Defiants and Battles deployed overseas, any merit in that?

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I doubt they were new airframes. another way of looking at this issue, is to look at the numbers of aircraft in other TOs. How many Fs were produced from start of production to the end of June 1941? The entire production for Me 109s in the whole of 1941 was 2600, including prototypes and possibly a few Emils. If we assume a uniform production rate (a false premise, as production of the F ramped up as the year progressed), we arrive at about 2500 copies produced, give or take. There were no Fs suitable for issue produced in 1940. There were a few f-0s and F-1s, but none of these were used operationally, or at least not for some months. To June 1941 that means the Germans received about 1200 Me 109Fs.

For Barbarossa there were about 550 Fs committed. There were about 180 on strength in France, and a further 120 over Germany in Reich defences. I estimate about 120 had been lost over france Jan-June 1940 in combat (will check when I can) , and there were a number of training formations that were using the type. Average standard wastage for the Luftwaffe excluding combat losses was aboiut 7% per month....if assume a median number of 500 machines in that 6 month period the Luftwaffe would have lost or written off about 180-200 machines to non-combat related causes. I have not included any deployments to the MTO in that rough estimation. But we come to a figure of 1150 machines needed to account for Me 109F usage in other TOs, leaving about 50 or so that could have been deployed to the MTO between Jan-June. Given that roughly 450 fighters were deployed into the MTO (excluding the Marita/Merkur unit deployments) we can say that 50 out of 450 were Me 109Fs.

When I get access to my source material i will be a lot more accurate than this, but it should be obvious just from the above, that it is physically impossible for the major type deployed into the MTO Jan-June was the F. What the Germans were doing was the same as the RAF was doing...sending older airframes approaching obsolescence to a secondary front. Thats why they were sending Emils and not fredericks.
 
A problem with simultaneous release is that either all bombs hit or all bombs miss. With sequential release the bombs can be spread out in a line, say 100ft apart. If, as Buffnut has said, the drop is just a bit early or late the odds are that the end bomb of the string may hit.

While Hudsons may have carried less of bombload at times than a Battle that is really picking your circumstances. Max bomb load for a Hudson went between 1400 and 1600lbs and four 250lbs bombs could be carried easily. Hudson had about 50% more range than Battle if not more while carrying a full bomb load. Hudsons could have four to six (seven?) .303 MGs, some planes being fitted with a ventral gun and one or two waist guns.

For a bit of history on the Australian Hudsons see: Hudson in Service with Royal Australian Air Force

As I said before, the problem is in getting skilled crews, both air crew and ground crew. Unskilled crews with obsolete aircraft ( and the Battle was considered obsolete in 1939, there just wasn't much to replace it in early 1940) aren't going to accomplish much no matter how heroically they die.

An additional 100 ( 8 or more squadrons) of any bomber would have made a difference in Malaya but that not only calls for aircrew but well over 1000 ground crew if not closer to 2000. Skilled ground crew.
 
The Battle could carry two 500lb bombs on external racks and had a maximum 1500lb bomb load in an overload condition, including up to 6 x 250lb bombs. The fact is that having a bomb bay makes dive bombing problematic and limits the dive attitude. The Battle could release it's bombs while dive bombing at any angle, and the aircraft was stressed for dive bombing, even though it had no dive brakes.

One hundred SE Battles would probably require less air and ground crew than 100 TE bombers of any type.
 
I think that's what's called a bait and switch. Firstly, no mention was made of dive bombing as a necessary role and secondly what was the range of a Battle in overload condition?

As for the point about fewer air and groundcrew, well the Battle had exactly the same aircrew complement as the Blenheim and the groundcrew number depends on what you measure. For example, in Singapore you may have required fewer groundcrew per squadron for Battles compared to Blenheims (although even that's arguable). One thing is certain in the Far East, that inclusion of the Battle in the AOB would have created significant additional logistics issues by introducing an engine that was not used on any other aircraft in the theatre - think overhaul crews at the MU, supplies at forward airfields, coolant (there were no liquid-cooled aircraft prior to the arrival of Hurricanes in Jan 42) etc.
 
To hit much of anything dive bombing the pilot needs to have trained in dive bombing, it also helps to have something more than a few grease pencil marks on the windscreen or side windows for aiming purposes.

What is the Range of a Battle in "overload" condition or with two 500lb bombs under the wing?

Hudsons were supposed to do 1500 miles with 1400lbs of bombs but certain models could trade bomb load for even more range. The big egg turret cost performance but offers better defense than a free swinging machine gun.

