Defence of the Reich
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Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Annex the Sudetenland.
Forget bombers and focus on more fighters with qualified pilots which entails an improved training program if possible. Stop needless manufacture of ridiculous prototypes and versions.
Forget bombers and focus on more fighters with qualified pilots which entails an improved training program if possible. Stop needless manufacture of ridiculous prototypes and versions.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
First off, I would stop the political in-fighting and get everyone on the same page.
Start ramping up pilot training and rotating aces into positions where thier experience would benefit the younger pilots coming into service.
Boost my jet engine program and get the Me262 and He280 up to strength by providing the engine manufacturers with the money and materials they deperately need.
Increase night fighter production and start becoming more offensive in this aspect by attacking strategic targets that will yeild the highest possible value.
Scale back on the "wonder weapons" and use the manpower and facilities to supplement current or next generation airframe production.
Restructure and co-ordinate AA systems.
Listen to my experienced generals and field marshals for input on battlefield situations and react accordingly...
Start ramping up pilot training and rotating aces into positions where thier experience would benefit the younger pilots coming into service.
Boost my jet engine program and get the Me262 and He280 up to strength by providing the engine manufacturers with the money and materials they deperately need.
Increase night fighter production and start becoming more offensive in this aspect by attacking strategic targets that will yeild the highest possible value.
Scale back on the "wonder weapons" and use the manpower and facilities to supplement current or next generation airframe production.
Restructure and co-ordinate AA systems.
Listen to my experienced generals and field marshals for input on battlefield situations and react accordingly...
Stop rotating air units from the eastern front to the western front and vice versa - completely different tactics required. Lots of good pilots from eastern front were annihilated in the west and vice versa.
Do everything to get high-alt interceptors and eliminate the enemy recons flying all over germany.
Flak ammo needs to be improved to ignite on both contact or set alt - until late in the war they only had either of the two options.
Do everything to get high-alt interceptors and eliminate the enemy recons flying all over germany.
Flak ammo needs to be improved to ignite on both contact or set alt - until late in the war they only had either of the two options.
Offense is the best defence and apart from defending the Reich it would be necessary to take the fight to the UK and the USA.
1a Emphasise the quality of fighters more: Me 109's with retractable tail wheels and smoothed over gun bulges, retractable tyre covers to improve performance. I think about 15mph gain was possible.
1b Faster specialised night fighters able to position themselves after a diversionary raid was discovered and intercept more targets in the limited amount of time available.
1c Something with much better altitude performance is required by late 1943.
2 The Germans did well in developing radar but more effort was needed to evade future allied jamming efforts which caused problems from 1943 onwards and to improve radar performance so that fewer resources were required. The multi-cavity magnetron was well known in Germany. Devices known as "rad" magnetrons with 8 tooth shaped cavities were capable of producing several kw at 18 to 22.5cm cm in 1939. I have pictures of a 1940 4 cavity magnetron from Lorentz with the circular cavities and narrow slits used in Randall and Boots magnetron. It seems because the Germans went straight to blind fire capable 50cm to 80cm radars while the allies initially used less capable played 15m to 1.5m radar they perceived less need to develop microwave units while their microwave effort was obsessively focused in achieving frequency changing which magnetrons only do with difficulty and with limited precision.
The main chance for German success was a series of new radars operating at 27cm using something called a ceramic disk triode that could have bypassed much of the allied jamming and window effort. It was more powerful and unlike magnetron was capable of coherent pulse Doppler to resolve windows. Manheim-K was the name of this radar but its introduction was delayed by the bureaucratic decision to focus on conventional radars.
3 I believe the V2 would have been an effective weapon. However a SAM missile might have been of more use and should be fielded earlier. Wasserfall SAM instead of V2 in 1944.
4 Divert some resources from the V2 into the V1. The V1 caused a massive expenditure of allied resources and cost at least 200 fighter aircraft losses. Had the weapon started firing 12-7 months earlier at the middle or end of 43 it would have relieved the German homeland greatly. The V2 had enormous scope for greater speed (it reached over 500 mph by Feb 1945), range and accuracy (Ewald Sauerkirsche trilateration guidance) and range (400 miles)
5 Obviously more effective air defence weapons were required. The Germans did have a crude proximity fuse that used a type of device called a cold cathode thyratron and did fire functioning prox fuses and did have a program. Such innovation is required in fuses, SAM missiles or even simple unguided missiles with prox fuses that would not have needed the toughness to survive a gun launch.
