Defence of the Reich

So if only 20% of production was going into Lend Lease, and less than 25% of Lend Lease was going to Russia, then that would amount to less that 5% of total production going into Lend Lease to Russia, a insignificant amount no matter what that exact kind of equipment that 5% was.

While 5374 medium tanks may seem like a lot of tanks, the USA produced over 21,000 M4/75 in 1943 alone, and 71, 000 tanks and self propelled guns during WW2, and the USSR produced 92,000 during the same period. Those are both of tanks and SP guns of 75+mm , With all that considered, 5300 medium tanks aren't significant.

The US Army and its support echelons in the form and in the strength that it was deployed historically, did not have the strength or the depth to tackle the German army, if the Germans were unfettered by their commitments in the East

According to Shelby Stanton (and I can quote him later if need be) the US Army had the capacity to provide about 20000 fillers per week (I think it was per week…I will check the time frame tonite). However, in any three month period from June 1944, the combat divisions committed to the battle suffered over 100% casualties, including non-lethal casualties over that randomly selected three month period. Roughly 50 Divisions were committed to front line operations June 1944 to May 1945 (sometimes more, sometimes less, for example by December 1944, there were 63 US divisions at the front)> With a 100% per quarter casualty rate (a not especially high rate of loss) and 50 divs assumed to be committed to the front, the Americans needed about 775000 fillers per quarter. They were receiving 240000. Some of the shortfall could be filled by wounded returns. Roughly 40% of the wounded could return within 5 months, another 30% would return to some level of service within a year. From memory Stanton assessed the average turn around time for a wounded soldier, from time of injury to return to active service, as about 7 months. At that rate, there would be a return rate of about 70000 men from the sick list each month, or 210000 per quarter. From returns from wounded plus new enlistments that complete basic, the US was receiving about 450000 men, so the net shortfall per quarter for the US Army, against a small part of the German Army, was roughly 325000 men per quarter. They filled these deficits by desperate expediants…..roughly half (from memory) of the nondivisional forces like TD units and AA formations were scrapped and the personnel press ganged into the Infantry and/or armour. About ¼ of the divisions fielded were designated (replacement Divs (not the right name, but that's what they were) and no longer capable of mobile offensive operations. Their sole role in life became defence and providing fillers for the 30 or so assault formations..

In the chaos of late 1944 and 1945, these expedients were good enough for the US Army to muddle through. The Wehrmacht was so stretched, so short of equipment and replacements itself, and so in a state of perpetual crisis, that such shortcomings that the US Army did possess were dwarfed by those being suffered by the Germans. However, in this scenario, the Germans would have none of those difficulties and moreover would have most of the logistic issues that plagued them solved. They would be present in far greater strength and in a far better sate of training. A far higher percentage of US casualties would be unrecoverable, because far more American prisoners would be taken in this hypothetical campaign.

The US Army was never short of equipment, in fact it was probably oversupplied with equipment. Equipment was never the limiting factor for the US Army, it was always the shortages of trained manpower that prevented or limited its full potential. And that was not a problem easily solved except with more time. The problems with assuming the US could afford more time have been discussed already. Some may choose to accept that, some not.

I'm still not convinced. But I'm not convinced of the opposite. You induce me think about this. I will research more, if I found anything will post here.

However, using your logic the Russians also would not won by themselfs.

Probably not. The most important item of lend lease supplied by the Americans to the Russians, was food. Without it, the Russians would not have the manpower to overwhelm the Wehrmacht....they would have been needed for domestic food production without American help.

Ok, so perhaps this indirect possibility would have allowed Germany to defeat the bombing campaign.

However, following your logic, the Allies considerated Nazi Germany to be a treat for them. If they realize that it would no be possible to set a foot in Europe, it makes to argue that at least they would try to weaken Germany by focusing in the aerial and naval war. That would free considerable resources against Germany. How do you view that Parfisal? Do you think the Allies could have let the German cities in rubble, like in 1945, before a peace deal was reached?