According to the figures the Hudson might be able to out climb the Battle by a fair margin down low. This might be changed by the use of a "super" Battle with a more powerful Merlin but adding 1000lb or more to teh weight of the "super" Battle may put you almost to the start point.

If you have 100 well trained pilots and crew, both air and ground, to send to Singapore in the fall of 1941, give them something better than the Battle.

You want "what ifs" how about 4 squadrons of Hampdens at Singapore? 4 times the bombload per plane, the ability to carry a 2000lb bomb or torpedo or mines making it rather more dangerous against ships.

The Battle in late 1941 is just too little return for the amount invested in aircrew, ground crew, and supply.
 

We were discussing accuracy of bombing, and I'm pretty sure that dive bombing tends to be more accurate than level bombing, although the Battle could do both.

The Battle's single engine suggests to me, that it would require less maintenance and therefore a smaller ground crew. The Battle was used as training aircraft even prior to the BofB and almost all Commonwealth air and ground crew were familiar with it.
 
I think the idea of sending Battles to the Far East is built on a false premise.
After the experiences of the RAF with the type on 1940 it wasn't going to commit its highly trained and valuable aircrew to combat in the type under any circumstances. The Battle was obsolete in 1940,the RAF just didn't know it. In 1941 it did and quite rightly had withdrawn what it now regarded as a death trap from front line service.
Cheers
Steve
 

The range with 4 x 250lb bombs was 1000 miles at 200 mph @ 15000ft. I would guess that overloads would reduce this somewhat, but it would still have been sufficient to strike most targets in Malaya, for example. The other thing is that the Battle was, in fact, available while large numbers of alternate aircraft such as the Hudson were not, as they were still considered frontline aircraft in Europe. The Battle actually suffered quite small losses in combat (~200) compared to total production (~2400) so the remainder were eventally all used for training, although dedicated training Battles were under production prior to the BofB.

As for the "super" Battle it already existed as a simple mod from Feb 1940 allowed the Merlin III to use 100 octane fuel and generate 30% more power under 10,000ft. With 6.25lb boost, the Battle was good for 210mph at SL, and probably 230-240 mph with 12lb boost (5min rating) with a 1000lb bo,b load.

IMHO, the Battle has suffered a smear job, to cover up the RAF's poor tactical employment of the type.
 
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I'm sorry, but that's just not true. The Battle was no more obsolete than the Stuka; it was just not being tasked properly. It should have been employed where the RAF enjoyed air superiority and/or where the fighter opposition consisted of aircraft such as the Cr-42 or A5M, which had a much smaller margin of speed over the Battle than the 109/110. Additionally in secondary theatres, the enemy tended not to have dense concentrations of FLAK. The Battle would have been a game changer in the Med or Malaya.
 

I thought we were discussing the applicability of the Battle to overseas theatres.

The Battle was not a true dive bomber. Yes, it could undertake dive attacks but at far shallower angles than a true dive bomber, indeed I doubt its accuracy was much better than that of the Blenheim (which could also employ dive attacks, as can any small/medium bomber).

As for the maintenance question, you're focussing on the squadron level where the number of maintenance crew is a function of sortie rate. If you don't want rapid sortie rates, then you only need one engine fitter crew per airframe which is no different from a single engined aircraft (although I agree this was unlikely you're still probably not looking at double the number of engine fitters for a twin-engined aircraft).

That said, you've ignored my point about the greater logistics train required to support Battles in Malaya. In 1941, the operational engines in use in northern Malaya comprised Wright Cyclones (Buffalos and Hudsons) and Bristol Mercurys. Adding Merlin-powered Battles means keeping those front-line squadrons supplied - that's a 30% increase in your logistics chain.
 

Someone else has already pointed out that all aircraft are vulnerable when incorrectly employed.

You now run into well established doctrinal problems. These take literally years to resolve.

The Luftwaffe used the Ju 87 successfully as long range artillery and within an umbrella of at least locally established air superiority. When it strayed from this method the results for the Ju 87 were disastrous.

This was a completely alien idea to the RAF in the first years of the war.

The RAF was bitterly opposed to being forced into a role supporting the army. This has its roots in inter service rivalries which do not disappear just because there was a war on. The RAF was a recent and very much junior service and was desperate to reinforce its independence. Chester Wilmot in "The Struggle for Europe" describes the RAF perceptively as labouring under "a junior service complex."