6 Somewhat more effort in dispersing, hardening and having repair contingencies of the synthetic oil industry.
7 Push through in flight refuelling as was shown successful by trials beginning in 1940, push through a 4 engine He 177 with 4 x BMW 801 or Jumo 211J in preparation for the even more powerfull DB603 or Jumo 213.
These aircraft will provide extended maritime reconnaissance in a survivable airframe, threaten lone dispersed distant Allied targets with well-known guided weapons, attack Soviet targets beyond the Urals and courier between Germany and Japan. When the USAAF starts bombing Germany the longer ranged versions now equipped with powerful new engines to get heavy fuel loads of the ground and in conjunction with in-flight refuelling will attack US East Coast targets. Large amounts of fighters will be withdrawn to defend the US and perhaps Canadian coast. Blackouts will be the norm. Minesweeping will become necessary in the Hudson river.
8 An atomic bomb will be needed. It's clear that the someone in Germany (Diebner?) knew the critical mass required of an atomic bomb with a HWA (Heers Waffen Ampt) or Army Ordinance Office paper placing the critical mass for both Uranium and Plutonium as 10-100kg which agrees with the Maud committee estimate of 2-100kg and matches the 55kg likely used by Littleboy. A program, run by a proper leader (say a Werner von Braun) instead of pure academics would have yielded results had it been started in 1940.
A good leader will have qualities open to such 'dreaming' and will understand the limitations of academics. One need only look at Dowdings imaginings of 'death rays' that lead to British radar. Speer let Weisacker and Heisengberg of the hook to easily. One recounts Churchill note that even if there was only a 1/10 chance of an atomic bomb working it must be done.
I don't envisage nuclear war but a kind of mutually assured destruction leading to a negotiated settlement.
1a Emphasise the quality of fighters more: Me 109's with retractable tail wheels and smoothed over gun bulges, retractable tyre covers to improve performance. I think about 15mph gain was possible.
1b Faster specialised night fighters able to position themselves after a diversionary raid was discovered and intercept more targets in the limited amount of time available.
1c Something with much better altitude performance is required by late 1943.
2 The Germans did well in developing radar but more effort was needed to evade future allied jamming efforts which caused problems from 1943 onwards and to improve radar performance so that fewer resources were required. The multi-cavity magnetron was well known in Germany. Devices known as "rad" magnetrons with 8 tooth shaped cavities were capable of producing several kw at 18 to 22.5cm cm in 1939. I have pictures of a 1940 4 cavity magnetron from Lorentz with the circular cavities and narrow slits used in Randall and Boots magnetron. It seems because the Germans went straight to blind fire capable 50cm to 80cm radars while the allies initially used less capable played 15m to 1.5m radar they perceived less need to develop microwave units while their microwave effort was obsessively focused in achieving frequency changing which magnetrons only do with difficulty and with limited precision.
The main chance for German success was a series of new radars operating at 27cm using something called a ceramic disk triode that could have bypassed much of the allied jamming and window effort. It was more powerful and unlike magnetron was capable of coherent pulse Doppler to resolve windows. Manheim-K was the name of this radar but its introduction was delayed by the bureaucratic decision to focus on conventional radars.
3 I believe the V2 would have been an effective weapon. However a SAM missile might have been of more use and should be fielded earlier. Wasserfall SAM instead of V2 in 1944.
4 Divert some resources from the V2 into the V1. The V1 caused a massive expenditure of allied resources and cost at least 200 fighter aircraft losses. Had the weapon started firing 12-7 months earlier at the middle or end of 43 it would have relieved the German homeland greatly. The V2 had enormous scope for greater speed (it reached over 500 mph by Feb 1945), range and accuracy (Ewald Sauerkirsche trilateration guidance) and range (400 miles)
5 Obviously more effective air defence weapons were required. The Germans did have a crude proximity fuse that used a type of device called a cold cathode thyratron and did fire functioning prox fuses and did have a program. Such innovation is required in fuses, SAM missiles or even simple unguided missiles with prox fuses that would not have needed the toughness to survive a gun launch.
6 Somewhat more effort in dispersing, hardening and having repair contingencies of the synthetic oil industry.
7 Push through in flight refuelling as was shown successful by trials beginning in 1940, push through a 4 engine He 177 with 4 x BMW 801 or Jumo 211J in preparation for the even more powerfull DB603 or Jumo 213.