Yes, there would have been a return for a time to the battle in the Atlantic. And a renewed battle in the air. In the end, I think the allies would win that campaign.....if you strip all the layers away from that it gets down to a battle of resources, and as you rightly point out, the allies simply had the resources to win. But without the Soviets, both these battles take time, and at the end of that, does the western alliance have the resources to win the battler outright in every sense...ie, an unconditional surrender. I doubt it. Thats a matter of opinion, obviously.

At the end of this chasing of tails, you have to ask, and then answer this fundamental question. Were the Russians critical to achieving victory for the allies. I think they were critical Neither do i think the Russians were able to win on their own. We were both as important as each other to the victory. Now, if you can accept that, a further question more relevant to the topic needs to be asked....does the elimination of the Russian Front have any likleihood of affecting the defence of Germany....Ive taken that to mean defence in every sense, not a narrow air defence view.

parsifal said:

Now, if you can accept that, a further question more relevant to the topic needs to be asked....does the elimination of the Russian Front have any likleihood of affecting the defence of Germany....Ive taken that to mean defence in every sense, not a narrow air defence view.

Click to expand...

I will accept, but to argue with you. In general the defense of Germany is improved, not only by more men and planes, also by more workers, which improves the industrial capability. Hitler's plan was to defeat Russia and realize millions of soldiers to the industry and the navy and air force, with the hope that they would be able to counter the Anglo-American navies and planes. As I have said before, this was the reason of why the LW started to receive priority as soon as the preparations to the Barbarossa were finished, as the Germans were aware of the big gap in acft production that already existed between them and the US and Britain. In theory, it would be an even fight if we put the Soviet resources in German hands. Now, you spoke in the German technology some posts behind, and I will say that it would help them in some areas while in others perhaps not so. The V2 causes me concern when analyzing the Allied situation, but with the Allies having victory in the air war, it's launching sites could have been attacked. As the Elektroboat, it would not be operational before 1945, and I'm not able to talk about it's capabilities. What I already heard however, is that it would not be impossible to be countered by the Allies. And we also would have new Allied technologies arriving. If the Allies wanted to turn Germany in rubble, put some investment in the B-36 in order to have it operationally earlier would not be a bad idea. We also would have the P-80, the Meteor, as well as new piston fighters like the P-51H. And lastly: the atomic bomb.

What I will say Parfisal, is that the combined Allied effort made victory more certain. At least for now, this is what I think.

Imagine a reverse scenario where Britain comes to terms with Germany in 1940.
Now there is no Anglo-American alliance in Europe. Germany turns it attention,unhindered,to the ideological war it wanted to fight all along in the East.

This was all laid out by Hitler in Mein Kampf:

"Without consideration of traditions and prejudices, it [Germany] must find the courage to gather our people and their strength for an advance along the road that will lead this people from its present restricted living space to new land and soil, and hence also free it from the danger of vanishing from the earth or of serving others as a slave nation."

And for any of his readers (and that was just about every adult German) who might not understand where this "new land and soil" was to be found:

"For centuries Russia drew nourishment from this Germanic nucleus of its upper leading strata. Today it can be regarded as almost totally exterminated and extinguished. It has been replaced by the Jew. Impossible as it is for the Russian by himself to shake off the yoke of the Jew by his own resources, it is equally impossible for the Jew to maintain the mighty empire forever. He himself is no element of organization, but a ferment of decomposition. The Persian empire in the east is ripe for collapse. And the end of Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state."

I see no way that the Soviets would have received any assistance from the "West",in fact the reverse might happen. I find it at least possible that the Germans could have pulled it off. We would be living in a very different world.

Steve

I think that a defeat of the Soviet Union under that circumstance is almost inevitable. Im not trying to argue that the soviets are indispensable, whilst the allies are not. Quite the contrary. All three of the major powers that fought the germans had critical roles to play in the victory.