Air Vice Marshall Slessor in a memorandum of May 1941 (AIR 20/2970) condemned what he saw as the tendency of the Army to ask the RAF to do what he thought it should be doing with its own guns. He and most senior RAF officers believed that the RAF's role was not on the battlefield at all but rather to prevent the enemy's forces from operating by denying them fuel,food and ammunition. This is a strategic not tactical role and this is what RAF bombers were intended for.

In the same file is another message dated a few days later, to the Air Ministry from a Group Captain Embry. This is presumably written with hindsight following the disastrous casualties amongst aircraft attempting to support the Army the previous year since Embry had led some of those missions. He argues that "the scale and intensity of German anti aircraft fire is such as to make close support prohibitive,with a potential casualty rate amongst aircraft out of all proportion to any result achieved".

Air Marshall Broadhurst,then commanding Desert Air Force was actually censured by Tedder for the air support provided to the Eighth Army at El Hamma in Tunisia during March 1943 nearly two years later!

These men and their senior colleagues would never be convinced to send the Battle to the Far East or Mediterranean,even on the promise of lesser ground defences and/or fighter opposition. They had already decided that they were not suitable for that role and withdrawn them from front line service.

Cheers

Steve
 
RCAFson said:
I'm sorry, but that's just not true. The Battle was no more obsolete than the Stuka; it was just not being tasked properly.
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Well, tasking a strategic bomber with tactical duties is going to lead to some not so desirable results.

Compared to the Stuka the Battle was a bigger airplane. About 6 ft longer and 6 feet more wingspan and about 22% more wing area. Yet the Battle has a lower empty weight?
Is that a partial reflection of the lack of armor and self sealing tanks?
The Battle has a higher normal loaded weight, of course it carries and extra crewman and about double the fuel of a JU-87B.
Most Battles were built with two position props, of course they could be refitted with constant speed.
Using 12lbs boost in a Merlin III called for notes in the aircraft log book, extra maintenance checks and shorter overhaul times. later Merlins could operate at higher pressures without these restrictions, or more accurately the level of "normal" boost went up as did the level of boost that required these extra measures.

Without armor and self sealing tanks the Battle would not have been much of a game changer. It is only a game changer because you are using it as an ADDITION (and in large numbers) to the existing forces. If used instead of an existing type it wouldn't have changed much.
There were only 76 Brewster Buffaloes in Malaysia, would another 100 have seen the Brewster as a game changer and changed it's reputation?
 
I think it's a stretch to say the Battle was a strategic bomber. Had the treaties on heavy bombers been enacted then, yes, it probably would have been considered "strategic" but in reality it was a replacement for the Hawker Hind (and its family) and so really was a light bomber (gusting to medium depending on your definition).

I agree, though, that more forces were needed in Malaya but I remain unconvinced that the Battle offered significant advantages over the Blenheim - adding a hundred of either might have helped in the first attacks against Japanese shipping but without additional fighters, a functional early warning system and the will to take the fight to the enemy I suspect the end result would have been the same...just longer and with more losses on the Allied side.
 
I don't think the Battle was much of a strategic bomber either but RAF doctrine at the time,and considerably later,was to employ bombers in a broadly strategic role.

Close air support was not considered a role at all and the means to apply it didn't exist in 1940 anyway.An Army officer requesting air support during the BoF would typically request it via a telephone call to London. He would be lucky to see any aircraft in less than three hours.

Even what we would now call the interdiction missions of 1940 were deeply resented and considered entirely inappropriate use of air power by the RAF's senior officers.

Cheers

Steve
 
Well the Battle had that 1000 mile range compared to the Hinds 430 mile range. If the fuel load had been cut in half the plane might have carried 1500lbs over 500 miles.

The Battle wasn't really much of a Strategic bomber as it turned out but then a lot of other peoples early single and twin engine bombers didn't turn out to be very good strategic bombers either.
 
Shortround6 said:
Well the Battle had that 1000 mile range compared to the Hinds 430 mile range.
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Yes,and in the 1930s noone in the RAF was envisaging the sort of massive area bombing raids of the 1940s. Why would a bomber need a 10,000 lb load? They honestly imagined that their bomber force would be a precision instument,destroying the enemy's "means of production" and preventing him sustaining his armies in the field.

There was plenty of talk of terror bombing,the destruction of cities and massive civilian casualties but this is not what the RAF nor,to be fair,the Luftwaffe initially intended to do.

Everyone in the UK was required to carry a gas mask. 38,000,000 were issued along with pamphlets and public information films,all at considerable expense. This too was eventually proven to be completely pointless!

It was pie in the sky stuff but then we have the benefit of hindsight.