These aircraft will provide extended maritime reconnaissance in a survivable airframe, threaten lone dispersed distant Allied targets with well-known guided weapons, attack Soviet targets beyond the Urals and courier between Germany and Japan. When the USAAF starts bombing Germany the longer ranged versions now equipped with powerful new engines to get heavy fuel loads of the ground and in conjunction with in-flight refuelling will attack US East Coast targets. Large amounts of fighters will be withdrawn to defend the US and perhaps Canadian coast. Blackouts will be the norm. Minesweeping will become necessary in the Hudson river.
8 An atomic bomb will be needed. It's clear that the someone in Germany (Diebner?) knew the critical mass required of an atomic bomb with a HWA (Heers Waffen Ampt) or Army Ordinance Office paper placing the critical mass for both Uranium and Plutonium as 10-100kg which agrees with the Maud committee estimate of 2-100kg and matches the 55kg likely used by Littleboy. A program, run by a proper leader (say a Werner von Braun) instead of pure academics would have yielded results had it been started in 1940.
A good leader will have qualities open to such 'dreaming' and will understand the limitations of academics. One need only look at Dowdings imaginings of 'death rays' that lead to British radar. Speer let Weisacker and Heisengberg of the hook to easily. One recounts Churchill note that even if there was only a 1/10 chance of an atomic bomb working it must be done.
I don't envisage nuclear war but a kind of mutually assured destruction leading to a negotiated settlement.
Your point 8 is very contentious Siegfried.
The cover of that document and date is unknown. It may post date the very report you refer to.
.
It is clear from interogations and "Epsilon" transcripts that the team working on the German atomic project (it scarcely clasifies as a serious weapons project) had absolutely no idea of the critical mass required.One of those "bugged" at Farm Hall was Kurt Diebner. They were working with figures and a theory in which Heisenberg had made some serious mistakes. The absence of the sort of wide ranging of peer review to which allied scientists would submit their work meant that his fundamental mistakes were carried over into the program.
There is some evidence of other enrichment programs,at least one SS effort, but there is no evidence that they ever built working reactors. Many German scientists,not just those rounded up by operation "Alsos" and incarcerated at Farm Hall, may have had the theoretical knowledge to do it but don't seem to have actually done it. Some of their proposed methods simply don't work others are way beyond the technology of the 1940's,some beyond 21st century technology.At least one was more Alchemical than Chemistry.
The fact that someone has patented a device,which several German scientists did,doesn't mean they had built one.
Another popular myth is of two nuclear tests (Rugen and Ohrdruf) but there is not a single shred of real scientific evidence to support this.One well known "nazi bomber" has produced a photograph of an explosion as evidence! It could be any explosion!
"Alsos",one of the first allied scientific missions into liberated Europe,found only a primitive program. No working nuclear reactor. No large quantities of separated Uranium-235. No credible bomb design.Alsos scientific director Samuel Goudsmit summed it up nicely. "Sometimes we wondered if our government had not spent more money on our intelligence mission than the Germans spent on their whole project."
A radiological device or "dirty bomb" is not a nuclear device.There is some evidence that one German program might have been attempting such a device.
We have to go on evidence not conjecture. Like most conspiracy theories the nazi bomb depends on hundreds or thousands of people on both sides of the conflict actively conniving to hide the existence of a weapon for some obscure political reasons.
It was Benjamin Franklin,a wiser man than most, who said,"three can keep a secret, if two of them are dead.
The first part of my working life was as an organic chemist,I do understand the relevant facts and figures.
Steve
The cover of that document and date is unknown. It may post date the very report you refer to.
.
It is clear from interogations and "Epsilon" transcripts that the team working on the German atomic project (it scarcely clasifies as a serious weapons project) had absolutely no idea of the critical mass required.One of those "bugged" at Farm Hall was Kurt Diebner. They were working with figures and a theory in which Heisenberg had made some serious mistakes. The absence of the sort of wide ranging of peer review to which allied scientists would submit their work meant that his fundamental mistakes were carried over into the program.
There is some evidence of other enrichment programs,at least one SS effort, but there is no evidence that they ever built working reactors. Many German scientists,not just those rounded up by operation "Alsos" and incarcerated at Farm Hall, may have had the theoretical knowledge to do it but don't seem to have actually done it. Some of their proposed methods simply don't work others are way beyond the technology of the 1940's,some beyond 21st century technology.At least one was more Alchemical than Chemistry.
The fact that someone has patented a device,which several German scientists did,doesn't mean they had built one.