In fact thats the very basis of my whole argument. Take away one or more of those pillars, and you have a very problematic issue. Even though the Germans stuffed their economy (aided by the allied campaigns) Germany overall, remained a very potent adversary. I believe it took the efforts of three major nations (plus a lot of lesser ones as well) to bring this recalcitrant nation to justice. Remove one or more of those major nations and the problem becomes very difficult.

Of course things worked to prevent any of this happening, and we should not foreget that. Foremost among them was the nature of the Nazi regime. It was inherently unstable, inherently irrational. Once it had convinced itself that it must win complete victory at all costs, none of the alternatives I suggested were even remotely possible. And this just wasnt a case of blaming hitler.....the whole nation suffered from this deranged state....In the end, the germans have themselves to blame, mostly, for their defeat.

parsifal said:

I think that a defeat of the Soviet Union under that circumstance is almost inevitable. Im not trying to argue that the soviets are indispensable, whilst the allies are not. Quite the contrary. All three of the major powers that fought the germans had critical roles to play in the victory.

Click to expand...

Yes and yes

To defeat the Soviet Union was of course the original intention of nazi ideology,policy and strategy.
Britain (and her Commonwealth/Empire) put a serious stick in the spokes. It's the reason why some Germans said they lost the war at the BoB. Not literally as a result of a lost aerial campaign but as a result of the consequences of Britain staying in the war,ultimately backed up by the economic and military might of the United States. Germany had already defeated Europe's supposedly pre-eminent continental military power,force Britain to terms and it really would have cleared the way for its domination of continental Europe.

Cheers

Steve

Today, many historians say that the war was "won and lost in the East". By saying that they want to mean the Allies would have been defeated if the Soviets were defeated. If the war had went like the Nazis planned, the situation for the Allies would be really complicated, but in my view it would not result in the Nazis in London and much less in Washington (the latter pure fantasy). In this scenario, I don't think the Allies won have won however. A stalamate would be the likely result.

I think Stona's view of Britain's role in the war is valid. The participation of Britain is overestimated. If not for Britain, it would be impossible for the US to participate in the war against Germany, and the Nazis also would be free to attack the Soviet Union.

For about a decade after the war it was said that Hitler's invasion was welcomed in much of the Soviet Union, particularly in the Ukraine. However, atrocities and death squads promptly turned hope into determined resistance. Even the occupied areas mounted resistance that seriously undercut any material advantage of the occupation –this being a burden additive to the scorched earth policy.

It's an interesting thought as to whether a threshold hearts and minds program would have gained support in the east rather than resistance. This, and leaving Mussolini to deal with his fiascos, might have presented serious resource concerns for the allies.

Balljoint said:

For about a decade after the war it was said that Hitler's invasion was welcomed in much of the Soviet Union, particularly in the Ukraine.

Click to expand...

Yes,and not just the Ukraine. Other areas of the Soviet Union too. The Baltic states were also keen collaboraters. Anti semetism was not and never has been confined to Germany.

It's an opportunity that nazi Germany was inevitably going to miss. Hitler never could figure out how the British controlled India,explaining it in the idiotic racial terms used by the nazis. The Indians,as described by Alfred Rosenberg,were racially unconcious "poor bastards" and that's why they could be kept under the British yoke. With that kind of racist ideology there's not much chance of allowing your Slavic "unter menschen" to run your occupied territories for your benefit.

Steve

It occurs to me that I should say who Rosenberg was. Without a full bio here's an extract from "Das Deutsch Fuehrer Lexikon" 1934/35 which gives an idea of his influence on nazi thinking.
"From 1921 until the present, editor of the Voelkische Beobachter; editor of the 'N.S. Monatshefte'; 1930, Reichstag deputy and representative of the foreign policy of the movement; since April 1933, leader of the foreign political office of the NSDAP; then designated as Reichsleiter; January 1934, deputized by the Fuehrer for the spiritual and philosophical education of the NSDAP, the German labor front -and all related organizations"