprassed Britain in aircraft production. But even so, Britain was producing and employing in substantial numbers an aircraft that the Germans practically didn't had an equivalent - the Lancaster. Now, if we put the US in the story, geez... things become complicated. If Germany brings more fighters, there would be an American response to that. As for bombers, I already wrote earlier: by 1945 there were 3000 B-29s in the USAAF inventory, 3000! Bombing Japan was not a priority for the US. If the US needed to bring more aircraft against Germany after Japan was contained in late 1942 (for Hitler, Japan would keep the US and Britain busy), this would be perfectly possible.

And lastly, I don't think that even if Germany had fuel, it would have a very high chance of not loose the war. Britain had fuel, but if the RAF had to face the USAAF in a hypotetical scenario where the geography was practical, the situation obviously would not be easy for the British. Germany's situation would be similar in this scenario. Hitler expected that Britain would come to terms if he had defeated the USSR. The Germans were working with the prospect of try contain the Anglo-American material and manpower superiority if they did not accepted peace, they were not thinking it would be a foregone conclusion to defeat such alliance in the battefield. The Japanese thinking was similar: "we gonna scare them, they will think our position is too much strong and gonna seek for peace. But if they put all their resources against us, we are in trouble".

 

[Jenisch]

Double post.

 

[parsifal]

I don't suggest for one moment that the Soviet contribution was irrelevant,far from it. I am saying the Western allies would have defeated Germany,eventually,without them. Not the same thing at all.

No way would the Germans have had the extra hundreds (thousands) of fighters available in the West. Take a look at German aircraft production throughout the war and it barely covered their losses. The mid/late war increases inproduction were to counter the air assault in the West which they singularly failed to do.They recalled most of their fighter units from the East to the West where the USAAF/RAF promptly shot them down

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Okay, accept that, although I tend to think the idea of unconditional surrender at least might be difficult to achieve. Its about the strength and capability of the allied ground forces. Put simply they would have needed to significantly increased their investment in the land forces (and from that, the logistics base needed to support them), and with that would com an inevitable cost in the strength and/or capability of the allied air power.

Looking at the US Army for a minute, according to Shelby Stanton. I dont have his book on the US Army in front of me (but it is at home) at the moment but from memory,he says the US raised 90 divs 1942-5. They started with cadres for 14 divs I think, but these were grossly understrength and completely ilequippe. The Americans had to retain a sizable force at home for further cadres and home defence, and had to also provide significant forces fort the PTO. This left precious little for force projection into the ETO at that time, moreover, with the mapower allocations that were made, the US found it very difficult to translate their massive economic power into effective military power on the ground. For a country of its size, the US Army expansion was actually quite limited, more limited than a mere examination of their force structures would suggest.

. By the end of 1942, the US Army stood at 74 divs, however for the ETO they only had 90000 men that the general board considered "combat ready".These were thrown into the Torch landings and were promptly shown up as severely lacking in training and experience. You simply dont expand from 14 cadres to 75 in less than a year, and expect your forces to be competitive against an army with years of combat experience, better tactical organization, supeior leadership and generally better weapons.

As 1943 progressed, the Americans continued to experience severee difficulties in their expansion. The problem I think is that they had severely under-estimated the support echelonns needed to support their overseas . People often think that a divisio consisted of about 16500 men for the US, but thi fails to take into account the massive "tails that supported each div. For the brits, the total divisional slice was about 55000 men per div, I think the US was similar. Anyway, for whatever reason, the US found that many of its divisions had to be taken out of availability and used to provide fillers for the few frontline units that they could deploy. By 1944, this figure had ballooned out to nearly 25 divs (which Stanton identifies). these units were not suitable for either mobile operations, or offensive operations. Eventually, in 1945, some of these units had their TOEs normalised and were moved to the front, but were used only defensively for the most partThe US effectively had around 30 Divs that it could use for brekthrough or offensive operations. Well short of the numbers they would need if the Russians were out of the equation. If the Germans maintained a force structure of , say 300 Divs in th4e west, the Allieswould need to double triple, or even quadruple their force structures, and that would have a massive effect on the amount of airpower they could deploy.