Another popular myth is of two nuclear tests (Rugen and Ohrdruf) but there is not a single shred of real scientific evidence to support this.One well known "nazi bomber" has produced a photograph of an explosion as evidence! It could be any explosion!
"Alsos",one of the first allied scientific missions into liberated Europe,found only a primitive program. No working nuclear reactor. No large quantities of separated Uranium-235. No credible bomb design.Alsos scientific director Samuel Goudsmit summed it up nicely. "Sometimes we wondered if our government had not spent more money on our intelligence mission than the Germans spent on their whole project."
A radiological device or "dirty bomb" is not a nuclear device.There is some evidence that one German program might have been attempting such a device.
We have to go on evidence not conjecture. Like most conspiracy theories the nazi bomb depends on hundreds or thousands of people on both sides of the conflict actively conniving to hide the existence of a weapon for some obscure political reasons.
It was Benjamin Franklin,a wiser man than most, who said,"three can keep a secret, if two of them are dead.
The first part of my working life was as an organic chemist,I do understand the relevant facts and figures.
Steve
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Whats interesting is that philosophically Germany had no defense because Hitler didn't believe in the word.
The HWA report, which was a sort of executive summary, got the critical mass estimate right. Heisenberg specifically states at farm hall that he had "never made a critical mass calculation". He really was a quasi pacifist torn with being a loyal German and being anti-war. You only need to look at his pre war philosophical ramblings (still available on Dover books) to see that.
Diebner was a Nazi and never talked much. So were several others. Certain scientists such as Diebners boss Schumann weren't even at farm hall. Bothe wasn't there either.
Don't read anything by Rose, Bernstein, Groves or Goudsmitt without taking many grains of salt. All were to close to the action in time. Non was a professional historian. All had axes to grinde against the Germans at farm hall for various reasons, some personal.
I recommend American academic Historian Mark Walker. He is professional and not personally attached by ethniticity, politics or profession to a specific result.
It can be shown that:
1 They (or someone) got the critical mass right.
2 Contrary to Goudsmitt they knew the difference between fast and slow as well as prompt and delayed neutrons. Ample evidence of that as Mark Walker proves in several books on the subject. Even Rose concedes it. He does a good job teasing apart Why the Germans didn't really try to build a bomb. (Heisenberg points out in his defense that even the USA didn't test a bomb by Germany's collapse)
3 They knew of moderators though they bet on Heavy Water due to bad measurements on Graphite due to contamination. Two Germans Hanle and Joos explained the problem with graphite contamination though the message didn't get from the Army Program to Heisenberg. Norweigen Heavy water was 'free' as it was a byproduct of electorlysis for the purposes of making amonia via Haber Bosch.
4 The knew of cadmium control rods as early as 1939 (even a general news paper published this).
5 They knew of neutron reflectors or tempers.
6 They knew how to calculate criticality of a heavy water lattice, rod or plate reactors as well as concentric spheres (calculated by Clara Doppel in 1942)
Its hard to believe that having demonstrated the abillity to distinguish fast from slow neutrons and having developed the abillity to calculate criticality that they would fail to calculate super-criticality for a bomb.
Diebner for instance developed several ways of calculating criticality quite different and more sophisticated than Heisenberg.
Really, the only reason this is contentious is because starting with Goudsmitt (and Groves) a hatchet job was conducted. Moral attacks by scientists are often couched in terms of 'scientific credibillity' they are however far from impartial.
The so called atomic tests at Rugen likely have conventional explanations. There do however appear to be some patents by Diebner and Schumann for using shaped charges to make neutron blasts. It is possible to make neutrons by bombarding certain materials such as berylium with particles such as alpha particles from radium or electrons from a vacuum tube, electron gun or atomic accelerator. Using shaped charges to blast lithium into berylium seems to have been a way Diebner at least looked at producing a powerfull neutron blast. Ie using chemical produced plasmas instead of beams. He along with Schumann were the shaped charge experts at the HWA. Virtually at the last month before littleboy was dropped on Japan at neutron trigger/source known as an "urchin" was added to the bomb. That is as far as I'd go in speculation.