Cheers

Steve
 

i think the production until june '41 was around (a large around) 1500 Friederichs. the 28 june '41 LW had 1213 109s in SE fighter unit (include replacement unit) of this 704 were Friederichs. the early Friederichs go in combat in october '40. The production of F-1 started in august '40 (F-2 in november '40), and is true that some Emils were built in early '41( Emils production in '41, all with DB 601N january: 33, february: 28, march: 54, april: 20, may: 0, june: 6) but also some Friederichs in '40. The F-4 go in production in may '41 and ended in in may '42. In June '41 the 109 unit in MTO were 7/26 and I/27 both with Emils (the first is a staffel and the 2nd is a gruppe). The alone unit with Emils sent in MTO (with exclusion of Balkans campaign) were the 7/26 that stay with Emil until the withdrawn in september '41 and the I/27 until the reequip with Friederichs in september '41 (the Jabo units were build up in Africa this staffeln officially born in 42 with Friederichs but were informally in use in late '41 probably almost 10/27 with Emils).
 
the 28 june '41 LW had 1213 109s in SE fighter unit (include replacement unit) of this 704 were Friederichs.
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Which confirms that only a fraction of the fighter units in the med were equipped with F subtypes. Think about it. over 550 of that 704 were deployed to the Eastern Front. (There were just under 300 Es allocated to the East Front incidentally, one source mentions 245). There were over 100 Fs allocated to the west, and then we have wastage and losses to account for. Whichever way you cut the allocation of resources there are less than 70 friedrichs on the Southern Frint in June and far more likley about 40-50. I know that over 50% of LW forces by June on the southern Front were fighters, some of which will be Me 110s but the lions share just has to be E subtypes. your unit based information sources may be saying that they were Fs, but in june this is simply a physical impossibility. They may be authorised to use Fs, but not yet received that equipme nt...a common failing for axis records. Try that excercise on some RA units, you will find the same problem
 
As has been noted the RAF did not like the idea of supporting the army directly, even though they claimed they could do it in order to get a larger share of the budget sometimes.
The Army found itself in France with niether proper air support OR modern heavy artillery ( why spend money on heavy artillery when you have bombers?) .

When looking at the Battle a lot of little things begin to add up, perhaps they are all circumstantial, but judge for yourselves.

1. I keep harping about the 1000 mile range. In 1934-37 why else would a plane have a 1000 mile range unless for strategic use?
A. The Boulton Paul's Sidestrand ( a re-engined modified Sidestrand) only went into squadron service in 1936, this bi-plane could carry 1500lbs of bombs and had a range of 545 miles (Wiki).
B. The Avro Anson went into service in 1936, 360lb bomb load and a range of 790 miles, Sept 1939 saw 10 Coastal Command and 16 Bomber Command squadrons flying Ansons.
C. At the end of 1936 the British had 9 squadrons of Handley Page Heyford night bomber biplanes. 3500lb max bomb load, 920 mile range, there are others.
D. as to the Battle, a range of 500 miles could be achieved on roughly 1/2 the fuel. The Battle carried just over 200 imp gallons. Taking out even 67 gallons let alone 100 could have increase the bomb load to 1500lbs over 500 miles (or more) .
E. OR Cut fuel tankage by 100 imp gallons, fuel alone (without tanks) is 750lbs. at a wing loading of 25.6lbs per square foot the Battle is using just under 30 sq/ft of wing for this fuel. As a very rough guess wing weight might be 3lbs a square foot so the wing could be made another 3 sq ft smaller. The Battle was paying a penealty for it's long range if it was intended to use it as a tactical or even interdiction bomber.
F. Why the bomb aimer? with the Mk. VII Course Setting Bomb Sight? Unless bombing was to be done from medium to high (for the time) altitude. The RAF had been bombing troops/trenches in WW I and in the middle east for years without such a bomb sight.
G. Why use a Merlin III engine? RR had built Kestrels without superchargers and with moderate and full supercharging. The Merlin X with two speed supercharger was shown at the Paris airshow in 1938 and the first production engine built in DEC 1938, if a low altitude bomber is what was wanted a Merlin with a lower supercharger ratio (even if not two speed) giving over 1100hp at 5,000ft on 87 octane fuel could have been had fairly early in the production run. Instead they kept the Merlin III with it's 16,500ft critical altitude. Cruising at 15,000ft will give longer range than cruising at 5-8,000ft.

The Battle has too many things pointing to it being optimized for a long range role for me to believe it was ever intended for a non-strategic role as understood in the early/mid 1930s.
 
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