Conversely, with losses reduced for the heer, by the close down in the east, and the reduced fuel consumption they would enjoy (look, at their overall fuel consumption during barbarossa, and then compare that to 1943.......its a fraction in the later years. If there is no eastern Front, the germans will solve their fuel issue). The Germans will be able to pour vast amounts of their resources into expanding their air force. So they will have relatively more aircracraft, whilst we will have relatively less. This is not agood or easy scenario for the allies, and their victory is not a certainty.

Do you seriously believe in the possibility of a peace arrangement in which Germany and the Soviet Union returned to the 1939 border? I assume you mean the one they "arranged" in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact

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I have read about it somewhere....cant recall the source, I agree that it sounds a bit far fetched, but given different circumstances in 1942 (ie a major collapse of the Red Army), as well as a change in German thinking (a much bigger ask) I do think it quite possible

Regards

Michael

 

[Jenisch]

.If the Germans maintained a force structure of , say 300 Divs in th4e west

You make critics to the Alllied logistical problems, but simply desconsiderate them when its the Heer. One of the pre-conditions for an invasion is air supremacy. The Allies would not start any invasion until they had put the LW in a situation similar to the one in D-Day. Having said that, how do you solve the problem of keeping 300 divisions supplied when their logistic system becomes a botteneck? Historically, the German forces in France already experienced severe problems due the destruction of the French railway system prior to D-Day, and the constant attacks of Allied aircraft in their supply convoys (ground troops also suffered heavy casualities). And as I already said earlier, there would be not need of hurry for the Allies advance. The EF lasted for four years, this Western Front could have lasted more time than historically if necessary.

One thing I'm certain: the situation in Europe by 1945 would not be good. The German economy would be in trouble, the German cities would be in rubble. By this time what Germany would do? Attack the USSR again? The Russians would be aware that the WM was not the same anymore, and Germany would simply not have conditions to do this. This also would be suicide against the Allies. The Allies could have put Europe under siege, and they also would be able to nuke Germany, killing even more civlians and contaminating others by radiation. Perhaps the people will revolt against the German government, a succesfull coup against Hitler could have occured. Other thing is that the Allies had alternatives to attack Hitler. The idea that 300 divisions would be put in France is hindsight. Even the actual invasion of France had an element of strategy: the Allies did not invaded in Calais, like the Germans expected. This prevented the Allied forces to come in contact with a much larger German contingent. Perhaps Norway could be targeted (difficult, but would deny Germany vital iron ore), other option would be Balkans. There are other options also, and they could have formed a grand strategy to weaken Germany until an opportunity to have a decisive confrontation with it arise. A scenario like this presents big challanges to the Allied attackers, but also to the the German defenders.

 

[parsifal]

PART 1

You make critics to the Alllied logistical problems, but simply desconsiderate them when its the Heer.

An attacker into enemy controlled territory, where the infrastructure has been thoroughly destroyed, will have an infionitely harder time logistically than a force that has had four years to stockpile resources, and is operating on the defensive. An attacker classically needs 3odds of 3 or 4:1 to achieve brekathroughs, for the allies this was typically 6 or 7 to 1, and artillery concentrations (the lions share of supply, were typically 10 or even 20:1.

For all these reasons, and many more, the allied logistic problem was many orders of magnitude greater than that facing the germans on the defensive. Mororever, by shutting down their major front, the germans would finally in 1943 be in a position to recover their mobility by rebuiding their MT pools and also building up armoured reserves and manpower reseves

One of the pre-conditions for an invasion is air supremacy. The Allies would not start any invasion until they had put the LW in a situation similar to the one in D-Day.