The Germans had two devices that actually produced enriched Uranium. An ultracentrifuge which produced around 0.6 grams of 6% enriched. Its prototypes were destroyed no less than 3 times by bombing before one survived long enough to test. Orders were placed on the Bamag company for several hundred in late 1944 apprently for reactor work. In theory they could produced weapons grade material by themselves without any intervening device and they were far more efficient though the hight RPM was a challenge. The other was the uranium sluice which chopped up a gaseaous stream of heated uranium and then used another blade to tip and tail off the lighter and faster moving U235. It didn't require high RPM, about 500. Again two prototypes destroyed by bombing with the final version producting about 4% enrichment. Hartek and Groth produced these. An alectronics expert who was wealthy and autonomouse enough to have his own lab, von Ardenne, looked at electromagnetic enrichments. In fact his "von Ardenne" Ion source was in fact superior to the one used in the allied caulutrons.
So there was ample people to draw upon.
Diebner was a Nazi and never talked much. So were several others. Certain scientists such as Diebners boss Schumann weren't even at farm hall. Bothe wasn't there either.
Don't read anything by Rose, Bernstein, Groves or Goudsmitt without taking many grains of salt. All were to close to the action in time. Non was a professional historian. All had axes to grinde against the Germans at farm hall for various reasons, some personal.
I recommend American academic Historian Mark Walker. He is professional and not personally attached by ethniticity, politics or profession to a specific result.
It can be shown that:
1 They (or someone) got the critical mass right.
2 Contrary to Goudsmitt they knew the difference between fast and slow as well as prompt and delayed neutrons. Ample evidence of that as Mark Walker proves in several books on the subject. Even Rose concedes it. He does a good job teasing apart Why the Germans didn't really try to build a bomb. (Heisenberg points out in his defense that even the USA didn't test a bomb by Germany's collapse)
3 They knew of moderators though they bet on Heavy Water due to bad measurements on Graphite due to contamination. Two Germans Hanle and Joos explained the problem with graphite contamination though the message didn't get from the Army Program to Heisenberg. Norweigen Heavy water was 'free' as it was a byproduct of electorlysis for the purposes of making amonia via Haber Bosch.
4 The knew of cadmium control rods as early as 1939 (even a general news paper published this).
5 They knew of neutron reflectors or tempers.
6 They knew how to calculate criticality of a heavy water lattice, rod or plate reactors as well as concentric spheres (calculated by Clara Doppel in 1942)
Its hard to believe that having demonstrated the abillity to distinguish fast from slow neutrons and having developed the abillity to calculate criticality that they would fail to calculate super-criticality for a bomb.
Diebner for instance developed several ways of calculating criticality quite different and more sophisticated than Heisenberg.
Really, the only reason this is contentious is because starting with Goudsmitt (and Groves) a hatchet job was conducted. Moral attacks by scientists are often couched in terms of 'scientific credibillity' they are however far from impartial.
The so called atomic tests at Rugen likely have conventional explanations. There do however appear to be some patents by Diebner and Schumann for using shaped charges to make neutron blasts. It is possible to make neutrons by bombarding certain materials such as berylium with particles such as alpha particles from radium or electrons from a vacuum tube, electron gun or atomic accelerator. Using shaped charges to blast lithium into berylium seems to have been a way Diebner at least looked at producing a powerfull neutron blast. Ie using chemical produced plasmas instead of beams. He along with Schumann were the shaped charge experts at the HWA. Virtually at the last month before littleboy was dropped on Japan at neutron trigger/source known as an "urchin" was added to the bomb. That is as far as I'd go in speculation.
The Germans had two devices that actually produced enriched Uranium. An ultracentrifuge which produced around 0.6 grams of 6% enriched. Its prototypes were destroyed no less than 3 times by bombing before one survived long enough to test. Orders were placed on the Bamag company for several hundred in late 1944 apprently for reactor work. In theory they could produced weapons grade material by themselves without any intervening device and they were far more efficient though the hight RPM was a challenge. The other was the uranium sluice which chopped up a gaseaous stream of heated uranium and then used another blade to tip and tail off the lighter and faster moving U235. It didn't require high RPM, about 500. Again two prototypes destroyed by bombing with the final version producting about 4% enrichment. Hartek and Groth produced these. An alectronics expert who was wealthy and autonomouse enough to have his own lab, von Ardenne, looked at electromagnetic enrichments. In fact his "von Ardenne" Ion source was in fact superior to the one used in the allied caulutrons.
So there was ample people to draw upon.
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davebender
1st Lieutenant
Almost too late to matter.
Give He-162 jet fighter and R4M FF rockets the highest priority for development and mass production. Both can be in mass production in less then one year. Both are relatively inexpensive to produce. Early versions of He-162 should be powered by Jumo 004A engine until the Jumo 004B engine is production ready.
