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The question is Was the 5in DP gun better for AA defence compared to the twin 4.7in RN destroyers gun. There is no doubt that all the RN officers who observed both in action believe that the result is yes, the 5in was a much better weapon. No one has even tried to quote an RN officer who believed that the twin 4.7 was even close to being as good as the 5in. We have opinions, theories but no quote from anyone at the time.
To base the defence against this on observations that the USN believed that the 5in wasn't as good as they liked is a different answer to a different question. I am very confident that the RN would have been absolutely delighted if their Heavy AA guns had shot down 18 percent of the suicide aircraft. To claim 39% of all kills in the period Jan - July is a remarkable achievement.
I don't disagree that there is a huge difference between claims and kills a difference that applies to all the armed forces of all the nations in the conflict.There's a huge difference between claims and actual kills. My look at USN AA kills as stated by Lundstrom leads me to believe that the actual 5in kill rate during 1942 was around 5 to 10%, at most, of total AA kills. After 1943 the USN began using VT ammo in large quantities, so one would expect an increase in 5in AA efficiency, but it seems to me that the decline from 1944 to 1945 was mainly due to increased accuracy of reporting and that the 39% claim for 1944 was greatly overstated.
However, if 5in AA was ineffective (and it was) in 1942 and if RN 4.7in AA was similary ineffective, then there would be a greater reliance on the CIWS, and thus the RN policy of of saving weight via lower elevation main armament but ensuring a heavy CIWS was justified, and that total RN AA efficiency and kill rates would actually decline if RN destroyers were equipped with MK37+5in/38 at the expense of their CIWS. This trade off is not something that anyone in the RN could have known, given how greatly inflated and misleading USN AA stats were during WW2 - especially given that RN AA kills seems to have been much more conservatively stated.
What we do have is a lot of reports from RN officers saying that they wanted the 5in as its a lot better than what they had.
And some of those officers said that after first hand observation of the 5/38 as opposed to their own 4.7s.
Ive seen some officers sing the praises of the 4.5, Ive seen some more or less say the 4in was good enough. Some officers are supportive of the 2 pounder, though less so than the 4.5. Ive never seen any officer say the 4.7 was okay. even Vians report on operations in Norway isnt glowing about the weapon.
And there are quite a few comments from RN officers that suggest they really liked the 5/38. Are all these officers wrong or idiots. It just beggars belief.
I think we need unequivocal evidence that officers though the British AA suites as superior to anything around. I would accept that there is evidence that the Brits had a workable system, but I simply dont think many people saw it as a great system, or that the US system operationally was a dud. Its true I think that there were teething problems, but that is a long way from proving or showing the system was a failure....
I can see where you are coming from re the 1942/43 time period but you still have no quote from anyone to support you. You have your theory but nothing more. Few would deny that 4-6 20mm and a quad 2pd is better than 4-6 20mm normally carried by the USN by late 42.
Even in your papers when describing the air battles in 1942 there were a number of examples of the attacking aircraft turning away in the face of 5in fire. There were examples where the reccomendation was that the 5in should be retained for putting barrage fire up over the carriers. However I can find no examples of any RN report saying that the 4.7in helped in turning away Japanese air attacks (I do know of one where his happened using the 5.25). I find no examples of reports saying that the 4.7in actually helped when firing barrage fire over the carriers. Plenty saying that it should be able to, but none saying that it did.
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There are numerous examples here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38377.pdf
of Luftwaffe and IAF aircraft refusing to come through the gunfire put up by the destroyer screens.
RN contact with the 5in/38 was very limited.
I don't really care what officers thought - it is the results that they obtained that matters.
One of the huge problems is that the USN was reporting great things about the 5in/38 that simply weren't true and this must have swayed opinion in both navies; something along the lines of: "...Gee we got hammered in Norway and Crete yet the USN appears to be shooting the Japanese out of the Pacific skies...their system must be better..."
The other problem is that if a staff study states that a 40deg gun and a heavy CIWS is better than a 80deg gun and a light CIWS, it doesn't mean that line officers will agree, even if the study is correct.