I agree, but that does not mean the germans need to maintin air parity or air superiority to challenge the allies. If they could have put up a meaningful presence on D-Day and after, this alone would have caused enormous problems for the allies.

Having said that, how do you solve the problem of keeping 300 divisions supplied when their logistic system becomes a botteneck?

By bringing them home from the easstern Front. The Germans, with a great deal of difficulty (and admittedly in the end unsuccessfully) did manage to maintain a semblance of logistic support on the eastern front, where conditions were many times more difficult to keep the frontline forces supplied. By bringing those forces back to western europe, where the road and rail networks were infinitely better (notwithstanding allied air activity, and where local supplies like food and fodder, were somewhat available the supply and logisitics difficulties are greatly reduced. Germany would not have the problems dupply wise that she did on the eastern front, and as a result of those difficulties, also on all her other fronts.

Historically, the German forces in France already experienced severe problems due the destruction of the French railway system prior to D-Day, and the constant attacks of Allied aircraft in their supply convoys (ground troops also suffered heavy casualities).

Their difficulties were caused mostly by the German State railways being grossly overstretched by the demands of the eastern front. Pull out of that front successfully, and some hundreds of thousands of railway workers, vast quantities of rolling stock and locos are returned to western europe, which means, vi8rtually no effect arising fom the allied air campaign on the French rail net. instead of lines and bridges laying wrecked for weeks because there is not the manpower to repair them, they are instead repaired almost immediately they are attacked. because there is now 4 or 5 times the amount of rolling stock and engines to pull them trains are not overstretched in their delivery of supply. Because the Germans have a substantial bomber force, it can re-challenge the control of the channel and open up this waterway to some sfriendly seaborne traffic. because they have additional fighters, oil training facilities and pilots, they can challenge the allied tactical air offensive into france in 1944. Because they have less strain overall on their economy they have plenty of time to properly develop their advanced weaponary including jet technologies, such that even though outnumbereed, their jet squadrons now properly worked up and with fewer teething problems can now deploy and tear holes in the allied piston engined fighters. Their concurrent development of jet bombers, from mid 1943 onward, means that their bomber forces are now un-interceptable. They begin barge hunting operations in the Channel, curtailing training preparations of the allied invasion forces. they start to receive proper intelligence froiom their closer air recon efferts, exposing Pattons fake army group for what it is. They develop Type XIII and XXI submarines that can reek havoc on allied convoys, both close and far.

 

[parsifal]

Part 2

And as I already said earlier, there would be not need of hurry for the Allies advance. The EF lasted for four years, this Western Front could have lasted more time than historically if necessary.

I know that you said it, but you didnt prove it or show it. Time was not on the side of the allies as much as you think. The more time that elapsed, the more likley German new technologies affecting the battle becomes a reality. For the allies time is not completely kind to them. They have spent years developing landing forces, including tank landing forces, that unfortunately are limited in size of AFVs they can land.....tanks like the Sherman, that even in 1944 were showing signs of being badly outclassed. Give the Germans more time, and they have more and better tanks to fight the same tanks the allies historically fielded, unless the allies want to postpone everything for even longer, whilst they go and rebuild and replace their amphibious landing forces.

And we still have not dealt with some strategically significant isues. By 1944, the British in particular were exhausted economically after more than 4 years of hard fighting. Because of their distateful and criminal policies in the occupied territories, the germans were not as exhausted. The Americans were not exhausted, but they were running short ofready reserves, particulalry manpower, and simply did not have the capacity to slug it out in an attritional battle with the wehrmacht.

One thing I'm certain: the situation in Europe by 1945 would not be good. The German economy would be in trouble, the German cities would be in rubble.

These are un-substantiated claims, and should be disregarded. you may be certain of it, but you have not shown it and certainoly havent proven it.

By this time what Germany would do?

Offer negotiated terms of peace, which the allies would probably accept

Attack the USSR again?

Maybe, after a rest in their victory over the allies

The Russians would be aware that the WM was not the same anymore, and Germany would simply not have conditions to do this.