Give He-162 jet fighter and R4M FF rockets the highest priority for development and mass production. Both can be in mass production in less then one year. Both are relatively inexpensive to produce. Early versions of He-162 should be powered by Jumo 004A engine until the Jumo 004B engine is production ready.
Kill Hitler and sue for peace. You have 110 million angry Russians on one side and England and the United States on the other in a country half the size of Texas. Unless you suddenly aquire thermonuclear weapons your going to lose. Period. Make peace and limit the casualties in your country.
Siegfried I am perfectly aware of all of this. Once again one or two of your points are scientifically contentious but this is not the forum for that.There are others which I can't comment on because whilst I understand what you are saying I have no intention of giving myself a physical chemistry refresher course. I didn't much enjoy the maths first time around and I definitely wouldn't today!
I have simple questions.
What hard evidence do you have any of the numerous German scientists involved in the German nuclear project calculated the critical mass of material for a Uranium bomb? One dated document,even a back of the envelope calculation will do.
Where is the physical evidence for a viable device? The material,a working design,even evidence of a coherent test program?
Every Chemistry graduate knows theoretically how a nuclear weapon works and even the various steps to produce the relevant materials,I know that I do.That is a long,long way from actually producing one
The program wasn't months but years away from a viable weapon. The more time passes the more often people will extrapolate poor or dubious evidence to revise the conclusions reached by the various allies in 1945.
Steve
I have simple questions.
What hard evidence do you have any of the numerous German scientists involved in the German nuclear project calculated the critical mass of material for a Uranium bomb? One dated document,even a back of the envelope calculation will do.
Where is the physical evidence for a viable device? The material,a working design,even evidence of a coherent test program?
Every Chemistry graduate knows theoretically how a nuclear weapon works and even the various steps to produce the relevant materials,I know that I do.That is a long,long way from actually producing one
The program wasn't months but years away from a viable weapon. The more time passes the more often people will extrapolate poor or dubious evidence to revise the conclusions reached by the various allies in 1945.
Steve
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Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Interesting question...I'm sure the German high command thought of everything they could... maybe even accepting the inevitable defeat?
Lost cause by 1943.
Cheers
John
The Reich was the only occupied "country" of WW2 that didn't produce any kind of meaningful resistance. If you won't accept the possibility of defeat until enemy forces are already in your capital it is difficult to plan for that eventuality.
Contrast that with the plans laid by the British in the event of an invasion. Some may seem faintly ridiculous now but at the time they were deadly serious.
Steve
I think the noose was tightening, but it was not a lost cause by 1943. Maybe late 1943 the earliest, but I think 1944 was really the point where defeat was inevitable.
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Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
We can laugh at 'Dad's Army' now. I agree it was anything but funny at the time.
Rather like 'Alo Alo'...
Still, at least we can still laugh at ourselves in these uncertain times.
Cheers
john
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Did WW2 go on till 1994 Chris? I must have missed something....
I know its just a typo mate.
I'll go with 1943. The loss of North Africa in May 1943 signalled the end.
Although I would add that this with that marvellous thing called hindsight...
World War II, 1943
Cheers
John
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Did WW2 go on till 1994 Chris? I must have missed something....
I know its just a typo mate.
I'll go with 1943. The loss of North Africa in May 1943 signalled the end.
Although I would add that this with that marvellous thing called hindsight...
World War II, 1943
Cheers
John
Ooops typo! Thanks for pointing that out. I was just picking on someone for that very same thing in the myth thread. Karma huh?
- Thread starter
- #18
That is a personal theory of mine. That is, several key people in German military and industry, realised that Germany was not going to win the war or a peace by 1944 maybe 1943. These people started to put a wrench in the works. Causing delays in development and production. Perhaps even talking with the Allies.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Casablanca Conference - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
After January 1943 it's pointless to talk of negotiating a peace treaty. Germany (and Europes) only hope is to hold out until FDR dies. Then maybe Germany can get a peace treaty which does not leave most of Europe under Soviet control.
After January 1943 it's pointless to talk of negotiating a peace treaty. Germany (and Europes) only hope is to hold out until FDR dies. Then maybe Germany can get a peace treaty which does not leave most of Europe under Soviet control.
johnbr
2nd Lieutenant
I would drop a 10k bomb in a bomber formation and step up R#D on the He-006 and kill the He011.Make the Ar-440 in to a night fighter with the DB-603n.