.The average RN destroyer officer probably thought his weaponry was inadequate to the task, and he was right, but that doesn't mean that an alternate FC system and a reliance on a HA 5in gun as in MK33 or Mk 37 USN destroyers would have produced better results - and there is no evidence that USN destroyers were doing better than RN destroyers in 1942
There are numerous examples here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38377.pdf
of Luftwaffe and IAF aircraft refusing to come through the gunfire put up by the destroyer screens.
First of all do you seriously expect the Gazette to say our AA guns were not up to the job. Secondly can you tell me where there is an example of the attacking aircraft turning away. I have seen a number of comments such as theenemy pressed home their attack, one where the Beaufighters withdrew but the enemy bombers dropped their bombs, but so far none that have turned away.
8. The remarks of the Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. JAGUAR are of considerable interest,
in particular his practice of firing 4.7-mch barrage
over the stern of a ship attacked by
dive bombers. The idea is now under development
in the Mediterranean Fleet with a view
to the destroyer screen putting an " umbrella
barrage " over the fleet.
31. The torpedo bombers approaching low
down from ahead were engaged with barrage
fire by the destroyer screen. This fire appeared
effective and on coming within range the enemy
split into two groups of three, one group altering
course to port, the other to starboard. One
of the starboard group followed by one of the
port group attacked FEARLESS who was
stationed in the starboard bow position on the
screen. The remaining two aircraft,of the port
group pressed home their attack on the port
bow of the convoy which took avoiding action.
There is no clear record of any torpedoes havmg
been dropped by the remaining two aircraft of
the starboard group, but MANCHESTER
observed two tracks from port and one from
starboard before a final torpedo approaching
from port hit her.
71. At 0615 two T/B aircraft were sighted
by NESTOR on the port quarter. Barrage
fire was opened and the aircraft crossed astern
making off in the general direction of the
-convoy. At 0650 two more T/Bs were sighted,
this time on the port bow. Barrage fire was
again opened and the aircraft crossed' ahead
and made off towards the convoy. Thinking
that SYDNEY STAR was about to fee attacked,
NESTOR made a '' (Help '' signal, in consequence
of which 'HERMIONE was detached
Tty Rear-Admiral Commanding, i8th Cruiser
Squadron at 0700 to join NESTOR and SYDNEY
STAR.
Approach to, and Arrival 'at Malta, z^th July
(D.4).
- 72. At 0705 when some 60 miles west of
Gozo, a half-hearted attack was carried out
l>y 3 T/B aircraftx on the main convoy and
~ escort. Torpedoes were released at long range
when the destroyer screen opened fire. Ships
took avoiding action, but no tracks were seen.
41. An unknown number of torpedoes was
dropped about 5,000 yards on the port beam
of the.convoy, which altered course -to 040°
at 1304, turning to 075° three minutes later.
Three of the six attackers tried to approach
over the port wing of the screen, ibut unable
to face the barrage put up by the destroyers
they dropped their torpedoes at the port wing
s'hip, LANCE, who had considerable difficulty
in avoiding them, two torpedoes passing very
close.
47. A group of aircraft splitting into two
formations was reported by R.D.F. closing
from the eastward at 1327. Destroyers on the
starboard wing of the screen opened fire at
1329, when 6 or 7 T/Bs (B.R.20) were seen
approaching very low from the starboard bowand,
beam.
48. Three of the aircraft pressed on through
the barrage of the starboard wing destroyers,
and carried out a most determined attack on
NELSON, who was swinging to starboard to
comb the tracks. One aircraft dropped its
torpedo about 450 yards 20° on NELSON'S
starboard bow, passing over the ship at about
200 feet height. This aircraft was almost certainly
shot down astern of NELSON by
SHEFFIELD and PRINCE OF WALES.
54. Six minutes after the end of the second
attack, R.D.F. reported a group closing from
the S.E. and diving. At 1345 a formation of
10 or ii S.79S were sighted yery low about
10 miles to the southward. These split up
into two groups when they came under fire from
the escorting ships on £he starboard side of
the convoy, and 7 or 8 retired to the southwest
and disappeared.