This is an altogether different scenario, but suffice it to say its unproven one way or the other. If the scenario pans out to a negotiated settlement, the wehrmacht will be in better shape than it was in 1941. Dont know about the Russians, but probably not good. if a separate peace is made, there would be no help from the allies, in particular ffodstuffs. The country would be starving, many of its generals shot or in prison for losing the war, most of its territories wrecked from the war with Germany. I would not be surpised if Stalinn was overthrown.....and who knows what then....

This also would be suicide against the Allies.

As history shows, attacking Russia whilst the west is undefeated, is indeed suicide. If the allies are forced to make peace the scebario is altogether different.

The Allies could have put Europe under siege,

If war dragged on between the west and the Germans (ie not an eastern front situation), I actually see the Germans being the ones doing the blockading with their new technologies like the Type XXIs and the new fancy bombers they were supposedly working on. its not a good situation at all, and infact all thos American troops bottled up in England may well be suffering many hungry nights as they wait for the situation in the western approaches to improve

and they also would be able to nuke Germany, killing even more civlians and contaminating others by radiation.

Possibly, but unlikely. The Americans had a policy of not dropping the bomb in Europe. But lets assume they eventually change that. We are now in th realm of specualtion, but I dont think it unreasonable to specualte that the policy might occur in say 1947. However instead of the 24 (or so) bombs that the US historically had built by then (and expended 6 of them) the additional strain placed on the US economy, the decreased size of that economy because of the renewed l;osses in the Atlantic and the demands for manpower in the military, will probablyreduce than number to maybe 5 or 6 bombs, and slow down the deployment to the latter part of the year. Maybe, maybe not, but the point is, you are assuming far too much. In that time frame, it is entirely possible, if a little improbable that the Germans may well have a bomb or two of their own. The allies coulod not know this, so would hesitate bewfore using them. I certainly can see the british having reservations about a nuclear exhnage on their soil.

Perhaps the people will revolt against the German government, a succesfull coup against Hitler could have occured.

Quite possibly, but that doesnt mean the end for Germany. Just as plausibly, there might be elections in Britain and the US that voted in leaders prepred to negotiate. Getting rid of Hitler might be a good thing. With someone like Donitz or Speer in charge, I would be even more afraid as the allies than if the madmen Hitler was in charge.

Other thing is that the Allies had alternatives to attack Hitler. The idea that 300 divisions would be put in France is hindsight. Even the actual invasion of France had an element of strategy: the Allies did not invaded in Calais, like the Germans expected.

Its interesting, but just note that the pas de clais feint was made possible because of the lack of hard intell for the german. that might well change because of better recon in this scenario.

This prevented the Allied forces to come in contact with a much larger German contingent. Perhaps Norway could be targeted (difficult, but would deny Germany vital iron ore),

The so called "iron route" was a bit of a myth, though it would hurt the Germans. Bu, go ahead, send more of the dwindling Allied manpower and shipping reserves to an unimportant front, likley to completely upset the Swedes and decrease the problem on the main front.....

other option would be Balkans.

Same as above, but this time substitute p*ssing off the Swedes to p*ssing off the Russians. It might work, but it is likley to just tie down yet more of the limited allied manpower reserves on a pointless and difficult front. Different if the allies had a significant manpower advantage, but in this scenario they dont. they need the Russians to achieve that

There are other options also, and they could have formed a grand strategy to weaken Germany until an opportunity to have a decisive confrontation with it arise. A scenario like this presents big challanges to the Allied attackers, but also to the the German defenders.

It raises big challenges for the Allies...imnsurmountable ones in fact. The situation for theGermans is far easier. They dont have three enemies to fight. one of them...the biggest, is out of the war. That makes their life a whole lot easier....

 

[parsifal]

Just a piece of advice. If you reply, be absolutely careful not to make any disparaging remarks. We have both been warned. Stay focussed on the issue, or we will be spending time on the beach