Three others tried to work round the starboard
bow, and the convoy was turned away
60° to port. These aircraft were turned away
by the gunfire of the screening destroyers,
having dropped their torpedoes well outside the
screen. One torpedo narrowly missed
LIGHTNING, but they dropped at too great
a range to be a danger to the convoy. One
of these aircraft was shot down by fighters
as it retired.
•*•-
55. Of the 7 or 8 aircraft who turned away
when first fired at, 3 returned from astern
of the convoy at 1354, two of which retired
again on being fired at. The third pressed
on to attack ARK ROYAL, but was shot down
by the combined fire of that ship and
NELSON, while still 1,000 yards from ARK
ROYAL and before he had dropped a torpedo.
56. At 1358 one' aircraft, seen right ahead
of NELSON, dropped a torpedo outside the
screen. COSSACK was able to avoid this
torpedo by the warning given by hydrophone
effect on her A/S set.
57. At this time (1359) one C.R-42 was seen
to be diving on the starboard wing destroyers,
and performing aerobatics over them, evidently
to make a diversion for the T/Bs. In so far
as the destroyers expended a large amount of
ammunition he succeeded, but after six minutes
was either shot down or failed to pull out from
a dive. None of the destroyers reported being
machine-gunned.
58. Result of Third Attack.,—Two more
enemy T/Bs and one C.R-42 fighter were shot
down, and no further damage inflicted on H.M.
Ships or convoy.
It was most noticeable that this attack was
hot pressed home with the same 'determination
as the first two attacks. Of the 10 or so
S.79s which originally approached, only four
fired torpedoes, and these were dropped at too
great a distance to endanger the convoy. The
only aircraft of this group to close within effective
range was destroyed before its torpedo was
dropped.
34. This attack was followed by a large
number of torpedo bombers which came in in
formation of 5 or 6 on the port bow, port\
beam and finally on the starboard .(quarter.y
None of these attacks were pressed home and
no aircraft penetrated the destroyer screen.
35. All dropped their torpedoes well outside
the screen and outside range of the convoy.
Several destroyers on the port side were near
missed by torpedoes. One tocpedo bomber was
probably shot down by ships' gunfire.
Not in the Pacific, where it was observed first hamd over a very long period of time. Im not in a position to say too much about Europe, but would be surprised if it was true there either
Really. Apart from demonstrating incredible disrespect and breathtaking arrogance, I would simply suggest that these men were in a better position to observe what was happening than you are. Or me for that matter.
USN misreporting was no worse or better than the RN. Both made errors in overclaiming. However even allowing for that, the USN was shooting down many times the number of aircraft than the RN ever even claimed.....In 1945 they shot down at least 900 enemy aircraft which is about 3 times the entire wartime tally for the RN. They suffered losses in Destroyers about half that suffered by the RN, despite being subjected to what I thin is obviously a much higher number of enemy sorties. I dont think the men making these observations were swayed by what they read so much as what they saw. And in that regard they have an immeasurably better understanding of the real situation than you or i can ever hope to achieve.
IMHO they observed the number of AA kill claims made by the USN, and then they drew the wrong conclusions:But those same line officers observed the relative success of the USN, the relative lack of success of their own AA, and realized the truth. Then they wrote it down, and told their bosses. their bosses believed them and started to make changes as the line officers had recommended. that isnt the disgruntled rumblings of a couple of junior officers or chairbound admirals who dont know what they are talking about. Its the mark of a couple of highly respected commanders, who observed what was happening and passed that information up the chain as they should. the command structure responded to their advice and began to make changes....being to adopt US methodss and techs. Thats not anything like what you are now trying to argue. thats a command system working as it should......the support commands listening to what the frontline is sayin and passing experience gained to the planners for appropriate action. in this case steps were being made to respond and rectify the obvious waknesses in the British defences.
I just cannot fathom why you are seriously attempting to argue along these lines. its a nonsense, and deep down I think you know it....
These were not a couple of disgruntled 2 ringers , they were flag officers observing for themselves the far more efficient US systems at work for themselves. They couldnt comment on the 1942 situation, but they could see for themselves what the results were in 1945. It wasnt a case of being disgruntled. Rawlings and frasers reports heaped great praise on certain weapons and told it like it was for others. They highlighted the great success of the airborne deterrent, they mentioned the ability of the 4.5s to engage (whilst the 4.7s remained silent, or had no effect) , they knew they needed the Bofors because of what they had seen in TF58. Package this how you like, the facts are the people in a position to know do not support your rather extreme views on this subject.
Good find. I note that the Aruntas report says she fired 60 rounds of 4.7 from 1641 to 1642. i wouldnt read too much into the times....having filled out these very after action reports myself, you tend to just put any duration that kind of fits. She might have been firing for 3 minutes, or 2 minutes, or 1 minute. Its usually a guesstimate that number. The number of rounds is more accurate, and i note that the two 4in HA threw out as much lead as the 4 x 4.7s, in the same time.
According to this report, the Arunta by this time (January 1945) had 6 x 40mm guns. Thats what i understoodas as well (which makes wiki wrong....it says they were not fitted until September 1945). It also says this intruder was brought down by the combined fire of the entire TG. Acoupe of things to note here. Arunta had been working with the Americans since 1942, and had by January 1945, been fully converted to their methods. They had partially re-equipped with US equipment (the Bofors) and did not claim this shoot down as entirely theiur own. It was brought down by the combined fire of the entire TG. Thats an American TG incidentally.
These were exactly the recommendations that had been made by Rawlings and Fraser, incidentally....people whom you think dont know what they are doing.
As for "by and large the RN and USN worked independantly". Are you serious? Operations by cruisers Australia, Canberra, hobart, Perth, Shropshire, Leandertroopships Kanimbla, Manoora, the operations off palembandg and Sumatra. Look at the strikes into Java, the battles of Coral Sea, Overlord, Husky gosh the list goes on and on. this statement is so staggeringly incorrect I am genuinely shocked
A total of 362 rounds were fired, 74 at the shore battery, 20 in the first engagement, and 268 in the second destroyer engagement, of which it is estimated that 200 rounds were fired at the first destroyer and 68 at the second. All firing was director-controlled, rapid, continuous fire. The average gun range for the first firing was 9,500 yards, for the second 14,000 yards, and for the third 12,500 yards... ...It is particulary pleasing that the guns maintained a sustained rapid fire of 268 rounds (average 68 rounds per gun) at an estimated rate of at least 12 shots per gun per minute without casualty.[1]
[1]United States Navy, AntiAircraft Action Summary, July 1942 to Dec 1942 (Information Bulletin No. 22), p.161-163
USS Edison (DD-439) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Yes, I absolutely expect Admirals, such as Cunningham and Somerville to speak their mind.
Anytime a TB attacked a destroyer it was a success for the destroyer screen since it had less chance of hitting a destroyer than a merchant ship, and indicated that the fire from the destroyers deterred the attackers from pressing through.
The key here are twofold. Edisons report says "at least" which means they never went lower than. it does not mean that the average sustained raof was 12 rpm. By definition, because it never dropped beloiw 12rpm, will be higher, over a sustained period. Fedhala incidentally was open water, and the conditions were rough. from memory also the types of targets at the beachead kep changing....were there not surface targets, land targets and airborne targets all present. if so, it may well be that Edison was changing from AA to HE to SAP at various intervals, and this may well have affected the rof. maybe not....would have to look more closely
Before I make any comment about Kimberley, would need to see the Action Report. And once again, entirely irrelevant, because it is an engagement in the hoirizontal plane....low angle gunfire against a surface target. No argument about sustained rof against surface target and could use contact fusing. In the vertical, its an entirely different matter, wher there were problems with the rammers above 30 degrees and fusing still had to be by hand fusing, because of the timers to be set. Also problems of slow turret traverse and elevation not a factor in a statis shoot, or against a relatively static surface target. The snippet you did provide, suggest s a certain relief that there werent any stoppages, which in fact suggest that they expected stoppages but they didnt happen.
We all indicated that the RN DD would be of some use against torpedo bombers, I couldn't find any high level, medium level or Dive bomber attack that was turned back by the fire of the destroyers. All the examples you gave were torpedo bombers. As I said I am aware of one report when the 5.25 guns forced high level bombers to turn away but that is an exception.
It is of course against these targets that the HA gun is of assistance